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— !"dv_matra$ ($%dv_matra'dv_matra 32)
A learned scholar with worldly fame,
understands nothing, like a donkey laden with sandalwood.
— Kabir (Ramainī 32)
The day is short, the labour vast, the toilers sluggish, 
the reward great, and the Master of the house is pressing.
— Rabbi Tarfor (Pirke Avot 2:20)
i
The era of the ethnically homogeneous nation is over (Liu et al. 2005:11).
The last two decades of immigration have transformed our country and such 
diversity raises new questions at every level (Morris 2005:246). 
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Abstract:
Using the Indian diaspora in New Zealand as a case study, this thesis 
examines how state categorisation practices and nation building narratives 
have constructed and racialised migrant minorities, such as Indians, in 
particular ways. It does so through a review of the historical settlement 
narrative and census records that have tended to erase early ethnic 
minority presence from what is seen as a predominantly bicultural 
encounter. 
Aotearoan colonial society has tended to render early Indian presence in 
New Zealand invisible. This pattern remains perceptible in the prolonged 
use of homogenising ethnic categories utilised throughout the history of 
the New Zealand census that obfuscate the extent of ethnic minority 
diversification with specific reference to the Indian community. 
The thesis critiques state constructions of ethnic identity through (1) the 
presentation of alternative historical narratives that more appropriately 
demonstrate the presence of non-Māori non-European minorities at first 
contact; (2) an examination of minority reporting in the New Zealand 
census during the period of early European settlement; and (3) an analysis 
of data from a survey of the Indian community in New Zealand. The 
survey data on self-reported experiences of discrimination underscore the 
importance of ethnic self-identification and the use of more heterogeneous 
categories for appropriate minority recognition. 
At a theoretical level, the thesis outlines a novel framework for diversity 
governance, known as deep diversity, which is informed by an 
interdisciplinary methodological and theoretical approach that draws on 
the disciplines of anthropology, demography, history, and policy studies. 
This framework rethinks current policy approaches that position 
minorities as beneficiaries of policies designed for their social uplift and 
integration into majority society, and instead places the onus of social 
integration on both minorities and majorities. The framework is applied to 
an analysis of qualitative data from historical sources that fundamentally 
question New Zealand’s existing bicultural settlement narrative; to 
quantitative data from both historical and contemporary census records; 
and to a self-administered predominantly web-based survey of 1,124 
Indian respondents using a snowball sampling method.
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This thesis presents an alternative historical settlement narrative that 
positions Indians as participating, along with Europeans, in first contact 
encounters with Māori in Aotearoa. Past and present census analysis also 
reveals the extent of historic Indian invisibility, and demonstrates 
continued state use of enumeration techniques that obscure and 
homogenise the diversity that exists within the Indian population. The 
survey results focus on the themes of identity and discrimination, the 
analysis of which offers insights about the importance of ethnic self-
identification, the continued presence of discrimination, and the use of 
more heterogeneous categories for appropriate minority recognition. 
Specific survey results show that respondents, while identifying as 
‘Indian’ on the census, favour terms that cite hyphenated nationality or 
ethnicity (e.g. Kiwi-Indian, Indo-Fijian) or regional, religious, linguistic 
and country of birth identifiers, as significant forms of self-identification. 
Results on discrimination demonstrate that 48.4% of survey respondents 
reported being the target of a discrimination event in New Zealand (86.9% 
of whom are migrants, while 13.1% were born in New Zealand). When 
queried about the presence of discrimination, 90.7% of respondents 
believe that racism and discrimination currently exist within New Zealand 
society, while only 9.3% believe that it does not exist. 
Minority invisibility contributes to social discrimination, and helps 
perpetuate the shallow diversity management practices in use today. More 
attention to the importance of appropriate minority self-identification and 
accommodation, involving majorities in minority integration programmes, 
and institutional support for a shared national identity, could all help 
facilitate and promote vital social cohesion strategies in New Zealand. The 
deep diversity framework articulated in this thesis offers an alternative 
vision for diversity governance and social cohesion that is appropriate for 
western liberal democracies with highly pluralised societies such as New 
Zealand. 
The author can be reached at <toddnach@gmail.com>.
iv
Acknowledgments:
I would first like to acknowledge my supervisory committee, Professor Priya Kurian 
(Political Sciences and Public Policy), Associate Professor Michael Goldsmith 
(Anthropology) and Dr Tahu Kukutai (Demography), social scientists from various 
disciplines who helped frame the multidisciplinary nature of this research. Each, in 
various ways, helped broaden my theoretical boundaries to glimpse connections and 
grasp insights that I had not earlier perceived. The supervisory process was, at times, 
challenging, but their persistence inspired me in unforeseen ways to help develop 
impractical ideas into reasonable concepts that contributed to the whole. Their comments 
and suggestions throughout provided excellent feedback and guidance at all stages of the 
research. I especially thank Professor Kurian for the excellent discussions we’ve had 
throughout the course of this research, and for steering it so assiduously through to 
completion. Special thanks must also go to Professor Douglas Pratt (Religious Studies), 
who was instrumental in helping me get this project off the ground, and for being there 
throughout. Thank you to you all! 
Throughout, others made both major and minor contributions that helped in various 
ways (e.g. contributions to the survey and its deployment, statistical analysis, informal 
discussions about various aspects of this research, reading early drafts, moral support). 
These include, but are not limited to, the following (in alphabetical order): Jovi 
Abellanosa, Dr Kunle Adeakin, Indu Aggarwal, Reynu Anand, Dr Robyn Andrews, 
Jocelyn Armstrong, Dr Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, Dr Sayeeda Bano, Dr Carrie Barber, Dr 
Patrick Barrett, Dr Richard Bedford, Daphne Bell, Prashant & Varsha Belwalkar, Hon 
David Bennett MP, Bhikhu Bhana, Dr Agehananda Bharati (posthumously), Dr Tej Bhatia, 
Krishna Bhatta, Smita Biswas, Dr Elaine Bliss, Dr Greg Booth, Dr Alison Booth, Jillene 
Bydder, Dr Giselle Byrnes, Dr Rajiv Chaturvedi, Marc Chytilo, Ruth Cleaver, Dr Bill 
Cochrane, Marg Coldham-Fussell, Dr Cathy Coleborne, Barry Cope, Dr Wendy Cowling, 
Aliya Danzeisen, Gayl de Boer, Joris de Bres, Chris Deegan, Shriram Desai, Dr Ruth 
DeSouza, Dame Susan Devoy, Abdullah Drury, Satya Dutt, Dr Joseph W. Elder, Su Ellis, 
Dr Teresa Fernandez, Dr Mustafa Farouk, Rebecca Fraser, Ismail Gamadid, Dr Anwar 
Ghani, Tanmoy Ghosh, Rabindra Narayan Goswami, Andrea Haines, Alan Hodgson, Dr 
Harvey Indyk, Veronica Indyk, Rohan Jaduram, Bharat Jamnadas, Dr Marcia Johnson, 
Sister Catherine Jones, Melanie Jones-Leaning, Dr Paul Judd, Dr Mehboob Kahan, Dr 
Tom Kalliath, Dr Parveen Kalliath, Jessica Berber King, Rawhiri King, Vinod Kumar, Alan 
Leadley, Dr Jacqui Leckie, Hon Melissa Lee MP, Dr Scott Levi, Michelle & Anthony Licht, 
Hon Tim Macindoe MP, Sandra Mackenzie, Dr Guna Magesan, Venerable Abbess 
Manshin, Rasik Master, Joy McDowall, Reverend Andrew McKean, Alexis & Aaron 
Mirkin, Hon Sue Moroney MP, Dr Paul Morris, Dave Moskovitz, Dr Debashish Munshi, 
Nigel Murphy, Rakesh Naidoo, Javer Naran, Nirmala & Naras Narasimhan, Pancha 
Narayan, Craig Nicholson, Rachel O’Connor, Dr Saburo Omura, Dr Chandra Lal Pandey, 
Ram Chandra Pandit, Louis Paulussen, Fran Peavey (posthumously), Dr Edwina Pio, 
Jürgen Pothmann, Chandra Sharma Poudyal, Dr Rajen Prasad, Dixie Pringle, Dr Richard 
Pringle, Wiremu Puke, Anjum Rahman, Mylene Rakena, Durgeshree Devi Raman, Venkat 
Raman, Selva Ramasami, Dr Mark Redhead, Dr Garth Ritchie, Dr Mark Rodrigues, Dr 
Sapna Samant, Satinath Sarangi, John Scaglione, Shveta Shah, Mortaza Shams, Nitika 
Sharma, Pritika Sharma, Dr Umesh Sharma, Lester Silver, Dr Rachel Simon-Kumar, 
Parveen Singh, Prabh Saran Singh, Prithipal Singh, Vandna Singh, Verpal Singh, Virendra 
& Sushila Singh, Mervin Singham, Hon Su’a William Sio MP, Marjie Slater-Kaplan, Dr 
Michael Slater-Kaplan, Dr Huston Smith, Liz Stedman, Keith Stobie, Carrie Swanson, 
v
Rina Tagore, Caroline Thomas, Peti Transfield, Dr Anand Tripathi, Saumya Tripathi, 
Reverend Uesifili Unasa, Amu Upreti, Dr Girish Upreti, Malathi Vasudevan, Sunitha 
Verghis, Dr Susan Wadley, Dr Michael Walmsley, Dr Kay Weaver, Dr Pushpa Wood, 
Philip Yeung, Laura Zilberberg, Dr Arvind Zodgekar and David Zwartz. You each helped 
contribute in important ways and I value the time spent with each and everyone of you 
no matter how small or large the contribution. 
I would also like to thank the following organisations, associations and institutions that 
helped in both tangible and intangible ways: Aotearoa Ethnic Network, Auckland 
Interfaith Council, Federation of the Islamic Associations of New Zealand, Guru Nanak 
Devji Hamilton Gurdwara, Hamilton City Council, Hamilton Kerala Samajam, Hamilton 
Malayalee Association, Hamilton Ramayan Sanstha, Human Rights Commission, New 
Zealand Federation of Multicultural Councils, New Zealand Indian Central Association, 
New Zealand India Research Institute, Office of Ethnic Affairs, Postgraduate Student 
Association (PGSA) and the Postgraduate Studies Office at the University of Waikato, 
Radha Krishna Mandir Hamilton, Sri Balaji Temple Trust, Statistics New Zealand, 
Waikato Interfaith Council, Waikato Jewish Association, Waikato Migrant Resource 
Centre, Waikato Muslim Association, and the Wellington Indian Association. I would also 
especially like to thank all of the Secretaries and Presidents of these, and other 
organisations and associations listed in Appendix K that helped in distributing the 
survey questionnaire. Thanks are also due to numerous unnamed survey respondents 
who took the time to answer the survey questionnaire. 
For financial support, I’d like to thank Gwenda Pennington and the Scholarships Office at 
the University of Waikato for administering the University of Waikato Doctoral 
Scholarship I received at the start of my research period. Thanks are also due to Kathryn 
Parsons at the University of Waikato for assistance in helping procure a Statistics New 
Zealand grant through the Council of New Zealand University Librarians (CONZUL) for 
data on those stating an Indian ethnicity in the 2006 New Zealand Census.
Last but not least, I’d like to express my deepest and most heartfelt gratitude to members 
of my immediate and extended families for putting up with me when I was most 
frazzled, could not see any way through to completion, and for supporting me when I 
most needed it. In particular, I’d like to thank my parents, Joan & Sidney Nachowitz for 
never doubting they would have another doctor in the family; Dr Marc Nachowitz & Dr 
Ann-Eliza Lewis for their regular pep talks on Skype; Jay Nachowitz & Judy Stern for 
their continued support; Dr Bill Bolstad, Sylvie Rabinovitch-Bolstad and Gauri 
Nandedkar for their unwavering belief that I would eventually finish, and for always 
being there when most needed; and Lloyd & Rita Morris for their unflagging emotional, 
physical and financial support that helped make this research possible. Most importantly, 
my heartfelt thanks and profoundest gratitude, appreciation and love are long overdue to 
my wife, Nona Morris, and sons Josh and Adam Nachowitz, for their unwavering 
support and encouragement through all the days (years?) when I simply said “not now, I 
can’t.” 
vi
Table of Contents:
Abstract" iii
Acknowledgements" v
List of Tables and Figures" ix
PART I: INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1: Minority Populations and Diversity Governance                                    " 1
                                                                                                               1.1 Introduction" 1
                                                                                                    1.2 Research objectives" 13
                                                                                                             1.3 Contributions" 17
                                                                             1.4 Definitions and notes on the text" 20
                                                                                                                  1.5 Conclusion" 27
Chapter 2: Towards a Framework of Deep Diversity
                                                                                                               2.1 Introduction" 33
                                  2.2 The multicultural context: a brief review of the literature" 38
              2.3 Situating New Zealand: contextualising identity and discrimination" 43
                                                              2.4 A review of critiques of multiculturalism" 53
                             2.5 The historical and theoretical foundations of deep diversity" 67
                                                                                     2.6 Shallow and deep diversity " 89
                                                    2.7 Towards a concise definition of deep diversity " 103
                                                                                                                  2.8 Conclusion" 107
Chapter 3: Research Methodology
                                                                                                               3.1 Introduction" 109
                                                                                3.2 Approaches to research design" 109
                                                                       3.3 Qualitative research methodologies" 116
                                                                     3.4 Quantitative research methodologies" 121
                                                                                                 3.5 Other considerations" 139
Chapter 4: Diversity and Discrimination in the New Zealand Context
                                                                                                               4.1 Introduction" 143
4.2 Māori responses to European arrival: immigration without consent                " 143
4.3 Biculturalism and multiculturalism: Māori, Pākehā and tauiwi                           " 149
                   4.4 The historical context of minority discrimination in New Zealand" 163
                                                                                                                  4.5 Conclusion" 181
PART II: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Chapter 5: Identity and invisibility: early Indian presence in Aotearoa, 1769-1850
                                                                                                               5.1 Introduction" 183
5.2 Crossing the                                                                                                  kālāpāni" 189
                                 5.3 Early Indian presence and identity formation in Aotearoa" 195
5.4 Early Indian presence and identity, 1769-1820                                                      " 204
vii
Chapter 6: Indian settlement and the New Zealand Census, 1851-2001
                                                         6.1 Introduction and theoretical considerations" 235
                                                      6.2 Exclusion and minority invisibility, 1851-1911" 244
6.3 Biological determinism & the consolidation of minority reportage, 1916-81   266
                                                  6.4 Minority inclusion and aspiration, 1986-present" 283
                                                                                                     6.5 Summary analysis" 288
                                                                                                                  6.6 Conclusion" 296
Chapter 7: Summary and analysis of the 2006 and 2013 Census data
                                                                                                               7.1 Introduction" 299
                                         7.2 Summary and analysis of 2006 and 2013 Census data" 301
                                                                                                                  7.3 Conclusion" 338
Chapter 8: Select Survey results and analysis
                                                                                                              8.1 Introduction " 341
                                                                                                    8.2 Complex identities" 347
                         8.3 Discrimination, personal safety and barriers in labour market" 377
                                                                                                                    8.4 Summary" 396
PART III: CONCLUSION
Chapter 9: Conclusion: a deep diversity framework for New Zealand
                                                                                                               9.1 Introduction" 397
                                                             9.2 The policy implications of deep diversity " 406
                                                                                      9.3 Significance of the research" 413
                                                                                           9.4 Reflections on the study" 416
                                                                                                          9.5 Future research" 420
            9.6 Summary conclusion: a deep diversity framework for New Zealand?" 423
                                                                                                                      Sources Cited! 427
PART IV: APPENDICES
                            Appendix A: Summary of census statistics on ethnicity, 1851-1926" 505
          Appendix B: Summary of census statistics on religious affiliation, 1851-1926" 507
             Appendix C: Detailed occupations of Indians recorded in the 1916 Census" 509
                      Appendix D: Industries of the ethnic Indian population, 1926 Census" 510
  Appendix E: Reported occupations of the ethnic Indian population, 1926 Census" 512
   Appendix F: Spoken languages & birthplace, all Indian ethnicities, 2006 Census" 515
Appendix G: Religious affiliation & birthplace, all Indian ethnicities, 2006 Census"516
                                                                                 Appendix H: Survey Questionnaire" 517
                          Appendix I: Spoken South Asian languages of survey respondents" 526
                 Appendix J: List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand" 527
         Appendix K: List of current NZ organisations related to the Indian diaspora" 540
viii
List of Tables and Figures:
Tables:
Table 2.1: Summary of contributions to multicultural theory" 86
Table 2.2: Key values and assumptions of the diversity discourse" 98
Table 4.1: Percentage of the total population, by ethnicity, 1976, 1996" 154
Table 4.2: Census, total population, by ethnicity, 1851, 1891, 1921 Censuses" 171
Table 6.1: Theoretical and historical periods evident in the New Zealand Census" 238
Table 6.2: Summary description of the population of the Colony, 1874 Census" 258
Table 6.3: Occupations of the 181 ethnic Indians recorded in the 1916 Census" 270
Table 6.4: Length of residence of the Indian population, 1916 Census" 271
Table 6.5: Indian arrivals in the colony, 1907-1916" 272
Table 6.6: Summary of Indians noted in previous census years, 1921 Census" 274
Table 6.7: Religious affiliation for ‘Race Aliens,‘ 1921 Census" 275
Table 6.8: Industrial distribution of ethnic Indians, 1921 Census" 276
Table 6.9: Grade of occupation of ‘Race Aliens’ described in 1921 Census" 277
Table 6.10: Religious professions of the Indian population, 1926 Census" 278
Table 6.11: Industries of the ethnic Indian population, 1926 Census" 279
Table 6.12: Reported occupations of the ethnic Indian population, 1926 Census" 281
Table 6.13: Intercensal growth in the Indian population, 1981-2013" 284
Table 6.14: Details of South Asians in recent New Zealand Parliaments" 287
Table 7.1: Indian ethnicity, 2001-2013 Censuses" 302
Table 7.2: Percentage change in ethnic populations in NZ, 2001-2013 Censuses" 304
Table 7.3: Percentage change in Indian ethnic communities, 2001-2013" 304
Table 7.4: Indian ethnicities (Level 3) by birthplace, 2006 Census" 305
Table 7.5: Stated Indian ethnicities by country of birth, 2006 Census" 307
Table 7.6: Country of birth by stated Indian ethnicity, 2006 Census" 308
Table 7.7: Top ten birth countries, total Indian population, 2006 Census" 309
Table 7.8: Age distribution by Indian ethnicities and birthplace, 2006 Census" 310
Table 7.9: Years since arrival, overseas-born, 2013 Census" 311
Table 7.10: Indians speaking at least one South Asian language, 2006 Census" 312
Table 7.11: Top spoken languages and birthplaces, all Indian ethnicities, 2006" 313
Table 7.12: South Asian languages by birthplace, Indian ethnicities, 2006 Census" 315
Table 7.13: South Asian languages spoken, by ethnicities, 2006 Census" 317
Table 7.14: Number of languages spoken, by birthplace, Indian ethnicities, 2006" 320
Table 7.15: Percentage of spoken languages by ethnicities, 2006 Census" 321
Table 7.16: Ethnicities by number of spoken languages stated, 2006 Census" 321
Table 7.17: Religions of those stating an Indian ethnicity, 2006 Census" 323
Table 7.18: Religious affiliation and ethnicity, total stated population, 2006 Census" 325
Table 7.19: Comparisons of ethnicity by religiosity, 2006 Census" 326
Table 7.20: Four Indian identity groups by stated religiosity, 2006 Census" 328
Table 7.21: Stated religious affiliation and Indian identity groups, 2006 Census" 330
Table 7.22: Highest qualification by identity groups, ages 15+, 2006 Census" 332
Table 7.23: Income range & median income by identity groups, age 15+, 2006" 335
Table 7.24: Income bracket by birthplace & identity group, age 15+, 2006 Census" 337
Table 8.1: Socio-demographic profile of survey respondents" 348
Table 8.2: Identity terms used, grouped by category" 354
Table 8.3: Identity terms for nationality or ethnicity" 355
Table 8.4: Identity terms used for regional geopolitical affiliations within India" 356
Table 8.5: Identity terms used for religious affiliations" 357
Table 8.6: Select respondent comments, Question 11 on identity" 359
Table 8.7: Language indicators by migrant status" 362
Table 8.8: Age range by Ability to speak a South Asian language" 363
Table 8.9: Migrant status by importance of S. Asian language use" 367
Table 8.10: Respondent comments on religion affiliation" 369
ix
Table 8.11: Migrant status by religious practice" 369
Table 8.12: Respondent comments on religious practice" 371
Table 8.13: Respondent religious outcome, based on parent’s religion" 373
Table 8.14: Extent of respondent agreement with Kiwi and Indian identity" 374
Table 8.15: Migrant status by agreement with Kiwi and Indian identity" 376
Table 8.16: Gender and Migrant Status by difficulty in finding employment" 378
Table 8.17: Respondent comments on finding suitable employment" 379
Table 8.18: Personal safety in New Zealand" 381
Table 8.19: Gender and Migrant Status by Perceived personal safety" 382
Table 8.20: Respondent comments on personal safety" 383
Table 8.21: Gender by ‘Ever been a target of discrimination?" 383
Table 8.22: Migrant Status by ‘Ever been a target of discrimination?’" 384
Table 8.23: Strength of identification by ‘Ever been a target of discrimination?’" 385
Table 8.24: Gender & Migrant Status by ‘Freq. of experiencing discrimination’" 386
Table 8.25: Strength of identification by ‘Freq. of experiencing discrimination’" 387
Table 8.26: Locations where discrimination occurs" 388
Table 8.27: Select comments on the locations of discrimination events" 390
Table 8.28: Gender and Migrant Status by ‘Does discrimination exist in NZ?’" 391
Table 8.29: Strength of identification by ‘Belief that discrimination exists in NZ’" 392
Table 8.30: Extent of agreement that discrimination against Indians exists in NZ" 393
Table 8.31: Gender & Migrant Status by ‘Agreement Indian discrimination exists’" 394
Table 8.32: Strength of identification by ‘Belief that discrimination exists in NZ’" 395
Figures:
Figure 3.1: Business card advertising the web-based survey" 132
Figure 3.2: Basket with cards on check-out counters at Indian diaries" 132
Figure 4.1: Editorial cartoon “Still they come” by John Blomfield (1905)" 165
Figure 4.2: Editorial cartoon “The Hindoo peril” (1917)" 166
Figure 4.3: Editorial cartoon “The coming artist” and “Will it come to this?” (1920)" 167
Figure 4.4: Editorial cartoon “And the aliens marched in bunch by bunch” (1920)" 168
Figure 4.5: Editorial cartoon “The alien wave” (1920)" 169
Figure 4.6: Editorial cartoon “No man’s land” (1922) and “Your daughter?” (1920)" 170
Figure 5.1: Edward Peters, Otago Daily Times (6 November 1990)" 233
Figure 6.1: Religious affiliation, 1861 Census" 248
Figure 6.2: Religious affiliation, 1867 Census" 253
Figure 6.3: Indian representation in New Zealand’s Parliament" 286
Figure 6.4: US Census questions on ethnicity, 2010 Census" 292
Figure 7.1: Questions 11 & 15 on ethnicity, 2013 Census" 303
Figure 7.2: Percentage & Income Range for stated ethnicities, ages 15+, 2006" 334
Figure 7.3: Median income by identity groups, ages 15+, 2006 Census" 336
Figure 8.1: Ancestral region in South Asia" 350
Figure 8.2: Number of South Asian languages spoken per respondent" 364
Figure 8.3: How often do you use a South Asian language at home?" 366
Figure 8.4: Level of importance for family to speak at home" 367
Figure 8.5: Respondent religion" 368
x
xi
xii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
MINORITY POPULATIONS AND DIVERSITY GOVERNANCE
We can see the diversity of human cultures behind us, around us, and 
before us. The only demand that we can justly make is that all the forms 
this diversity may take… may be so many contributions to the fullness of 
all the others (Claude Lévi-Strauss 1952:46). 
1.1 Introduction
With the advent of globalisation and the proliferation of human migration, 
the impacts and implications of an ethnically and religiously diverse 
polity are under intensifying academic and public debate (Young 1998, 
Boston & Callister 2005, Boston et al. 2006, Rata & Openshaw 2006, Bromell 
2008, Waters 2012). Much of the critical focus of this discourse has been on 
immigration policy and the political and socioeconomic consequences of 
increased immigration on the modern democratic state (Freeman 1997, 
Smith & Edmonston 1998, Castles 2004, Kerr & Kerr 2011, Pakulski & 
Markowski 2014). This is, however, a predominantly political discourse, 
and migration is merely one factor of many that contributes to a contested 
and increasingly complex national identity. Taken together, migrant, 
minority and majority populations within any given polity constitute an 
ethnocultural diversity in which state intervention is often necessary. Yet 
not all nation-states have policies that favour immigrants or minorities, 
and fewer still have proactive settlement and minority integration policies 
designed for plural and pluralising societies (Inglis 1996, Parekh 2006, 
Lentin & Titley 2011, Spoonley & Tolley 2012). Some states eschew 
minority integration policies that promote diversification in favour of 
those that advance either an assimilationist agenda, such as France,1 or 
those that seek to remain homogenous in an emergent global economy, 
1
1 See Brubaker (2001), de Wenden (2003, 2012), Silberman et al. (2007), and Bienkowski (2010).
such as China, Japan and Korea.2 Others actively promote multicultural 
policies designed for the public accommodation and celebration of 
minority identities while simultaneously fostering the adoption of a 
majority national identity in which all members of society can participate. 
These contrasting approaches can best be summed up as 1) majority 
policies that promote minority integration and assimilation into majority 
communities, and 2) multicultural policies that support diversity and 
promote minority accommodation. Such approaches to diversity 
management are largely dependent on the particular circumstances of 
individual nation-states, and are often the result of complex sociohistorical 
processes, shifting demographics, and the myriad geopolitical issues that 
nation-states confront. From a policy perspective, there are multiple ways 
of managing such diversity, and no single approach or method suits all 
situations (Rodríguez-García 2010, Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010, Spoonley 
& Tolley 2012). Still, there are commonalities at work, and a wide variety 
of multicultural approaches are under review in liberal democratic states, 
many of which have been thoroughly identified, evaluated and critiqued.3 
As existing policy scholarship does not necessarily address which 
approaches are best utilised in specific conditions, many countries tend to 
experiment with strategies implemented elsewhere, sometimes resulting 
in failed attempts at minority integration or backlashes that tend to 
increase discrimination and decrease social cohesion. This thesis, 
therefore, provides a needed context for diversity governance in New 
Zealand and introduces a framework useful in the interpretation, design 
and implementation of practical policy scenarios and outcomes. Focusing 
2
2 See Tarumoto (2003), Castles (2007), Geon-Soo (2007), Olneck (2011), Kunz & Fachun (2012), and 
Oishi (2012). 
3 See Taylor (1994), Kymlicka (1995, 2007, 2010a), Burayidi (1997), Parekh (2006, 2008) and Modood 
(2007). 
on the Indian diaspora4 in New Zealand as a case study, this thesis 
examines how nation building narratives and state categorisation practices 
have constructed and racialised migrant minorities, such as Indians, in 
particular ways that reinforce prevailing stereotypes, and challenges 
minority representation in official state statistics through a historical 
review of its quinquennial census. Such an analysis reveals a repeated 
pattern of minority invisibility, erasure and misrepresentation of identity, 
and the continued proliferation of minority discrimination. State actions in 
this contested arena entrenches and perpetuates discriminatory practices 
and exclusion at structural and institutional echelons, and the experience 
of racism at community and individual levels. This thesis examines the 
institutional and historical contexts in terms of self- and state-defined 
identity and sets out a conceptual diversity governance framework 
designed to aid in the interpretation of existing policies as either shallow or 
deep. The framework offers a way to recognise policy approaches designed 
for the reduction of intolerance and the accommodation of minority rights 
within plural or pluralising societies. 
Background
Operationally, there are two contrasting policy streams designed to 
manage diversity in liberal democratic states. One concerns the policies 
and legislation that incorporate migration, immigration and the 
appropriate settlement and integration of minorities (Penninx 1996, 
Zolberg 2006, Skeldon 2008, Kurthen & Heisler 2009), what I would term 
the migration complex. In addition to policies, per se, this stream includes 
the theoretical and empirical policy scholarship that addresses the 
movement of migrant groups into host societies and their appropriate 
settlement, acculturation and integration. But this literature is fragmented, 
3
4 The use of the term diaspora here refers simply to the dispersion of any people away from their 
original homeland. 
with distinct subgenres that address the wide ranging issues associated 
with the movement of populations. It includes immigration theory and 
practice, the right of nation-states to control their own borders, domestic 
security and foreign policy, and guidelines and policies that determine the 
appropriate settlement and acculturation of migrants. 
The second policy stream comprises the scholarship addressing the 
philosophical and practical challenges of appropriate minority 
accommodation in plural societies (Taylor 1994; Parekh 2000a, 2006; Rex & 
Singh 2005; Kymlicka 2007, 2010a), framing it as a human rights and social 
justice issue. This literature questions state decisions to integrate and 
assimilate minority populations into mainstream society or allows 
accommodation in some, most, or all matters in which values diverge. 
This underscores a more pressing theoretical and practical challenge as 
sociocultural, historical, political and economic realities vary widely 
between states. While consensus remains elusive, there is robust debate on 
the merits and implications of accommodating the needs of heterogeneous 
populations, especially when such needs clash with majority values.5 
These approaches are problematic for several reasons. First, research tends 
to focus on fragments of the migration complex rather than viewing its 
entire process. For example, separate bodies of theory, practice and policy 
exist for each of the distinct phases of migration (e.g. emigration, 
immigration, settlement and acculturation, integration, and citizenship). 
In so doing, an overview of the relationships and connections between the 
constituent elements is lost, and policy is fractured. Second, many policies 
are unnecessarily duplicated, being designed, implemented and managed 
4
5 This may refer to any of potentially multiple sets of values that majorities may have. 
by different institutions with divergent agendas.6 Third, the question of 
appropriate minority integration is critical, but the literature is often 
written as if the migration complex is isolated from the underlying 
processes that might cause or contribute to migration, and such a 
separation should not be a factor in determining policy that incorporates 
minority populations into majority society. Instead, there is a belief that 
there are only two possible outcomes for states accepting immigrants—
that minorities should either be assimilated or accommodated. Decisions 
therefore are primarily based upon what states and majorities require, 
rather than on what minorities need. The urgent questions for states to 
consider should ultimately focus on the extent of minority 
accommodation, and on who makes these decisions. 
Most policy practices echo the dominant discourse and tend to take a 
segmented view of the migration complex, for instance viewing the 
polarising issue of immigration (e.g. whom to let in, which types of 
migrants to allow, and how many of each) as separate from settlement and 
acculturation. Other approaches view settlement policies as merely ways 
to help minorities better integrate or assimilate into host society. Still 
others focus on the assimilation versus accommodation debate. Disparate 
policy approaches yield neither conviction of purpose nor clarity of 
process, which can result in poor implementation, increases in incidences 
of discrimination, or more dramatically, in ethnic tension or unrest (Smith 
1973, Easterly 2001, Kielstra 2010). Furthermore, migrants and minorities 
are often viewed as presenting unwieldy challenges for policymakers 
(Safran 1994, Hannum 1996, Cook 2003, Joppke 2004), whose directives 
often evoke targeted responses; even the language of policy evokes 
5
6 e.g. similar integration policies may be implemented by different government institutions, one 
designed to better integrate migrants into majority society (e.g. NZ’s Settlement Support), another 
for minority uplift (e.g. NZ’s Te Puni Kōkiri and the Ministry for Social Development), and another 
for the accommodation of minority rights (e.g. NZ’s Human Rights Commission); in particular, 
Chapter 8 in Boston et al. (2006:129-165) is especially instructive.
particular images—as if hurling policy missiles at ‘issues’ would make 
them disappear. If social cohesion is a primary policy objective, then more 
comprehensive and inclusive methods must be considered. What is 
lacking, therefore, is a common conceptual approach, an integrative 
framework that takes a more holistic view of the processes and results of 
migration and minority accommodation, and one that integrates 
minorities and majorities in diversity policy. This is a significant gap in the 
literature that this thesis addresses. 
Here, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the use of the words 
management and governance and how I utilise these terms throughout. The 
term ‘diversity management’ is commonly used to refer to state and 
majority policies regarding migrant and minority populations.7 In 
reference to increasing cultural diversity resulting from immigration, 
Vertovec (2007:1027) states that “policymakers respond with various 
strategies for a kind of diversity management strategy that came to be 
called multiculturalism.”8 Yet ’management’ implies hierarchical top-
down administration; that minorities must be managed by majorities (as if 
minorities are political pawns moved about in an attempt to achieve 
‘social cohesion,’ the ultimate aim of the diversity discourse). This 
language is generally acceptable when determining how workplace 
diversity can best be managed by organisational or corporate hierarchical 
structures within an affirmative action context (Gilbert et al. 1999, 
Ivancevich & Gilbert 2000, Lorbiecki & Jack 2000, Wrench 2005), the source 
of the term.9 However, public policy on diversity would be better served 
by the use of the term governance. In its broadest sense, governance refers 
to “all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, 
6
7 See, for example, Sanchez & Brock (1996), Gilbert et al. (1999), Bassett-Jones (2005), 
8 See also Vertovec (2010:84), Faist (2009). 
9 See Munshi & McKie (2001) for an alternative view. 
market, or network; whether over a family, tribe, corporation, or territory; 
and whether by laws, norms, power, or language” (Bevir 2013:1). Here, I 
use the term in the sense of participatory government, one that focuses on 
deepening democratic engagement through majority and minority citizen 
participation in the processes and policies of governing. I draw on 
Gaventa’s (2006:7) use of the term to refer to the “political project of 
developing and sustaining more substantive and empowered citizen 
participation in the political process than what is normally found in liberal 
representative democracy alone.” Diversity governance in this sense evokes 
images of mutually shared responsibility for the development, 
implementation and results of policies designed to attain or maintain high 
levels of social cohesion in plural or pluralising societies. Thus, I use 
‘diversity management’ to refer to most existing forms of multicultural 
policy, marked by ad hoc, piecemeal, and superficial government responses 
to ethnic diversity, and ‘diversity governance’ to refer to more inclusive 
and participatory forms; but not interchangeably. 
In order to outline a theoretical and practical approach to diversity 
governance, I use the term deep diversity, and compare it to the more 
established but shallow approaches of diversity management used today. 
The juxtaposition of two alternative strategies uses what Williams 
(1996:63) refers to as “oppositional categories” to contextualise existing 
policy, and provides a framework for analysing the distinct approaches 
evident in existing diversity management schemes. Deep diversity can be 
useful for explicating the various ideological, normative, and operational 
values held by particular diversity management schemes, the institutional 
approaches they take, the diverse implementation mechanisms they 
empower, and the relevant policy arenas in which they operate. In this 
thesis I argue that such an approach to diversity policy is not only feasible, 
but worthwhile in the New Zealand context, given its high percentage of 
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overseas-born citizens10 and presence of an indigenous ‘majority 
minority.’11 
Shallow perspectives tend to view entire minority communities as a single 
ethnic category or group (e.g. ‘Asians’ or ‘Polynesians’), or as smaller 
national entities (e.g. ‘Indians’ or ‘Samoans’); deeper interpretations make 
less generalised assumptions, and no one minority group can or should be 
labeled by its largest common denominator. This thesis argues that the 
terms Asian or Indian,12 for example, most often used by states in the 
enumeration and management of diversity, are largely political monikers 
that tend to homogenise minority populations, rendering particular 
ethnicities virtually invisible. There are deeper vertical designations of 
geographic, economic, linguistic or religious denotation, with which 
members of particular communities may choose to identify. This depth of 
diversity can best be articulated through the presentation of a case study 
on a prominent ethnic minority, the Indian diaspora in New Zealand, to 
highlight the importance of self-reported identity and incidences of 
discrimination.13 A deep diversity approach can examine the extent to 
which existing policies and enumeration methods can adequately account 
for subgroups that may exist within horizontal designations of ethnicity. 
Such an approach may help clarify whether or not policies designed for 
improving minority integration or social uplift should also focus on more 
complex self-reported identities than on the expedient political ones. 
8
10 According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2013:36-37), New 
Zealand ranked 4th amongst OECD nations, after Luxembourg, Switzerland and Australia. The 
2013 New Zealand Census also showed that 25% of the population is born overseas.
11 Here I use ‘majority minority’ to refer to the largest minority population within any given area.
12 Asian, for example, is a Level 1 ethnic category used in the New Zealand Census, while Indian is a 
Level 2 ethnic category. Both represent the use of vertical, or hierarchical, categorisation schemes.
13 I have chosen both identity and discrimination as two examples, of many, that emerged from the 
results of a survey on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand that I conducted between 2008-2013. 
Relationships between self-reported identity (e.g. race, ethnicity, birthplace, ancestral affiliation, 
generation in New Zealand, nationality, religion, residency status, language) and discrimination 
have been reported by numerous social scientists (see Sellers & Shelton 2003, Sellers et al. 2006, 
Jackson et al. 2012, Williamson 2013). 
New Zealand’s Indian population, as one of many possible minority 
communities to examine, makes an ideal case study due to a number of 
historical processes and unique conditions. These include 1) the early and 
wide dispersal of Indian populations globally (Sastri 1959, Clarke et al. 
1990, Motwani 1993, Parekh 1993, Peach 1994, Jayaram 2004, Lal 2006a); 2) 
the resultant geographic range of birthplaces and birth countries from 
which they emigrate (Kadekar 2005, Lal 2006a, Didham 2010), considering 
that most other migrant communities tend to have a higher degree of 
sociocultural and linguistic homogeneity and generally arrive from a 
single country or region of the world; 3) the direct immigration from India 
and settlement in New Zealand (Tiwari 1980, Zodgekar 1980, Leckie 2007); 
and 4) the extensive range of cultural, ethnic, social, caste, religious, and 
linguistic variation in the Indian population (Didham 2010, Zodgekar 
2010) not evident in other migrant communities in New Zealand. The long 
history of the Indian diaspora in New Zealand, beginning with its earliest 
sojourners and comprised of both a well-established domestically-born 
minority and recent overseas-born migrants who hail from a wide variety 
of sending nations (Zodgekar 1980, 2010; Leckie 2007, 2010; Friesen & 
Kearns 2008; Bandyopadhyay 2010b), should allow an equitable position 
in New Zealand’s settlement narrative. Yet inclusion of non-Māori 
minority communities in Aotearoa’s earliest history has remained elusive. 
Historically, Indians in New Zealand consisted of mostly small 
populations of Punjabi and Gujarati settlers (McGee 1962, 1993; Tiwari 
1980; McLeod 1980, 1884, 1986; McLeod & Bhullar 1992; Leckie 1995b, 
1998, 2007). Since reform introduced by the 1986 Immigration Policy 
Review and implemented following the Immigration Act 1987 and 
additional policy amendments, the constitution of migrant populations 
underwent rapid transformation, significantly altering New Zealand’s 
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demographic composition (Winkelmann 1999, Hoadley 2003, McMillian 
2006, Bedford & Ho 2008). The 1986 Census reported 15,810 ethnic Indians 
before immigration reform, while the 2013 Census recorded 156,567 ethnic 
Indians (Statistics New Zealand 1986, 2013), an increase of 890.3% growth 
over the 27 intercensal years from 1986-2013. Those of Indian ethnicity are 
no longer just Gujaratis and Punjabis. There is a deeper heterogeneity not 
evident in the publicly released statistics. 
Although census figures are one indicator of population growth, they do 
not portray the dramatic internal changes within minority communities. 
Moreover, existing scholarship on the Indian diaspora does not adequately 
address the significant geographic, economic, linguistic and religious 
demographic changes. This research uses a deep diversity approach in 
studying the Indian community, to seek an understanding of the scale of 
change. In so doing, this thesis examines the need for a more specific 
vocabulary that can acknowledge and recognise the heterogeneity that 
exists within these minority communities. This has implications for 
existing public policies designed for social uplift and integration, which 
tend to aggregate subgroup populations (Edmonston et al. 1996, Chapple 
2000, Snipp 2003, Gardiner-Garden 2003, Kukutai 2004, Paradies 2006). 
This is problematic as aggregate representation of subgroup populations 
often has the consequence of skewing the delivery of limited resources, 
especially in incidences where identification with multiple ethnicities and 
subgroups (e.g. Bhojpuri-speaking Indian Muslims, Indo-Fijian women) 
are involved. Such groups are more poorly represented than recognised 
minority populations and adequate representation may be unavailable. 
Despite the heterogeneity that exists within minority communities, 
asserting a multiethnic or subgroup identity is neither widespread nor 
commonplace, as ethnic loyalty and minority obligation often require that 
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anomalous individuals self-identify exclusively as either members of one 
minority group or the other, but rarely as belonging to multiple groups, or 
as belonging to the majority (Boladeras 2002:131; Kertzer & Arel 2002, 
Cowlishaw 2004:114, Paradies 2006). While reporting of multiple 
ethnicities in the New Zealand census has improved in recent decades 
with the introduction of ‘ethnicity’ questions and multiple tick boxes,14 it 
is still difficult for non-Māori minorities to report identification with 
subgroup communities within existing ethnic classifications. Existing 
policies for managing such diversity, and especially the institutional 
instruments for data collection on which such policies rely, have not kept 
pace with the extent and scope of recent demographic changes in minority 
populations. 
Census reporting is not the same for all minorities. New Zealand’s 
indigenous Māori, for example, are prompted to provide iwi15 
identification on the Census, a basic right bestowed as an indigenous 
peoples, while other minority populations lack similar choices that would 
allow for more accurate subgroup self-identification. Non-Māori 
minorities in New Zealand are thus not nearly as well recognised in the 
publicly available census data, are poorly recognised by state institutions, 
and potentially disadvantaged in receiving local or national government 
services. This may further marginalise already disenfranchised 
communities attempting more appropriate integration and access to 
publicly available resources. While the argument for special entitlements 
and rights for Māori, as an indigenous people, is well justified and 
established (Maaka & Fleras 2000, O’Sullivan 2006), public debate on 
11
14 The ability to tick more than a single box for ethnicity occurred for the first time in the 1989 New 
Zealand Census (Barber 2004:13). 
15 Tribal.
establishing equitable policies for non-indigenous minorities that are 
discriminated against is lacking. 
Moreover, tracking the incidence of discrimination within such subgroup 
classifications is virtually nonexistent. Quantifying the extent of 
discrimination in contexts such as the labour market, health care and 
renting is challenging and surveys tend to rely on self-reported 
experiences. When collected, discrimination data almost exclusively use 
the broadest ethnic or minority categorisations (e.g. Asians, women, 
homosexuals) and are rarely collected at the subgroup unit (Simon 2012). 
Indeed, precisely how multiethnic and subgroup communities are defined, 
in regards to laws and policies designed to prevent discrimination, is 
either elusive or ambiguous (Snipp 2003:584). Such information would be 
advantageous in better directing policies to specific populations or for 
more appropriate delivery of resources in highly plural or pluralising 
societies. 
With increasing pluralism, it is vital for modern western democracies to 
deliver strong diversity governance that engenders more robust forms of 
social cohesion and endeavours to keep ethnic tension at bay. Resilient 
multicultural policies can have multiple effects and advantages: they may 
entice prospective migrants to help lessen employment shortages, and 
proactive settlement policies can help recent migrants better adjust to a 
new sociocultural milieu. They also lead minorities to more certain forms 
of belonging (e.g. permanent residency, citizenship) and to full 
participation in an inclusive national identity, strengthening social 
cohesion. Countries with weak multicultural policies may prevent or limit 
new migrant arrivals, may force potential migrants to search for more 
welcoming shores, or compel recent migrants to emigrate, increasing 
domestic skill shortages. More problematically, states that do little to 
12
promote ethnocultural diversity or have weak multicultural and diversity 
institutions (i.e. those promoting forms of either social exclusion or the full 
assimilation of minority populations into host cultures) may experience 
increasing forms of ethnic tension and violence (Reitz & Banerjee 2007). 
Specific diversity and multicultural policies that encourage social 
inclusion and participation, and pathways toward citizenship, tend to 
strengthen social cohesion (Castles 1995). Unifying these disparate sets of 
policies into a framework for diversity governance should have positive 
ramifications for diminishing resources while improving social cohesion. 
1.2 Research objectives
This thesis examines Indian participation in the history of Aotearoa, and 
considers their historic invisibility in New Zealand’s settlement 
discourse.16 It also queries and elucidates census representation(s) 
depicted in state statistics, and subsequently highlights significant changes 
to the Indian demographic through an analysis of recent census statistics 
and the presentation of survey data that supports the emergence of Indian 
identities not captured by existing state categories. Indian communities 
may therefore serve as examples for analysing state portrayal of 
minorities, which has implications for diversity governance. Throughout, I 
discuss the role that the conceptual framework of deep diversity may play 
in understanding issues of identity and invisibility through its application 
to the case study. 
In sum, the primary research objectives of this study are: 
1. to illustrate the historic and current treatment of Indians in existing 
scholarship through a reexamination of both historical accounts and 
census records related to the case study; 
13
16 I define my use of the terms ‘Aotearoa’ and ‘New Zealand’ in Section 1.4.
2. to establish the importance of identity recognition of minorities by 
majorities, and the significance of ethnic self-identification for 
minorities;
3. to provide a brief demographic profile and statistical description of 
Indian ethnicity and self-identification based on the 2006 and 2013 
Censuses, for comparison with the collected survey data; 
4. to present survey data and respondent comments from the case study 
that demonstrate the divergence of self-identification from the 
census, and to indicate the extent of self-perceived discrimination; 
5. to explicate a potential framework for diversity governance, known as 
deep diversity, which underpins the first four objectives. 
The first four research objectives each provide an example in which a deep 
diversity framework may be applied to a minority case study, providing 
the rationale necessary for determining practices of diversity management 
or diversity governance. A critical look at historic accounts of the earliest 
Indian arrivals in Aotearoa may reveal different interpretations of known 
history relevant to Māori-European first encounter. Indeed, the possibility 
of the involvement of non-Māori non-European others in the exploration 
and settlement of Aotearoa has previously been poorly considered. 
Likewise, an examination of the census descriptions of early Indian 
settlement may also reveal previously unknown or earlier examples of 
structural discrimination and institutional marginalisation. In either case, 
notions of identity and invisibility remain central themes that I wish to 
explore. An examination of state-imposed categories and self-reported 
identity constructs may reveal a profound disconnect between how states 
interpret and categorise minorities and how minorities may envision 
themselves. 
The current top-down approach is largely based on state identification and 
enumeration of minorities, primarily wielded through the institutional 
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mechanisms of a state census or other representative forms of population 
quantification, yet such categorisation tends to poorly describe 
populations.17 Existing state approaches serve to homogenise minority 
groups into what are perceived to be easily manageable ethnicities, while 
individual and group self-constructions of minority identity tend to 
recognise themselves as more widely heterogeneous. Such divergent 
approaches to identity have the possibility of complicating the delivery of 
state policies to particular groups. 
To address the limitations of existing policy, I investigate the issues of 
discrimination and racism as reported by participants in a large, non-
representative survey of Indians resident in New Zealand, most of whom 
were migrants. These are garnered from both respondent comments and 
survey data to determine the incidence of self-reported discrimination, 
despite the fact that policies designed for minority integration and 
migrant settlement are well-established in New Zealand society. I argue 
that identity issues are of primary importance to diversity governance, 
even where such policies are already taken seriously by both proactive 
government and nongovernment agencies empowered to promote 
minority integration, foster social justice, and promote human rights for 
the benefits of all members of society. The recurring and frequent 
incidence of discrimination and prejudice within society also raises the 
question of whether or not existing diversity management policies are 
achieving the desired effects for which they are intended. The continued 
existence of such phenomena, despite policies designed to counter their 
effects, strongly suggests that current diversity management strategies 
need to be reassessed. 
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17 See Barber (2004). 
A deep diversity framework utilises a bottom-up approach, rather than 
relying on top-down ‘management’ methods currently employed by state 
institutions empowered to ‘manage’ minorities or to improve integration 
outcomes. Such an approach can shift existing paternalistic models in 
which states work primarily to improve minority integration, to one that 
approaches diversity governance as a collaboration between migrant, 
minority and majority communities—integral in achieving a more socially 
cohesive and domestically secure state. Using a deep diversity framework, 
I unpack existing state interpretations of ethnic identity through both a 
deconstruction of historical sources that obfuscate minority identity and 
the census enumerations currently used in diversity management which 
tend to render ethnic subgroups invisible. Existing state-initiated diversity 
management is largely a reflection of historic top-down policies, what 
Williams (1996:74) refers to as a “managerialist notion of diversity.” It is 
therefore vital to reexamine state portrayal of ethnic minorities, through 
unearthing more inclusive histories and contextualising census 
classifications in order to achieve a more inclusive framework of diversity 
governance. Such varied approaches may shape state methods of 
managing multicultural populations. These objectives would therefore 
position the research as a critique of state-led diversity management 
policies. 
This thesis, however, does not purport to provide solutions for vexing 
policy issues designed to manage increasingly diverse populations, nor 
does it provide a set list of specific policy recommendations for diversity 
governance in New Zealand. Rather, it outlines a conceptual framework 
within which existing sociohistoric contexts may be queried, existing 
policy may be examined, or new policy may be conceived, all within 
particular guidelines, and all in terms of the relative appropriateness of 
particular policy initiatives, considering the specific cultural, economic 
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and political circumstances within which particular policies may be 
framed. It does not provide a checklist of all the circumstances and 
nuances likely to be associated with New Zealand, or any other country 
for that matter. It does not evaluate existing policy in New Zealand, and 
does not provide a roadmap to social cohesion. While providing a global 
context is necessary in which to provide pertinent background 
information, the focus here remains fixed on New Zealand, and relevant 
examples are provided throughout. Its applicability in a global context is 
beyond the purview of this thesis. Furthermore, deep diversity is 
presented here as a work in progress, in its initial stages only, and is not to 
be considered as a complete package. Rather, in writing this thesis, it is 
hoped that what is presented can stimulate and encourage a wider 
discussion of the appropriateness of existing policy approaches, given the 
increasing pluralism faced by most modern western democracies today. 
1.3 Contributions
This study makes three broad contributions to existing scholarship. The 
first is historical, utilising primary source material to extend the history of 
Indian presence and settlement in New Zealand. When I began 
preliminary research into the topic in 2006 there were few existing 
published source materials on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand. These 
included a number of scholarly articles in published journals,18 numerous 
book chapters,19 and a few books.20 Much of the remainder was difficult to 
obtain, such as the dozen Masters dissertations and PhD theses on themes 
related to Indians in New Zealand.21 Also, much of the existing 
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18 See, for example McGee 1962, Shepard 1982, Leckie 1985 & 1998, Palat 1996, Trlin et al. 1999, Kolig 
2003, Bernau 2005, Friesen et al. 2005. 
19 For example Taher 1970, McLeod 1980, Zodgekar 1980, McGill 1982, Leckie 1990, 1995a & 1995b, 
McGee 1993, Friesen 1996, Shepard 2002, Johnson & Figgins 2005.
20 e.g. Tiwari 1980, McLeod 1984 & 1986.
21 See Grimes (1957), McGee (1960), Taher (1965), Kirwan (1978), Budhia (1979), Khan (1980), Leckie 
(1981), Kasanji (1982), Meanger (1989), Nandon (1994), Prasad (1995), Raza (1997), Nayar (2005).
scholarship on ethnic minorities mostly focused on New Zealand’s other 
large ethnic minority, the Chinese population, currently New Zealand’s 
largest Asian population.22 More recently, there have been numerous 
publications over the course of my research, including the publication of a 
number of important books,23 book chapters,24 and numerous journal 
articles.25 26 Yet none of these consider the historical context of Indian 
presence at the very founding of the modern New Zealand state.
The second sets out to more appropriately describe the diversity that 
exists within the Indian diaspora in New Zealand. Current census data 
portray the diverse Indian community as largely homogenous. Census 
categories using publicly released state enumeration methods for non-
Māori minorities (e.g. Indian) merely present a few select subgroups, 
while European and Māori subgroups are comprehensive and well-
defined.27 This puts particular ethnic minorities and subgroups at a 
significant disadvantage. For example, publicly available census figures 
may sometimes enumerate those that have self-reported Level 2 ethnicities 
(e.g. ‘Gujarati’ or ‘Punjabi’), but lump the remainder of India’s myriad 
ethnic groupings into the category Indian nfd.28 As such, it is not currently 
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22 Though this may change: the 2013 Census reported 171,957 Chinese and 156,567 Indians, though 
the Indian population was growing at a much faster rate than the Chinese. If current trends 
continue, the Indian population would catch up and surpass the Chinese population by 2018. 
23 See Lal (2006a), Leckie (2007), Pio (2008), Kolig (2010), Bandyopadhyay (2010b), Watson (2012). 
24 See Leckie (2006, 2010); Bandyopadhyay (2006); Pio (2007b); Friesen & Kearns (2008); Ballantyne 
(2010); DeSouza (2010); Johnson (2010); Zodgekar (2010); Ip & Leckie (2011); Singh & Singh (2011); 
Watson (2011). 
25 Kolig (2006), Nayar & Hocking (2006), Wood & Guerin (2006), Johnson (2007), Pio (2007b), 
Friesen (2008a), DeSouza (2009), Watson (2011). 
26 I’ve compiled a complete bibliography of published sources on the Indian diaspora in New 
Zealand, which can be found in Appendix J. 
27 While ‘European’ and ‘Māori’ represent Level 1 classifications (i.e. the top tier ethnic 
categorisations) on the New Zealand Census, both are well described at further subgroup levels 
(e.g. at national and regional levels for all European communities, and at iwi levels for Māori), 
while ‘Indian,’ a Level 2 classification subsumed under ‘Asian,’ is not adequately described in 
publicly available census data. Statistics NZ also recognises the Treaty relationship, and the unique 
character of Māori statistical needs (Statistics New Zealand 2012b). 
28 nfd = not further defined. 
possible to gain a deeper understanding of the population, unless one is 
merely interested in the largest grouping Indian, itself a subgroup of the 
term Asian, which is most widely used in the reporting of census data. In 
contrast, it is relatively easy to freely download tables from Statistics New 
Zealand with the extraordinary range of European subgroups, birthplaces 
and languages. Likewise, Māori tribal affiliations are also similarly 
displayed and made available to the public through a wide variety of 
downloadable reports and spreadsheets. Like Asian, other ethnic minority 
terms in wide use by state institutions, such as Pacific,29 and MELAA,30 are 
horizontally categorised terms that obscure the subethnicities within. 
While Indian and Chinese are both classed as Asian, they could not be more 
distinct; yet majority society tends to amalgamate such populations, 
blurring boundaries and failing to recognise differences between 
populations. Such broad terms homogenise ethnicity and obscure deeper 
categorisations.31 The presentation of data collected through the survey 
will demonstrate the diversity hidden within state-constructed identities 
of minority communities that are not otherwise available, and hopefully 
show the relevance of releasing such data to end users where it is not 
currently available.
The third broad contribution examines the search for a more socially 
relevant approach to policy inquiry, one that outlines an alternative logic 
designed to return policy formulation, delivery, and evaluation to its 
normative roots. Public policy should not, as de Haven-Smith (1988:ix) 
notes, be thought of as a social experiment, “as some sort of projectile 
aimed at a ‘target’ population,” but rather one that is “better conceived as 
a multifaceted effort to mitigate complicated social problems, the causes of 
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29 referring to members of Pasifika minorities.
30 referring to those of Middle Eastern, Latin American and African extractions.
31 see Prewitt (2013) for a similar critique of the use of broad categories in the US census. 
which are subject to dispute.” Deep diversity rethinks the current 
approach that positions minority populations as beneficiaries of policies 
designed for their social uplift and improved integration into mainstream 
society. It offers a more inclusive, practical framework designed for all 
constituents of multicultural societies, rather than one directed at 
minorities. 
1.4 Definitions and notes on the text
Certain key terms and concepts used throughout are contested, and their 
definitions here are not so much an attempt to provide a definitive 
interpretation, but to briefly inform the reader of their intended meanings 
in this thesis. Māori words are presented in italics where they are not 
generally perceived to be a part of the English lexicon. This is done for the 
benefit of readers outside of New Zealand who may not be familiar with 
colloquial terms used in New Zealand English. In the first instance, these 
are translated in corresponding footnotes, generally sourced from 
Moorfield (2011). These terms are also presented using the more 
traditional macrons over elongated vowels, where needed, rather then 
resorting to the alternative system which doubled the vowel (e.g. ā for aa). 
I also follow the convention of non-capitalizing Māori words unless Māori 
usage specifically treats certain words as proper nouns, and hence 
capitalized. In this I again follow Moorfield’s usage, so nouns like Pākehā32 
remain capitalised throughout, while similar words, such as tauiwi33 are 
not. Throughout, I make repeated reference to minority, indigenous, migrant 
and majority populations. These are defined below.
20
32 Pākehā is a common Māori word in New Zealand English which refers predominantly to New 
Zealanders of European descent. 
33 Here interpreted as the non-Māori, non-Pākehā population of New Zealand.
Minority populations: When referring to minority populations, I 
specifically mean those groups within society that do not belong to, or are 
not members of, the dominant (political) or majority (demographic) group, 
or those individuals or groups that are disadvantaged or marginalised in 
some way. Members of minority groups also share particular experiences 
that are commonly associated with identification as a minority. Such 
experiences may include, but are not limited to, bias, bigotry, chauvinism, 
discrimination, hatred, inequity, intolerance, partisanship, prejudice, 
racism, ageism, and sexism by members of a dominant group. Members of 
minority populations also sense a close affinity towards others within 
their group that share the same or similar experiences (Mossakowski 2003, 
Sellers et al. 2006, Yip et al. 2008). 
In Multicultural citizenship Kymlicka (1995) argues that there are basically 
two distinct categories of minorities within modern western liberal 
democracies: polyethnic groups and national minorities. Polyethnic 
groups generally refer to minority immigrant populations that have 
voluntarily settled in new host countries. National minorities, according to 
Kymlicka (1995:11), refers to indigenous populations, or “historical 
communities, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given 
territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture.” In 
Kymlicka’s interpretation, national minorities in multiethnic states must 
be present at the founding of the modern nation, have a prior history of 
self-government, have a common culture and language, and must have 
institutions that support self-government. I will use the term minority to 
refer to Kymlicka’s polyethnicity, and the term indigenous to refer to what 
Kymlicka calls national minorities, as the latter is often used in European 
contexts and is not in common usage in New Zealand. 
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Indigenous populations: An indigenous population is one that originates 
in, is characteristic of, or occurs naturally in a particular region or country, 
and exists prior to the arrival of settler societies that followed or before 
colonisation. I follow Coates (2004) definition of indigenous as referring to 
those ethnic minorities who have been marginalized as a result of their 
historic territories becoming part of a formally declared state. Indigenous 
can variously refer to aboriginal, autochthonous, first-nation, native, and 
original populations within political states, or to the earliest or first known 
human inhabitants of a particular territory or locale. Hitchcock & Vinding 
(2004:8) further define indigenous populations as those that fulfill the 
following characteristics: 1) have arrived earlier in time in particular 
locales than other populations, 2) exhibit the voluntary perpetuation of 
their cultural distinctiveness, 3) have experience of being subjugated, 
marginalised and/or dispossessed in some way, and 4) self-identify as 
being indigenous.34 Following Kymlicka (1995), indigenous communities 
are usually considered minority populations in most western democratic 
states. My use of the term indigenous implies that all of these definitions 
are valid. In the New Zealand context, Māori are the indigenous 
population. 
Migrant populations: Migrants are individuals who move from one 
location, usually their place of birth or country of origin, to settle in 
another place, region or country. They emigrate for a variety of reasons, 
but the most often cited ‘pull’ factors are improved economic 
opportunities, or the promise of a better lifestyle, climate or environment; 
while loss of land, poverty, war, and religious or political discrimination or 
persecution are the most often-cited ‘push’ factors that encourage 
individuals and communities to emigrate (Lee 1966, Schoorl et al. 2000). 
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34 See also the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations 2008) 
adopted in September 2007. 
The term migrant can refer to both voluntary or involuntary migrants. 
Voluntary migrants are those that chose to move of their own volition, 
while involuntary migrants may refer to refugee populations, typically 
displaced by war, poverty, or religious or political persecution. Migrant 
can also refer to either domestic migrants (those that change location 
domestically within the borders of any particular state), or to international 
migrants (those that leave the country of their birth to reside in a country 
other than their place of birth). Migrants can be either temporary or 
permanent, choosing either to live in their new location for a short time 
before moving on again, or to settle permanently in their new location. I 
use the term migrant to refer to international migrant individuals and 
communities that have left their countries of birth to immigrate to New 
Zealand, either temporarily or permanently. 
Majority populations: Majority refers to the members of the dominant 
group within any particular society that constitute a number that is greater 
than half of the whole. When referring to populations, a majority generally 
refers to the larger or dominant group of people that exist within a 
community, society, or nation that share the particular attributes, 
characteristics, customs, features, mannerism, qualities, and traits that 
make them the most prevalent group within the population. Majority 
populations generally possess a larger share of influence and power in the 
sociocultural, economic, political, and legal spheres, and exert control over 
the delivery of state resources, including health and educational services. 
In the New Zealand context, majority most often refers to the European 
population that has been the majority ethnicity since the second complete 
Census35 was undertaken in 1858, which recorded 59,413 Europeans and 
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35 The first complete NZ Census took place in 1851, when Māori were still the majority population.
56,049 Māori present, at 51.5% and 48.5% of the population respectively.36 
The European majority reached its zenith in the 1916 Census, when it 
made up 95.1% of the total New Zealand population.37 Based on my 
analysis of census records, in terms of the total population, the percentage 
of Europeans have been in decline since 1916. The 2013 Census currently 
records a European population comprising 75.3%38 of the total population. 
In some places throughout the text I also refer to host communities. In such 
instances, host community refers to the majority population that receives 
and helps support new migrant communities. It should not be confused 
with the term tangata whenua (people of the land), which refers to Māori as 
indigenous and belonging to Aotearoa, and implies ‘hosting’ and ‘having 
guardianship responsibilities’ for non-Māori peoples in Aotearoa.39 
Other key terms
Diversity: Diversity is defined as the state or quality of being different or 
distinct—that which embodies a noticeable heterogeneity. Following 
Boston & Callister’s (2005:35) usage, diversity will be used both 
descriptively and prescriptively “as a term to depict or explain particular 
empirical phenomena and as a principle or criterion to guide action and 
policy.” Descriptively, diversity is used to refer to particular defined 
categories or types of difference, such as cultural or ethnic diversity, or to 
denote divisions in a wide variety of contexts and disciplines in both the 
natural and social sciences. In the social sciences, diversity traverses 
multiple settings, as in business (e.g. workplace diversity, diversity 
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36 Statistics presented here are derived from the 1858 New Zealand Census. 
37 Statistics presented here are derived from the 1916 New Zealand Census. 
38 This consists of the census usually resident population count that stated an ethnicity, and does 
not include the 65,973 people (or 1.6% of the total stated population) who self-identified their 
ethnicity as New Zealander. 
39 see (Moorfield 2011).
training ), or law (e.g. diversity jurisdictions). When applied to cultural 
diversity, it refers to the wide variety of ethnocultural groups within any 
given area. Neighbourhoods, particular locales, towns, cities, regions and 
nation-states can all be referred to as being culturally or ethnically diverse, 
provided they meet the requirements of having multiple ethnocultural 
groupings; the same is true for organisations, businesses and sundry 
institutions. Cultural diversity is most often used interchangeably with 
plural/pluralism and multicultural/multiculturalism to describe a condition 
or sociopolitical state in which many cultures coexist and are able to 
maintain their cultural distinctiveness.
Williams’ distinction between the terms diversity, difference and division, 
which are not fixed categories, is relevant here. 
The emphasis is not so much on the difference between subjects but upon 
understanding how those differences are constructed and how the categories are 
themselves constituted through difference. Identities are not, in this way, seen as 
fixed, but ambiguous, fluid and unstable, changing with the shifting power 
relations of time and place (Williams 1996:64). 
Her take on these terms aligns well with the framework I employ—in 
which existing categories in use by state mechanisms are less crucial than 
the ways in which individuals and groups choose to self-identify. Williams 
describes diversity as a shared collective experience, which does not 
necessarily imply relations of subordination in regards to, for example, 
ethnicity, nationality, or religious affiliation. It is division which implies 
relations of subordination, not diversity itself, while difference is the 
condition or situation where diversity becomes the basis for resistance 
against subordination. Deep diversity, in an aspirational sense, would 
envision majority-minority distinctions less relevant in fully pluralised 
societies. Thus diversity is used in a positive sense to refer to the state or 
condition of being socially or culturally diverse. Prescriptively, diversity, as 
in diversity policy, is used to refer to a set of policy goals or guidelines put 
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into effect and used in the governance of multicultural populations in 
plural or pluralising societies. 
Multiculturalism: The term multiculturalism, over the years, has had a 
number of varying definitions associated with it. These range from the 
very general: “a body of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of 
people understand themselves and the world and organize their 
individual and collectives lives” (Parekh 2000a:2-3), to the more specific 
“multiculturalism is a system of beliefs and behaviors that recognizes and 
respects the presence of all diverse groups in an organization or society, 
acknowledges and values their sociocultural differences, and encourages 
and enables their continued contribution within an inclusive cultural 
context which empowers all within the organization or society” (Rosado 
1997:2). 
Ideologically, multiculturalism seeks to treat individual or group members 
of a minority culture as having the same rights afforded to members of the 
majority society. It implies that all minority communities in mainstream 
host societies should be granted equal rights in all spheres, without being 
expected to give up the sociocultural, linguistic, and religious elements 
that characterise their distinct cultures and set them apart from dominant 
society. Amongst governments that espouse a policy of multiculturalism, 
there is the expectation of conformity to certain key values held by the 
dominant society (Castles & Miller 2009). A certain amount of integration 
into the host society is therefore both encouraged and expected, and is a 
key component of modern multiculturalist policies in liberal democratic 
states that proactively ‘manage’ diversity. As a central theme of this thesis, 
my use of the term multicultural policies can best be explicated using 
Kymlicka’s definition as “an umbrella term to cover a wide range of 
policies designed to provide some level of public recognition, support or 
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accommodation to non-dominant ethnocultural groups, whether those 
groups are ‘new’ minorities (e.g. immigrant and refugees) or ‘old’ 
minorities (e.g. historically settled national minorities and indigenous 
peoples)” (Kymlicka 2007:16). This definition aptly fits the New Zealand 
context. 
Aotearoa and New Zealand: These terms both refer to the country now 
known as Aotearoa New Zealand. Aotearoa, being the original Māori 
name, means ‘Land of the long white cloud.’ In general, I often use 
‘Aotearoa’ to refer to the country prior to 1840 and the signing of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, and ‘New Zealand’ when referring to the modern 
state.
1.5 Conclusion
Deep diversity explores issues of identity and the blurring of 
subminorities that often render them invisible. This approach allows 
examination of the problems of discrimination, tolerance and social 
inclusion, which are arguably amongst the most important challenges 
facing pluralist states today. As global mobility intensifies, populations 
diversify. This has important ramifications for both plural and pluralising 
nations that increasingly grapple with discrimination, prejudice, ethnic 
tension, racism and violence, while simultaneously struggling to improve 
health, education, employment, and immigration and settlement policies 
that foster improved social cohesion. Maintaining an appropriate balance 
amongst such competing pressures is a considerable challenge for any 
nation, and successful public policies of inclusion are indeed potent 
measures of a country’s social cohesion and domestic security.
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Despite the significance of these issues, existing diversity management 
policies appear fragmented and systematically directed at what are 
perceived to be distinct policy arenas. Immigration policy is often limited 
by its narrow focus on employable skills and the number of migrants 
permitted entry to offset rising emigration. Settlement policies are usually 
only concerned with strategies that acculturate, assimilate or integrate 
migrant populations into majorities, yet raising majority awareness of 
minorities is often ignored. Such shallow policies most often target 
minority social uplift at the expenses of majority education. Current 
diversity management strategies thus appear issues-driven, emphasising 
the differences that separate rather than the similarities that bind. This 
thesis, therefore, offers an alternative framework for considering more 
appropriate forms of diversity governance for states with large minority 
populations, rather than existing forms of diversity management and the 
policies they engender. 
This thesis is divided into three main parts, constituting the introduction, 
the findings and analysis, and the conclusion. Part I: Introduction, which 
includes Chapters One through Four, establishes the main focus of the 
thesis, outlines its research agenda, presents the theoretical framework, 
and contextualises the topic, all of which provide the necessary 
background for the presentation of the findings and analysis that follow. 
Chapter One provides an overview of the thesis and its research 
objectives, and sets the stage for the ensuing discussion. Chapter Two 
critically examines multiculturalism and the theoretical foundations of 
deep diversity, and describes a conceptual framework for diversity 
governance. Chapter Three outlines the various qualitative and 
quantitative methods undertaken in this study. Chapter Four discusses the 
New Zealand context in which the case study is situated. 
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Part II: Findings and Analysis, consists of Chapters Five through Eight, 
and contains the substantive chapters that present the research and 
directly address the research objectives. Chapter Five examines the 
invisible history of a minority population and emphasises the importance 
of accurate historical representation in establishing a distinct ethnic 
identity that can be situated within the larger national ethos. In so doing, it 
reframes the history of tauiwi in Aotearoa. The data presented in Chapter 
Five examine the historic treatment of non-Māori minorities by 
demonstrating that Aotearoan history has been written predominantly 
through the eyes of Māori and European historians, ignoring alternative 
contributions.40 The extent of Indian involvement in the exploration and 
colonisation of New Zealand’s history has not been previously addressed. 
Chapter Six examines the minority history told through the state 
instrument of the New Zealand Census and the move from early Indian 
presence, discussed in Chapter Five, to that of Indian settlement, as 
sojourners settle, and initial instances of Indian appearance in the census 
record begins. It reveals the extent to which European control of census 
enumeration obscured the presence of the very earliest ‘settled’ Indians. 
The presentation of this material helps establish that past state treatment 
of ethnic minorities tends to render non-Māori minority and their 
subgroups invisible. Such an exegesis further demonstrates the invisibility 
of minority ethnic and religious populations in New Zealand and the 
power that states wield through such an instrument.
The demographic profile of the Indian population in New Zealand is 
provided in Chapter Seven, which presents recent Census results and 
discusses the statistical composition of the Indian population based on 
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40 This lack of non-Māori minority history is only now just beginning to be addressed (see Ip 2003, 
2009; Johnson & Moloughney 2006; Bandyopadhyay 2010; Voci & Leckie 2011), but even these 
volumes deal with recent history only and do not delve back far enough into the historical record. 
both publicly available and requested data.41 Due to the February and 
June 2011 Christchurch earthquakes, the 2011 Census was unfortunately 
delayed until 2013, so this chapter is based largely on the 2006 data. The 
public release of ethnicity data from the 2013 Census took place in May 
and August 2014, so the most recent statistics were introduced while 
editing this thesis prior to submission. Chapter Seven explores the 
statistical results of those choosing to self-identify as “Indian” from both 
the 2006 and 2013 New Zealand Census, and critiques the state reportage 
of identity that emerges from existing categories of ethnicity, birthplace, 
linguistic and religious affiliation. Such an examination exposes the 
disparity between the current use of ethnicity as a classificatory tool in the 
census and the myriad ways in which minorities choose to identify. 
Another research objective is tackled in Chapter Eight which presents 
selected results from my survey, portraying the importance of self-
identification and the degree of self-reported discrimination experienced 
by survey respondents. It presents findings and analysis from the survey 
data that demonstrate the depth of self-reported identity not evident in the 
2006/2013 Census and portray the continued discrimination experienced 
by Indian minorities, as evidenced through respondent comments on 
employment, engagement with majority society, self-reported racism and 
perceptions of personal safety. 
Addressing any apparent disparities between the divergent foci of each 
Chapter in Part II is crucial in acknowledging the overarching themes of 
the thesis. In particular, the earliest minority history explored in Chapter 
Five, the historical treatment of minorities in the census scrutinised in 
Chapter Six, the demographic description of the current Indian population 
30
41 The data from the 2006 Census was requested in 2012 under the auspices of an academic grant 
made by Statistics New Zealand. 
in Chapter Seven, and the statistical examination of select survey results in 
Chapter Eight, upon initial reading may appear disconnected, and this 
warrants an explanation here. I address this linkage through an analysis 
informed throughout by the framework of deep diversity, which serves as 
the unifying thread that binds these contrasting chapters together. 
Throughout Part II, I analyse the twin themes of identity and invisibility, 
which provide the coherence necessary to relate the disparate elements 
evident in these substantive chapters. In Chapter Eight, discrimination, a 
dénouement of minority invisibility and the state’s homogenising of 
identity, becomes a critical analytical variable, highlighting the need for 
policy modification. As this thesis is multidisciplinary, the substantive 
chapters focus on anthropological, historical, demographic and statistical 
inquiry and analysis. This multidisciplinarity, which may appear to be 
disconnected, has fundamental components that contribute to the 
explication of deep diversity, explored throughout, and elucidated 
through the themes of identity and invisibility. 
Part III concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications of 
diversity in the New Zealand context, reflections on the value and 
significance of the framework of deep diversity and the analysis it 
facilitated, and ends with specific recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK OF DEEP DIVERSITY
Multiculturalism is not about minorities, for that implies that the majority culture 
is uncritically accepted and used to judge the claims and define the rights of 
minorities. Multiculturalism is about the proper terms of relationship between 
different cultural communities. The norms governing their respective claims, 
including the principles of justice, cannot be derived from one culture alone but 
through an open and equal dialogue between them (Parekh 2000a:13). 
When we sit back and reflect on what people have said and written, we often 
discover better, deeper and more humane interpretations (Gee 2005:xi). 
2.1 Introduction
For those in most liberal western democratic states today, living in a 
multicultural society has become an acknowledged and accepted element 
of everyday existence. Yet issues of race and ethnicity remain significant, 
and when they occur, they attract controversy. For example, this is being 
written against the backdrop of a recurring debate in New Zealand 
concerning immigration policy and the role that migrants play in society. 
A recent incident, concerning a racist Pākehā rant against a Pakistani taxi 
driver in Invercargill, highlights this debate. While the Pakistani driver 
remained calm and polite throughout the verbal onslaught, repeatedly 
informing his passenger that he was being recorded on video, the 
passenger describes the driver as an “Islam prick” and repeatedly tells the 
driver to “f*** off back to where you come from” (Powley 2013, Jones & 
Fuatai 2013). These types of incidents are common,42 and highlight the 
notion that, for majorities at least, diversity is often best understood in 
terms of general categories that are convenient and mutually 
comprehensible. Labels like Asian, European, Māori, and Polynesian, or 
black, white and brown, are most commonly used and understood. Yet such 
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42 Statistics New Zealand (2012) reports that one in ten people aged 15 or over reported 
experiencing some form of discrimination in New Zealand within the previous year. 
terms only serve to obscure the more relevant honorifics with which 
members of minority communities may choose to identify. Should we 
choose to look, we would encounter ever more subtle forms of diversity 
not worn on our sleeves. 
Along with Asian cab drivers and white racists, governments and 
institutions are equally culpable of homogenising diversity. States, 
empowered by legislation, regularly enumerate their populations through 
a census or similar instrument, and in so doing categorise citizens and 
residents according to fixed lists of ethnicities and subgroups.43 Referring 
to British censuses conducted in India, Chakrabarty (1998:98) argued that 
“counting Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Untouchables became a political 
exercise,” which had the effect of simplifying and homogenising 
identities, even though people lived their lives in far more heterogeneous 
ways. The collection of such ethnicity data for the purposes of 
enumeration and the allocation of state resources has, generally, proved 
exceptionally problematic, and appears to have done more to increase 
awareness of the dilemmas inherent in such classification schemes than to 
resolve either the theoretical or practical issues (Cooper 1994, McKenney 
& Bennett 1994, del Pinal 2003, Barber 2004, Phillips 2007). 
Official statistics do not merely hold a mirror to reality. They reflect 
presuppositions and theories about the nature of society. They are products of 
social, political, and economic interests that are often in conflict with each other. 
They are sensitive to methodological decisions made by complex organizations 
with limited resources (Alonso & Starr 1987:1). 
Such complexities underscore the importance of the continual 
reevaluation of current enumeration methods for the reporting of 
ethnicity. They embody critical arguments both against officially 
sanctioned forms of diversity and for broader interpretation of diversity. It 
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43 Morning (2008) reported that 63% of the national censuses of the 141 countries she reviewed 
incorporated some form of ethnic categorisation and enumeration, with their question formats 
varied by diverse conceptualisations of ethnicity (e.g. as ‘race’ or ‘nationality’). 
seems that a new, or more nuanced, vocabulary is necessary to keep pace 
with rapidly altering demographies. 
While states and majorities may value the status quo, minorities need to 
rethink existing power structures that may marginalise, alienate, and 
homogenise, even though they may reap some benefit from existing 
enumeration and apportionment procedures. These may not be enough. 
Kertzer & Arel (2002:2) claim that censuses do much more than simply 
reflect social reality, they play a crucial role in the construction of that 
reality. Creating group boundaries, however artificial, only reinforces and 
validates existing accepted hierarchies. Ethnic classifications are often 
superficial and camouflage deeper forms of self identification that carry 
significant implications for public policy. To complicate matters, many 
existing state policies only allow for the collection of a single ethnicity per 
resident (Morning 2008), as in particular health and education policies 
designed for ethnic minorities (Leather 2009). As national censuses are 
often seen as an arena in which ethnic minorities struggle for official 
recognition and equality (Kukutai & Didham 2012), such policies tend to 
subvert minority aspirations and the multiple identities with which 
individuals may choose to identify. Thus states wield power over ethnic 
minorities, an authority that is largely concentrated within state-
supported institutions, and buttressed by policies and legislation too 
firmly established and structurally entrenched to easily adapt to rapid 
demographic change. This places already disenfranchised minorities at 
further risk of marginalisation, especially in the allocation of scarce 
government resources. While such a view may appear to situate 
minorities as passive agents and as victims of hegemonic state policy, it 
should be acknowledged that they possess considerable agency and 
capacity to resist and challenge dominant paradigms. Such ability is 
evident in increasing presence in the public sphere, petitions for cultural 
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or religious accommodation, and in increasing political representation 
(Park 2010). 
As governments in multicultural democracies are increasingly being 
challenged to justify their collection of ethnic and racial data and the 
targeted policies they support (Hirschman 1987, Kukutai 2004, King-
O’Riain 2007), minority populations recognise that their voices for greater 
inclusion are beginning to be heard by previously unresponsive 
governments (Jackson & McRobie 1998, Banducci et al. 2004, Narayan 
2005, Park 2010). In many multicultural societies, the statistics gathered by 
various state instruments of enumeration now show sufficient diversity to 
be utilised for some minority advantage, as in the health and education 
sectors where modest gains have been made but much progress remains 
(Fleras 1989, Durie 1998, 2005; DeSouza 2006, 2009; Bishop et al. 2009). As a 
result of changing demographics, states need to be held accountable to 
more appropriate standards for identifying self-reported ethnicities, and 
to properly enumerate these.
The substantive chapters presented here demonstrate that ethnicity and 
identity cannot be easily categorised into the generic terms in use today. A 
more subtle approach to diversity and its governance is necessary; one 
that more adequately recognises that a deeper heterogeneity exists than 
that currently defined. The concept of deep diversity presented in this 
chapter articulates, first, a conceptual framework that facilitates new ways 
of interrogating historical data and assessing the suitability of existing 
approaches to diversity management. It demonstrates that existing 
histories and state enumeration methods aid in the perpetuation of 
structural and institutional discrimination—that such barriers must fall in 
order for the particular social, economic, health and education indicators 
that separate minority from majority to progress. 
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Second, deep diversity may also be useful in guiding policymakers in the 
design and implementation of public policies that manage the 
transformed demographies evident in western democracies today. As a 
novel conceptual framework, it is hoped that some of the ideas articulated 
in this initial formulation of deep diversity will help advance the ways 
that policy is currently contextualised and actualised. Further, the use of 
deep diversity as an evaluative public policy tool needs further 
explication, which remains beyond the purview of this thesis. Existing 
ways of theorising, designing and implementing policies for diversity 
management no longer keep pace with the ethnic, religious and linguistic 
changes occurring today. Such policies, therefore, must better adapt to the 
realities of a briskly changing environment. 
This chapter begins with a brief review of the literature of 
multiculturalism, the context in which it is situated, and a discussion of its 
relevant criticisms, all of which provide a necessary context for 
introducing the concept of deep diversity. Next, the historical and 
theoretical foundations of deep diversity are introduced, followed by a 
framework for diversity governance that examines both shallow and deep 
forms of multicultural engagement. Contextualising “oppositional 
categories” (Williams 1996:63) in this way allows for an examination of 
historical and present state treatment of minorities in order to help 
identify the suitability of both current and future approaches to diversity. 
The purpose of such a framework is not to examine existing legislation 
and policy, but rather to analyse past and present methods in order to 
provide a more contemporary conceptual framework for guiding 
legislators and policymakers in New Zealand to create and implement 
more appropriate governance strategies within a context of increasing 
demographic plurality. Finally, the chapter ends with a concise definition 
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of deep diversity that draws on the elements discussed throughout the 
chapter. 
2.2 The multicultural context: a brief review of the literature
John Rex, in his pioneering work on ethnic relations, laid out an early 
definition of multiculturalism in four parts, as being a society which “(a) is 
unitary in the public domain but which encourages diversity in what are 
thought of as private or communal matters; (b) is unitary in the public 
domain and which also enforces or at least encourages unity of cultural 
practice in private or communal matters; (c) allows diversity and 
differential rights for groups in the public domain and also encourages or 
insists upon diversity of cultural practice of different groups; (d) has 
diversity and differential rights in the public domain even though there is 
considerable unity of cultural practice between groups” (Rex 1985:4). 
While Rex’s definition draws upon some of the early uses of 
multiculturalism as a term, it lacks an important element espoused by 
Castles & Miller (2009), that diversity gains meaning through communal 
ascription to key values held by the host society. Such practices might be 
through the shared experiences of migrant communities (e.g. migration to 
the host country,44 common settlement narratives, similar experiences in 
finding suitable employment, new educational experiences, political 
participation in the host country, gaining citizenship), or other minority 
populations (e.g. shared struggles for equal economic opportunities, 
improved political and social participation in society, better health and 
education outcomes). Elements common to all minority communities help 
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44 Indeed, early Indian emigrants shared a special relationship with others aboard the boat leaving 
India. Known as *+dv_matra*dv_matra .dv_matra/’s (jahāzi bhāis) or ‘ship brothers,’ the term still retains meaning for those 
traveling together or undertaking similar pursuits. It implies camaraderie and companionship in 
communal endeavours. Kolff (2013:29) notes that its usage indicated an awareness that the old 
ritual distinctions evident in India were beginning to fade while simultaneously marking the 
emergence of a new shared group identity. See also Ghosh’s (2009, 2012, 2015) characterisations in 
his Ibis trilogy. 
create a sense of sharing a common national identity with the host 
community, such as the sharing of events and experiences with majority 
communities (e.g. belief in a national identity or ethic; shared 
participation in national celebrations, elections, sporting events; shared 
conviction in key national values, principles or ideologies; trust in political 
institutions; profound belief in a founding document or constitution). 
Ascription to such norms can often aid the settlement, adaptation and 
integration of new migrants (Grant 2007, Ager & Strang 2008, Dhingra 
2008, Doerschler & Jackson 2012) and can also enhance the wellbeing of 
minority communities in host societies (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2006, Fischer 
& Boer 2011, Ward & Stuart 2012). For migrants, this also fosters a certain 
sense of pride of one’s new participation in national identity, and this is 
especially valid as one moves towards a greater sense of belonging to 
one’s adopted homeland and potential citizenship. For minority 
communities, a greater sense of belonging can foster increased 
participation in all levels of society (de Wit & Koopmans 2005, Parekh 
2006). 
Like Rex, Bauböck (1996:204-205) formulated a set of four definitions for 
multiculturalism: (a) a descriptive term for the existence of various 
culturally distinct groups within a society, (b) an explanatory concept that 
refers to the diversity of cultural groups, (c) a source of conflict and social 
disintegration, rather than an effect, and (d) a normative idea that refers to 
the positive value of a plurality of cultures within society. Kobayashi 
(1993) attempts to define multiculturalism in terms of a nation-state’s 
sociopolitical and legislative agenda—that multiculturalism can be 
exemplified as a demographic, institutional or structural phenomenon; 
demographic in that it describes a country’s ethnocultural and 
demographic diversity, institutional in that governments officially 
recognise and promote multiculturalism through official state policies, or 
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as structural in that multiculturalism is regulated by institutional policy 
and legal reform, which provides a basis for social change. Kymlicka 
(1995) distills multiculturalism as that which recognises the ethnocultural 
identities and differences of its residents.
There is an additional body of literature that defines multiculturalism in 
terms of its policy initiatives; policies that “endorse the right of different 
cultural or ethnic groups to remain distinct rather than promoting 
assimilation into a society’s cultural mainstream” (Jackson 2009). From 
this literature it is evident that there is no fixed definition or doctrine of 
multiculturalism. The concept is variously interpreted by different 
countries according to their sociopolitical and historical contexts and is 
approached using a wide variety of strategies:
Each country has a different definition of multiculturalism, different sets 
of public policies to deal with/respond to cultural difference, and 
correspondingly different definitions… (Sandercock 2011:50). 
In practice, it has been formulated as official policy in several Western 
countries since the 1970s.45 Parekh (2000) discusses how the early 1970s 
marked the emergence of the multicultural movement in Canada and 
Australia, followed by the USA, UK, and other European nations. In the 
late 1960s Canada began to characterise the particular policies it was 
considering for a new mode of immigrant incorporation—those intended 
to promote tolerance and respect for cultural diversity—as 
multiculturalism (Kivisto & Faist 2010:161, Ley 2010). In 1971, Canada 
became the first country to adopt multiculturalism as an official state 
policy, thus affirming its commitment to the value and equality of all its 
citizens regardless of race, ethnicity, language or religious affiliation 
(Moodley 1983, Inglis 1996, Frideres 1997, Kymlicka 2003, Dewing 2009, 
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45 See Stasiulis (1988), Inglis (1996), Parekh (1996, 2000), Burayidi (1997), Hall (1997), Kymlicka 
(2002, 2007), Boston et al. (2006), Bromell (2008), Kivisto & Faist (2010), Vertovec & Wessendorf 
(2010). 
Citizenship & Immigration Canada 2012). Australia followed suit by 
developing a similar multicultural policy, and the full introduction of 
official state policies were formalised in 1972 (Zubrzycki 1977, Foster & 
Stockley 1988, Castles 1992, Inglis 1996, McAllister 1997). Its multicultural 
policy remained intact despite opposition espoused during the Howard 
government with the release of the 1988 “One Australia Policy” (Maddox 
2005), and later opposition in the mid-1990s from MP Pauline Hanson and 
her One Nation party (Ley 2010). 
Other immigrant- and minority-friendly countries also introduced 
multicultural policies of varying degrees. In the UK, the fact that Britain is 
an immigrant nation with a multicultural society had been widely 
accepted (Singh 2003, Solomos 2003, Hadjetian 2008), prompting Tony 
Blair’s Labour government to introduce formal state multicultural policies 
(Blair 2006, Sommerville 2007, Shi 2008). Swedish multicultural policies, 
unlike Australia, Canada and the UK, were not based on a national 
identity of a nation of immigrants. Rather, large numbers of migrant 
populations from Finland, Yugoslavia, and substantial numbers from 
Africa, Asia and other non-European regions introduced new sources of 
cultural diversity into the Swedish population. This prompted the 
government to replace its earlier policy of assimilation with formal 
multiculturalist policies in 1975 (Skutnabb-Kangas 1983, Hammar 1985, 
Inglis 1996, Westin 1996). 
In the Netherlands, an official national policy of multiculturalism was 
adopted in the early 1980s (Penninx 1996, Scheffer 2011), but these policies 
were later overturned due to rising opposition. Politician Pim Fortuyn, 
who rose to power on an anti-immigration platform, led the charge but 
was later assassinated in 2002 for his radical views. His anti-immigrant 
stance, along with fellow citizen and film director Theo van Gogh, also 
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murdered in 2004 (Anthony 2004), fomented debates on immigration and 
the role of multiculturalism in the Netherlands, which resulted in the open 
rejection of multiculturalism and the introduction of new policies aimed at 
assimilation. The Netherlands has now attracted international attention 
for the extent to which it reversed its previous multiculturalist policies, 
and its policies on cultural assimilation and integration have been 
described as some of the toughest in Europe (Entzinger 2003, Dutch 
Ministry of Justice 2004, Cohen 2005, The Economist 2006, Prins & Saharso 
2010, Scheffer 2011). France also has adopted formal assimilationist 
policies that eschew multiculturalism and thus refuses to engage in ethnic 
enumeration (Simon & Pala 2010, Simon 2012, Léonard 2014). Other 
countries in the European Union (e.g. Germany, Denmark, Switzerland) 
have opted for less formal approaches and have enacted policies aimed, to 
varying degrees, at social cohesion and integration (Schönwälder 2010, 
Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). 
In the USA, there are currently no official multicultural policies at the 
national level, although there are formalised programmes over a wide 
variety of institutions (e.g. educational, state policies, commerce) that 
support and institutionalise diversity in both the education and business 
sectors (Naylor 1997, Takaki 2008, Nieto & Bode 2011). In Asia, numerous 
countries consider themselves multicultural, including India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore, but none of these have instituted 
formal multicultural policies, although India has a constitution which 
formally enshrines rights and protections for minorities and particular 
groups. As in the US, these policies tend to focus on managing diverse 
populations in the educational, economic and development sectors. India 
is arguably the most diverse country in the world, with its cultural, 
linguistic, religious and ethnic diversity unparalleled amongst nations 
(Hardgrave & Kochanek 1986, Jalali 1997, Fearon 2003, Panda & Gupta 
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2004).46 India’s diversity policies are most usually operationalised in 
public institutions, and in the political and policy solutions devised to 
address its cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic inequalities. These 
have focused predominantly on affirmative action or preferential 
treatment of its lower castes and minority populations (Jalali 1997, Jayal 
2006). All of these countries, to varying degrees, have established 
strategies and mechanisms for managing the increasing ethnic diversity 
found within their borders.
This variety of state responses to increasing pluralism is often determined 
and influenced by the particular historical, economic and political 
processes that have led to its increased diversity. By now, many of these 
policies have been in operation for decades and their outcomes and 
ramifications are well-documented. While some approaches demonstrate 
substantive positive outcomes for minority populations that are 
commonly recognised and similarly deployed in many western liberal 
democracies, other approaches have not been quite as effective. 
2.3 Situating New Zealand: contextualising identity and discrimination
While the above discussion provided a necessary context, the following 
serves to situate New Zealand with reference to a global multiculturalism, 
presenting recent select incidents that raise questions about the 
management of diverse populations (with particular focus on the 
importance of identity and discrimination to the diversity discourse), and 
the variety of multicultural responses and diversity policies in effect 
today. As a point of departure, some nations that favour formal 
multicultural policies are asking pertinent questions of their intrinsic 
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46 Although recent evidence, based on combining data on ethnicity and race with a measure based 
on the similarity of languages spoken by major ethnic or racial groups, puts African countries such 
as Chad and Togo as being amongst the most culturally diverse (Gören 2013). 
worth. Such enquiries have prompted Kymlicka, a prominent Canadian 
proponent of such policies, to raise a critical question for policy 
practitioners today: “We now have close to forty years experience with 
various forms of liberal multiculturalism. Are they working well? Are they 
a ‘success’ that warrants their global diffusion?” (Kymlicka 2007:135). To 
address this question, this section examines some recent global events and 
specific New Zealand incidents that highlight the significance of identity 
and discrimination in managing plural societies. 
To begin, some centre-right governments in several European countries—
most notably in Denmark and the Netherlands—have recently reversed 
official national multicultural policies to return to those of assimilation 
and integration (Vasta 2007; Hedetoft 2010; Prins & Saharso 2010; Vertovec 
& Wessendorf 2010; Vincour 2010a, 2010b). Amid rising anxieties over 
international and domestic terrorism, similar events in a post-7/7 Britain 
have given way to an increasing debate over the role of immigration, the 
participation of ethnic minorities, and the appropriateness of 
multiculturalism as the model form of diversity management policy in the 
UK (Modood 2005; Grillo 2007, 2010). In Canada, critics of 
multiculturalism have recently “flocked to the new Reform Party which 
explicitly called for immigration restriction and a curtailment of 
multiculturalism” (Peskin & Wehrle 2012:262). The 2012 rise of the 
xenophobic right-wing extremist Golden Dawn party in Greece called for 
similar measures (Tsatsanis 2011, Behrakis & Babington 2012, Xenakis 
2012:440). The 2011 Norway massacre of 77 people by Anders Breivik, 
protesting parties supporting multicultural policy, has also sparked 
similar debates, causing popular shifts towards anti-immigrant views 
(Jupp 2011). Indeed, this pattern is being repeated throughout western 
liberal democratic states (Cohen 2005, Kymlicka 2010a, Vertovec & 
Wessendorf 2010, Lesin ́ska 2014). In recent years, increasing globalisation, 
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migration, domestic and international terrorism, and rising ethnic tensions 
have led several heads-of-state to publicly express uncertainty about their 
own multicultural policies: British Prime Minister David Cameron, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Australia’s ex-prime minister John 
Howard, Spanish ex-president Jose Maria Aznar and former French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy47 have all voiced concerns about the 
effectiveness of their multicultural or immigration policies (Dempsey 
2010a, 2010b; Vincour 2010a, 2010b; Zapata-Barrero 2010; Falloon 2011; 
Peskin & Wehrle 2012:262). 
While other multiethnic states, like Canada, Australia and Sweden, 
continue to actively pursue multiculturalism as formal state policy, others, 
such as Germany, have not attempted to better integrate their national 
minorities and have remained quite ambivalent about multiculturalism. In 
2010, German Prime Minister Angela Merkel commented that “this 
multicultural approach, saying that we simply live side by side and live 
happily with each other, has failed. Utterly failed” (Dempsey 2010a-c, 
Eddy 2010). While Germany’s attempt to integrate its national minorities 
cannot be regarded as on par with formal multicultural states like 
Australia and Canada, its admission is nonetheless revealing. Germany is 
not a settler society like the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Yet, 
like most modern nations with diverse populations, the absence of strong 
public policies designed to foster social cohesion is palpable. German 
attempts at integrating minority and majority populations have been half-
hearted at best, as Germany had always expected its immigrant 
populations to return home.48 In reality, most nation-states do the 
minimum or almost nothing to encourage integration, and there is often 
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47 All leaders of conservative parties.
48 German citizenship is based primarily upon the concept of jus sanguinis, by which citizenship is 
not determined by one’s country of birth, but rather by having one or both parents who are citizens 
of the state. January 2000 reforms, however, have made it somewhat easier for resident foreigners 
in Germany on a long-term basis to procure citizenship (Green 2000). 
an unwritten expectation that their diverse peoples should simply co-exist 
the best they can in the absence of formal public policies designed to 
foster a more appropriate social amalgamation of their cultural and ethnic 
minorities. 
In New Zealand, high-profile public outbursts of racism by prominent 
television personalities have also fueled the ongoing debate on identity 
and discrimination. Certain incidents made headlines around the world, 
prompting intervention by New Zealand’s Broadcasting Standards 
Authority and the Human Rights Commission. In September 2003, 
Television New Zealand (TVNZ) broadcaster, the late Paul Holmes, 
referred to then United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan as a 
“cheeky darkie” (Dye 2003). During an October 2010 broadcast, TVNZ’s 
morning ‘Breakfast’ show co-host Paul Henry, while interviewing Prime 
Minister John Key about then Governor-General Sir Anand Satyanand49, 
asked if he would consider choosing “a New Zealander who looks and 
sounds like a New Zealander” when his term finished in mid-2011 
(Neville & Harper 2010). While Henry considers himself to be a “real New 
Zealander,” Satyanand could never be one according to Henry, despite 
Satyanand’s being born and raised in Auckland. In a single statement, 
Henry affirmed the identity of European New Zealanders as constituting 
the nation, while subjugating minority populations based solely on 
physical features. Henry’s remark was squarely directed at all Indian New 
Zealanders, suggesting that they cannot possibly be considered ‘New 
Zealanders’ due to the colour of their skin. 
Later the same week, Paul Henry, while discussing the 2010 
Commonwealth Games in New Delhi, deliberately mispronounced the 
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49 Satyanand was born in New Zealand and is of Indo-Fijian descent.
name of Delhi’s Chief Minister, Ms. Sheila Dikshit,50 with relentless 
“rollicking laughter” (Nash 2010). In the span of just a few days, Henry 
both raised the question of national identity and publicly ridiculed an 
individual on the basis of ethnicity. In both, he attempted to get European 
New Zealanders to laugh with him, while humiliating minorities. Paul 
Henry later gave a formal apology to the Governor-General, but the 
‘Dikshit affair’ sparked an international diplomatic incident involving the 
New Zealand High Commissioner to India, Rupert Holborow, who was 
summoned to the Indian Foreign Ministry for a formal protest (Adams 
2010, Ihaka 2010). Ironically, although Henry later resigned from his 
breakfast show at TVNZ, the incidents generated substantial publicity for 
Henry, increasing his prestige amongst the sizable population of New 
Zealanders with whom his remarks resonate.51
The institutional responses to these high-profile incidents varied. Paul 
Holmes’ “cheeky darkie” comment ended with an apology and 
reprimand, but the Broadcasting Standards Authority refused to uphold 
the complaints made over the comment (Walsh 2003). The response to the 
Paul Henry incidents, however, were widely condemned. TVNZ at first 
defended Henry’s remarks, observing that he often said what many New 
Zealanders thought, but were afraid to speak out loud (Rudman 2010). 
The complaints about Henry’s comments were later upheld by the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority (Donnell 2010), citing breaches of the 
three separate standards of: good taste and decency (Standard 1), fairness 
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50 Ms. Dikshit is a career politician for the Indian National Congress and former member of the 
Indian Parliament. She was the elected Chief Minister of Delhi (1998-2013) by virtue of being the 
leader of the largest party in the Delhi Legislative Assembly. As Chief Minister of Delhi she stepped 
into the role of overseeing the Commonwealth Games in Delhi in 2010. She was recently sworn-in 
as the new Kerala Governor on 11 March 2014. She earlier represented India for the United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women (1984–1989), and she and her colleagues were jailed in August 
1990 for 23 days by the state government of Uttar Pradesh when she led a movement against the 
atrocities being committed against women. She has also served as the Minister of State for 
Parliamentary Affairs (Press Trust of India 2003, Government of Delhi 2013).
51 Paul Henry, after a brief hiatus on Australian television, is now back on air in New Zealand with 
a popular weekday night news magazine show on TV3. 
(Standard 6), and discrimination and denigration (Standard 7),52 forcing 
TVNZ to backtrack on its original comments. TVNZ was also widely 
castigated for its initial public support of Henry, and for its cynical use of 
racist comments to boost publicity, viewership and profits (Drinnan 2010, 
Rudman 2010). 
Capping a highly charged month of debate on identity and discrimination 
in October 2010, came the news that a “blonde, blue-eyed beauty queen” 
named Jacinta Lal, with a Fijian-Indian New Zealander father and a 
European New Zealander mother, was crowned winner of the Miss India-
New Zealand Central beauty pageant, and was subsequently booed by 
some members of the Indian audience for “not being Indian 
enough” (Misa 2010, Vass 2010).53 In questioning her ethnicity based on 
physical features, Indian audience members mirrored the Henry/
Satyanand affair, raising the question of what actually constitutes a real 
Indian? 
Lal, after hearing that the story had made international headlines, made 
one of the few sensible comments in the wake of this controversy: “This 
issue has been blown out of proportion and has taken the focus off the 
inappropriate and offensive comments Paul Henry made on national 
television, which was the real issue” (Vass 2010). This news item clearly 
shows that prejudice and intolerance can occur not just between majority 
and minority populations, or between different ethnic groups, but within 
them as well. This incident underscores the theory that ethnic boundaries 
can equally be formed by exclusion as well as by inclusion (Barth 1969, 
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52 personal communication, TVNZ letter, 18 October 2010.
53 Similarly, a recent event occurred in the US in September 2013 when Nina Davuluri, an Indian-
American, was crowned the winner of the Miss America 2013 beauty contest, sparking a post-
pageant onslaught of anti-immigrant comments. Indian bloggers were also quick to point out that 
she would probably never have been selected as Miss India as her skin would be considered too 
dark (Ghosh 2013, Judkis 2013, Raj 2013). 
Guibernau 2013, Wimmer 2013). Such anecdotes reveal both the 
importance of identity and the pervasiveness of discrimination, themes 
central to this thesis. While the Lal anecdote may be more about notions of 
authenticity policed from within (rather than about state-imposed 
categories), it nonetheless corroborates the perception that the ethnic term 
Indian is a construct that does not adequately embody the heterogeneity of 
the Indian population; and demonstrates, through exclusion, that a deeper 
understanding of identity is necessary if discrimination is to be more 
adequately addressed by public policy. 
In another example of race-based discrimination, Richard Prosser, an MP 
representing New Zealand First,54 penned a prominent article, entitled 
“Enemy at the gates,” about limiting the rights of ethnic minorities in 
New Zealand:
If you are a young male, aged between say about 19 and about 35, and you’re a 
Muslim, or you look like a Muslim, or you come from a Muslim country, then 
you are not welcome to travel on any of the West’s airlines (Prosser 2013:9). 
He further stated that the rights of New Zealanders are being “denigrated 
by a sorry pack of misogynist troglodytes from Wogistan, threatening our 
way of life and security of travel in the name of their stone age religion, its 
barbaric attitudes towards women, democracy, and individual choice…If 
the belief systems of ancient history are so important to you, and the 
advances of the decadent West so abhorrent, go ride a camel instead.” 
Such derogatory remarks are offensive to most members of society and 
only serve to proliferate a message of hatred and social exclusion. 
Prosser also found fault with his fellow parliamentarians alleging that 
“excessive tolerance, coupled with the twin evils of diversity and 
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54 New Zealand First is a political party, founded in July 1993 by Winston Peters, that is best known 
for its strong anti-immigration policies. The party garnered just under 7% of the vote in the 2011 
elections, and held 8 seats in the New Zealand Parliament (Johannasson & Levine 2011, Peters & 
van Even 2011). In the September 2014 elections, New Zealand First achieved 8.7% of the party vote 
and currently holds 11 seats in Parliament, including Prosser. 
multiculturalism, upheld and promoted by political correctness and other 
weaknesses of spirit and nationalism, mean that the citadel has already 
been breached, and that the terrorists have already won” (Prosser 2013:9). 
He clearly positions himself as a zealously resolute anti-immigrationist. 
Prosser was supported by the leader of the New Zealand First party, 
Winston Peters, who publicly stated that he would not apologise for 
Prosser’s statements, that he had been writing in his capacity as a 
columnist and not as an MP, that the views expressed were not those of 
the party, and that he would not ask Prosser to resign his position as a 
duly elected minister (Young et al. 2013). The declamation by New 
Zealand First leaves little interpretative leeway; New Zealand is certainly 
not immune to the possibility of the emergence of an extremist, right-wing 
political party, and white supremacist groups, such as the National Front 
and Right Wing Resistance, are currently active.55 
Such remarks from our elected officials discredit New Zealand’s 
international reputation (Bennett 2013) and point to the more destabilising 
issue of the structural discrimination that still exists within New Zealand 
institutions. The March 2013 review of New Zealand’s exemplary human 
rights record by the United Nation’s Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination cited the Prosser proclamation as an example that 
New Zealand still has much work to accomplish in removing any 
remaining vestiges of structural discrimination. 
The Committee regrets the recent inflammatory remarks by a Member of 
Parliament vilifying persons from Central Asia or the Middle East based 
on their skin colour and country of origin as well as their religion, but 
welcomes the strong criticism of such statements by the Minister of 
Justice and Ethnic Affairs and the Race Relations Commissioner, among 
others, as well as the unanimous resolution passed by the Parliament 
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55 The Christchurch-based Right Wing Resistance (RWR) resurfaced in Oamaru in November 2013, 
to leaflet residents about recruiting armed militias to patrol the New Zealand coastline in order to 
ward-off an invasion of Asian migrants from “people smugglers in Indonesia” (Ashton 2013). It 
also distributed blatantly anti-Semitic propaganda via leaflets to suburban Hamilton mailboxes 
regarding a Jewish conspiracy in New Zealand in May 2015, of which the author has a copy. See 
<rwrnz.blogspot.co.nz> for their manifesto. 
reaffirming the State party’s commitment to preserving an inclusive 
multiethnic society (UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination 2013). 
In its non-binding recommendations, the United Nations Committee 
strongly urged New Zealand to intensify its efforts to promote social 
cohesion through raising awareness of discrimination in order to combat 
existing stereotypes and prejudices against particular ethnic and religious 
groups. The continued recurrence of such incidents as mentioned above 
indicate that New Zealand is not doing enough to educate the majority 
about its minority populations. 
While there are similarities between the Holmes, Henry, Lal and Prosser 
examples, their differences are also significant. While the Lal story was 
taken to the media, the Holmes and Henry incidents were perpetrated by 
the media, and Prosser’s comments were made by a sitting 
parliamentarian. Such incidents clearly demonstrate the perpetuation and 
impact of widespread discrimination and impede the efforts of public 
policy to stem the tide of social exclusionism in society. Both the Lal and 
Henry/Satyanand incidents raise issues of authenticity, the heterogeneity 
of minority populations, and the importance of identity in deeply 
multicultural societies. In the wake of such incidents, real questions 
emerge about what actually constitutes a real New Zealander or a real or 
legitimate Indian. Questions of legitimacy further problematise the 
prevailing construction and use of such ethnic categories. 
The question of what constitutes a legitimate Indian is thorny, tangled in 
complex queries of birth country, language usage, and generations 
removed from Indian soil. Both here and abroad, the use of the term Indian 
has become a broad ethnic category, allowing anyone with ancestral ties to 
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the subcontinent to utilise the designation to varying degree.56 This 
homogenises the population, blurring the distinction, for example, 
between Gujaratis and Malayalees (who each speak distinct languages 
and have singularly dissimilar cultures), or between Indo-Fijians and 
South African-Indians who differ sociopolitically and historically from 
India-born Indians. The amalgamating nature of a broad ethnic construct 
may simplify census procedures but echoes shallow forms of diversity. 
The frames of reference used in Indian self-identification enable us to view 
a deeper ethnic diversity that puts the Lal story into sharper focus. 
In a time of blurring boundaries and cultural hybridity,57 it is impossible 
to discern identity as anything other than self-constructed, although states 
often ascribe or impose ethnic identity on minorities. These particular 
incidents contextualise the importance of both the identity and 
discrimination discourses for majority and minority alike. They 
underscore an urgent need for remedial action, and more forceful public 
debate on the meaning and merits of immigration, minority participation, 
and increasing diversity. Given that such incidents occur with regularity, it 
should be evident that public policy has not kept up with recent 
demographic change. Has multiculturalism really failed, or is it merely the 
implementation of public policies? Perhaps the global backlash against 
diversity and multiculturalism is not so much due to the rapid increase in 
ethnic minorities in liberal western democracies (as the media, or some of 
our more ardent politicians, might have us believe), but rather to the 
manner in which existing diversity management policies are designed and 
implemented. If this is indeed the case, perhaps deeper forms of diversity 
governance might provide a more meaningful context. Such a context is 
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56 Likewise, the term European has similar connotations and homogenises white populations of 
European extraction.
57 See Bhabha (1994), Appadurai (1996), Brah (1996). 
furthered through a brief critical discussion of multiculturalism, below, 
which helps establish key weaknesses that a deep diversity framework 
hopes to address. 
2.4 A review of critiques of multiculturalism
In its broadest sense, multiculturalism can be considered not only an 
acceptable, but a desired ideology and policy, especially if it promotes 
social cohesion and inclusion. Despite their promise, these policies have 
been the target of critique since multiculturalism was first mooted in the 
1970s (Broudy 1975, Ivie 1979, Glazer 1981, Thomas 1981). More recent 
critiques have shown that particular states (e.g. Australia, UK, 
Netherlands) that previously espoused formal multiculturalism are now 
dismissing it in favour of policies more focused on civic integration 
(Vermeulen & Pennix 2000:20-22, Entzinger 2003, Joppke 2004, Neerup 
2012). 
Such a move is predicated on the rapid and sustained increase in 
migration and the corresponding rise of minority populations that had 
previously existed in small or insignificant numbers. First, there are more 
source countries now than when multiculturalism was first promoted as a 
state policy in some liberal democracies (Clyne 2009:44, Gochenour & 
Nowrasteh 2014:12). The recent growth in immigration has now altered 
the discourse; where previously it had generally been a question of 
accommodating minority or indigenous needs, state policies must now 
address the growing number of both immigrant and national minorities 
within their borders. Second, is the problem that distinct parallel 
institutions for ethnic minorities have arisen in most multicultural states. 
Separate educational systems, sociocultural networks, community and 
voluntary organisations, employment, and places of worship, all of which 
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may operate in native languages, indicate that many ethnic communities 
and networks now operate alongside majority societies rather than within 
(Cantle 2001:9, Joppke 2004, Gijsbertsa & Dagevosa 2007, Phillips 2007:5). 
Third, and most importantly, multicultural policies of minority 
accommodation58 and integration often did not address the problems of 
unemployment and economic marginalisation often experienced by 
minority populations. Whereas accommodation and integration have 
most often focused on cultural issues in the past, many now believe that 
employment and economic integration must form the basis for a new 
generation of immigration and multicultural policies (Joppke 2004, 
Scheffer 2011, Hansen 2012, OECD 2012). Since the recent and rapid 
migration increases of the past decades, multicultural critiques have 
begun to account for these factors and have instead begun to push for 
varying forms of increased civic and economic integration. 
While multiculturalism has been disparaged by both the right and left, a 
common underlying critique is that it was implemented as a set of policies 
for the national accommodation of non-white minorities—a liberal 
response that often masked the discriminatory racialised and 
institutionalised histories of many Western receiving societies such as 
Canada, the US, Australia and the UK (Bannerji 1995, 2000; Hage 1998; 
Hesse 2000; Hall 2000; Sandercock 2011). Such a critique calls upon 
western receiving nations to not only address the atrocities of a racialised 
past (and present), or to acknowledge the devastating impacts of 
colonialism and institutionalised discrimination, but to move forward 
through apology, redress, and charting out a clear pathway that addresses 
historical injustices and lays out an inclusive, socially cohesive agenda. 
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58 My use of the term ‘minority accommodation’ refers to the extent that multicultural societies and 
their resulting legislation and policies are willing to allow particular ethnocultural and/or religious 
practices to continue by state entities, especially when such practices attract considerable attention 
and challenge shared majority values. 
This critique has emerged from a subordinate minority that, as a result of 
increasing ethnic diversity and heightened minority participation, has 
found its voice (Banducci et al. 2004, Sullivan 2010, Park 2010). 
In contrast, there are some in majority communities who believe that the 
ideology and policies of multiculturalism are an affront to Western views 
and culture and should be debunked. Warder (1993) argues that 
multiculturalism has the potential to balkanise, weaken scientific 
advances and replace economic competition with quotas that support 
unskilled labour. For Schlesinger and Auster, the introduction of 
multiculturalist notions were seen as a move to totally unmake American 
culture: 
The national idea had once been e pluribus unum. Are we now to belittle the unum 
and glorify pluribus? Will the center hold? Or will the melting pot yield to the 
Tower of Babel? (Schlesinger 1991:2).
Multiculturalism, in sum, is far more than a radical ideology or misconceived 
education reform; it is a mainstream phenomenon, a systematic dismantling of 
America’s unitary national identity in response to unprecedented ethnic and 
racial transformation (Auster 1992:43). 
In contrast to these views, Hage (1998) argues that multiculturalism is 
actually a way of alleviating white guilt—that its policies do more for 
white society than they do for minority communities. Much of 
Kundnani’s work (2002, 2007, 2014) discusses how multicultural policies 
often have the reverse effect of increasing the wrath of the majority, 
resulting in a weakening of minority aspirations, and this warrants 
mention here. In a similar fashion, some critics have suggested that 
multiculturalism simply reflects prevalent colonial views—that ‘us-them’ 
dichotomies still persist within multicultural discourse (McLaren 1995, 
Goh 2008). Gouws & Stasiulis (2013:7) argue that colonial histories are 
fraught with discriminatory legislation aimed at indigenous populations, 
and that modern liberal democratic regimes have not managed to displace 
the colonial past but have rather incorporated it into the democratic 
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present. In such instances, identity politics, in which various minority 
identities jockey for recognition, is a direct consequence of persistent 
European hegemony. 
Another critique of multiculturalism is that it does not differentiate 
between which groups may flourish. In the absence of any serious checks 
and balances, any group with any agenda may emerge and be given equal 
voice in an overcrowded democracy. This may sanction the proliferation 
of hate groups, allow the operation of armed anti-government militias, 
and enable particularly xenophobic or religious fundamentalist groups to 
survive and thrive. According to some, multiculturalism (and similar 
constitutional ‘freedom of speech’ acts) serve to give voice to a 
particularly dark side of human endeavour (McCann 2009, Simi & Futrell 
2010). If the very essence of multiculturalism is the advent of equality for 
the myriad cultural, ethnic, linguistic, religious and ideological groupings, 
then the necessity for particular regulatory policies and institutions 
becomes ever more acute. In such instances, the state usually assumes the 
additional responsibility and financial burden for maintaining a tenuous 
balance between groups with radically opposed agendas, although in 
some instances, non-governmental organisations and entities may suffice. 
More generally, critics of multiculturalism have often wondered if its 
policies are sustainable, or even desirable (Parekh 2000a, Nagle 2009, 
Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010, Lentin & Titley 2011). Some wonder if 
multiculturalism is too costly an expense to bear. Citing the mounting 
economic costs of diversity, Scheffer (2011:325) states that “tolerance is 
groaning under the burden of maintenance” and concludes “the 
multicultural drama now unfolding is therefore the greatest threat to 
social peace.” Citing the Dutch example, Scheffer argues that minority 
integration into mainstream society has failed, that integration policies 
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have been too liberal and have focused too much on the “retention of 
culture” of immigrants, and that multiculturalism ignored the formation 
of a minority underclass of people who did not feel connected to Dutch 
society and who were unable or unwilling to integrate into it (Scheffer 
2000, Entzinger 2003). This unwillingness would, according to Scheffer, 
further stratify society. In Scheffer’s view, governments are too indifferent 
to the fate of minorities, and minorities are too apathetic in their efforts at 
integration (Scheffer 2000, Penninx 2005). More to the point, the most 
pressing problem for migrant communities in the Netherlands was 
unemployment and economic marginalisation (Joppke 2004). Scheffer’s 
outspoken views, eschewing policies of liberal admission and minority 
accommodation, helped swing the government’s former policies away 
from promoting cultural diversity towards one of full integration. 
According to Scheffer, the unconditional integration of minority 
populations through the intensive instruction in local language, culture 
and history is the way to make multicultural policies work (Scheffer 2000, 
2011).59 Only once this is achieved can full economic integration be 
possible. One problem with this line of thought, however, is that it 
assumes that the ‘majority community’ is itself homogenous—that there is 
no internal diversity of gender, sexuality, ideology and values. Another 
assumes that improved economic integration will lead to equality; that 
racism somehow does not exist or is not a significant barrier to full 
participation and inclusion. 
Scheffer, and those espousing similar strategies, desire nothing short of 
the full integration of minority populations into majority society. While 
this might appear as an appeal for minorities to uphold particular national 
values for the benefit of a greater national identity, it may negatively 
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59 This, however, was not applied to many majority societies. Pākehā in New Zealand, for instance, 
were never expected to assimilate to Māori language and culture. 
impact minority populations compelled to suppress distinctive cultural, 
linguistic and religious practices from the public sphere and relegate them 
to the private. Such an integration pathway may create a sense of 
alienation for subordinate communities. According to this discourse, 
majority populations want minorities to more fully integrate so that 
majorities might better accept, relate to, and employ minorities. This 
position assumes first that minorities stand apart from majority society, 
that they are already marginalised, and second, that minorities are the 
ones responsible for the grunt work of integration.60 Majority group 
members often expect minority populations to relinquish their individual 
and group distinctiveness, the very essence of their unique identity. Such 
a stance exemplifies the white anxiety of which Hage (1998) speaks, and is 
still present in race relations today. 
Minorities in most countries are generally willing to integrate into 
majority society, but are unwilling to give up their cultural identity. 
Scheffer (2011) maintains that multicultural policies should vigorously 
promote the comprehensive integration of minority communities; that 
minorities either integrate fully into society or forever remain on its 
margins. Scheffer’s insistence conjures up pop-culture images from the 
Star Trek: Next Generation television series that aired between 1987-1994 of 
Borg domination and their “Resistance is futile—You will be assimilated” 
ultimatum, issued when confronting other space-faring alien races61. The 
Borg model suggests that any politically formidable group can easily 
overpower smaller cultural groups (e.g. subordinate minorities) as being 
‘irrelevant’ to their continued evolution. The Borg quest for ‘perfection’ 
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60 As an example, state policy in the Netherlands shifted the onus of integration on to minority 
communities in its 1994 policy “The integration of ethnic minorities,” which describes integration as 
purely the responsibility of minority communities, and as no longer being a state commitment (de 
Wit & Koopmans 2005, Phillips 2007:7).
61 In the Star Trek universe, the Borg are a cybernetic blend of humanoids and robots that have 
incorporated the technological and biological distinctiveness of each species they encounter and 
assimilate them into their own collective being in their search for ultimate “perfection.”
also raises the moral imperative of the appropriateness of majority 
communities that demand the total integration of minorities into their 
population. In so doing, the Borg rid themselves of all distinction between 
individual members of their society to further the needs of their collective. 
It should be noted that the Borg are eventually defeated by the particular 
distinctiveness and individuality posed by humanity. However 
implausible it may seem, Scheffer’s model may unknowingly commit any 
such society that demands universal adherence to strict integration to a 
similar fate. 
Offering an alternative approach, Kymlicka (1995, 2007, 2010a) argues for 
full minority accommodation. Parekh (2000a, 2006, 2008) qualifies and 
clarifies this approach, stating that where minority values clash with 
majority culture, the values of the majority should prevail. To what extent 
then may Scheffer or Kymlicka be correct? Exactly how much integration 
is necessary to sufficiently maintain parity between civil harmony and 
social unrest in dominate and subordinate communities? How do states, 
and other agencies and institutions charged with maintaining diversity 
ascertain the tipping point and achieve equilibrium? A definitive answer 
may be elusive, but it is clear that a balance must be struck between 
policies of liberal immigration and total minority accommodation on the 
one hand, and total integration and state imposed assimilation on the 
other. Finding such balance will differ between countries (Spoonley & 
Tolley 2012), and depend upon the specific historical, political, 
sociocultural and economic circumstances of particular states. In New 
Zealand, which lacks formal multicultural policies,62 parity will need to be 
achieved between the state’s obligations to remain firmly grounded in its 
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62 New Zealand, like the US, has specific institutions (e.g. Human Rights Commission, Office of 
Ethnic Affairs, Race Relations Commissioner) and particular policies and legislation (e.g. New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Human Rights Act 1993 and it numerous Amendments in 1994, 
1999, 2001, 2007 and 2008) in place that support diversity and multiculturalism. 
bicultural commitments and tauiwi-majority need for improved 
integration of minority populations. Indigenous Māori have already taken 
a lead role in working with tauiwi on issues of sovereignty (Tuffin et al. 
2004), and there appears to be much room for potential Māori-Asian 
partnerships to develop (Chang 2009, Kukutai 2011b, Young 2011). 
If a linear scale could be drawn with liberal immigration and full minority 
accommodation on one end (representing Kymlicka’s position), and total 
integration and assimilation at the other (representing Scheffer), deep 
diversity would fall closer to that of Parekh, lying centre-left with a 
decisively Kymlickian lean. Accommodating minorities should be an 
ongoing discussion, one that involves constant mediation and negotiation 
between subordinate and dominant positions, a robust deliberative 
context that would involve the active engagement of all parties concerned. 
There will be no definitive response that works in all circumstances, as 
each state will need to tailor such a balance to the particular conditions 
that make it unique. Nonetheless, a first step of active engagement would 
be to recognise that diversity is ever-present, in both minority and 
majority populations, and then to construct ways in which to engage that 
diversity. 
In an active deliberative context of engagement, the notion of identity 
becomes critical to the diversity discourse. Identity, crucial to a deep 
diversity framework, can be instrumental in achieving social cohesion 
between minority and majority populations (Kearns & Forrest 2000:1001, 
Novy et al. 2012:1879). Putnam (2007) agrees, arguing that societies 
premised on a national identity are better able to overcome the downsides 
of increased migration and pluralism, and Miller’s (1995) claim that a 
strong national identity fosters trust and solidarity among fellow citizens, 
regardless of ethnicity or nationality (Reeskens & Wright 2012). It is a 
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defining human characteristic which interprets the social milieu(s) 
navigated in the course of daily affairs. Yet identities are paradoxical, for 
they often set individuals apart and weave them back together as 
collectives. While identity may help define, for example, ethnocultural, 
religious, and linguistic selves, and provide meaning and import to 
existence, it can also marginalise and minoritise, disengage and isolate 
from the dominant social order. Alternatively, minority identities may 
help to shape and build associations comprised of those sharing similar 
affinities, for example, members of the same ethnic or religious 
communities, or those that hold a birth country in common. As 
individuals, members of minority populations also hold majority selves, 
those parts that aid integration and identify with wider society, such as a 
shared national identity. This very nuanced complexity of identity 
simultaneously differentiates and binds individuals together. A deeper 
understanding of what identity represents, therefore, is a key element that 
makes the active engagement of deep diversity effective. 
Addressing both Scheffer and Kymlicka, minority integration should be 
pursued, but not at the cost of relinquishing cultural identity. Doing so 
only further widens the gap between subordinate and dominant, creates 
resentment, and foments discord. Minorities should proactively be 
accommodated and encouraged to express their diversity in both private 
and public spaces, by participation in the design and implementation of 
policies that facilitate engagement. While policy domains are not normally 
the primary site of cultural expression, such displays may allow 
minorities to contribute to society in ways that forced integration does 
not. As such, minorities have a stake in contributing to majority society, 
and are more inclined to be positively engaged in its economic, political 
and social activities. Accommodation should thus be moderated in the 
Parekhian sense through continued active engagement and deliberation. 
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Along with encouraging distinct cultural identities, states must work to 
actively cultivate and further a national identity in which minorities can 
participate. Such a national identity can be composed of the sharing of 
common histories and hardships (such as a shared colonialism or 
participation in armed conflict63), communal connections to the land, the 
celebration of national festivals, and the backing of national sports teams 
in an international arena, for example.64 Linking minority policies to the 
promotion and participation in a shared national identity may help to 
reconnect and link the positive, yet vague, concepts of ‘diversity’ and 
‘multiculturalism,’ which most often lack historical meaning, to notions of 
equality and social justice, which help evoke such histories. Majority 
populations may ultimately be more welcoming of migrants and 
minorities if common links are found and incorporated into a shared 
national ethos. 
In addition to reaching back for historical commonalities, minority 
policies must also have an eye toward the future. A communal national 
identity would be meaningless to migrants without the articulation of 
clear pathways to citizenship. The US is currently grappling with such 
issues as it decides the fate of migrants who have entered the country 
without proper documentation (Ryo 2013, Thomas 2014). While many 
individual states have laws to deport such ‘illegal’ immigrants and their 
offspring, the federal government is attempting to pass legislation that 
would create new pathways to residence for qualifying undocumented 
migrants, and their children born in the US. This would empower 
formerly disenfranchised migrants through granting them legal status, 
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63 While such shared experiences can never be fully inclusive, they can, nonetheless, contribute to a 
shared national identity.
64 For more on the importance of national identity see Greif (1995b), Liu (2005), Parekh (2008), 
Bertelsmann Foundation & the Migration Policy Institute (2013).
allowing for greater participation in society rather than being 
marginalised, or having to work ‘under the table.’ Further, migrants that 
lack pathways to citizenship are most usually deprived of the core right of 
political participation (Bauböck 2006). Pathways to permanent residency 
and citizenship offer migrants well-defined trajectories and may 
contribute to a greater sense of belonging to one’s adopted nation. For 
most migrants, emotional, historical, social and economic ties to new 
homelands are known to intensify and solidify once citizenship is 
attained, and well connected migrants are more likely to be positive 
contributors to society in economic, political and cultural ways (Castles & 
Spoonley 1997, Kofman 2005).
Moreover, the ultimate cost of assimilation, the total integration of 
minority populations, implies another paradox—that diversity should 
somehow end in the creation of a new monoculture, consisting of a single 
shared homogenous national identity (not an ethnic, cultural, religious or 
linguistic identity) that displaces the distinctness of heterogeneously 
diverse populations. Individuals in such populations might outwardly 
appear distinct, but would all subscribe to the normative values 
determined by a state-mandated national identity. Not only is such 
attachment unduly authoritarian and unrealistic in modern liberal 
democratic states, it does not buffer against the potential discrimination, 
for example, of Indians belonging to the New Zealand state. Caution 
should be exercised when states fail to accommodate minority needs and 
instead push a wholly integrationist agenda. The danger inherent in such 
oppressive approaches would imply the imposition of stronger state-
imposed identities that would supersede individual and group minority 
identities. 
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Assimilation should therefore not be the end game of state policies that 
promote integration as a way of managing diversity. If a state views 
integrationist/assimilationist models as paramount for any of a variety of 
reasons (e.g. to promote social cohesion, reduce ethic tension), it should 
not be pursued with the intent that minority communities adapt to host 
societies in ways that exclude minority heritage, identity and culture from 
the public sphere. The implications of extreme state views towards 
assimilation eventually result in situations that suppress minority culture 
and heritage in favour of a dominant majority with a unified national 
identity with all sharing an analogous belief system. Ultimately, such a 
path towards inclusion may threaten social cohesion. 
As an example, France has attempted to pursue such assimilationist 
policies with the introduction of legislation in April 2011 banning the 
public wearing of the niqab or face veil (Hamel 2002, Wiles 2007, Iqbal 
2011). French law also forbids state employees from wearing Muslim 
headscarves, and other visible religious symbols like a Jewish yarmulke or 
Christian cross in public schools, welfare offices or other government 
facilities (Keaton 2013). Likewise, the Swiss ban on minarets as a blight on 
the architectural landscape (Stüssi 2008, Cumming-Bruce & Erlanger 2009, 
Langer 2010, Mayer 2011) points to similar ends. There are numerous 
examples of such exclusionist/assimilationist policies being debated, 
enacted or enforced around the world. The issue of the wearing of the 
kirpan (ceremonial dagger) by Sikh communities in North American 
schools (Bagga 2006, Stoker 2007), the Sikh wearing of turbans (Stromer 
2005, Gohil & Sidhu 2008, Ahluwalia & Pellettiere 2010), the right to build 
and display the sukkah by Canadian Jews during the annual celebration of 
Sukkot (Barnett 2011), or the general wearing or display of religious 
symbols in the public sphere (Gereluka & Race 2007, Danchin 2008, 
Barnett 2011, SALT 2010) are all prominent examples of such policies. 
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Even racial profiling at airports in a post-9/11 world (Chandrasekhar 
2003, Ramirez et al. 2003, Goodey 2006, Harcourt 2006, SALT 2012, Rights 
Working Group 2013), although not indicative of an assimilationist policy, 
increasingly reflect the assumptions of what many majority societies now 
consider ‘normal.’ 
Even grander schemes have been envisioned that attempt to reorient 
entire societies. The former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir bin 
Mohamad, while introducing the Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991, outlined a 
scheme known as Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020), that called for the 
establishment of a united Malaysian nation made up of Bangsa Malaysia, 
or a single Malaysian race (Chin 1998, Teik 2003, Greider 2004). 
Wawasan’s two major objectives for Malaysia are: 
1) to reach the status of fully developed nation with an advanced industrialized 
economy by the year 2020, and 2) to create a sense of national identity called 
Bangsa Malaysia. While Bangsa Malaysia is a bumiputra—defined cultural 
principle which privileges many aspects of ‘buminess’ as the core of Malaysian 
national identity, it aims to move beyond ethnic insularity into a new ‘nationalist 
ideology’ in order to unite the multiple religio-ethnic components of national 
society, based on notions of a common Malaysian idea of territory, population, 
language, culture, symbols and institutions (López & Hassan 2004:4).
More than fostering a shared national identity, this course of action would 
appear to supplant ethnicity in favour of a unified national identity. Such 
Malay-centric ethnic rationalisation policies put minority Chinese and 
Indian populations in Malaysia at risk (Hing 1997, Teik 2003). In 2009, the 
concept of “One Malaysia” was introduced by Prime Minister Najib Razak 
as another rallying cry for national unity. This updated policy does not 
have the radical implications for national identity that the idea of Bangsa 
Malaysia carried (Gabriel 2009). 
Such policies are ostensibly directed at improving settlement outcomes 
and aiding acculturation, but these legislative attempts to integrate 
minorities into mainstream populations often have an opposite effect. 
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Rather then improving integration, they raise issues for both minority 
communities and host populations that often lead to social exclusion and 
marginalisation—minority communities on the one hand often reject such 
attempts to regulate their ethnocultural heritage, while portions of 
majority communities are often inclined to react negatively. For both, the 
issue is often portrayed by the media in ways that slant the debate in 
favour of host communities, which now recognise an issue, with opposing 
lines of supporters and opponents drawn. Such media scrutiny often ends 
in resentment on the part of minorities, and varying levels of tolerance, 
indifference, discrimination or racism from majorities. Whether 
integration policies for minority communities, while complying with laws 
that promote public safety and welfare, are written in such a way that 
public displays of minority art, culture, language, history, architecture and 
religion aren’t opposed, but rather embraced and celebrated, is something 
that a framework for deep diversity hopes to address, by focusing on 
what reasonable accommodation65 might be, as opposed to the reactionary 
discrimination of, and opposition to, difference in the absence of 
individual or communal understanding of minorities. 
Overall, state responses to increasing diversity have varied in this age of 
transnationalism and globalisation, due to changing circumstance and the 
inevitable need for context specific policy. Numerous responses have been 
developed by states that find themselves in varying historical, political, 
cultural and socioeconomic contexts that often dictate or determine which 
particular policy approach will be legislated. States are also forced to 
gauge public opinion, and politicians often score political points with 
their constituents by following majority lead. Whichever path is pursued, 
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65 Here, and following, I refer to reasonable as that which would be considered fair and equitable, 
especially in terms of the extent to which majorities and minorities need to cooperate in order to 
achieve a just settlement and accommodation of any particular minority request. Also, following 
Wenar’s (2013) interpretation, while each side may believe that their position is correct, neither can 
force the other to accept that truth, even if they belong to a majority that has the power to enforce it. 
multicultural policies and state handling of diversity will continue to be 
both varied and debated. Such critiques have led one commentator to 
claim that the old multiculturalism is dead and that a new one needs to 
spring to life (Alibhai-Brown 2001). While there is some pessimism about 
the theory, ideology and policies of multiculturalism, such critiques, and 
the debates they engender, suggest that alternative approaches are 
possible. In introducing one such alternative, this thesis next turns to an 
examination of the historical and theoretical antecedents in explicating a 
deep diversity framework. 
2.5 Historical and theoretical foundations of deep diversity
This section outlines some of the critical historical and theoretical 
perspectives that have led to modern multicultural theories, and situates 
deep diversity within this context. These can be traced back to questions 
of social justice raised by early thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau 
and Mill, to the more contemporary works of Kymlicka, Parekh, Sandel, 
Taylor, Williams and Young. I will briefly mention the important aspects 
of their work that relate to multicultural theory and discuss their 
relevance to deep diversity. Such a discussion firmly grounds deep 
diversity as emerging from long philosophical and theoretical traditions of 
egalitarianism, social justice and tolerance that have informed 
contemporary theories of multiculturalism. 
The ‘social contract’ and the foundations of modern multicultural theories
The question of political legitimacy and power has always been of 
paramount importance in discussing issues of social justice. In Occidental 
philosophy, the notion of a ‘social contract’ can trace its lineage back to the 
original covenant between God and the ancient Hebrews. In Oriental 
traditions, this concept can best be linked to the Buddhist emperor of 
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India, Ashoka, who, in the third century BCE,66 outlined the importance 
and need of toleration in society (Sen 2009:xii), and also to the later 
Mughal emperor of India, Akbar (1542-1605), who was a great defender of 
religious tolerance and protector of the separations between religion and 
the state (Habib 1997:4, Chandra 2007:252, Sen 2009:xiii). Early Greek 
philosophers began to codify these musings into moral and philosophical 
concepts (Strauss & Cropsey 1987, Irwin 2007) and early Roman 
jurisprudence laid down laws for healthy governance and good 
citizenship (Irani 1995, Stein 1999). Although these provided the necessary 
foundations for ethical values and the creation of a ‘just society,’ it wasn’t 
until the mid-seventeenth century that the idea of a ‘social contract’ in 
western philosophy began to emerge. 
Hobbes helped establish the prominence of individual rights, equality, the 
belief that legitimate political power must be ‘representative’ and based on 
the consent of the people, and a liberal interpretation of law which leaves 
individuals free to do whatever the law does not explicitly forbid (Hobbes 
1651/2010, Manent 1996:20–38, Lloyd & Sreedhar 2014). Locke later 
formulated the classic reasoning for religious tolerance. Three particular 
arguments were central to his thesis: 1) nation-states and their legal 
systems in particular, and their human actors in general, cannot reliably 
evaluate the truth or claims of competing religious viewpoints that are 
counter to the dominant belief; 2) even if they could, enforcing a single 
‘true religion’ would not have the desired effect because belief cannot be 
enforced or compelled by violence; and 3) coercing religious uniformity 
would lead to more social disorder than allowing diversity (Locke 
1689-1692, McGrath 1998:214-215). 
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66 Throughout, I use the accepted religion-agnostic designations BCE (Before Common Era) and CE 
(Common Era) to refer to the Christian references for BC (Before Christ) and AD (Anno Domini) 
respectively. 
While Hobbes’s ideas had firmly established the notion of modern liberal 
democracy, Locke’s reasoning and arguments for tolerance form the basis 
of multicultural theory. His insights on toleration form the fundamental 
arguments for modern concepts of minority accommodation, which are 
founded on the application of fundamental human rights to all groups 
and individuals in society. While Locke may have been referring to the 
armed imposition of state-sponsored religion that was occurring 
throughout Europe before and during his time, the sociopolitical realities 
of today offer an updated interpretation suggesting that state-mandated 
assimilation and integration of minorities into existing social norms may 
likewise lead to social unrest. Locke therefore became an early advocate 
for minority rights. Locke and Rousseau both agreed that the social 
contract between citizens and their government was this: that in exchange 
for granting government authority and for relinquishing some of their 
freedoms, citizens are granted civil rights but are also obliged to respect 
and defend the rights of others. 
There were a number of prominent points that emerged from this thinking 
that have especially important implications for modern multiculturalism. 
These can best be summed up in two significant ideals: 1) the strong belief 
that legitimate political power must be entirely representative and based 
on the will and consent of the people, and 2) that mutual cooperation and 
full respect be given to the rights of others. These themes set the stage for 
further advancement from ‘social contract’ to ‘social justice’ theories, and 
their legacy provides an important foundation for deep diversity. 
’Social justice’ as a basis for contemporary multicultural theory
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls (1971) posits a ‘fair choice’ option within 
which interacting parties would choose mutually acceptable principles of 
justice, envisioning a society of free and independent citizens holding 
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equal basic rights cooperating within an egalitarian economic system 
(Rawls 1971, Nagel 1973, Wenar 2013). Picking up where the social 
contract left off, Rawls perceives two basic principles of social justice. The 
first states “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others” (Rawls 1971:60). 
The second states “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that (a) they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged 
members of society, and (b) offices and positions must be open to 
everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 
1971:303). With his notion of distributive justice, Rawls defines an 
exceptionally profound principle that the most disadvantaged and 
marginalized in society should reap their fair share of the social capital it 
produces. 
Members of any free society, according to Rawls, will have widely 
divergent worldviews, yet there can only be one law in each nation-state. 
Its members should therefore be expected to be reasonable in their 
interpretations and follow laws that are fair and acceptable:
Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and 
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason (Rawls 1993:137).67
These ideas are later picked up and critiqued by Young (1986, 1989, 1990) 
and Fraser (1997, 2003), focusing on the notions of difference and 
discrimination and incorporated into the social justice and 
multiculturalism debate. The notion of reasonable interpretation therefore 
adds legitimacy to government and the laws it enacts. This same 
reasonableness should also prevent members from imposing their own 
beliefs on other law-abiding citizens. Though each may believe that s/he 
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67 The assumption, however, that a “common human reason” exists, would be challenged by post-
modernists, among others. 
is right, no one can force other reasonable members of society to live by 
that truth, even if s/he belongs to a majority that has the power to enforce 
it (Wenar 2013). Rawls’ original work, and the critiques that they 
spawned68, are of relevance for the notion of deep diversity as they set out 
principles of equality and legitimacy for minorities who hold widely 
divergent beliefs and practices in modern liberal democracies. 
A communitarian response to liberalism
The last few decades have seen a dramatic rise in the incidence of 
international migration (Bedford & Ho 2008, Papademetriou 2013), and 
this has caused a shift from earlier ideals and themes to the discussions of 
the merits of multicultural approaches in modern liberal democracies. 
Following Rawls, other contemporaries69 have picked up on the preceding 
ideas and have constructed modern theories of multiculturalism that 
move beyond the notion of social justice to incorporate the effects of 
modern migration on nation-states, and the importance of national 
minorities that exist within them. 
Taylor’s notion of reasonable accommodation in the Canadian context of 
bicultural citizenship and Québec nationalism was largely influenced by 
Rawls, and has had an enormous impact on notions of identity, minority 
participation and political recognition. Taylor (1994) was the first to 
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68 Rawls, responding to earlier criticism that his conception of justice was similar to other existing 
theories (e.g. the utilitarianism of Hegel and Mill), and that it didn’t define a necessary distinction 
between the moral and political conceptions of such a theory (Nozick 1974, Wolff 1977, Walzer 1983, 
Sandel 1998, Sen 2009), later defined a doctrine of political liberalism and its legitimacy within 
liberal societies in an attempt to address these critiques (Rawls 1993/2005). Amartya Sen, for 
instance, recently critiqued Rawls’ beliefs about the distribution of social goods, instead 
substituting his belief that it is more important to focus on our ability to effectively utilise those 
goods to purse our ambitions, than on their distribution (Sen 2009). Sandel (1998) also enhanced 
Rawls’ theory by establishing that individual values and aspirations are equally important in our 
interpretations of the meaning of justice. Marxist critiques dismissed Rawls’ interpretation of justice 
as simplistic, as it tended to ignore the predominance of capitalistic society and market economies 
as the source of much injustice in the world (Wolff 1977).
69 e.g. Taylor (1994), Kymlicka (1995, 2007, 2010a), Parekh (1996, 1997a, 2000a, 2008), Sandel (1996, 
1998, 2009), Benhabib (1996, 1998, 2004), Kukathas & Pettit (1990), Kukathas (1995, 1997, 1998, 2003), 
Sen & Williams (1982) and Sen (2009). 
identify the notion of ‘deep diversity,’ his particular attempt at a proposed 
solution to the problem of political fragmentation in a bicultural Canada. 
Deep diversity, according to Taylor, addresses the special calls for formal 
acknowledgment that come from minority communities within larger 
states. The question of recognition often addressed by Taylor includes 
demands for cultural recognition, claims for special privileges, appeals for 
special forms of citizenship rights and pleas for various forms of self 
government (Taylor 1994, Levy 1997, Redhead 2002). Deep diversity was 
therefore “an idea meant to promote multiple forms of belonging to a 
federated state” (Redhead 2002:2). 
Someone of, say, Italian extraction in Toronto or Ukrainian extraction in 
Edmonton might indeed feel Canadian as a bearer of individual rights in a 
multicultural mosaic. His or her belonging would not “pass through” some other 
community, although the ethnic identity might be important to him or her in 
various ways. But this person might nevertheless accept that a Québecois or a 
Cree or a Dene might belong in a very different way, that these persons were 
Canadian through being members of their national communities. Reciprocally, 
the Québecois, Cree, or Dene would accept the perfect legitimacy of the mosaic 
identity (Taylor 1993:183). 
Taylor’s vision of deep diversity is one of toleration, concurrently 
addressing the nature of political and sociocultural fragmentation that 
exists in states with national and ethnic minorities, and outlining a 
practical method for the political recognition of minorities in multicultural 
states. 
The virtue of deep diversity is that it embraces an openness to the diverse array 
of collective and individual rights demanded by Canada’s various citizens while 
promoting allegiance to the national state. Deep diversity simultaneously 
promotes tolerance and cultivates commonality, thereby mediating political 
fragmentation by addressing both of the contrasting normative forces at work 
within it, recognising particularity and promoting unity (Redhead 2002:2). 
Although originally conceived to deal with the issue of Québec 
nationalism in Canada’s bicultural society, Taylor has brought the question 
of minority rights (be they indigenous or exogenous), to the philosophical 
lineage described here. In applying his principles to the question of more 
recent migrant populations, the concept of deep diversity can be widened 
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to apply to multicultural societies impacted by the contemporary milieu of 
transnational migration and globalisation. Taylor also introduces the 
importance of the concept of identity in accommodating minority rights. 
Taylor’s critique of Rawls70 helped formulate the notion of 
communitarianism, a political philosophy that stresses that the communities 
in which we live are to be considered of equal importance as the 
individual, and whose central claim is precisely the necessity of attending 
to community in concert with liberty and equality (Zakaria 1996, Frazer 
1999, Smith 2001, Kymlicka 2002). This requires the belief that there is 
more than individual rights, that the significance of the institutions that 
comprise civil society must be taken into account, and that, ethically, we 
are obliged to consider the social capital (the reciprocity, trust, and 
solidarity) that exists between them (Frazer 1999:21). Essentially, Taylor 
shifts the debate from the focus on individual rights (liberalism) to one 
encapsulating a civic republican focus on collective responsibility 
(communitarianism). Taylor’s critique also underscores the belief that the 
institutions and organisations formed by the individuals and groups that 
comprise civil society are equally responsible as are individuals, morally 
and ethically, for proper action in a ‘just society’ that benefits all citizens. It 
is therefore incumbent upon such entities to act with reasonable authority71 
in matters of a civil nature. State adherence to such reasonable demands 
by its civil institutions would ensure a ‘just society,’ regardless of place of 
birth, language spoken, culture lived, religion practised, or an individual’s 
identity and ethnicity.
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70 Taylor was not alone in his criticism of Rawls. Sandel (1998, 2009) and Walzer (1983, 1987) also 
thought that Rawls paid little attention to the ideal of community, although none would label 
themselves communitarians (Bromell 2008:61, Bell 2013). 
71 As earlier defined by Rawls (1993:137). 
Sandel followed similar reasoning as Taylor in his critiques of Rawls, 
arguing that Rawlsian liberalism rests on an overly individualistic 
conception of the self (Sandel 1996, Bell 2013). A communitarian like 
Taylor, he places special emphasis upon national political communities 
and argues for measures that increase civic engagement and public 
participation (Sandel 1996). These critics of liberalism72 do not identify 
with the communitarianism to which their critics have accused them of 
subscribing (Bromell 2008:61, Bell 2013). Taylor, while rejecting the 
communitarian moniker, oddly prefers to identify himself as a 
‘liberal’ (Gutmann 1994, Taylor 1994, Bell 2013), while eschewing 
liberalism itself. Sandel points out that the term ‘communitarian’ is 
misleading, as it implies that rights should rest on the values that exist 
within any given community (Sandel 1994, Bromell 2008:61) and prefers 
the label ‘civic republican’ rather than ‘communitarian’ (Bell 2013). Simply 
put, Sandel believes that liberals place importance on liberty and 
individual rights over the greater good, while communitarians hold that 
the greater good trumps the rights of individuals (Sandel 1996, Bromell 
2008:6). Civic republicanism, on the other hand, emphasises the 
responsibilities of citizens as equally important as rights. 
In Democracy’s Discontent, Sandel (1996) offers a civic republicanism 
grounded in the belief that citizens need to do much more than vote. 
According to Sandel, while liberalism protects an individual from 
involvement in majority decision-making, communitarianism, and 
specifically civic republicanism, teaches that an individual’s rights are the 
result of participatory self-government. Liberty is afforded to individuals 
as a result of participation in the greater good, rather than the other way 
around. Bromell clarifies that “the individual is free insofar as he or she is 
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72 Liberalism here defined as the theory that individuals should be free to lead lives of their own 
choosing, without interference from the state.
a member of a political community that controls its own fate and a 
participant in the decisions that govern its affairs” (Bromell 2008:70). 
The hope for self-government lies not in relocating sovereignty but in dispersing 
it. The most promising alternative to the sovereign state is not a one-world 
community based on the solidarity of humankind, but a multiplicity of 
communities and political bodies—some more, some less extensive than nations
—among whom sovereignty is diffused (Sandel 1996:345). 
In Sandel, the trajectory towards a full theoretical basis for deep diversity, 
from the early social contract, through social justice theory and liberalism, 
to communitarianism, appears nearly complete. 
Multicultural citizenship: responses to the communitarian challenge to liberalism
What remains, however, in tracing a broad outline of the history of deep 
diversity, is bridging the theoretical gap between liberal/communitarian 
theories and the age of transnationalism, a time and place in which 
exceptional polyethnicity has emerged as the norm for liberal 
democracies. In the 2013 Census, 25.2% of the population73 was born 
overseas (Statistics New Zealand 2014), situating New Zealand amongst 
the most ethnically diverse countries in the OECD74 (Forbes 2012, Office of 
Ethnic Affairs 2014, Patsiurko et al. 2012). With overseas-born individuals 
now comprising one of every four persons, a critical mass has been 
reached suggesting that now is the time to review and improve existing 
diversity management practices.75 For Kymlicka, multiculturalism 
addresses the ways that a society might go about responding to its 
diversity by treating minority groups as equal citizens, with the 
recognition and positive accommodation of group differences required 
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73 Of those stating a birthplace.
74 A January 2012 Forbes Insight report entitled Global diversity rankings by country, sector and 
occupation ranked New Zealand second, after Norway, in terms of diversity in the workplace. 
Patsiurko et al. (2012) rank New Zealand seventh, based on 2000 data. 
75 Fortunately, a number of scholars have been addressing these changes globally (Kymlicka 1995, 
2007; Parekh 1996, 1997a, 2000a, 2008; Young 1986, 1989, 1990, 1995; Barry 1989, 1995, 2001, 2005; 
Kukathas 1997, 1998; Benhabib 1998, 2004).
through what he terms “group-differentiated rights” (Kymlicka 1995, Song 
2014). Kymlicka’s work focuses on developing and defending a liberal 
theory of multicultural citizenship as an alternative to communitarianism 
and provides a liberal framework for formulating the policies necessary 
for the just treatment of minority populations (Kymlicka 1995, Kukathas 
1997, Bromell 2008:105). Such policies would allow for the recognition and 
accommodation that minority groups require in contemporary western 
liberal democracies (Bromell 2008:105). The type of multiculturalism 
required would demand a reevaluation of current practices, the 
transformation of biased patterns of representation that tend to 
marginalise particularly vulnerable groups (Young 1990, Taylor 1994, 
Gutmann 2003, Song 2014), and incorporating the importance of how 
minorities choose to self-identify. 
While individual rights have been the mainstay of liberal theory, 
Kymlicka, like Taylor and Sandel, has argued for the recognition of both 
individual and group rights within modern nation-states:
A comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state will include both 
universal rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership, and 
certain group-differentiated rights or ‘special status’ for minority cultures 
(Kymlicka 1995:6). 
He posits that group rights are a recent innovation in liberal western 
democracies, which have traditionally avoided assigning rights to specific 
ethnic, religious, linguistic and geographic groups. While Kymlicka (1995) 
acknowledges that Canada’s indigenous populations don’t share a 
common language and culture, and that the Québécois are themselves 
colonial immigrants, he does nonetheless argue that these minority groups 
deserve special state recognition and rights. In contrast to both ‘national 
minorities’ and the Québécois, newer immigrant minority populations are 
less deserving of such rights as they come to the state voluntarily and thus 
have some degree of responsibility to integrate to the norms of their new 
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nation. They also have the right to freely and publicly express their 
ethnicity and culture. Kymlicka states that ethnic minorities that exist 
within host societies reject assimilation into majority culture, and typically 
do not seek self-government or to be recognised as a separate nation 
within the state. Instead, they seek to negotiate fairer terms of integration 
into the host culture (Kymlicka 1995:67, 1995:98, 2001:30; Bromell 
2008:123). While such migrants may want recognition for their distinct 
ethnic identity they specifically differ from national minorities in that they 
“seek only the accommodation of their cultural traditions, and do not wish 
to become separate, self-governing nations” (Kukathas 1997:408). This 
resonates with the New Zealand situation. Kymlicka (1995:176) concludes 
that disadvantaged groups often demand group representation rights, 
which itself should be seen as a positive step in liberal democracies, for it 
generally sends the message that minorities in polyethnic states seek 
affirmation for inclusion and participation in majority culture, rather than 
strive for withdrawal or separation from the host society. Deep diversity 
affirms such integration of both national minorities and migrants into host 
societies as it creates an inclusive polity rather than one of exclusion based 
on ethnicity or race. 
Kymlicka concedes that majority cultures in host societies are not always 
sympathetic or supportive of this ethic; that dominant majority 
sensibilities do not always acknowledge ethnic minorities as positive 
contributors to society, nor might they support the proposition that 
minority populations can have a positive effect. In Canada, Kymlicka 
(1998:146) cites implacable opposition to full minority participation on the 
part of the non-aboriginal, non-francophone majority population. This 
would require convincing majority cultures of the merits of the just 
treatment of ethnic minorities. Existing shallow multicultural policies in 
this regard are often lacking. An updated governance policy based on 
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these ideals would, however, address state obligations to engage majority 
communities and institutions on the need for, importance of, and the 
benefits of minority participation. 
Like Kymlicka, Parekh agrees that modern societies are dealing with 
diversity in ways never before seen. How modern states cope with this 
diversity is the focus of much of his work, thus taking Kymlicka’s 
theoretical work to more practical levels. Parekh discusses the terms in 
which both liberal and non-liberal societies might work together, and in so 
doing, picks up on Taylor’s original challenge of how dialogue can best be 
achieved between groups with radically divergent worldviews, e.g. the 
clash between religious extremism and liberal western democracies 
(Taylor 1994; Parekh 1997b, 2000a, 2008; Bromell 2008:106). Parekh further 
argues that multiculturalism is not just about western societies managing 
diversity in all its forms, but more importantly, it’s about recognising and 
implementing the proper terms for dialogue (Parekh 1997b, Bromell 
2008:106). 
Minority accommodation, belonging and national identity
In essence, Parekh, proffers: 1) the advantages of cultural diversity, 2) the 
importance of cultivating social cohesion, and 3) a practical focus on 
engaging diverse communities. First, Parekh states that cultural diversity 
is an inherently desired value in society.
Since human capacities and values conflict, every culture realizes a limited range 
of them and neglects, marginalizes and suppresses others. However rich it might 
be, no culture embodies all that is valuable in human life and develops the full 
range of human possibilities. Different cultures thus correct and complement 
each other, expand each other’s horizon of thought and alert each other to new 
forms of human fulfillment (Parekh 2006:167). 
One of Parekh’s key insights is that plural societies represent diverse 
systems of meaning and beliefs about what constitutes the good life. As a 
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result, each culture needs others in order to better understand itself and to 
expand its own intellectual and moral horizons (Bromell 2008:167). 
Second, if plural societies are to be socially cohesive they need a common 
sense of belonging and a strong national identity that explicitly recognises 
and affirms its diversity (Parekh 1997b:528-529). This does not necessarily 
demand adherence to any particular set of common goals, a shared sense 
of history, or cultural homogeneity, but rather an enduring commitment to 
the continuing existence and well being of society. Likewise, a political 
community cannot expect its members to develop a shared sense of 
belonging unless it also belongs to its members (Parekh 1999). 
Third, the challenge, according to Parekh, is for societies to meet the 
demands of diversity, especially when cultures clash, which can both 
create difficulties in managing diversity and expose rifts in social 
cohesion. 
Diversity furnishes the texture and variety of social life, thereby extending 
choice and opportunity. It can be a source of economic strength, cultural vitality, 
national pride and solidarity. But it can equally generate social conflict, ethnic 
tension and political instability (Boston et al. 2006:xi). 
All heterogeneous societies include communities with practices that may 
offend majority values. Parekh (2006) offers as examples such cultural 
practices as polygamy, arranged marriages, first cousin marriages, male 
and female circumcision, methods for the slaughter of animals, dress 
codes, burial practices and the status of women, any or all of which might 
be unpalatable to the majority. It is in these particular contexts that Parekh 
provides the foundations for a just and operable public policy and sets the 
scene for a truly deep diversity. Parekh offers an important guideline, 
stating that where social conflict exists and resolutions are required for 
cultural practices deemed inappropriate or unacceptable to the majority, 
the overriding factor is that the operative public values of the wider 
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society should prevail (Parekh 2006:272-273). Kymlicka (2010b:83) furthers 
that there are necessary limits to minority accommodation, and claims 
should be evaluated on the basis of elevating core liberal values. Where 
claims do not specifically enhance individual freedom, equality of 
opportunity, democratic citizenship and effective participation, they 
become incompatible with liberal democratic norms and societies should 
not defend them. Here, Parekh and Kymlicka offer us practical principles 
for accommodation in deeply diverse societies. 
This may be difficult to achieve, as societies are often confronted with 
policy dilemmas that arise from such juxtapositions. For example, New 
Zealand faced a particularly difficult situation over the Jewish practice of 
shechita, a method for the ritual slaughter of animals to make them kosher 
for consumption, which states that an animal must be killed with ‘respect 
and compassion’.76 The controversy emerged in May 2010 when David 
Carter, the then Agriculture Minister, overruled advice from the National 
Animal Welfare Advisory Committee to exempt shechita from a new 
animal welfare commercial slaughter code. Under the new code, which 
was made effective immediately, all commercially killed animals must be 
stunned before slaughter to ensure the humane treatment of the animals.77 
While halal meats prepared for consumption by the Muslim population 
allow for such a stunning before slaughter, shechita does not, as the animal 
must be unharmed before slaughter, and the Jewish belief is that all 
stunning methods involve an unnecessary additional injury to the animal. 
Previously, shechita was considered exempt, just as it is under the US’s 
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76 Judaism, like Buddhism, teaches that all animals should be treated with compassion, and that 
humans must avoid causing pain to any other living being. However, it also recognises that animals 
may be killed as it fulfills an essential human need, and that all killing must be done so that the 
animal does not suffer needlessly. 
77 What is in dispute here is that majority values hold that it is considered humane to first stun an 
animal before slaughter (so that it is unconscious before being killed), while the minority view is 
that the practice of stunning prior to killing involves an unnecessary additional injury to the 
animal.
Humane Slaughter Act. Minister Carter decided in May 2010 to annul all 
exemptions from the new legislation. This upset Jewish leaders and 
created a particularly difficult policy decision for New Zealand. The ban 
appeared to violate New Zealand’s Bill of Rights, which protects freedom 
of religion. The new code contravened provisions in the Animal Welfare 
Act which exempt certain religious practices from its purview, and the 
Human Rights Act, which protects against discrimination. After months of 
controversy and threats of legal action, Minister Carter had to back down 
only days before he was to be taken to court to justify his particular 
interpretation of the code (Fisher 2010, Harper 2010, Jerusalem Post 2010, 
Bouma et al. 2010). 
What is important in this example is Parekh’s belief that plural societies 
must be willing to enter into previously unknown territory, traverse 
unfamiliar worlds of thought and belief with open minds and hearts and 
have an ability to live with unresolved differences (Parekh 2006:340). What 
should lie at the heart of engagement and form the basis for dialogue is a 
mutual respect between different ethnocultural groups. Phillips (2007:168), 
one of whose key arguments78 focuses on the significance of group 
differentiation and its importance in achieving an equitable 
representation, would agree with the significance of minority engagement 
and accommodation. She asserts that it is now widely accepted that states 
can actually harm their citizens by trivializing or ignoring their cultural 
identities (Phillips 2007:11). Taylor (1992) affirms that denying cultural 
recognition can be as damaging to minorities as denying them their civil 
or political rights. 
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78 Phillips’ main emphasis, however, is on the problems of collective identity and values which may 
override any particular individual differences within groups. 
The significance of a mutual commitment to a national identity, or a 
greater good, which Parekh refers to as ‘operative public values’, allows 
for negotiation between opposing policies to take place. 
Operative public values are those that a society cherishes as part of its collective 
identity and in terms of which it regulates the relations between its members. 
They are embodied in its Constitution, such international human rights 
documents it has signed, its legal and political institutions, and the norms and 
practices governing the relations between its members (Parekh 2006:363). 
What is important to Parekh is the dialogue itself, not so much the 
resolution.  Both Kymlicka and Parekh agree that multiculturalism cannot 
and does not solve all issues that may arise and that living with 
disagreement is part and parcel of life in polyethnic societies. What Parekh 
offers to the concept of deep diversity are important operative principles 
to policy issues that provide an important conceptual framework for the 
formulation and implementation of public policies. 
From theory to policy: addressing institutional and structural discrimination
While conceptual frameworks are essential for diversity governance 
strategies, in practice, one frequent outcome emerging from plural 
societies is the recurrence of discrimination. Yet minority discrimination is 
not merely the domain of individual actors, and is often associated with 
agencies that may impede equitable minority progress. For new policies to 
be effective it is vital that institutional barriers to minority rights be 
removed. In formulating a comprehensive approach, deep diversity would 
also need to address the institutional and structural obstacles that exist in 
society. The writings of Young and Pincus here become instrumental in 
advancing a policy framework that addresses these barriers. Young’s 
particular vision of social justice focuses on a concrete analysis of state 
hegemony over minority populations: 
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A conception of justice which challenges institutional domination and 
oppression should offer a vision of a heterogeneous public that acknowledges 
and affirms group differences (Young 1990:10). 
Young emphasises issues of profound structural discrimination which 
often prevent minorities from achieving parity with majorities. 
Pincus (1994, 2010, 2011) furthers Young’s argument by offering three 
types of discrimination: individual, institutional and structural: 
Individual discrimination refers to the behavior of individual members of one 
race/ethnic/gender group that is intended to have a differential and/or harmful 
effect on members of another race/ethnic/gender group. Institutional 
discrimination, on the other hand, is quite different because it refers to policies of 
the dominant race/ethnic/gender institutions and the behavior of individuals 
who control these institutions and implement policies that are intended to have a 
differential and/or harmful effect on minority race/ethnic/gender groups. 
Finally, structural discrimination refers to the policies of dominant race/ethnic/
gender institutions and the behavior of the individuals who implement these 
policies and control these institutions, which are race/ethnic/gender neutral in 
intent but which have a differential and/or harmful effect on minority race/
ethnic/gender groups (Pincus 2010). 
Pincus defines his use of the words ‘dominant’ and ‘minority’ in terms of 
the presence or absence of power to control, not in terms of their relative 
size. With institutional discrimination, the intent to discriminate is 
predominantly a conscious decision, while structural discrimination 
proceeds on the overt basis of neutrality. The notion of intent is paramount 
in distinguishing these two types of discrimination. Pincus offers the 
lending practices of US banks as an example of structural discrimination. 
When blacks and Hispanics are deliberately disadvantaged in receiving 
loans compared to whites, then institutional discrimination is at play. 
However, when banks act in race-neutral ways by considering ‘credit 
worthiness’ as the main criterion, then most blacks and Hispanics would 
still be disadvantaged because of their lower incomes and the fact that 
their creditworthiness is not as strong as it is for whites (Pincus 2010). 
Likewise, the July 2012 change in New Zealand immigration law by the 
National government concerning family migration (Immigration New 
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Zealand 2012), while being race-neutral and promoted by National as a 
way to lessen the public burden of health care of the elderly, unfairly 
targets lower income minority groups from, for example, the Pacific 
Islands, India and China, as parents from these countries may be less able 
to support themselves in retirement as opposed to parents of migrants 
from, for example, the UK, Europe and North America. This change in 
policy, then, unfairly discriminates against ethnic minority groups. So 
clearly, seemingly ‘fair’ policies that purport to be ethnically and racially 
neutral or discrimination-adverse, are ultimately not. 
While it is essential to distinguish between both institutional and 
structural discrimination, the distinction is less vital for deep diversity 
than the supposition that all types of discrimination need to be identified 
and recognised and taken into account when formulating policy. Pincus 
(2010) states that it is much harder to deal with structural discrimination 
than with institutional discrimination as the former is neither intentional 
nor illegal, but its effects can be just as insidious. 
Generally, all types of discrimination exist where social exclusion is 
prevalent.  Institutional and structural forms of discrimination are based 
upon preferential treatment of the majority, and prevent minority groups 
from fully engaging in majority society. This type of discrimination often 
excludes minorities from full participation in the economic, social and 
political life of the majority. Institutional and structural discrimination can 
also partly explain why certain minority groups in society may form a 
majority in state prisons, or why particular ethnicities are disadvantaged 
in the receipt of and access to health care, education and social services. 
Removing such barriers at institutional levels is of the utmost importance 
in promoting a just society. Group difference and distinctiveness should be 
acknowledged in all public policies in order to promote the full 
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participation of minority groups (Bromell 2008:190). Summarising Young 
(1990:11), where differentiation is stressed, equality no longer is identified 
with sameness, nor is difference associated with deviation. 
Young (1990:15) defines social justice in terms of “the elimination of 
institutionalized domination and oppression.” Her point (1995:161) is that 
“difference does not mean otherness, or exclusive opposition, but rather 
specificity, variation, heterogeneity.” Social justice “requires not the 
melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of 
and respect for group differences without oppression” (Young 1990:47). 
More succinctly, 
The assimilationist ideal assumes that equal status for all persons requires 
treating everyone according to the same principles, rules, and standards. A 
politics of difference argues, on the other hand, that equality as the participation 
and inclusion of all groups sometimes requires different treatment for oppressed 
or disadvantaged groups (Young 1990:158). 
Such a perspective would provide justification for opposing the policy 
approaches of Don Brash79 (2004), whose ‘one law for all’ rhetoric 
stereotypes and discriminates against minorities, promotes an 
assimilationist ideal, and manipulates the race discourse in an attempt to 
realign party support (Johansson 2004). Majority populations need to 
adjust to the reality of such politics of difference, by, for example, 
accepting the fact that Māori may require more days off work for fulfilling 
cultural responsibilities, that Muslims may wish to swap Easter for Eid, or 
that orthodox Jews wish to continue the traditional practice of shechita. 
While the majority may perceive these to be double standards, they are 
not, for they simply accept the reality of heterogeneity and minority 
accommodation. In essence, such accommodation challenges the so-called 
neutrality of ‘standards,’ which are inevitably culturally specific to the 
dominant group. If minority rights are to be valued and social cohesion 
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79 A former National Party leader 2003-2006, as espoused in his 2004 Orewa speech. 
upheld as an ideal, policy must focus on promoting social inclusion by 
supporting both minority and majority national identities,80 and by 
removing institutional and structural discrimination. If not, assimilationist 
ideals are likely to prevail. By denying minorities the rights of particular 
ethnocultural, religious and linguistic expression, the state assumes a 
hegemonic stance, resulting in minorities less likely to contribute to the 
social, political, economic and educational spheres of majority society, and 
more likely to protest such measures, fomenting dissent. The lack of 
minority voice and participation would represent a withdrawal from 
majority values, threatening social cohesion. 
This section has attempted to link historical ideals of social justice to 
modern theories of multiculturalism, juxtaposing a liberal focus on 
individual rights with a civic republican focus on responsibilities. Table 2.1 
summaries the contributions each mentioned author has made to 
multicultural theory and deep diversity. 
Table 2.1: Summary of contributions to multicultural theory. 
Author: Dates: Major works: Contribution:
Thomas 
Hobbes
1588-1679 Leviathan (1651) established the prominence of individual rights, 
equality, representative power, and the notion of 
modern liberal democracy; gave rise to the social 
contract theory
John Locke 1632-1704 Letters concerning 
toleration (1689–92), Two 
treatises of Government 
(1690)
formulated the classic reasoning for tolerance within 
society, which forms the basis for modern 
multicultural theory and the accommodation of 
minority rights; furthered social contract theory; 
defined the concept of the separation of church and 
state; considered the ‘father’ of modern liberal 
theory
Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau
1712-1778 Discourse on the origin of 
inequality (1754), On the 
social contract (1762)
outlined the basis for legitimate governance; put 
forth a framework for classical republicanism; 
strongly endorsed religious tolerance
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80 It should be noted that minority identities and majority national identities are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive entities. While minority identities contain and subscribe to majority national 
identities, not all majority, or national, identities contain or subscribe to minority identities. 
Author: Dates: Major works: Contribution:
John Stuart 
Mill
1806-1873 On liberty (1859), 
Considerations on 
representative government 
(1861), Utilitarianism 
(1863)
developed a conception of liberty that justified 
individual freedom over unlimited state control; 
furthered liberal political thinking, addressed the 
limits and nature of state power; argued that 
freedom of speech was a necessary condition for 
social progress; furthered a fundamental principle of 
citizen participation in society; utilitarianism
John Rawls 1921–2002 A theory of justice (1971); 
Political liberalism (1993)
posited the fair choice option; all citizens hold equal 
basic rights; notion of distributed justice; 
individuals should be expected to have a reasonable 
interpretation and follow laws that are fair and 
acceptable; not to impose one’s beliefs on others; 
furthered theories of social justice
Charles 
Taylor
1931- Multiculturalism: 
examining the politics of 
recognition (1994), 
A secular age (2007) 
first to introduce the term deep diversity; introduced 
the notion of reasonable accommodation and 
recognition of minority populations; the importance 
of identity in accommodating minority rights; the 
rights of communities (communitarianism) are of 
equal importance as individual rights (liberalism); 
critiqued liberal theory from a communitarian 
perspective
Michael 
Sandel
1953- Liberalism and the limits 
of justice (1982); 
Democracy’s discontent 
(1996)
critiqued Rawls’ liberalism as overly individualistic; 
takes a communitarian stance, but, like Taylor, is 
uncomfortable with the title; placed special 
emphasis on national political communities and 
argued for measures that increase civic engagement; 
favours the communitarian belief that the greater 
good trumps the rights of individuals; emphasised a 
civic republicanism that believes responsibilities are 
as equally important as rights
Nancy Fraser 1947- Unruly practices: power, 
discourse, and gender in 
contemporary social 
theory (1989); Justice 
interruptus: critical 
reflections on the 
‘postsocialist’ condition 
(1997); Redistribution or 
recognition? A political-
philosophical exchange 
(2003)
argues that social justice must be understood in 
terms of the equitable distribution of resources and 
the recognition and representation of minority 
groups; incorporated feminist, critical and post-
structuralist theories into reinterpreting 
multiculturalism
Anne 
Phillips
1950 The politics of presence 
(1995); Which equalities 
matter? (1999); 
Multiculturalism without 
culture (2007)
argues for greater representation and equality, and 
the importance of difference; challenges the narrow 
interpretation of contemporary liberal theory; 
William 
Kymlicka
1962- Multicultural citizenship 
(1995), Multicultural 
odysseys: navigating the 
new international politics 
of diversity (2007)
argues for the recognition of both individual and 
group rights; provided a liberal framework for the 
just treatment of minorities; 
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Author: Dates: Major works: Contribution:
Bhiku Parekh 1935- Rethinking 
multiculturalism: cultural 
diversity and political 
theory (2000); A new 
politics of identity: 
political principles for an 
interdependent world 
(2008)
put forth practical solutions to theoretical problems 
of cultural diversity; recognised that 
multiculturalism is not about managing diversity, 
but rather about negotiating the proper terms for 
dialogue; emphasised the importance of social 
cohesion and a practical focus on community 
engagement; cultivating a strong national identity
Fred Pincus birth date 
unknown; 
retired 
Univ. of 
Maryland, 
2012
“Discrimination comes 
in many forms: 
individual, institutional 
and structural” (2010); 
Understanding diversity 
(2011)
identified and furthered an analysis of three distinct 
forms of discrimination upheld by institutions and 
government policy that often stand in the way 
minority advancement. 
Brian Barry 1936-2009 Liberal theory of justice 
(1973); Democracy, power 
and justice (1989); 
Theories of justice (1989) 
Culture and equality: an 
egalitarian critique of 
multiculturalism (2001)
opposed and critiqued Kymlicka, Young and 
Parekh’s forms of multiculturalism and took issue 
with liberal multiculturalist understandings of 
‘equality,’ objecting on the basis of egalitarian 
grounds; argued that justice is only concerned with 
ensuring equal opportunities and not with 
providing equal access to any particular set of 
choices; argued that the ideal of a republican 
citizenship needed to be updated to include today’s 
diversity; argued that cultural and religious 
minorities should be held responsible for the 
consequences of their own beliefs and practices.
Iris Marion 
Young
1949-2006 Justice and the politics of 
difference (1990); 
Inclusion and democracy 
(2000)
advanced theories of justice, democratic theory and 
feminist social theory; known for her critical 
analysis of the basic concepts underlying theories of 
justice; advocated the affirmation of difference; 
argued that communitarian principles tended to 
suppress group difference while valuing and 
imposing homogeneity; supported citizen 
responsibility and active participation in 
government; advanced notion of structural 
discrimination and the institutional barriers to 
minority equality
What emerges from such a review is a clearer understanding of the 
historical and theoretical foundations of multiculturalism and the issues of 
diversity governance that still must be addressed, e.g. the importance of 
identity and tackling discrimination. What follows outlines a conceptual 
framework for deep diversity that helps distinguish multiculturalism from 
a more robust understanding of diversity governance and minority 
accommodation. While Taylor’s original conception of deep diversity 
focused on minority recognition and the nature of political and 
sociocultural fragmentation in bicultural Canada, his priority focused on 
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the political recognition of non-national minorities in multicultural states 
that harbour significant national minority populations.81 His conception 
was thus seen largely as a way to politically engage minorities in more 
representatives forms of government. Taylor also introduced the concept 
of minority allegiance to the national state as a way of ‘cultivating 
commonality’ to mediate the political fragmentation he saw occurring in 
the Canadian context. The present conception of deep diversity takes the 
notions of political representation, minority accommodation and national 
allegiance introduced by Taylor to a more comprehensive level by 
addressing ‘commonalities’ in terms of cultivating a shared national 
identity,82 unpacking existing state categories which tend to homogenise 
minorities,83 and incorporating minority discrimination and majority 
participation in the dialogue.84 These distinctions are crucial to 
contemporalising and contextualising deep diversity in an environment of 
increasing pluralism. 
2.6 Shallow and Deep Diversity
Having discussed and critiqued multiculturalism, and having laid a 
theoretical foundation for an updated approach, a more fully articulated 
concept of deep diversity, beyond Taylor, can be addressed. Here, I 
consider both shallow and deeper interpretations of diversity management 
and governance that follow from the theoretical lines introduced earlier. 
Through outlining such a framework, I hope to highlight some 
interpretive problems that emerge when considering such juxtapositions 
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81 Like Canada, with its significant Inuit and Native American populations, and New Zealand, with 
indigenous Māori, who now comprise 14.9% of the New Zealand population stating an ethnicity 
(Statistics New Zealand 2014). 
82 Such as explicating shared minority and majority histories that have previously been unknown or 
have remained invisible (see Chapter Five).
83 See Chapters Six and Seven.
84 See Chapter Eight.
and demonstrate that deeper conceptualisations of plurality are possible 
and necessary in furthering diversity governance. The purpose here is not 
to analyse existing policy or write new guidelines, but rather to explore 
the possibilities inherent in conceptualising governance strategies that are 
more aligned with the pluralism found in liberal western democracies 
today. Deep diversity is thus not an attempt to create a single unifying 
theory to explain the migration complex, nor is it a predictive model used 
to anticipate particular settlement outcomes. Instead, it provides a 
conceptual framework for identifying and promoting policies designed to 
aid social cohesion. Deep diversity strives for a richer understanding of all 
cultures, customs, ethnicities, identities, languages and religions that 
comprise modern society. It aims to nurture a common and cohesive 
national identity while supporting group differentiation and minority 
accommodation that provides a basis for continued deliberative and 
active engagement. 
Here, I appropriate Taylor’s ‘deep diversity’ to refer to a wider approach 
to multiculturalism and diversity governance that seeks to combine the 
theoretical and historical antecedents with more contemporary 
formulations of multiculturalism and its numerous critiques. Such an 
approach takes into account 1) the significance of cultural rights and 
sensible minority accommodation (while valuing its Parekhian 
limitations), 2) the emphasis on both minority and majority responsibilities 
(as most previous formulations of multicultural policy have focused 
almost exclusively on minority responsibilities to integrate), 3) the 
consequences of a failure to properly acknowledge and accommodate 
minority identity, 4) the cultivation of a sense of minority belonging to a 
national identity equally important to minorities and majorities, and 5) a 
focus on mitigating discrimination. All of these are best approached 
through policies of 6) active engagement between minority and majority 
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populations which lies at the heart of deep diversity and sets it apart from 
Taylor’s conception and previous iterations of multicultural policy. 
Most multicultural states already have policies and practices designed to 
manage diversity within its borders. Most have laws that regulate the 
entrance of new migrants or policies designed to accommodate national 
minorities. Policies promoting cultural diversity are currently considered 
desirable for multicultural states (Young 1986, 1990; Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 
1995, 2007; Parekh 2006, 2008; Phillips 2007), as they allow for greater 
participation in majority society, giving minorities a sense of value and 
inclusion. Multiculturalism promotes increased political participation and 
welcomes minority contributions to society, even if states don’t. Once such 
participation is achieved, majorities often declare their proactive stance on 
minority inclusion; having become multicultural is usually sufficient 
enough for the state to rest on its laurels. Once a state considers itself 
multicultural, it often perceives that little additional work remains besides 
maintaining status quo. Vigilance is relegated to the minimum while 
‘maintenance’ supplants ‘furtherance’ as premium. 
This perspective diverges from minority discourse, which generally 
struggles for appropriate political representation, the accommodation of 
its cultural and religious rights, economic parity, better health and 
education outcomes, reparations for historical injustice, social equity and 
respect. Minority advocates and representatives often feel that the burden 
of mainstream acceptance falls squarely on them—that a failure to 
constantly keep the minority agenda on the majority’s view screen may 
somehow render their work meaningless. From these competing 
discourses, it is clear that better cooperation and understanding between 
minority and majority populations is needed. These conflicting 
approaches emphasise the limitations of existing frameworks and render 
91
current normative interpretations of diversity management outdated. 
New frameworks that focus on ‘governance’ over ‘management’ are 
required in order to advance the discourse. 
For decades, ethnic and racial classifications have been conceived and 
used to segregate, build hierarchies and nurture racial and ethnic 
stratifications and inequalities (Simon & Piché 2012:1358). I have earlier 
stated that existing perspectives of diversity, as formulated by the various 
state entities discharged with their management, are often thinly 
described to pigeonhole minority groups into conveniently defined sets 
that conform to established traditions and give advantage to majority 
populations. Comprehensive, all-encompassing categories (like Asians, 
Polynesians), while favourable for state purposes and to state entities, tend 
to distort the heterogeneity that exists within such classifications. This 
deeper diversity is composed of both further group and individual 
identities that are often masked behind state-imposed labels. Such 
obfuscation can only serve purposes favourable to the state, and may 
prevent smaller minority groups from appropriate representation or 
accessing funding to improve educational, health and financial outcomes. 
When cloaked behind a more encompassing term (e.g. Asian), the depth 
and breadth of minority populations is hidden to majorities, which are 
often content with shallow minority labels. Further description only 
exposes the extent of difference and spoils the status quo. Using such 
labels to describe minority communities also helps states feel secure, as 
they can easily identify, catalogue and manage such groups (Foucault 
1977, Dean 2010, Lemke 2012). Further classification may instill 
trepidation, especially where majority members may have difficulty 
distinguishing between nationalities (e.g. Chinese from Korean), knowing 
the difference between Hindus and Muslims, or recognising the need for 
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non-majority languages. This majority angst is similar to the “white 
anxiety” of which Hage (1998) speaks. 
Majorities, and the institutional structures that uphold their values, may 
actually prefer such state-imposed labels. They take reassurance in 
defining primary demographic divisions, rather than trying to grasp the 
breakdowns within expansive categories. Which is more readily 
comprehensible by majority society or more easily and conveniently 
explainable by the state? That 11.8% of the New Zealand population are 
Asian, or that, for example, 4.1% are Chinese, 3.9% Indian, or 0.2% Sri 
Lankan?85 How would majority sensibilities react if it was fully aware that 
Sri Lankans, for example, can be further divided along linguistic 
boundaries composed of predominantly Sinhalese and Tamilian speakers, 
or along religious lines of predominantly Buddhist, Hindu and Christian 
members? Such subgroups often embody distinct histories, languages, 
cultures and religions all veiled behind the term Sri Lankan, and further 
obscured by the term Asian.86 These distinctions also conceal further 
subsets based on, for example, gender, economic class, profession, age, 
sexual orientation and gender identity. One’s ethnicity does not always 
determine one’s country of birth, which leads to further divisions of, for 
example, Fijian-born Indians, India-born Indians, South African-, 
Malaysian-, Singaporean- and UK-born Indians, each harboring 
distinctive minority and national identities that are reflected in the 
country of their birth. Wouldn’t such recognition make majority 
populations overwhelmed and uncomfortable? What if each subgroup 
petitioned the state to be accommodated in some way or recognised and 
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85 Ethnicity statistics are based on the 2013 New Zealand Census data released 15 April 2014. 
86 Even so, it is important to recognise that such subgroups often coexist, intermarry, and often 
share a common national identity despite such differences. 
granted minority rights?87 Adhering to fundamental divisions like Asian 
or Polynesian serves to keep the finer impacts of migration and diversity 
mysteriously vague and indeterminate from the majority, which furthers 
state purposes. 
Since states often use such terms to apportion, monitor and track scarce 
resources, it is in their best interest to limit the number of officially 
sanctioned minorities. Further classification may only complicate 
disbursing limited funds available for addressing disparities in sectors like 
health and education. Such elementary classifications are often used to 
determine political representation, which majorities may prefer to limit. 
Further identification of minority subgroups might convey implicit 
recognition which states may be loathe to confer. 
Such primary classifications, while perhaps beneficial for the state, tend to 
obfuscate complex identities, which may further disadvantage minorities. 
Majorities tend to fear what they do not know or understand (Hage 1998), 
and majority fear of increasing ethnic diversity has been shown to affect 
majority-minority relations (Outten et al. 2012). State policies that shield 
majorities from full minority recognition can therefore only be considered 
paradoxical. In limiting official recognition to particularly large regional 
or national minority groupings (e.g. Asian, Indian), state policy may only 
be diminishing majority ability to differentiate, as majority members may 
be unable to discern the difference between, for example, Sikh, Hindu or 
Muslim, by relying on skin colour as a distinguishing characteristic.88 
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87 It is worth noting here that achieving recognition is more likely to be successful if subgroups 
strategically adopt a pan-ethnic label such as Asian or Pasifika, or Latino/Hispanic in the US.
88 As an example, see Putnam (2000), Prosser (2013).
Alternatively, this trepidation can also cause majority populations to 
respond in unforeseen ways. The addition of the New Zealander category 
to the 2006 Census provides a good example. The movement to create 
such a category, composed of predominantly majority members (Kukutai 
& Didham 2012), may stem from either an unconscious majority desire to 
simplify and do away with ethnic categories altogether, or may appear as 
an attempt to create a stronger national identity, one based solely on 
nationality rather than ethnicity.89 Such movements only emphasise and 
reaffirm the dominant group’s perception that their interests are not 
reflected by official practices of ethnic enumeration (Simon & Piché 2012) 
and reify the ‘white anxiety’ of which Hage (1998) speaks.90 
Prosser’s (2013) philippic is a good example of a majority member feeding 
such angst by simplifying discrimination to its broadest possible category 
(i.e. dark-skinned males with accents). Knowing how to discern deeper 
ethnic categories (more than the state might allow, or that the majority 
might comprehend) may render a white individual’s character 
questionable for fellow Pākehā compatriots. Corollaries to this can be 
found in recent US elections where Republican Tea Party contenders, 
attempting to score additional political points with ‘middle America,’ (i.e. 
disgruntled white middle-class conservatives), have often portrayed their 
Democratic opponents as being ‘too educated’ or ‘out of touch’ with the 
US electorate (Marietta 2009). Such a ‘dumbing-down,’ as Prosser 
exemplifies, describes a pervasive sense of declining educational, cultural 
and political standards that only appeal to a lowest common denominator, 
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89 The campaign to tick the New Zealander box that proceeded the 2006 Census contained elements 
of both (Kukutai & Didham 2012 ).
90 Interestingly, the 2013 Census revealed a sharp decline in majority support for a New Zealander 
ethnicity: whereas the 2006 Census showed 11.1% of the total population that stated an ethnicity 
self-identifying as New Zealander, only 1.6% of the total stated population did so in 2013. This 
decline occurred despite the absence on both censuses of a specific New Zealander tick box; 
respondents to both the 2006 and 2013 Censuses had to specifically write in the term New Zealander 
to be counted as such. The absence of a similar campaign to encourage a New Zealander ethnicity 
prior to the 2013 Census may emerge as the reason for such a decline. 
and serve to raise the self esteem of those espousing such jargon (Putnam 
2000, Arden 2003, Sowell 2010). By advocating the banning of all young 
male Muslims, and all who ‘look Muslim,’ from flying on Air New 
Zealand, Prosser denigrates all Muslims—and possibly all those of a 
darker complexion—regardless of nationality or religion—to the position 
of potential terrorist. For Prosser, it is the colour of one’s skin that would 
serve to alert potential gatekeepers that terrorists are afoot. His ignorance 
is even more disturbing as a sitting MP.91 Such an example can only 
accentuate both the lack of, and the need for, diversity policies that target 
majority populations. 
An analytical framework of deep diversity
According to the New Zealand Federation of Multicultural Councils 
(2014), existing state interpretations of diversity are in need a a major 
rethink. Their policy position paper released prior to the September 2014 
national elections identifies key areas in which the management of 
growing ethnic populations can be improved. In some area, existing 
policies92 merely reinforce the status quo, provide limited forms of 
minority recognition, and are usually limited in their ultimate 
effectiveness. Such policies can be seen as having breadth but no depth in 
their design and implementation, and existing forms of institutional and 
structural discrimination may often impede their effectiveness. A deeper, 
more inclusive view of diversity must be embraced by state entities if 
multiculturalism, as a viable form of governance, is to move beyond mere 
majority toleration of minorities and into deliberative active engagement 
between stakeholders. In order to operationalise these concepts, the 
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91 Prosser, third on the New Zealand First Party List, was reelected to another term in New 
Zealand’s 51st Parliament during the 20 September 2014 national elections. He originally entered 
Parliament in December 2011. 
92 In its policy statement, the New Zealand Federation of Multicultural Councils lists the following 
key areas for policy improvement: constitutional issues, ethnic affairs, race relations, settlement 
support, and refugees and asylum seekers (NZFMC 2014). 
framework presented below views the normative, operative and 
ideological values of two successive diversity discourses: the first of the 
shallow variety, the type of approach extant today, and the second, of a 
deeper interpretation that shifts the balance from existing management 
approaches to more equitable governance strategies in which majorities 
and minorities equally determine the proper terms of engagement; a form 
of social détente between parties that share a common interest in social 
cohesion. 
One of the defining characteristics of shallow forms of multicultural policy 
is their basis in the concept of tolerance, which supports existing forms of 
ethnocultural maintenance; that majority society should somehow tolerate 
national minorities and expanding migrant populations. Shallow forms of 
multicultural policy most often follow the pattern of two ships passing in 
the night. Existing multicultural policies are often ‘top down’—
formulated, targeted and implemented (‘managed’) by majority 
government, directed solely at minority populations, and purposed with 
the task of better integrating minorities into majority society. According to 
Butcher (2008), existing multicultural policy is “sufficient if the only 
expectation upon the host society is to provide the services and resources 
to aid integration of migrants.” Shallow forms allow for varying degrees 
of accommodation and minority rights, but these are often characterised 
by proactive minority requests or demands for accommodation, a ’bubble-
up’ approach in which majorities are seen to receive, consult and grant or 
deny such appeals. This type of interaction is less one of engaged dialogue 
and more one that reinforces existing stereotypes of majority dominance. 
It perpetuates a status quo that majority (dominant) and minority 
(subordinate) are unequal partners in deliberative processes. Under this 
type of framework, minorities, while encouraged to participate in majority 
society, are minimally accommodated while structural and institutional 
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Table 2.2 Key values & assumptions of the diversity discourse: shallow and deep approaches. 
KEY VALUES: SHALLOW APPROACH: DEEP APPROACH:
Normative • Diversity management strategies 
apply
• Assumption that minorities are 
not fully integrated and must be 
properly ‘managed’
• Stresses the importance of 
toleration over accommodation
• Structural and institutional 
discrimination prevalent
• Diversity is mostly accepted and 
tolerated by majority society; 
• Most minorities recognised, 
some accommodation within 
limits
• Superficial recognition of rights
• Minority political representation 
limited & below census 
proportions.
• Diversity governance strategies 
apply
• Assumption that most minority 
populations are fully integrated, 
socially and economically
• Stresses the importance of 
accommodation over toleration
• Policies to address and remove 
structural and institutional barriers 
introduced
• Diversity proactively encouraged 
and actively engaged; 
• All minorities recognised, most 
accommodated within limits
• Comprehensive recognition of 
rights
• Minority political representation 
exceeds proportions described in 
national census
Ideological • Society has a dominant 
monocultural or bicultural 
(homogenising) identity, but 
recognises existence of ‘others’
• Scant government support for 
strengthening non-majority 
ethnicities, religions and 
languages
• Migrant and minorities must 
adhere to an existing national 
identity
• Pluralism considered something 
novel to be dealt with or 
controlled through policy and 
legislation
• National identity based on 
exclusive majority ideology or 
biculturalism
• Social cohesion is a stated and 
achievable policy goal
• Society is proactively multicultural, 
multiethnic, multireligious and 
multilingual
• Active government support for 
strengthening minority ethnicities, 
cultures, religions and languages
• Migrants and minorities contribute 
to and participate in a national 
identity
• All forms of pluralism considered 
the normal state of affairs; co-
governance strategies for diversity
• National identity based on shared 
and inclusive multicultural 
identity and histories, built on 
bicultural foundation
• Social cohesion replaced by more 
realistic notions of ‘civic solidarity’
Operative • ‘Toleration’ is the operative 
principle, minority 
accommodation difficult
• Bigotry and racism prevalent in 
society; racist incidents occur 
frequently
• Minorities politically dependent 
on majority
• Diversity policies directed 
towards minorities and 
migrants only
• Policy design and 
implementation is reactive
• Policy evaluation undertaken by 
‘management’ directive as 
needed
• Active engagement and minority 
accommodation are operative 
principles
• Comity & mutual respect of 
diversity prevalent in society; racist 
incidents occur, although 
infrequently
• National minorities have 
proscribed amounts of political 
autonomy
• Diversity policies co-governed by 
and for minority, migrant and 
majority equally
• Policy design and implementation 
is proactive
• Policy evaluation ‘co-managed’ at 
regular intervals
98
barriers remain embedded, stifling already limited minority participation. 
Such discriminatory barriers are well entrenched, change averse, and slow 
to adapt to shifting demographies. In countries with sizable populations of 
migrants and national minorities, majorities, as dominant actors in 
shallow approaches to diversity, constantly struggle with balancing the 
aspirations of minorities with the needs of the majority.
In deeper forms of governance, majority tolerance of minorities is 
inadequate. Management approaches are replaced by governance 
strategies in which authority relationships are substituted with more 
balanced deliberative debate. Given existing structural inequalities in 
society, such exchange between stakeholders should initially focus on 
creating systems and processes which actively mediate and address such 
inequalities. In active engagement scenarios, minority and majority aspire 
equally towards more robust and attainable forms of civic solidarity. State 
policies are more proactive and minority communities more willing to 
engage in a shared civic culture. In terms of minority integration, deeper 
approaches would address both minority and majority responsibilities for 
mitigating discrimination, promoting both minority and national 
identities, and advocating more balanced forms of integration. In terms of 
settlement and integration, it aims to nurture a common and yet cohesive 
national identity while supporting group differentiation and providing 
policies that help minorities achieve equal human rights, participation, 
and access to citizenship, regardless of ethnicity, race, religion, language, 
or country of birth. 
In examining this diversity discourse (Table 2.2), the two divergent 
approaches can be interpreted by viewing the various normative, 
ideological and operative assumptions associated with each. Normative 
assumptions generally affirm or establish what might be commonly held 
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beliefs about existing shallow and proposed deeper interpretations of 
diversity. Normative conceptions of shallow approaches contain a variety 
of fundamental assumptions. These include majority control of the 
discourse, the understanding that minorities are not yet fully integrated 
into majority society, that diversity must be carefully and ‘appropriately’ 
managed, and that policy formulation, implementation and monitoring 
needs to be continually undertaken in order to achieve social cohesion. It 
stresses the primacy of the toleration of difference over that of full 
minority accommodation. Normative assumptions of shallow 
interpretations embody a superficial recognition of minority rights. Under 
such guise, social cohesion is limited and broadly described, and 
discrimination and racism constantly tug at the social fabric that binds 
society, reaffirming the need for continued management. In disputing 
normative interpretations of shallow diversity, social cohesion remains a 
largely aspirational goal that is loosely defined. Under existing regimes, 
social cohesion may best be described as 
the willingness of members of a society to cooperate with each other in order to 
survive and prosper. Willingness to cooperate means they freely choose to form 
partnerships and have a reasonable chance of realizing goals, because others are 
willing to cooperate and share the fruits of their endeavors equitably (Stanley 
2003:5). 
Under such a scheme, citizens share a collective belief in a common moral 
community that enables and engenders trust between them. This echoes 
Butcher’s (2008) comment that existing social cohesion policies “are 
sufficient if the only expectation upon the host society is to provide the 
services and resources to aid integration of migrants, for example.” Larsen 
(2013), however, demonstrates that the perceived trustworthiness amongst 
citizens is strongly influenced by the level of social inequality and how 
both poor and middle classes are represented in the mass media. Shallow 
interpretations of social cohesion are therefore reinforced by the structural 
and institutional inequalities that often perpetuate the aspirational nature 
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of diversity policies. As such, ‘social cohesion’ remains as nearly 
unattainable as ‘sustainable development’ is to shallow forms of the 
development discourse, or as unrealisable as ‘universal human rights’ are 
to weak social justice dialogues. 
Stanley’s (2003) definition of social cohesion however embeds a glimmer 
of deepness: it implies the willingness of its citizens to cooperate in 
achieving mutually beneficial goals, yet it fails to define what constitutes 
such a common moral community. What is fundamentally missing is the 
notion of a shared national identity—something to which all members of 
society can belong and in which all may equally participate. Under 
existing practices of minority integration into mainstream society, 
minorities are encouraged to value majority mores above their own, often 
engendering exclusion; majorities remain aloof, while shallow 
management strategies request increasing tolerance as a virtue to be 
cultivated. Instead, majorities must be proactively engaged in removing 
inequalities, and minorities more willing to participate in a national arena, 
for deeper forms of social cohesion to occur. This is why a shared national 
identity is fundamental to the success of forming deeper associations 
rather than superficial ones, as a shared national identity can be the 
vehicle through which diverse members of a society bond. Normative 
approaches of deeper strategies differ in that governance includes 
partnerships between stakeholders; that minority and majority are equally 
responsible in establishing better outcomes for attaining more realistic 
forms of social cohesion, which I term ‘civic solidarity,’ emphasising 
minority accommodation over toleration. Such solidarity includes 
comprehensive minority recognition, and both minorities and majorities 
remain actively engaged in a national identity that welcomes and 
celebrates multiple forms of diversity. 
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Ideological values represent aspirational beliefs, principles and ideals that 
are currently accepted. Ideological values of shallow diversity approaches 
are based on the belief that society has a dominant monocultural or 
bicultural identity, but recognises the existence of minority communities. 
Shallow approaches believe that majority values dominate and direct 
policy. Social cohesion is merely an aspirational goal and policies are 
initiated to bring it about, yet the goal is rarely actualised. In deeper 
approaches, society is proactively multicultural, multireligious and 
multilingual, and these assumptions are shared by both minority and 
majority participants. Ideological notions of, and belief in, social cohesion 
are replaced by stronger and more achievable forms of civic solidarity. 
Discrimination and incidents of racism diminish as policy has been 
appropriately directed at all segments of society, and minority and 
majority are equally responsible for policy formulation, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation. 
Operative values result from actualising normative assumptions and by 
putting policies into play. In shallow approaches, these are exemplified 
either by state imposition or by majority acceptance of particular 
normative assumptions and policy directives. Rarely are they defined by 
minority participation in the discourse. In an operative sense, minorities 
are seen as sole actors in a diversity sphere in which they are manipulated 
by majority players through policy initiatives designed to ‘better integrate’ 
them into majority society. This approach requires minorities to be 
responsible for their own integration through top-down policies 
disseminating majority language, culture and history in an attempt to 
improve their socioeconomic, health and education outcomes (cf. Scheffer 
2000, 2011). In exchange for minority effort, majority populations are 
merely expected to remain tolerant of minority participation. In such 
scenarios discrimination and bigotry may remain prevalent, and incidents 
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of racism may continue to occur at regular intervals. In this model, 
pluralism is considered something new or novel, diversity management is 
implemented reactively instead of proactively, responding to demographic 
change—something that must be dealt with by majorities and controlled 
through state policy or legislation. 
In contrast, the operative assumption of a deeper approach is one of active 
deliberative engagement, based on communitarian principles and the 
accommodation of minority rights. Comity and respect for all forms of 
difference are operative principles practiced by both minorities and 
majorities. Diversity policies are evenly directed at minority, migrant and 
majority populations and all are equally responsible for equitable forms of 
civic solidarity. While minority communities work towards integration, 
majority populations are the target of, and are responsible for, specific 
education policies designed to advance their understanding of minority 
language, culture and religion, and focus on the benefits of minority 
sociocultural and economic integration that would serve to mitigate the 
more drastic forms of racism and discrimination. By adapting such a 
framework, existing social cohesion policies can be more appropriately 
directed towards more attainable forms of civic solidarity. 
2.7 Towards a concise definition of deep diversity
Now that all of the pieces are in place, it is possible to construct a more 
comprehensive definition of what I currently conceive deep diversity to 
be. To summarise, deep diversity consists of the following key points:
1. Broadly speaking, deep diversity is a conceptual framework that 
considers the normative, operative and ideological values of both 
shallow and deep interpretations of the diversity discourse; one that 
rejects shallow interpretations in favour of deeper ones. Such an 
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interpretation shifts the balance from existing diversity management 
approaches to more equitable governance strategies in which both 
majorities and minorities equally determine the proper terms of 
engagement; a form of social détente between parties that share a 
common interest in social cohesion. 
2. On reasonable minority accommodation: Deep diversity recognises that 
denying appropriate cultural recognition can be as damaging to 
minorities as denying them their civil or political rights. It therefore 
encourages minorities to express their diversity in both private and 
public spaces, and supports reasonable minority accommodation, 
emphasising that where minority values clash with majority society, 
the operative public values of the wider society should take 
precedence. While there are necessary limits to minority 
accommodation, claims should be evaluated on the basis of elevating 
core liberal democratic values (Kymlicka 2010b:83). Where claims do 
not specifically enhance individual or group freedom, equality of 
opportunity, democratic citizenship and effective participation, they 
become incompatible with liberal democratic norms and societies 
should not defend them.
3. On active engagement: Such deliberation is best approached and 
moderated through deep diversity’s emphasis on policies that support 
continual active engagement between minority and majority 
populations, and of recognising and implementing more appropriate 
terms for dialogue. Deep diversity insists that such dialogue supplant 
existing shallow forms of toleration and consultation, and instead 
embody a mutual respect between all ethnocultural groups as a 
fundamental basis for engagement and negotiation, as the dialogue 
itself is more important to deep diversity than its resolutions or 
outcomes. 
4. On majority responsibility: As majorities do not always acknowledge 
minorities as positive contributors to society, majorities must shoulder 
an equal share of the responsibility for minority integration. Deep 
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diversity thus emphasises both minority and majority responsibilities 
for minority integration into mainstream society, as shallow 
formulations of multicultural policy have focused almost exclusively 
on minority responsibilities to integrate, rather than on policies 
designed to educate majorities about a) the importance of, and need 
for, minority integration in social, economic and political spheres, and 
b) for increasing the ethnocultural, religious, linguistic and historical 
literacies of majorities about specific minority populations within 
society. Deep diversity therefore addresses state obligations to engage 
majority communities and institutions on the need for, importance of, 
and the benefits of greater minority participation in society, as well as 
to increase general majority literacy of minority populations. Such an 
approach might help mitigate the discrimination that currently exists 
within society. 
5. On mitigating discrimination: Deep diversity recognises the significant 
barriers to integration that are currently faced by minority populations 
as a result of deeply embedded structural and institutional forms of 
discrimination. Such discrimination is based upon preferential 
treatment of the majority, and prevents minority groups from fully 
engaging in majority society. It is not merely the domain of individual 
actors, and is often associated with agencies that may impede equitable 
minority progress. This type of discrimination often excludes 
minorities from full participation in the economic, social and political 
life of the majority. For new policies to be effective it is vital that 
institutional barriers to minority rights be removed. ‘Deeply diverse’ 
policies would therefore need to address these obstacles. 
6. On the importance of self-identification: Deep diversity recognises the 
importance of self-reported identity as being wholly determined by the 
individual or group in question, as opposed to being based on state 
interpretations only. Thus deep diversity has specific applications vital 
for states to consider when, for example, deploying instruments that 
enumerate or categorise populations (e.g. census), distributing 
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precious resources (e.g. funds designated for minority social uplift), or 
determining which minority groups should be politically recognised 
and engaged (e.g. establishing fair and equitable terms for engaging 
minorities and their representatives for negotiating recognition or 
accommodation). As discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, a deep 
diversity framework may prove useful in analysing hierarchical 
systems of classification that may prove useful to states, but do not 
necessarily conform to minority designations based on self-reported 
identities, such as in the state census.93
7. On the importance of a shared national identity: If plural societies are to be 
socially cohesive they need a common sense of belonging and a strong 
national identity that explicitly recognises and affirms its diversity 
(Parekh 1997b:528-529). A deep diversity framework therefore 
considers a shared national identity as being of central importance, and 
as equally essential to minorities as to majorities, as societies premised 
on such an identity are better able to overcome the downsides of 
increased pluralism. A strong national identity thus fosters trust and 
solidarity between diverse citizens, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or 
country of birth, and is a key element that makes the active 
engagement of deep diversity both possible and potentially effective. 
Participation in a shared national identity can also aid minority 
political participation, reduce discrimination, and further social 
cohesion, as it can help cultivate a heightened sense of individual and 
group belonging to a particular state. In the New Zealand context, such 
belonging suggests the creation of a uniquely Indo-Kiwi identity, 
which is explored in Chapter Five. A deep diversity framework 
therefore requires that states actively work to cultivate and further a 
shared national identity in which minorities can not only participate, 
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93 Here, I do not mean to imply that existing classifications, as currently in use by the census, 
should be replaced by entirely self-reported identities. Instead, I merely point out that in the New 
Zealand context, existing categories do not accurately portray the diversity inherent within 
particular non-Māori minorities. Applying a deep diversity framework has first allowed particular 
issues to be identified, and may allow policymakers to address, and potentially implement, 
possible solutions to the equitable application of classificatory hierarchies across all populations.
but in which they can secure their future through transparent 
pathways to citizenship, which are clearly articulated and equally 
available to all who are eligible.
8. On furthering social cohesion: The conceptual framework of deep 
diversity is ultimately directed towards facilitating improved social 
cohesion. Reasonable minority accommodation, active engagement, 
shared majority responsibility, mitigating discrimination, self-
identification, and the importance of fostering a shared national 
identity, as discussed in the substantive chapters that follow, are all 
areas of interest in which a deep diversity framework may operate and 
contribute. 
2.8 Conclusion
Adapting deep diversity as a conceptual framework is possible at any 
stage of policy practice. What is required is a comprehensive shift from 
shallow forms to deeper conceptions of multicultural policies that include 
guidelines outlined above. Social cohesion is difficult to achieve, except 
perhaps in monocultural societies94 or paradoxically in ones which 
minorities are so assimilated into majorities that national identity 
supersedes or replaces minority identity, or the distinction between the 
two completely disappears.95 Deep diversity does not intend to abandon 
or replace existing forms of multicultural policy, but rather to enhance 
them in the ways outlined above with more realistic aspirations and 
implementable objectives. Existing multicultural policies are redeemable 
without going to the extremes of assimilation and integration posited by 
Scheffer (2000, 2011), or by promoting and imposing oppressive forms of 
unshared national identity as currently practised by a number of 
European countries that have rejected multiculturalism as a national 
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94 Assuming that monocultural societies share homogenous values and ideologies. 
95 cf. the Borg model referred to earlier.
policy objective (Brubaker 2001, Bienkowski 2010, Wihtol de Wenden 
2012). A process of robust and deliberative active engagement and 
minority accommodation may lead to better and more achievable 
outcomes. 
The conceptual framework of deep diversity introduced here is by no 
means complete—it is merely the beginning of an evolving theoretical 
framework that may eventually find use in formulating, interpreting, 
monitoring and assessing diversity policy in liberal western democracies. 
For now, it remains a work in progress and much explication remains. 
These cursory notions however form the basis for examining the data 
presented in the substantive chapters that follow suggest new ways of 
questioning and interpreting historical data and for assessing the 
suitability of existing approaches to ‘managing minorities.’ In its present 
form, I apply deep diversity for fresh insight in approaching existing 
source material, which enables new histories to be revealed; and in data 
collection, which allows for deeper questioning and explication of 
heterogeneity. The normative, ideological and operative assumptions 
inherent in shallow and deep approaches are applied in such a way as to 
demonstrate the importance of adopting deeper and more comprehensive 
positions on multicultural policies. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
The research methodology is formulated using three conceptual 
approaches in research design (interdisciplinary, mixed-methods, and case 
study). First, utilising method and theory from several disciplines in the 
social sciences, it combines anthropological, historical, demographic and 
policy methodologies to address core research objectives. Each offers 
distinct methodological approaches and applications of theory, data 
collection and analysis. While interdisciplinary methodologies may 
overlap, this research was undertaken by selecting appropriate methods 
from each discipline, creating a comprehensive methodological approach. 
Second, a mixed methods research design that blended both qualitative 
and quantitative techniques seemed appropriate given the objectives of 
this study. While Chapters Five and Six, the first two substantive chapters, 
deal specifically with qualitative methodologies, Chapters Seven and 
Eight are quantitative. The intent ensured that each approach reinforced 
the other, providing critical strength to the data, as well as a more robust 
analysis. Third, the research focuses on a single case study as best 
exemplifying the issues discussed in this thesis. These approaches to 
research design, as well as the disciplines in which they are embedded, are 
discussed below. 
3.2 Approaches to research design
Interdisciplinary Approaches
There were four distinct disciplinary approaches that figured, in varying 
degrees, in this research: anthropology, history, demography and policy. 
The first, anthropological, provided an overarching perspective that 
109
informed the research throughout and guided my interactions with both 
real subjects and engagements with historical material. As Harris notes 
(1995:2), “The distinction of anthropology is that it is global and 
comparative.” While other social sciences may examine particular aspects 
of the human experience, anthropology adheres to a more holistic and 
dynamic view of culture. As anthropology provides the “original 
multicultural approach to human social life” (Harris 1995:5), it integrates 
an ideal interrogative and interdisciplinary framework in which to 
examine a particular ethnocultural group within a larger multicultural 
context. 
Anthropology also emphasises the importance of cultural immersion in 
order to provide valid and reliable description. As a researcher, my own 
knowledge of the Indian subcontinent spans several decades, which laid 
the groundwork for extensive networking within the Indian community in 
New Zealand. During the course of this research, Indian friends and 
colleagues would often pass on sifārish96 to other groups and individuals 
as a way of introduction, and having a proper sifārish allowed access to a 
wider variety of sociocultural and religious communities. My foundation 
in South Asian life, language and culture was also an important factor in 
choosing it as a case study. Such grounding not only guided everyday 
interactions, it was essential in designing a tenable survey tool. At an 
analytical level, an anthropological perspective allowed me to interpret 
findings in an unambiguous and objective way, rather than seeking to 
discern a truth, however deeply hidden. For anthropologists, the task of 
the researcher is, therefore, to 
become familiar with a culture in the way one becomes familiar with a book 
or a poem, and then to read or interpret it as if one were a literary critic. The 
goal of these anthropologists is not to discover the scientific truth about a 
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96 From the Urdu (شرافس) or Hindi (dv_matra1dv_phadv_matradv_matra$3), meaning ‘recommendation.’
culture but to compose interpretations about the ‘other’—the other culture—
that are elegant and convincing (Harris 1995:278). 
Here, emic and etic perspectives in anthropology97 are particularly useful 
for unraveling the mystery that, emically speaking (i.e. from the 
perspective of the Indian community), heterogeneity is internally complex, 
while etically (i.e. for majority society) it remains externally abstruse. 
Anthropological perspectives allowed me to see through all that. 
Second, anthropological perspectives are tied to, and compatible with, 
historical particularism, a theoretical trajectory first given voice by 
twentieth century anthropologist Franz Boas (1920), which argues that any 
society is a collective representation of its unique historical past. This was 
particularly appropriate for research design, as both the historical and 
contemporary structuring of identity by self and others was an important 
step in developing an awareness of deep diversity, within both 
multicultural and policy contexts. A historical approach to research design 
also requires great flexibility in carrying out its methodologies due to the 
…constant changes in research technology and because of the many possible 
places in which historical documentation can be found. Though research is an 
intellectually challenging and rewarding experience, it is rarely easy and never a 
fast process Bombaro (2012:xiii). 
While new technologies may make locating historical sources easier than 
before, they still require a critical reading, and a consideration of their 
origin. There are two main approaches for conducting historical research: 
original source materials and historian-produced texts based on their own 
research and interpretations. Source-based research is an inherently 
heuristic process, as the researcher must be creative in searching out 
material from a range of primary source materials, as well as following up 
on evidence of sources presented in other texts and bibliographies. These 
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97 These terms are used in the anthropological literature to describe perspectives from within (emic) 
and from without (etic). Originally based on the linguistic terms phonemic and phonetic described by 
Pike (1967), they were later appropriated by anthropologists (see Goodenough 1970:104-119 and 
Harris 1976:329-350) to refer to both insider and outsider perspectives. 
considerations of material and source, along with the specifics of the 
particular historical approaches undertaken in this research are discussed 
in the Research Methods section below. 
Third, contextualising a demographic approach became an important 
early consideration in research design. Over two centuries ago, Malthus 
(1798) observed that human histories were only written by and about the 
upper classes. The great omission from the historical record, he noted, was 
that of the non-elite general population, and thus he suggested a different 
history be recorded, derived from accurate statistical data. In so doing, 
Malthus established an agenda and method for “the diligent historical 
demographers and social historians of our time, whose labors are bearing 
rich fruit” (Brundage 2013:5). Quantitative measurements of the human 
population are therefore not only long-established, but a highly effective 
means of measuring variables in populations, and population censuses 
remain “the oldest and largest socioeconomic surveys conducted in any 
country, and the most frequent single source of cross-national comparative 
data, especially for studies covering all regions of the world” (Hakim 
2000:27-8). As such, a demographic approach, based on both census and 
survey data, provided essential quantitative information that could be 
used to further the research objectives. 
Fourth, a policy perspective has been significant throughout this research. 
While this study was originally conceived as predominantly demographic, 
it emerged during the course of the research that focusing on policy was 
the most useful way of expressing its findings, and the larger topics and 
issues that I wished to explore. The research, therefore, emerged as a 
critique of existing state multicultural policies, rather than as an 
anthropological ethnography, or historical or demographic piece on the 
Indian diaspora. Thus the policy aspect of the research provided the most 
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important, and challenging, part of research design. As a result, the 
research does not address specific policies, but rather focuses on wider 
issues that underpin the role of public policies in fostering a harmonious 
and ethnically diverse society. It is a study more about knowledge for 
appropriate action rather than the further development of social science 
knowledge (cf. Scott & Shore 1979:224-39, Hakim 2000:3-4, Majchrzak & 
Markus 2014), although the latter would be an added benefit if it helped 
reorient the way in which diversity management is currently practised. 
In addition to the interdisciplinary orientations mentioned above, I 
included three additional approaches to research design that were 
fundamental to completing this study: grounded theory, mixed methods, 
and the application of a case study that would serve to integrate the 
different anthropological, historical, demographic and policy approaches. 
Mixed Methods design
While existing publications on the Indian diaspora were instructive, most 
were historically focused, and none painted a deeper demographic picture 
of the population today. Therefore, a cross-sectional survey was designed 
to quantify the scope of the divergence between what a census 
communicates about a minority population (quantitatively) and what an 
actual community that interacts within a world not bounded by existing 
census hierarchies may convey (qualitatively). The scope of this project 
needed to be wider than merely reporting demographic disparities and 
change, which tends to be a largely descriptive endeavour. It also needed 
to more broadly reflect how changes wrought by recent immigration 
might impact historic, present and future state treatment of minorities. 
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The use of mixed methods research is not new. “The nature of most 
research conducted in the social sciences lends itself to use mixed methods 
research procedures” (Kemper et al. 2003: 273). Yin (2014:14) makes a 
strong case that multiple methods (e.g. a survey within a case study) are 
valid as they are not mutually exclusive. A mixed methods research design 
brings together disparate research methods to help the researcher describe 
or explain particular phenomena and answer specific types of questions 
generally not available when employing a single method. In combination, 
a mixed methods approach presents several advantages. First, the 
dimensions of the project are widened as data can be gathered that would 
not otherwise be procurable using a single method; second, a more 
complete picture of the phenomena can be obtained; and third, research 
goals may be more readily achieved (Morse 2003:189).
Research using quantitative data addresses some kinds of questions.  For others, 
qualitative or mixed-methods research can best inform policy makers, especially 
when the relevant aspects of diversity include lived experience, complex 
interactions and subjective beliefs and attitudes (Boston et al. 2006:xiv). 
The qualitative design of this study involved historical research and a 
review of the census record. Also, qualitative responses about identity and 
discrimination from the survey, along with contemporary examples of 
selected relevant events in the news media, provided a platform to 
address the problems imbedded in state minority treatment. The specific 
methods used are described in the research methods section below. For 
quantitative design, two specific methods were employed: a comparative 
analysis of both past and present census data, and statistical data 
collection using a questionnaire and its subsequent analysis using 
specialised software. Overall, a mixed methods design can increase a 
study’s reliability, especially if data collected from one method 
corroborates that collected from another. 
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Case Study approach
The selection of a single non-Māori minority to examine as a case study is 
in keeping with the general stance of anthropology. Thus, like 
ethnography, case studies have a way of illuminating theory while 
highlighting praxis. These practical applications can often “elucidate the 
unique features of the case” (Bryman 2008:54), emphasise difficult 
theoretical concepts, or give clearer meaning to analysis. Of all research 
designs, “case studies are probably the most flexible” (Hakim 2000:59). 
They not only explore a social entity, they can look at subsets or 
combinations of subsets: “Case studies take as their subject one or more 
selected examples of a social entity—such as communities, social groups, 
organisations, events, life histories, families, work teams, roles or 
relationships…” (Hakim 2000:59). A case study approach also allows for a 
variety of data collection techniques which support the use of mixed 
methods, justifying their use in social science research (Yin 2009:x, 2014). 
Ultimately, they allow for “a more rounded, holistic study than with any 
other design” (Hakim 2000:59). The application of case study approaches 
can also answer questions that seek to explain how or why particular 
circumstances or social phenomena exist (Yin 2104:4). Because the intent of 
this research is ultimately to inform policy through an understanding of 
the case study and the theoretical implications of deep diversity, the 
research design necessarily involved a case study approach. 
These usually “begin with a question that often can be linked to emerging 
grounded theory” (Shulha & Wilson 2003:660). Thus, in keeping with the 
theoretical direction of this research, a case study of the Indian diaspora 
can serve as the medium to explore the historic and identity-marking 
complexities of a particular minority group to which a grounded theory 
approach can be applied. A case study approach utilising survey data and 
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quantitative analysis ultimately strengthens the arguments on the role of 
identity and the importance I ascribe to minority invisibility in both 
historical documentation and past and present census material.
3.3 Qualitative research methodologies
Two main research methods were applied to the qualitative data presented 
in this thesis, historical research and census analysis. Specific quantitative 
methods regarding the survey and its analysis, are discussed in Section 
3.4.
Historical research
Although Hakim (2000:149) states that there should be no major changes 
of direction or methods during the course of a research project, reading 
early histories of Indian presence in New Zealand revealed that there were 
alternative narratives to be told. Interrogations of the historical 
authenticity of ethnicity tendered by both the New Zealand census and 
other historical documentation related to early Māori-tauiwi encounter 
established a new and important line of inquiry. Thus, the research 
expanded to include an analysis of historical documentation that recorded 
the very earliest European visits to Aotearoa. These included the ships 
logs and diaries of the captains, first mates and/or naturalists in my 
search for relevant passages or descriptions of South Asian presence 
aboard or ashore. Census documents were also used to discern a 
distinction between existing reductionist census models that homogenise 
non-Māori minorities and the breadth and depth of subgroups that exist 
within the study population. 
Regarding the use of historical documentation, Bombaro (2012:125) 
defines primary source material as “documents, artifacts, images, 
and other evidence of an event created by firsthand witnesses.” 
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These must also be critically examined. Approaching such material 
is usually accomplished through a two stage method of external 
and internal critique. Chitnis (2006:38) states that the objective of 
external assessment is to restore a document [or artifact] to its 
archetype, while the objective of internal assessment is to determine 
its acceptability as verifiable. External critique questions the 
circumstances of the original document (e.g. author, date, place of 
composition) to determine its veracity, whereas internal critique 
examines and analyses the contents of the text for meaning and 
accuracy, establishing if presented facts can be accepted as true 
(Berg & Lune 2012:312-315). The point of external critique is 
therefore to establish the authenticity of the text while internal 
critique is designed to establishment its credibility (Chitnis 
2012:43). 
Secondary sources are once removed from primary sources, and offer “a 
summary, analysis, commentary, or criticism of events in history based on 
the study of primary sources” (Bombaro 2012:85). Beyond secondary 
sources are tertiary sources, which generally include reference material 
that “summarizes and condenses the information found in primary and 
secondary sources” (Bombaro 2012:57). Historians can use all three types 
in their research and analysis, but despite an emphasis on facts, these texts 
must be viewed as a blend of objective and subjective writing. Historians 
have two essential mandates—to record the events of the past and to offer 
up an interpretation of those facts. Thus, while the substance of historical 
writing is objective and factual, the “life breath of history is interpretation, 
which also gives a definite viewpoint to a work of history” (Chitnis 
2012:1). History can never be wholly objective, and an ideal work would 
be one that “combines subjectivity and objectivity in due proportion 
without upholding the one at the cost of the other” (Chitnis 2012:2). This 
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has particular meaning for minority history, which is often written and 
interpreted by dominant voices that can render minorities insignificant or 
invisible. This is the case in what little survives of early Māori-tauiwi 
encounter. However, while European interpretations clouded and 
distorted early Māori history, much remains intact through the importance 
Māori ascribed to preserving oral histories. 
Brundage (2013:8) reports that there are efforts underway to “recover and 
develop the history of minorities,” especially for the attainment of 
economic and social equality. The research presented here is included in 
this category. European accounts of early Māori-European encounter 
“often serve to obscure the historical realities around the lives of the 
masses of the disempowered” (Brundage 2013:9). Thus, there were several 
challenges to coordinate in the historical chapter of this thesis, including 
the authenticity and credibility of source materials, and creating a 
balanced view of the historical subjects to ensure visibility. Relating 
historical anecdote back to the theme of identity, explored in Chapter Five, 
was another such challenge. The editorial cartoons presented in Chapter 
Four were useful in illustrating the background and historical context of 
minority discrimination. Juxtaposing the historical census data within the 
context of the editorial cartoons was particularly instructive, as it allowed 
me to interpret the implications of both state and media reaction to Asian 
immigration. 
My examination of historical data comprised “a searching-out of 
underlying themes in the materials being analysed” (Bryman 2008:529), 
and aimed to elucidate the social phenomena of minority invisibility, state 
and media reaction to immigration, the importance of identity(-ies), and 
the complex social practice of discrimination, which are reflected in the 
handling of minorities and in the diversity management practices that 
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have perpetuated existing models of minority treatment rooted in a 
colonial past. 
Careful scrutiny of early Māori encounter history, and the meticulous 
reading of the historical reportage of minorities in the New Zealand 
Census provided valuable data about early Indian presence. Since many 
extant texts on both Indian and Chinese history in New Zealand have 
relied on census records to confirm first presence, it was a revelation to 
find new information that had not been previously uncovered. 
Consequently, both historical and recent census data were utilised in such 
a way as to reveal an alternate picture than the one espoused by state 
institutions and media, and easily understood by majority society. 
The use of early written accounts of initial Māori-European encounter also 
uncovered new information about non-Māori minority presence in 
Aotearoa. In conducting historical research, the historical documents 
consulted were fairly easily accessible through a standard university 
library system and is available to future researchers for renewed scrutiny. 
A search of the ‘PapersPast’ database98 produced over 82,000 original 
articles, editorials, and letters to the editor that directly referenced the 
word “Indian.” Many of these documents referenced court cases and other 
newsworthy items. Most early newspapers also reported the movements 
of ships in and out of local ports, detailing both the cargo, news of the 
occupants aboard, and how long the ship planned on remaining in port. 
The ‘Timeframes’ collection99 from the Alexander Turnbull Library yielded 
historical editorial cartoons, of which many were worthy of inclusion.100 
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98 <www.natlib.govt.nz/collections/digital-collections/papers-past>. This archive contains a vast 
collection of digitised versions of select New Zealand newspapers between 1839 and 1932. 
99 see <www.natlib.govt.nz/collections/digital-collections/timeframes>.
100 Those included in Chapter Four have received the necessary copyright clearance from the 
Alexander Turnbull Collection of the National Archives, which stated that these were freely 
reproducible, as long as they were not used for commercial purposes. 
The historical anecdotes presented were generally taken from captain and 
first mate logs and naturalists’ diaries from the earliest European voyages 
of exploration, provided evidence of South Asian sailors aboard incoming 
vessels. In particular, I used Dunmore’s 1981 English translation of the 
French journals of Surville & Labé, and Ollivier’s 1985 English translation 
of the journals of Marion du Fresne’s voyages to New Zealand in May-
July 1772. These included both direct translation and the historians’ 
interpretations. In utilising these, I referred only to the translations and 
not the commentary, so I considered these as primary sources. Secondary 
sources were also utilised, as in Richards’ (1994, 2010) history of sealing in 
New Zealand, and others accounts of early historians (e.g. McNab 1907, 
1914) and missionary accounts (e.g. Howard 1940). Salmond (1991, 1997) 
proved especially useful in providing the context within which both Indo-
Māori and Indo-European encounter could be contextualised and 
discussed.
Census analysis 
In utilising historical census material I employed the method of historical 
demography, which examines quantitative data collected about human 
populations in the past. Historical demography is not only a well-
established social science practice (Hakim 2000:28), but a highly effective 
method as well. Census data also provides a benchmark for establishing 
minority settlement patterns and thus became a primary contributor of 
data for this research. Population censuses are also vital data sources as 
they are the oldest and largest socioeconomic surveys conducted by state 
governments, and secondary analysis of census data is well established in 
the social sciences (Hakim 1982, 2000:27, Kiecolt & Nathan 1985:33-34).
During the early stages of this research a thorough review of 
historical census documents was conducted, using each of the 
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quinquennial censuses held in the University of Waikato library, 
from the very first 1851 census up to and including the 1926 
Census. I searched through the original published census records 
with a fine-tooth comb, reading each and every footnote in specific 
sections of the early censuses that covered birthplace, race,101 
nationality and religious affiliation. This allowed me to create the 
ethnicity and religious affiliation tables presented in Appendices A 
and B which proved central to the analysis presented in Chapter 
Six. These became working documents from which I composed the 
historical narrative and thematic analysis that emerged from the 
data. I decided to stop my analysis at the 1926 threshold as the 
history of Indian settlement in New Zealand based on the census 
has been well-recorded from that point on by Leckie (2007) and 
others. 
Such collation of the early census data allowed for, as Hakim (2000:28) 
comments, a renewed look at old records that can “overturn received 
wisdom and introduce a new perspective on the recent past.” Since most 
demographers do not collect their own data, the use of historical census 
material proved useful in advancing notions of historical state treatment 
of minorities in New Zealand. To be clear, analysis of this material is 
historical rather than demographic. Demographic analysis is applied to 
recent census and survey data and is discussed in Section 3.4 below. 
3.4 Quantitative research methodologies
In order to establish inherent differences between the actual composition 
of the Indian population and the picture painted by recent census results, 
it was necessary to both utilise a statistical approach to recent census data 
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101 I use the term ‘race’ here in the manner in which it was used in the early censuses, as the concept 
of ethnicity used today was poorly know at the time.
and to design and deploy a cross-sectional survey. These are discussed 
below.
Statistical census analysis
Viewing how official state statistics quantify and categorise ethnic 
minorities became the focus for the presentation of recent census statistics 
presented in Chapter Seven. The data is taken from both the 2006 and 2013 
New Zealand Censuses, as the Christchurch earthquakes forced the delay 
in the 2011 Census.102 In the case of the 2006 Census, data was obtained 
from the freely downloadable spreadsheets from the Statistics New 
Zealand website. These, however, usually aggregate Level 2 and Level 3 
ethnic categories into Level 1 ethnicities (e.g. European, Asian), and hence 
are only useful for broad generalisations. Data specifically on the Indian 
population therefore required a customised data request and subsequent 
grant from the Council of New Zealand University Librarians (CONZUL) 
and Statistics New Zealand (JOB-3357 and JOB-4081). As the 2013 Census 
data on ethnicity only became available in two waves occurring in May 
and August 2014 during the writing stages of the thesis, it was not 
possible to resubmit a second customised data request in time to do an 
updated analysis based on the 2013 Census data. Where possible, I have 
updated the 2006 data with the publicly available 2013 data, and where 
not, I have presented the 2006 data. 
Analysis focused on providing a picture of the ‘Indian’ population as 
projected by the state. This centred on using the two largest ethnic identity 
variables (i.e. ‘Indian’ and ‘Fijian Indian’), and crosstabulating these with 
other census indicators in order to establish if there are any significant 
differences in subgroup populations. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 
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102 This is discussed in Chapter One.
Seven. The results of this analysis were then juxtaposed against survey 
data presented in Chapter Eight. 
Survey design, deployment, and data entry and analysis
The Indian population in New Zealand has never before been surveyed to 
the extent reported here, and there was a real need to be able to form a 
clear demographic profile to address some of the research objectives. 
While sufficient historical data exists,103 and recent census figures are 
available to quantify numbers, religions, and geographical spread 
(Statistics New Zealand 2006, 2014), information describing the 
composition of today’s Indian population, especially in terms of identity 
and ethnic subgroups, is sorely lacking. Therefore, a detailed 
questionnaire was deployed between 2008-2013 to collect both qualitative 
and quantitative data through the use of a self-administered, mixed-mode, 
web-based, survey of 1,124 members of the Indian population resident 
throughout New Zealand. 
Validity was an early and pressing concern as the surveyed population 
does not represent a random sample.104 Procuring such a sample from a 
‘sample frame’ was not possible, considering the resources available for 
thesis research. As a result, this determined the type of survey deployment 
that could be utilised (i.e. snowball sampling). While such methods are 
unrepresentative of the target population (Goodman 1961, Biernacki & 
Waldorf 1981, Atkinson & Flint 2001, Kemper et al. 2003, Browne 2005, 
Bryman 2008:184-185), the purpose was to explore key themes rather than 
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103 See McGee (1962, 1993), McLeod (1980, 1984, 1986), Tiwari (1980), Zodgekar (1980), Leckie (1981, 
1990, 1995, 1998, 2006, 2007, 2010), Kasanji (1982), Shepard (1982, 2002, 2006), McLeod & Bhullar 
(1992). 
104 e.g. discounting the population census (which would require doing a stratified random sample 
using meshblock census data, and considerable sampling expenditure and resources), no survey 
frame of the entire Indian population in New Zealand exists from which a random sample can be 
drawn. 
provide a representative sample. This is further discussed below. 
Reliability of survey data was also an important consideration (Hunter & 
Brewer 2003:581-582, Tashakkori & Teddlie 2003:706, Bryman 2008:31-33, 
Yin 2014:45-46). In order for the data to be reliable, it would need to be 
replicable, so in both planning the research and in carrying it out, the 
methodologies are presented so that they can more easily be replicated. 
This includes a copy of the questionnaire in Appendix H. 
" Questionnaire design: 
Composing appropriate questions for the questionnaire included several 
considerations. First, it was necessary to ensure that these were succinct 
and clear enough that anyone in the target audience would understand 
the intent; second, it was important to anticipate prospective respondents’ 
queries and be able to account for these in the final version; and third, it 
was essential to show appropriate sensitivity for religious, political and 
personal questions. In terms of format, considerations included layout and 
selecting the most appropriate configuration for many of the questions. 
Proper layout included choices of horizontal or vertical presentations of 
responses, number of rows, providing enough options, the use of tick-
boxes or radio buttons, and the use of closed- or open-ended questions. 
These challenges were often resolved by a number of different techniques, 
which included further literature research on survey design,105 looking at 
similar survey questionnaires,106 and the trialling of a number of different 
versions of the same question on ‘pretesters’—those that had agreed to 
help during the design stage of the questionnaire. Pretesting was crucial in 
getting feedback about what worked, and what did not. Equally 
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105 See Bethlehem (2000), Jenkins & Solomonides (2000), Nesbary (2000), Presser et al. (2004), 
Trouteaud (2004), Peytchev et al. (2006), Couper et al. (2007), von Selm & Jankowski (2006), Healey 
(2007), Malhotra (2008), and Toepoel et al. (2008). 
106 See Spoonley et al. (2007), Department of Labour (2009). 
challenging was determining which questions would comprise the 
deployed version. Both survey length and the amount of time it took to 
complete were significant concerns. Most questionnaires should be just 
long enough to get the answers being sought, yet short enough to keep 
respondents ticking boxes (Malhotra 2008). Early versions contained over 
a hundred questions and the initial drafts took pretesters a half hour to 
complete. The final questionnaire, by comparison, contained 79 questions 
with pretesters reporting an average time of 16 minutes to complete. 
Next, some questions needed further finesse. A particularly onerous 
example was the question on identity.107 During the pretest, this was 
framed as open-ended, allowing respondents to best consider their 
answer. This allowed for a variety of responses that ran the gamut from 
predictable and pedestrian, to informative and quizzical, and on to 
comical and outrageous. Many were single word entries, like “Indian,” 
while others used the opportunity to expound on the meaning of life or 
left it entirely blank. Yet while the open-ended approach had many 
advantages, it was difficult to classify and code these types of responses.108 
To change the question from open-ended to closed-ended required 
identifying lists of potential identity words (like mother, Indian, Muslim, 
and professional), and classifying certain sets of words that shared 
particular characteristics under broad headings such as gender, caste, 
religion, occupation, family, and ethnicity. These words were then 
randomly listed on the questionnaire with the intent of seeing what broad 
categories were representative of identity and hence important to 
respondents. The intent was to determine if generalizations such as “71.2% 
of the surveyed population selected words categorized under the heading 
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107 See Question 11 in Appendix H. 
108 This is one of the reasons why Statistics New Zealand doesn’t ask an open-ended ethnicity 
question on the census.
‘nationality’ (e.g. ‘Kiwi’ or ‘Indo-Fijian')” or “8.6% of respondents felt that 
stating their caste was an important identifier” were possible. However, it 
was determined that listed words might be skewing respondents towards 
selecting particular characteristics that they might not otherwise have 
thought of or chosen unless prompted, referred to by Waters (2000:1736) as 
the “example effect.” This brought about a return to open-ended self-
identification as preferable. 
" Eliciting responses: 
An early consideration was determining how best to get potential 
respondents to complete. Examining the variety of response rates that 
could be expected from an array of deployment methods, many had high 
non-response rates (Kaplowitz et al. 2004, Heerwegh & Loosvelt 2008, 
Manfreda et al. 2008) but more recent methods, involving technology and 
mixed deployment, were beginning to appear in the literature (Bennet & 
Nair 2010, Fan & Yan 2010, Monroe & Adams 2012, Sauermann & Roach 
2013) and showed promise in improved response rates. The question of 
incentives for achieving higher response rates was also explored. Most 
demonstrate elevated response rates when incentives to complete are 
offered (Cobanoglu & Cobanoglu 2003, Birnholtz et al. 2004, Gendall & 
Healy 2008). However, respondents would need to provide email 
addresses to receive an incentive, and this would compromise the ability 
to maintain confidentiality. I decided to preclude incentives and rely on 
respondent interest instead.
Recent studies on response rates of web-based surveys have often 
produced inconsistent results as factors affecting response rates have long 
been influenced by the varying contexts of each particular study (Sax et al. 
2003). Shih & Fan (2008) show a mean response rate of 34%, with results 
for the individual studies in their meta analysis ranging from 7% to 88%. 
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In their meta-analysis of 45 studies, Manfreda et al. (2008) show results for 
web-survey response rates that range from 11.1% to 82.1%. On average, 
Cook et al. (2000) state that normal response rates for web-based surveys 
should run between 35-40%.
" Pretest: 
A pretest was conducted in October 2008 by soliciting 100 Indian friends 
and acquaintances to respond to the first draft of the questionnaire. In the 
first group of twenty emailed invitations, individuals were invited to 
provide feedback about the questionnaire regarding rationale, justifiability 
and clarity of question content, obvious absence of or repetition of content, 
question order, satisfaction level with response options, and total amount 
of time taken to complete the survey. The survey was then updated using 
the feedback, and another batch of invitations sent out. This process was 
repeated five times at roughly two week intervals. Reminders were sent 
one week after the initial request. Pretesting continued through March 
2009. 
" Selecting appropriate deployment methods: 
There are a wide variety of dispersal methods for questionnaires. As 
expected, each has advantages and disadvantages.109 There are traditional 
paper-based surveys (hard copy manually distributed and collected), 
phone surveys, emailed surveys which embed the questionnaire within 
the email or send it as an attachment (Donmeyer & Moriarty 2000), which 
recently become possible with minor technological advances,110 or a web-
based survey sending a URL link directly in an email to potential 
respondents, which, like the email option, has also recently come into 
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109 See Cobanoglu et al. (2001), Coderre et al. (2004), Kaplowitz et al. (2004), Fricker et al. (2005), 
Schillewaert & Meulemeester (2005), Wright (2005), Heerwegh & Loosvelt (2008), Manfreda et al. 
(2008).
110 Such as Google Forms, a part of the Google Docs suite available on the web. 
wide usage in recent years. Hard copy was both the traditional method 
and has been shown to be effective,111 and could be disseminated in a 
variety of ways: posted by mail, distributed at specific events designed to 
attract target audiences, or given in person to individual potential 
respondents. 
Regarding the limitations of each dispersal method, paper questionnaires 
are expensive112 and time-consuming to prepare, and the data would have 
to be manually entered from each collected questionnaire. With phone 
surveys recent research in this technique has shown alarming drops in 
response rates as newer technologies are introduced and improved.113 This 
line of inquiry has also been supplemented with recent research on how to 
decrease non-response rates (Steeh et al. 2001). 
Emailed surveys are problematic in that the embedded format would not 
always remain constant (the received format being determined by the 
capabilities of a respondent’s email client), and length was an issue—it 
works well for brief surveys but becomes cumbersome with an extended 
questionnaire. Emailing surveys as PDF attachments meant that the 
receiver would have to not only print out the survey, but would also have 
to return it by post at their own cost. Furthermore, emailing potential 
respondents an embedded survey, or emailing them a direct clickable 
URL link, would require that receivers be fairly computer literate, which 
might alienate a portion of the target audience. 
128
111 See  Cobanoglu et al. (2001), Kaplowitz et al. (2004), and Healey et al. (2005).
112 Costs of a paper questionnaire include printing and distribution costs, i.e. paper, photocopying, 
envelopes, and postage.
113 See Groves & Couper (1998), Piekarski et al. (1999), Curtin et al. (2000, 2005), Tuckel & O’Neill 
(2001).
Biases also tend to be introduced when respondents who answer online 
questionnaires have different attitudes or demographic characteristics 
than those who do not respond. This is particularly the case for online 
questionnaires as many social groups are underrepresented among 
internet users, including people of limited income, members of particular 
ethnic or religious groups, older persons, and those with lower levels of 
educational attainment.114 Other studies suggest that there is very little 
variation between surveys conducted on-line and traditional paper-based 
surveys, or that the differential between offline and online populations is 
quickly closing and may be insignificant in the near future.115 
Each method however did have specific benefits. With hard copies many 
potential respondents could be mobilized by organising gatherings and 
giving presentations; those present could subsequently complete and 
directly return the questionnaire. Particular audiences that were under-
represented could also be targeted, e.g. high-schoolers, elderly, Muslims, 
Sikhs, South Islanders, and low income earners. It would also be possible 
to ensure the inclusion of groups that were non-computer literate. 
Regarding email, sending electronic messages to potential respondents 
was both economical and direct; in addition, specific individuals could be 
targeted with emailed cover letters intended explicitly for them, hopefully 
increasing response rates (Porter & Whitcomb 2007). PDF questionnaires 
(formatted as intended) could be attached or URLs could be included to 
effortlessly deliver respondents directly to the web-based survey. This 
latter method (web-based survey) would also dramatically reduce the 
amount of time spent performing the otherwise onerous data entry task. It 
also meant that respondents would not need to mail completed surveys. 
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114 See Grossnickle & Raskin (2001), Miller (2001), Ray & Tabor (2003), Wilson & Laskey (2003), and 
Wright (2005).
115 See Fricker & Schonlau (2002), Riva et al. (2003) and Gosling et al. (2004). 
Recent research has shown that, in terms of response rates, web-based 
surveys are nearly as good if not better than traditional mail surveys 
(Baruch & Holtom 2008:15, Manfreda et al. 2008). 
" Sample frame: 
The survey required creating a sample frame—a list of the target audience 
along with their mailing addresses for postal surveys, or a directory of 
email addresses for use in a fully systematic and randomized polling 
sample. Most social scientists prefer random samples (Kemper et al. 2003, 
Bryman 2008) as these are suitable for making highly probable 
generalisations about a population and can be utilised in numerous ways; 
for example, to make predictions, as a basis for sound policy decisions, or 
to compare with other populations. Having a sample frame of 40,000 
would be ideal, as it would allow for random selection of a set of about 
4,000 from the original list, and from that, a return rate of about 25% to get 
the minimum 1000 responses to meet this survey’s objective.116 
In order to determine the best strategy for ensuring a stratified sample 
while using a snowball method, it was necessary to break down the census 
numbers and derive percentages for such variables as age, income, gender, 
marital status, religion, linguistic group, and birthplace. By repeating this 
process in the sample, it was possible to juxtapose the two to ascertain 
where the sample significantly differed from the census. It was then 
feasible to target specific groups to help balance the differential. This 
method helped me create a more-stratified sample in order to increase the 
reliability of the results. While the sample may not have been completely 
random, it better approximated randomness than snowball sampling 
alone could. 
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116 In order to have a statistically significant sample.
Random samples often employ methods like canvassing every fourth 
house or ringing every twentieth phone number in the book, which in this 
case was not only impractical, it was impossible. There is no available list 
of South Asians in New Zealand, or at least not an accessible or affordable 
one. While Statistics New Zealand might be able to compile such a catalog 
from the quinquennial census, it would be impractical and costly to make 
such a confidentiality-compromising request. The next step, thus, was to 
compile a list of my own. This included collecting business cards of 
contacts, social networking through personal contacts, networking at 
conferences, utilising email list serves and Indian business directories, 
advertising in targeted publications and web sites of Indian organisations, 
and making personal contact with the secretaries of the numerous Indian 
organisations (which had the benefit of authenticating my email requests). 
All of these contacts were within New Zealand and all from within the 
public domain. 
It was important to also be opportunistic as a researcher. While traveling, I 
found people by equally canvassing such establishments as dairies and 
taxi stands, Indian restaurants and doctor’s offices hoping to find 
proprietors, cooks, drivers, anyone from the subcontinent willing to take 
the survey. This provided many opportunities for gupshup and guftagu,117 
important South Asian social mechanisms for building rapport and 
establishing credibility. I had also created a small paper business card with 
information on the survey and the URL for easy access. 
I also assembled small baskets with hundreds of cards and distributed 
these throughout Indian restaurants and shops selling Indian groceries in 
Auckland, Hamilton and Wellington, asking shopkeepers to leave these on 
the counter so that customers might take one at checkout. These baskets 
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117 Gupshup (4535, پشپگ) means gossip, guftagu (4dv_matradv_pha784dv_matra , وگتفگ) is general conversation. 
were even deployed in South Island locations by an enthusiastic 
respondent willing to help.
Figure 3.1: The business card advertising the web-based survey.
Figure 3.2: Basket and cards left on checkout counters at Indian dairies & restaurants.
In 2008, I created a web site focused on the Indian diaspora in New 
Zealand.118 The site, consisting of four pages, contains a page that 
introduces the research, another that introduces the survey (with a link 
connecting visitors directly to the questionnaire), a third page of known 
Indian groups, organisations and associations, and a fourth listing 
Indians in New Zealand
Partic ipate  in an anonymous on-l ine 
survey at  the  University  o f  Waikato 
from your computer  at  home by vis i t ing: 
<http:/ / indiandiaspora.wikispaces.com>
Todd Nachowitz,  PhD candidate
Department of  Polit ical  Science & Public  Policy
University of  Waikato
email :  tn37@students.waikato.ac.nz
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118 See <http://indiandiaspora.wikispaces.com>. 
published references on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand.119 Both the 
list of known published sources and the list of Indian organisations were 
picked up by Wikipedia and now appear as External Links on their 
“Indian New Zealander” page.120 Those Googling “Indian diaspora in 
New Zealand” or similar terms are directed to both the Wikipedia page 
and my web site. I continue to update these web pages regularly. This 
method continues to shepherd those proactively searching for information 
to find my web site, and ultimately find the survey. New contacts 
translated into additional survey respondents that I might not have 
otherwise been able to reach. 
Contacts from all sources were compiled into an alphabetical list of email 
addresses without names attached, resulting in over a thousand unique 
email addresses in my target population. This list became a key step in 
finding prospective survey respondents. Names from New Zealand’s 
major phone books (hard copy and web-based) were also used to compile 
a list of potential names and postal addresses. However, by selecting 
obviously South Asian surnames (e.g. Singh, Patel, Fernandez, Khan, 
Sharma, Gupta) to which postal questionnaires could be sent immediately 
introduced bias and could potentially skewed the sample, either through 
oversubscription to particular names that might invoke certain caste or 
religious affiliations, or by not having any feasible way of determining if, 
for example, all Hussains were from India and not from Pakistan. 
Nonetheless, it was helpful as an additional means of enlarging the 
sample frame and may have slightly increased overall numbers. In 
particular, it enabled contact with additional numbers of Sikh 
respondents, as comparisons with the 2006 Census showed that members 
of this community were under-represented in the survey. It may also serve 
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119 see Appendices J & K. 
120 See <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo_Kiwi>. 
as a respectable illustration of a methodological situation in which ends 
might justify means.
" Questionnaire deployment: 
Four basic deployment strategies were eventually employed: the web-
based questionnaire, mail-based questionnaire, presentations with survey 
distribution; and table displays at conferences and relevant gatherings. 
How best to introduce the survey for each type of deployment technique 
required consideration. Additionally, it was important to consider 
disparate approaches for each deployment method in order to maximize 
response rates.121 Confidentiality and the anonymity of survey 
respondents was always a primary concern. Respondents taking the web-
based survey remain anonymous as no identifying information was 
solicited, and Survey Monkey, discussed below, only records a respondent 
number and the date on which the survey was submitted. Collected hard-
copy surveys were also anonymous and individual respondents were 
identified by a Respondent Number written onto the top left corner of the 
first page of each returned survey. 
Web-based questionnaire: Here, an internet-based survey company, Survey 
Monkey, was used. It allowed great flexibility in terms of design, proved 
extremely useful in gathering data, and provided simple statistical 
analysis (percentages) of the results. Each potential respondent was asked 
to click on a link delivered in an email invitation to take part in the survey, 
which would bring them directly to the questionnaire. Information that 
introduced the survey and the researcher was also provided, including 
information on the ethics approval received from the University of 
Waikato prior to deployment. For many questions Survey Monkey had 
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121 See Byrom & Bennison (2000), Whitcomb & Porter (2004), Heerweg (2005), Porter & Whitcomb 
(2005, 2007), and Moskowitz & Martin (2008).
been set up with a list of possible responses provided in dropdown menus 
so that responses could be easily selected, thereby limiting possible 
spelling errors and ensuring data consistency. The ‘snowball’ sampling 
method asked potential respondents to forward the email invitation to 
other friends, family and colleagues in their personal networks who might 
be interested in completing the survey. Survey Monkey also allowed for a 
‘thank you’ screen to be displayed at the completion of the survey where 
an additional opportunity for respondents to forward the survey link on 
to others in their network was provided. 
For all its benefits, there was one issue with Survey Monkey, the “enable 
Java Script” problem, that had first appeared during the pretesting phase. 
When a few pretesters did not complete the questionnaire, it appeared to 
be because of an “exit this survey” link on each questionnaire page (so 
that respondents would always have an ‘opt out’ option). However, in the 
actual deployment period, a pattern emerged: most respondents were 
‘opting out’ at the same page in the survey. Finally one pretester reported 
she could not complete the questionnaire past question #12. Apparently, 
when accessing the survey from an older computer, or from one with a 
browser that does not have “Java enabled,” the remainder of the survey 
would be blocked. This resulted in lost or incomplete data on 16% of those 
that navigated to the site and began the survey. In order to mitigate this 
problem, explanatory notes were placed in the emailed invitations, on my 
web-site, and on the introductory page of the web survey.122
Paper version questionnaire: A hard copy version was also created for 
distribution at presentations, conferences, or to individuals. The paper 
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122 The note reads: “Having some difficulty completing the survey? Some older computer browsers 
may present some problems. If so, make sure that you are using the latest version of your browser. 
Also, check your browser's settings and make sure that it is configured to enable Java Script. This 
should fix the problem. If, after enabling Java Script and rebooting your computer, you are still 
experiencing this problem, you can try completing the survey using another, newer, computer.” On 
the web site I also provided the option, and a link, for respondents to download the pdf version of 
the survey. 
version of the questionnaire needed to be adapted from the web-based 
version in order to be usable. However, there were certain biases that were 
introduced by having two versions, most notably that the web-based 
survey compels respondents to provide answers by not allowing them to 
proceed without first entering a response, thus improving the overall 
number of replies for individual questions. With the paper version, 
respondents could skip questions or miss out whole pages. 
The second bias arose from the necessary avenue for data collection that 
precluded pure random sampling. In order to lessen sampling bias during 
the data collection stages, the use of stratification techniques that would 
allow under-represented groups (e.g. Muslims, Indian Christians, the 
young and elderly) to be targeted by using additional deployment 
methods was incorporated. For example, giving presentations to Indian 
groups in a wide variety of regions and from a variety of backgrounds 
(e.g. religious groups, sociocultural organisations, Indian sporting events) 
created the opportunity to administer the questionnaire. 
Live presentations: Throughout the research, period attending and speaking 
at numerous conferences and gatherings enabled networking with 
additional individuals and groups. An opportunity to speak at the annual 
gathering of Indian businesspeople in Auckland in 2011 provided 
additional access to the Indian entrepreneurial community. The 
presentation consisted of a combination of historical information on the 
Indian diaspora in New Zealand and census data on the Indian 
population. This provided a constructive backdrop for introducing the 
research and distributing the questionnaire. These had the added benefit 
of connecting with geographically spread sociocultural and religious 
groups (e.g. Indian seniors; mandir, masjids and gurdwaras for particular 
faith and cultural celebrations). Each additional presentation opened up 
new opportunities for survey respondents. 
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Tables at key locations: Obtaining permission to set up unstaffed tables or 
countertop displays at key locations that would draw large numbers was 
another important deployment method. A poster briefly introducing the 
research was displayed, and a table or countertop held a stack of 
questionnaires, pencils, and a large box into which completed 
questionnaires could be dropped. This set up would often be left in place 
for 1-3 weeks, returning later to collect the materials and completed 
questionnaires. This form of presentation worked well in locations like 
mandirs, masjids, and community centres. In some instances (e.g. 
conferences, community events and gatherings), I staffed a table beside 
the display in order to meet and talk with people interested in the 
research.
" Summarising responses: 
Snowball sampling methods cannot be appropriately compared with 
sampling based on a survey frame with a known number of invitations 
sent, as researchers have no way of knowing or tracking how many 
additional invitations may have been forwarded to others by the primary 
recipients. It is therefore impossible to determine acceptable response rates 
for this type of sampling. Having sent out approximately 1,000 email 
invitations, a total of 1,124 responses were received by the time the survey 
closed, in early 2013.123 
" Data entry and analysis: 
While Survey Monkey proved extremely useful as a delivery and 
collection tool, it was poorly equipped to analyse received data. For data 
entry and analysis, SPSS was used.124 SPSS is widely employed in the 
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order for the survey results to be statistically significant.
124 This included SPSS versions 18 through 22 over the course of the research.
social sciences, and though frequency of use is not always the best method 
for selecting an appropriate path (Frost 1916), many social scientists still 
use SPSS for their statistical needs. Though cumbersome, it did not have 
as steep a learning curve as more highly regarded statistical packages (like 
Stata or R) and it allows researchers to apply particular statistical formulae 
to help determine correlation between variables as well as confidence 
intervals. 
While data can easily be exported from Survey Monkey into an Excel 
spreadsheet, it can only export information for a limited number of 
variables that cannot exceed a set number of columns, otherwise the 
exported data becomes segmented into additional spreadsheets. Since the 
exported data included both the questions and every possible response, there 
were huge numbers of columns in the exported spreadsheets. For 
example, Question 16 asked for a respondent’s birth country with 193 
countries listed125 as potential answers; Survey Monkey would export 
each potential response as a separate column, enumerating the results for 
any particular country in the appropriate cell. Only a small number of 
columns, in this case 23, contained results of the exact number of 
respondents for each particular birth country; despite this, for Question 16 
alone, all 193 columns of data were exported. As there were a total of 79 
Questions in the questionnaire, exporting individual columns for every 
potential response for each question required an unwieldy amount of data 
be exported as separate Excel spreadsheets. It was impossible to import 
this volume of data into SPSS. As a result, it was necessary to manually 
enter the data from each survey question for each individual respondent, 
which on average, took about 20 minutes each. This was done regularly, 
throughout the study period, for each of the 1,124 survey respondents. 
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Once all of the data was manually entered into SPSS, analysis of the data 
could proceed using frequency and percentages to arrive at totals that 
could be compared with the census results for the Indian population in 
New Zealand. This was followed by simple bivariate analysis using cross-
tabulation procedures (using the chi-square function reserved for 
categorical data) executed by selecting two or more variables for 
comparison and choosing the appropriate menu function in SPSS. Missing 
data (i.e. respondents not answering any particular question) was 
removed from these calculations. 
" Additional notes on the survey: 
Only a small portion of the survey results are presented in Chapter 8, and 
not all questions were answered by every respondent. Some questions 
were filters (e.g. birthplace, ability to speak a South Asian language). In 
these instances, filter questions would either direct respondents to a 
subsequent section, or to skip over if it did not apply to their particular 
circumstances. As a result, many of the questions have fewer numbers of 
the survey population answering them (e.g. n=846), as opposed to the 
total surveyed population (n=1124). Results are presented using frequency 
tables and charts, and an analysis is conducted by applying the chi-square 
statistic to crosstabulated variables to determine relationships. 
3.5 Other considerations
Potential bias in research
There are methodological biases and influences to be addressed. Foremost 
is the increasingly discredited notion that all research must necessarily be 
devoid of bias. Mulgan’s (2004:4) assessment, that “there can be no 
entirely value-free political analysis” is more germane than Durkheim’s 
sociological method and his statement that “all preconceptions must be 
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eradicated” (Durkheim 1938:31). Bias-free research is an impossible and 
ultimately undesirable ideal—it presumes that one’s actions are not 
political or that one’s behaviour in the field does not have any effect. It 
also fails to acknowledge that there can be multiple truths and 
innumerable perspectives. There may be a generation or two straddling 
this Durkheimian divide, but it is safe to say that social science research 
has progressed in the intervening years. 
Borrowing from feminist methodologies, Mies’ (1993:68) notion of 
“conscious partiality,” or the idea that a researcher is aware of and 
accountable for his or her biases, values and assumptions, is worthy of 
attention. Feminist research has often been accused of harbouring such 
partiality (cf. Huber 1973, Denzin 1992:49-52), but most practical responses 
to these criticisms had earlier, and appropriately, come from feminist 
scholarship that aims to better situate the researcher within the field of 
investigation and overcome researcher bias (Oakley 1981, Ring 1987, 
Cannon et al. 1991, Ferguson 1993:168, Olesen 2013). Feminist standpoint 
epistemologies are particularly keen on exploring the social construction 
of research encounters (Stacey 1988, Reinharz 1992, Schwandt 1998:242): 
Giving voice to women’s perspectives means identifying ways women create 
meaning and experience life from their particular position in the social hierarchy 
(Riger 1992:734). 
Particularly, Harding’s (1991) standpoint methodology and Haraway’s (1991) 
informatics of domination question notions that while scientific methods are 
designed to remain objective, they rarely are, as academic investigation is 
inherently a subjective task, a researcher’s particular take on a given topic. 
Increasing general awareness of the subject matter is likewise of interest to 
a feminist approach, as it favours multiple perspectives and embraces 
additional views that supply new ideas and theories, contributing to a 
wider appreciation of a topic. This type of exegesis should be readily 
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identifiable in both the historical and census data presented in Chapters 
Five and Six, as both exemplify novel strategies of attacking and 
unearthing historical material. Haraway’s Cyborg manifesto (1991b) also 
resonates with her notion of multiple ways of being—as there is no single 
way of being female, it should be evident that there is no such thing as, for 
instance, being Asian; seemingly simple identity categories exist in 
infinitely more heterogeneous ways. 
More recent discussions on bias have focused on the notion of reflexivity; 
that researchers should be both “reflective about the implications of their 
methods, values, biases, and decisions,” and that most research should be 
interpreted with “a sensitivity to the researcher’s cultural, political, and 
social context” (Bryman 2008:682). In other words, a researcher’s 
particular point of view is most usually framed by a specific set of 
attitudes, beliefs and values that may seep into and possibly blur one’s 
analysis and interpretation. If research is to be truly objective, specific 
research biases and predilections must be explicitly acknowledged in 
order to mitigate and minimise any potential effect. 
In terms of reflexivity, while this research strives to be objective 
throughout, there is both evidence towards, and support for, all types of 
pluralism. The methodology used follows feminist perspectives that rely 
on consciousness raising in both majority and minority populations. 
Furthermore, as a researcher, it is vital that I acknowledge the personal 
and professional experiences of living and working in South Asia for over 
a decade, and my experiences as a member of a Jewish religious minority, 
have facilitated an overall empathetic view of minority experience, 
particularly, awareness of discrimination and the structural and 
institutional factors that perpetuate its entrenchment. In acknowledging 
this empathy, there is admission of implicit bias towards minorities. 
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Moreover, bias may be perceived in that there is a conscious intent to 
benefit the community studied; I contend that something be delivered 
back to the communities within which the work was conducted and this 
necessarily influences the research design. 
Ethics approval
Ethics approval was sought and granted from the Faculty of Arts 
and Social Sciences’ Human Research Ethics Committee at the 
University of Waikato. Written information about ethics approval, 
and how the research would be used, was provided for all 
respondents answering questionnaires. 
One last introductory and background chapter remains before presenting 
the substantive chapters, that of providing the necessary context of 
diversity and discrimination within New Zealand, to which I now turn.
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
DIVERSITY & DISCRIMINATION IN 
THE NEW ZEALAND CONTEXT
Ahakoa ki tāna anō kī, he tangata rata a Taiaroa ki te Pākehā, engari e noho āhua 
hihira ana ia ki te haere mai o tauiwi ki konei noho ai. 
Despite saying that he liked the Pākehā, Taiaroa remained guarded about 
foreigners coming here to settle (Orange 1990:136). 
4.1 Introduction
This chapter begins with a historical introduction to Māori-Pākehā-tauiwi126 
relations, and illustrates how Māori-Crown relations set the context for the 
later incorporation of non-Māori minorities. In particular, it examines the 
Crown’s ambivalent policies that both sought to assimilate and 
simultaneously racialise Māori and non-Māori minorities as inferior 
others. This becomes clearer in the discussion of census history in Chapter 
Six. The bicultural/multicultural discourse is also introduced as necessary 
context for interpreting existing diversity management practices. The 
bicultural discourse, and Māori-Pākehā perspectives on it, helps 
distinguish New Zealand from other settler societies in its formulation of 
minority policies. The chapter ends with a summary of the historical 
context of discrimination and a brief review of human rights legislation. 
These are useful in providing a needed context for the historical 
expository and demographic analysis in which subsequent chapters are 
framed. 
4.2 Māori responses to European arrival: immigration without consent
Indigenous Māori, as first migrants to a new land, grappled with 
uncharacteristic climates and geographies, searched for alternative 
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126 Tauiwi refers to non-Māori and is often translated as ‘foreigner.’ Since Pākehā are provided for in 
the Treaty of Waitangi, it has come to refer to those not specifically mentioned in the Treaty. As 
such, it is often used to refer to non-Pākehā migrants. 
sources of sustenance, and found novel resources upon which to build a 
new material culture that was wholly apart from their collective memories 
of Polynesia.127 With the successful negotiation of these hurdles, over a 
period of many centuries and remembered in the recounting of a colourful 
oral history and a collective whakapapa,128 Māori became known as tangata 
whenua, the people of the land.129 Like most other autochthonous 
populations around the globe, indigenous Māori were eventually 
subjugated by colonial settlement and dispossessed of their lands and 
taonga.130 In this sense, Māori, as Aotearoa’s original inhabitants, would 
view their European (Pākehā) colonisers as an immigrant population. Any 
general discussion of Aotearoan arrivals must necessarily take into 
account initial Māori views of, and responses to, early European arrival, as 
this has contemporary implications for the treatment of new migrant 
communities and ethnic minorities.
Māori reaction to European intrusion often depended upon the location, 
time, and size of settler populations. Where ratios favoured Māori, there 
was often peaceful cohabitation between them, often with small numbers 
of Pākehā living under the care and protection of their guardians, and 
intermarriage was common (Wanhalla 2008). Although there was some 
intermarriage “Māori and settlers lived in largely different 
worlds” (Chambers 2003:170). Where ratios favoured Pākehā in large 
numbers, the opposite was often true, and Māori response one of 
suspicion rather than invitation. This simple equation holds true for most 
cultures during first contact—once a population balance begins to shift in 
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127 see King (2003), Howe (2008), Moon (2013), McLauchlan (2014).
128 genealogy, lineage, descent. 
129 Tangata whenua is most often translated as indigenous peoples of the land. It can also mean ‘host’ 
as in those that have the right of hosting visiting populations. Tangata whenua are also considered as 
the people who have authority in a particular place, as in Ko te tangata whenua te hunga pupuri i te 
mana o tētahi whenua (Royal 2012:4). 
130 treasure, anything prized, applied to anything of considerable value. It can also be translated as 
property, goods, possessions, or effects.
favour of recent arrivals, positive relationships between the two wane and 
either one of two possible scenarios may ensue: the original inhabitants 
work collectively to oppose newcomers (e.g. Native American tribes 
opposing European expansion in the Americas), or the new immigrants/
colonisers respond, often more forcibly than their indigenous 
counterparts, with the imposition of enforced political repression/
oppression, often through violent means (e.g. British Rāj in India, 
apartheid in South Africa). As with most conflict, end results are never 
immutable and change when new elements are introduced. 
Similarly, response to first contact in Aotearoa was unpredictable. 
Depending on the particular circumstances of the encounter, different 
hapū131 and iwi132 would have had different responses to European 
colonisation. At first contact, some Māori thought Europeans to be gods 
floating on magical vessels, others saw them as goblins with strange 
habits that ran off into the bush to hide (Salmond 1991, Bassett et al. 
1998:21). Māori response might also have depended upon the early 
reactions of European captains at the time of contact, e.g. Abel Tasman’s 
initial misreading of first contact at Taitapu (Golden Bay) in December 
1642 resulted in four unexpected European deaths (Sharp 1968:124, Wilson 
2013a). After a time, Māori began to welcome new arrivals and met 
regularly for mutually beneficial trade. Overall, there “was general Māori 
acceptance of this small number of Pākehā, especially as they opened up 
routes for trade and access to technology and arms” (Kelsey 1984:22). The 
two populations “were in need of each other, and a spirit of tolerance and 
respect generally prevailed” (Owens 1992:31). 
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131 Hapū refers to one’s kinship group, a clan, tribe, or subtribe, but most usually refers to a section 
of a larger kinship group. 
132 Iwi is usually simply translated as ‘tribe,’ but more specifically can refer to one’s extended 
kinship group, tribe, nation, people, nationality, race. It generally refers to a large group of people 
descended from a common ancestor. 
These first visitors were welcomed by the people of the land for the cornucopia 
of material goods they brought with them from the factories of industrial 
England. Economic welcome, trade and sexual congress were the equalisers in 
Māori New Zealand for the first forty years of European contact (Walker 
1990:9).
In the early 1800s, Māori had mixed views about the arrival of Europeans. 
Chiefs would assess the possible benefits these newcomers might bring in 
terms of trade, tools and weapons. Initially, the Ngāpuhi chief Hongi Hika was 
in favour of British missionaries settling in New Zealand. This was not for 
religious reasons, but because he knew that an association with missionaries 
would increase his influence on other Europeans, bringing greater 
opportunities to trade for tools and weapons (Beaglehole 2006:53). 
For some decades, Auckland settlers benefitted from living reasonably close to 
many hard-working Māori who could supply fresh fruit, fish, pork and 
potatoes (Chambers 2003:148).
Māori at the time often viewed Europeans mostly as a means to an end—a 
nuisance to be tolerated as a conduit for acquiring new commodities that 
were in need at the time.133 
Likewise, Europeans needed fresh foods, primary resources and guides to 
explore the interior. As Banks tellingly wrote in his journal about Cook’s 
first expedition and penetration into the interior:134
The noble timber, of which there is such an abundance, would furnish plenty 
of materials either for the building defenses, houses or vessels. The river 
would furnish plenty of fish, and the soil make ample return of any European 
vegetables sown in it…swamps which might doubtless easily be drained, and 
sufficiently evinced the richness of their soils by the great size of the plants 
that grew upon them, and more particularly of the timber trees which were the 
straightest, cleanest, and I may say the largest I have ever seen…we were 
never but once ashore among them, and that but for a short time on the banks 
of the River Thames; where we rowed for many miles between woods of these 
trees, to which we could see no bounds (excerpts from the diary of Joseph 
Banks, as recounted in Park 1995:29). 
Cook’s journal is full of admiration for the timber and the fertility of the soil. It 
was a land full of promise, a kind land where settlers from Europe could build 
a comfortable life (Bassett et al. 1998:26). 
It was during these early years that forging alliances was especially 
important for both parties. Māori needed access to guns and ammunition, 
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133 e.g. nails, woolen blankets, guns. 
134 This occurred in 1769 along the Waihou river near present-day Thames.
which was often the pivotal ingredient for determining outcomes amongst 
warring tribes. In exchange, Pākehā needed food, guidance and protection 
for their own survival. 
As European settlement progressed, Europeans began to rely less on 
Māori and more on themselves. They established permanent settlements 
to provide food, shelter and entertainment for growing populations. These 
settlements:
…first saw the commercial possibilities of New Zealand, and for some decades 
New Zealand was in effect an Australian frontier. Without the planting of these 
colonies, it is unlikely that any trade in flax, timber, or sealskins could have 
developed (Chambers 2003:126). 
Blacksmiths, furniture makers, and others were needed to supply and 
repair their possessions. Whalers and sealers arrived to exploit a growing 
demand for their products. Missions were established in order to 
proselytise, convert and civilise the ‘godless heathens’ to Christianity. 
God’s work often included the harvesting of timber and other resources 
necessary to support growing European populations. However, the 
discourse changed and Māori began to regard European settlement 
differently. Pākehā were increasingly scrutinized as exploiters of 
communal resources and as harbingers of new diseases that decimated 
Māori populations (Pool 1991). Māori began to think more in terms of 
resources lost to Pākehā rather than as beneficiaries of European 
fraternisation. Initially, European colonisation was merely immigration 
without Māori consent. Eventually, power shifted as European colonisers 
dispossessed Māori of their land, religion, and other valued institutions. 
As no single political authority existed at the time of first contact, Māori 
were without a formal immigration policy, and lacked a unified identity, 
choosing instead to identify along hapū and iwi lines. As Europeans 
settled, Māori formed the Kīngitanga (King Movement) in 1858, whose 
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primary purpose was to unify hapū and iwi in order to stall land alienation 
(Papa & Meredith 2012). While encounters occurred throughout Aotearoa 
over time, involving countless individual and collective actors with 
innumerable outcomes, it can be said that, if anything, Māori responses to 
initial European arrival and settlement were generally those of welcome 
and accommodation (Owen 1992). These initial engagements, and their 
numerous outcomes, would later help formulate a Māori response to 
tauiwi arrivals, customs and traditions based on values of kaitiakitanga135 
and accommodation that are widely practised in New Zealand today. 
With the dramatic increase of Europeans over the last 175 years, Māori 
have remained resolutely committed to a policy that strongly embraces 
bicultural relations, based on the principles outlined in the Treaty of 
Waitangi. Some Māori either reject biculturalism altogether or express 
ambivalence towards it (O’Sullivan 2007, Smits 2010). Those that reject it, 
do so on the grounds that it does little to empower self-determination 
(Fleras & Elliott 1992), that Māori cultural practices aren’t as deeply 
embedded into New Zealand institutions as they should be (Stavenhagen 
2006, Smits 2010), or that the appropriation of Māori intellectual property 
has gone too far (Durie 1998). O’Sullivan (2007) argues that biculturalism 
serves to reinforce the status of Māori as “junior partners,” thus 
legitimising Pākehā hegemony. Others take this further by suggesting that 
bicultural policy merely reinforces the perception that Māori are perceived 
to be ‘a disadvantaged minority with special needs’ (Maaka & Fleras 2005, 
Smits 2010). Even so, Māori generally proceed with firmly rooted beliefs of 
welcome for non-Māori and continue to pursue relationships in good 
faith. 
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135 guardianship, stewardship. 
The foundations for New Zealand’s modern immigration policies and 
diversity management practices can therefore be found in practical Māori 
applications of accommodation, consultation and justice (Jackson 1995, 
Stéphanie 2011). As global migration grows, biculturalism may serve as 
the basis for a deeper understanding of more recent encounters with new 
migrants. This has helped foster a uniquely New Zealand approach to 
race relations. It is what sets New Zealand apart from other settler 
societies, and is largely responsible for policies of social cohesion and 
inclusion. 
4.3 Biculturalism and multiculturalism: Māori, Pākehā and tauiwi
During the roughly 120 years between the time when Europeans 
outnumbered Māori in the late 1850s136 and the passing of the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act in 1975, Māori were largely dispossessed of their lands and 
marginalised by European colonisers. This era can best be characterised 
by widespread discrimination against Māori by Europeans practising an 
assimilationist policy (Pearson 1990, Thomas & Nikora 1992, van Meijl 
2006, Sullivan 2010), a period in which Māori have tenaciously fought for 
their own cultural survival (Macdonald 1990, Vasil 2000, Walker 2004). 
Except for a few court cases that mentioned the Treaty of Waitangi in the 
first few decades after its signing, the period between 1877 and 1975 was 
one in which the Treaty failed to exist in the eyes of the New Zealand 
courts (Ruru 2004:59-61). The historical treatment of Māori has largely 
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136 Estimating Māori population figures prior to European arrival is a difficult affair, with estimates 
varying between 100,000 to 500,000, with significant and steady decline until the early 1900s (Pool 
1977:24, 1991; Salmond 1997). Sutton (1986:315) estimated the 1858 Māori population at just over 
60,000. The first official enumeration of Māori took place in 1857-1858 (Kukutai 2011a:36), 
undertaken separately from the official 1858 Census which recorded only Europeans. This 
enumeration of Māori estimated the 1858 population to be 56,049. The 1851 Census recorded 26,707 
Europeans present in Aotearoa, and the 1858 Census recorded 59,398 Europeans present in 
Aotearoa. The 1861 Census recorded 99,021 Europeans and estimated the Māori population as 
56,336. Based on these figures, I estimate that the European population surpassed the Māori 
population sometime between 1855 and 1859. 
been an exercise first in institutionalised discrimination, followed more 
recently by social policies and practices designed to improve relations. 
The first of these was Crown movement away from the practice of early 
assimilationist policies towards those of integration. Two Department of 
Māori Affairs reports (Hunn 1961, Booth & Hunn 1962) described this new 
relationship, in which Māori were expected to do most or all of the 
changing:
Integration denotes a dynamic process by which Maori and pakeha are being 
drawn closer together, in the physical sense of the mingling of the two populations 
as well as in the mental and cultural senses where differences are gradually 
diminishing (Booth & Hunn 1962:2). 
In successive years, assimilationist and integrationist policies began to 
yield to more normative shallow approaches to diversity management that 
stressed tolerance above all else. This exercise between the two parties has 
been partially successful, measured by generally improving bicultural 
relations that emphasised the settling of historic grievances and 
traditional property rights (Thomas & Nikora 1992, Barrett & Connolly-
Stone 1998, Poata-Smith 2004:59137). It wasn’t until the late-1970s—after 
the passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Act—that Māori-Pākehā attitudes 
began to shift, along with a commitment from the political leadership for 
new bicultural policies (Vasil 2000, King 2003, Hill 2010, Smits 2010), 
which were widely adopted and practised. 
Maori leaders were seeking more than greater or total inclusion; rather, they 
aspired in effect to a bicultural society and policy that would enable them not just 
to retain their culture and have it recognized as familiar and legitimate but also to 
entrench it as foundational and of equal value to that of Pākehā culture and 
polity” (Hill 2010:296). 
Biculturalism eventually became widely accepted as a strong policy 
directive (Vasil 2000, King 2003:465, Bartley & Spoonley 2005). As a result, 
the period between the early 1990s to the present has generally seen 
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137 Poata-Smith, however, has been critical of the shift away from collaborative protest seeking 
social justice to iwi-driven cultural nationalism. 
improvement in Māori-Pākehā relations (Barrett & Connolly-Stone 1998, 
Vasil 2000, Smits 2010) although diversity management policies appear 
stuck in both ideological modes of shallow approaches to diversity 
governance.138 What improvement there has been should not be 
interpreted as a reversal of past assimilationist policies. There have been 
numerous setbacks to these relations during this same period. Of note, the 
passing of the highly contentious Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 
generally disenfranchised Māori (Ruru 2004, Charters & Erueti 2005, van 
Meijl 2006) and led the UN to independently report that:
The legislation appears...on balance to contain discriminatory aspects against 
Māori, in particular in its extinguishment of the possibility of establishing Māori 
title to the foreshore and seabed and in its failure to provide a guaranteed right of 
redress (UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2005). 
Dissatisfaction with this legislation gave rise to the subsequent formation 
of a new Māori Party as a more advantageous political vehicle for Māori 
aspirations (Mutu 2005, van Meijl 2006). The June 2010 repeal of the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act and the announcement of a new bill to replace 
it (Finlayson 2010) has angered many Pākehā who feel that the government 
has given away too much.139 These examples, and the significant lack of 
equity between Māori and Pākehā health policies (Hefford et al. 2005, 
Health Research Council 2010), and across a range of other socioeconomic 
indicators and policy outcomes (Teaiwa & Mallon 2005), show that there is 
still much progress to be made.140 
Appropriate mutual recognition of the terms of reference remain 
contested by both sides, and there is still uncertainty and confusion over 
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138 See Humpage & Fleras (2001) for a critique of the government’s ‘Closing the Gaps’ strategy. 
139 Repeal of the 2004 Foreshore and Seabed Act is one of the main policies of the Pakeha Party, 
launched in 2013, which seeks to end all special treatment for Māori, abolish Māori seats in 
Parliament, and put an end to Māori privilege (see Espiner 2013, Pakeha Party’s website at 
<www.pakehaparty.com>). The Pakeha Party is currently considering registration with the Electoral 
Commission as a registered political party (New Zealand Newswire 2013). 
140 See Sibley & Liu (2004) on strong Pākehā opposition to the resource specific aspects of 
biculturalism. 
how the meanings and definitions are best represented, and how they are 
to be understood, recognised, interpreted and operationalised. The 
various connotations of biculturalism, and the changing definitions by the 
parties involved, are nuanced, complicated, and open to oscillating 
interpretations that usually depend on where one stands. For instance, 
does biculturalism refer merely to the ongoing relationships between 
Māori and Pākehā, as played out in the public domain? Or does it concern 
bilateral agreements between Māori and the Crown? Are Pākehā to be best 
considered as non-Māori, or does the word imply only white European? 
Alternatively, are Māori and Pākehā considered opponents or partners in 
this relationship? Either way, biculturalism as a policy initiative can only 
be considered in its adolescent phase, and dissimilarities of understanding 
and purpose remain considerable. Though bicultural policies are not new, 
they are well established (Pearson 1991, Thomas & Nikora 1992, Vasil 
2000, Rata 2005), and may be regarded as a contentious strategy based on 
the framework provided and upheld by the Treaty of Waitangi. 
As biculturalism formalised in the 1970s, the first large wave of non-Māori 
minorities arrived from Polynesia and began to alter the cultural, 
economic, political and religious landscape in the main urban centres 
(Bedford & Larner 1992, Chambers 2003, Hill 2010, Moon 2013:130, 
McLaughlan 2014:198). By the 1990s Pacific populations on Niue, the Cook 
Islands, and Tokelau were smaller than those that resided in New 
Zealand, making Auckland the Pasifika capital of the world (van Meijl 
2007, Alefaio 2008): 
The number of Pacific Islanders in archipelagic New Zealand grew exponentially. 
In 1945 only 2200 Pacific Islanders were counted, yet by 2001 this number had 
grown nearly one hundred times to 202,000—6.5% of the domestic population 
(Salesa 2009:170). 
During the years of favourable economic growth in the post-WWII period, 
New Zealand drew upon Pacific populations to fuel a growing economy, 
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and many came as unskilled labour in the 1960s and 1970s for jobs in the 
manufacturing sector (Gibson 1983, Bedford & Warner 1992, Ongley & 
Pearson 1995, Spoonley 2006). Yet while both Māori and Pasifika have 
made significant socioeconomic progress, they account for “some of the 
poorest health and education statistics, the lowest incomes, and some of 
the highest welfare dependency and incarceration statistics” in New 
Zealand (Teaiwa & Mallon 2005:211). The greater number of Pacific 
peoples who arrived during the post-war years began to strain existing 
social service capabilities, and by the mid-1970s, concurrent with the first 
oil shock and rising unemployment, had, by Crown accounts, generally 
overstayed their welcome (Bedford 1985, Bedford & Warner 1992). The 
New Zealand government began regulating their arrivals by adjusting the 
migration flows of Pacific peoples who did not have New Zealand 
citizenship by right (Bedford & Warner 1992, Bedford et al. 2000). In March 
1974, prompted by large numbers of overstayers and an economic 
downturn, the Muldoon government began a series of “dawn raids” in 
which to weed out the overstayers. These raids continued into the early 
1980s (de Bres & Campbell 1976, Bedford & Warner 1992, Wearing 2004). 
From the time of the dawn raids through the late-1990s, biculturalism 
normalized, informed public discourse, and became the subject of 
considerable controversy (Ritchie 1992, Wetherell & Potter 1992, Spoonley 
et al. 1996, Barclay & Liu 2003, Sibley & Liu 2004). During this time, Māori 
grew roughly 94%141 and Pacific populations more than tripled between 
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141 The average annual growth rates for Māori were highest between 1945-1966, before rapid 
fertility decline (Pool 1991, Kukutai & Rarere 2014). 
1976-1996.142 This period also coincided with a new wave of immigration, 
seeing the arrival of the first non-European and non-Pacific migrants in 
great numbers. 
Table 4.1: Percentage of the total population, by ethnicity (Statistics New Zealand 1976, 1996). 
1976 Census 1996 Census Percent 
intercensal change
1976-1996n % n %
European 2,693,186 86.1 2,879,085 79.6 +6.9
Māori 270,035 8.6 523,374 14.5 +93.8
Pacific 61,354 2.0 202,233 5.8 +229.6
Asian 24,967 0.8 173,502 5.0 +594.9
Although Asians had been settled in New Zealand since the 1880s (McGill 
1982, Brooking & Rabel 1995, McKinnon 1996, Vasil & Yoon 1996, 
Zodgekar 2010), their populations were small and relatively clustered. 
However, during the 1976-1996 period, Asian populations, consisting 
mostly of Chinese and Indians, more than quintupled. For all at the time, 
there appeared to be two conflicting discourses in effect: one, the clearly 
outlined policy of biculturalism beginning to take shape; the other, 
recently introduced immigration reform that created new waves of non-
Māori minorities. There was thus biculturalism on the one hand, while 
foundations for a strong multicultural population were being laid on the 
other. 
The 1984 national elections voted in a Labour government which pursued 
radical economic reform (Rabel 1991, Poot 1992, Brooking & Rabel 1995). 
Net migration increases were largely fueled by these reforms (Poot 1992, 
154
142 There were major changes to the definitions used to collect ethnicity statistics during this 
period that make exact tracking of these numbers problematic: “the Māori Affairs Amendment 
Act defined Māori for the purposes of the 1974 act as any person with Māori ancestry, rather 
than the census definition of half or more Māori descent. An attempt was made to accommodate 
this legislative change in the 1976 Census by including a two-part question, first asking for 
fractions of blood, then Māori ancestry. However, the two-part question caused some confusion 
among respondents, with a significant portion giving inconsistent answers to Part 1 and Part 2, 
or answering only one part of the question. As a result, the reported figures understated the 
population and were adjusted at an aggregate level to reflect historical trends” (Statistics New 
Zealand 2001:3). Even so, I use the 1976-1996 data merely as an illustration of the extent of 
growth in Māori and Pacific populations during this time. 
Bartley & Spoonley 2005), and increased immigration of a skilled 
workforce was seen as essential to give the economy a much needed boost 
(Bedford et al. 1987, Trlin 1992). These policies were codified with the 
passage of the Immigration Act 1987. The Act, and the policy changes it 
implemented, rejected the essentially white New Zealand policy of 
assimilationist preference for immigrants from traditional source 
countries, and loosened immigration restrictions. 
Immigrants are now selected on the basis of personal merit rather than national or 
ethnic origin. This is a significant departure from the bias in favour of the British 
and West Europeans which had shaped New Zealand migrant flows for almost a 
century. The change reflects a new public opinion that discrimination related to the 
accident of birth is no longer acceptable and an acknowledgment that diversity 
would enrich rather than weaken New Zealand society (Department of Statistics 
1988:202). 
The 1987 Immigration Act did not specifically endorse cultural diversity 
as a preferred policy outcome, but rather placed its emphasis on selecting 
skilled migrants needed for the New Zealand labour market (Brooking & 
Rabel 1995).
Recent immigration of non-Māori minorities has necessitated a rethink of 
biculturalism. Understandably, Māori are reluctant to relinquish it as a 
policy objective until the Articles of the Treaty are first realised (Walker 
1995a, 1995b; Smits 2010), and appropriate restitution of historic 
grievances received. As a policy initiative, multiculturalism has no basis in 
the Treaty of Waitangi, and may be considered a potential threat to the 
promise of biculturalism. What might motivate Māori to embrace 
multiculturalism when biculturalism has not been fully achieved?143 
It is better to accept the notion of a bicultural New Zealand, as preferred by Maori, 
than to create an unnecessary and damaging controversy by insisting on 
multiculturalism (Vasil 2000:1). 
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143 See Durie (2009) for his perspective on Māori-Crown relations beyond 2020, with particular 
emphasis on the relevance and applicability of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
In an officially bicultural New Zealand, multiculturalism has often been 
seen as a threat to Māori—an attempt by Pākehā to dilute strengthening 
calls of Māori self determination (Johnson 2008). 
The Treaty is specifically a Māori-Crown agreement. There were certainly 
other nationals here at the time of its signing in 1840,144 but the Treaty 
specifically excluded them as it only mentions Māori and the Crown (and 
its British subjects). As British subjects, this should have allowed Indians 
present at the time of the signing the right to remain. However, the 
introduction of subsequent Crown policies145 more clearly excluded 
Indians from full participation in the terms of the Treaty and full rights of 
entry. 
Differing interpretations of the Treaty have not necessarily clarified the 
issue. For instance, there is the notion that Māori should embrace non-
Māori not as Pākehā, but as tauiwi, to be considered as a single, yet 
multicultural, group. There is some basis for this in the Treaty if the 
Crown takes responsibility for representing later settlers: 
The signatories to the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 were the Crown and Maori. The 
Crown represented the Pakeha (British settlers) and Tau Iwi (later settlers) and the 
Maori represented all tribes and sub-tribes of New Zealand. Thus, the Treaty 
reaffirmed the aboriginal status of Maori and all subsequent cultures arriving in 
New Zealand were represented by the Crown as one party to the Treaty (Neill 
2004).
A recent report by the Human Rights Commission appears to agree:
The Treaty of Waitangi is a fundamental reference point for race relations and 
human rights in New Zealand. The Treaty is also the founding document of the 
nation and applies equally to all. It recognises the right of everyone to belong in 
New Zealand and to enjoy equal rights (Human Rights Commission 2010a). 
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144 e.g. French, Chinese, Indian, American. 
145 Specifically, this refers to the Asiatic Restriction Bill 1896, The Immigration Restriction Act 1899, 
The Immigration Restriction Act 1908, and The Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Act 1919, The 
Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 1920 (see Roy 1970; Bennion & Boyd 1994; Leckie 1985, 
1995b; Murphy 2007; Beaglehole 2012), among others, some of which were specifically aimed at 
Chinese exclusion.
This is not so much an interpretation of the Treaty as it is a specific Māori 
belief that tangata whenua have the responsibility of guardianship 
(kaitiakitanga) over tauiwi, should welcome and provide guidance and 
assistance, rather than exclude them under the terms of the Treaty. This 
interpretation also has no basis in the Treaty, which provides a framework 
specifically within a bicultural context. Smits (2010:67) agrees, stating that 
there was no place in the “rhetoric of unity and assimilation for other 
minority ethnic groups, such as the Chinese, who were present in small 
numbers” from the 1860s. 
Making biculturalism work has not been an easy task, as both Māori and 
Pākehā have grappled with race relations and issues of social inequality for 
their entire communal history (Barrett & Connolly-Stone 1998, Walker 
2004). Some have even referred to the Treaty as a document that best 
exemplifies social injustice (Liu 2005:5). As bicultural policies began to 
have a positive impact on race relations (Smits 2010), the 1987 
immigration reform brought increasing numbers of tauiwi to New 
Zealand. While Māori and Pākehā engaged in a predominantly 
biculturalist discourse, state mechanisms began to promulgate a 
potentially divisive multicultural agenda through the introduction and 
use of such terms as ‘equality’ and ‘multicultural’ when referring to 
Māori, Pākehā and tauiwi, which at the time had consisted of Pacific 
populations and a small but growing cadre of Asian immigrants (Race 
Relations Act 1971,146 Tauroa 1982, Fleras 1984). There have also been 
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146 The Race Relations Act 1971 established the office of the Race Relations Conciliator and set up 
procedures for complaints about racial discrimination. Amendments to the Human Rights Act 1993 
in 2001 merged the Race Relations Office with the Human Rights Commission. Both the 
Commission’s primary functions under the HRA are relevant to race relations: to advocate and 
promote respect for, and an understanding and appreciation of, human rights in New Zealand 
society; and to encourage the maintenance and development of harmonious relations between 
individuals and among the diverse groups in New Zealand society (Human Rights Commission 
2014, Chapter 18; Race Relations Act 1971, see <legislation.knowledge-basket.co.nz/gpacts/reprint/text/
1971/an/150.html>).
numerous attempts to portray a multiculturalist discourse within the 
wholly bicultural framework provided for in the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Bartley & Spoonley 2005, Hill 2010, Smits 2010), but Māori opinion, 
media accounts, and public sentiment suggest that Māori have remained 
wary of potential ulterior motives on the part of a predominantly Pākehā 
government intent on progressing multicultural policies at the expense of 
biculturalism:
Not only did multiculturalist policies ignore or downplay the special status of 
Maori under the treaty, they argued, but in both theory and practice such policies 
also neglected the cultural reality of New Zealand being primarily a nation of two 
peoples rather than of many (Hill 2010:302). 
Hill’s comment reveals a fundamental unidimensional racial bias to the 
biculturalism that underlies the appeal of the bicultural/multicultural 
discourse. Clearly, more recent white European immigrants to New 
Zealand, from, for example, South Africa, Europe and North America, are 
both implicitly and explicitly accepted into New Zealand society as 
Pākehā, without question, while their Asian counterparts are not. Although 
white non-British European migrants to New Zealand have no formal 
historical ties to the Treaty, they do have a distinct advantage over Asian 
migrants who may be perceived as having fewer social and economic 
opportunities, for instance due to a perceived lack of fluency in English, a 
‘difficult accent,’147 or perhaps by not appearing to look or be ‘Kiwi’ 
enough.148 
There is a profound anxiety attached to these issues by all populations. 
Asian migrants may feel sorely disadvantaged as a result, even though 
many have native fluency. Persons of Asian origin born in New Zealand 
might experience anxiety over not being fully accepted as ‘Kiwis.’ Māori 
experience a similar type of anxiety over migration issues, one associated 
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147 This may also be true, to a lesser extent, for Eastern European migrants.
148 See also Sibley & Liu’s (2007) work on ethnicity and nationhood. 
with the loss of control over the bicultural discourse in the face of 
increasing immigration and the rise of polyethnicity (Kukutai 2008, Chang 
2009). Continued immigration may therefore disadvantage Māori and 
undermine the promise that multiculturalism embodies: that Māori, 
Pākehā and tauiwi can live peaceably in a multicultural New Zealand 
under the terms of the Treaty. This is not always clear, as the various 
causes and manifestations of this anxiety may be distinctly manifested 
across diverse ethnic groups. 
Complicating matters is the prevalent anxiety that white Europeans may 
fear about the increasing numbers of non-white immigrants, or of rising 
concern over the increased fertility rates of non-European populations. 
Hage (1998) termed this apprehension the “white nation fantasy,” 
referring to the rise of Pauline Hanson’s anti-immigrant One Nation Party 
in Australia. This suggests that Pākehā could likewise resort to unease and 
nationalistic concerns and perhaps try to construct themselves as the only 
ones worthy to lead:
It should be remembered, however, that worry can be the last resort of the weak. 
There are many people for whom worrying is the last available strategy for staying 
in control of social processes over which they have no longer much control (Hage 
1998:10).
This may also account for the similar rise in France of the French National 
Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen and his daughter Marine, or the recent rise of 
the Golden Dawn party in the two elections in Greece in early 2012. Closer 
to home, Winston Peters’ New Zealand First party, also ran on an Asian 
anti-immigration policy that played largely on Pākehā fears that the Crown 
was giving too much away. Kerry Bolton’s satanic neo-Nazi group (van 
Leeuwen 2008) and Kyle Chapman’s rise of the National Front and Right-
wing Resistance also share similar anti-Asian and anti-Africa immigration 
rhetoric (Spoonley 1987:157-158, Neems 2009, Newbold & Taonui 2012). 
Hage argues that the white nation fantasy is experienced by both white 
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racists and by members of the opposite extreme, the white 
multiculturalists: 
I argue that both White racists and White multiculturalists share in a conception of 
themselves as nationalists and of the nation as a space structured around a White 
culture, where Aboriginal people and non-White ‘ethnics’ are merely national 
objects to be moved or removed according to a White national will. The White 
belief in one’s mastery over the nation, whether in the form of a White 
multiculturalism or in the form of a White racism, is what I have called the ‘White 
nation’ fantasy. It is a fantasy of a nation governed by White people, a fantasy of 
White supremacy (Hage 1998: 18). 
Māori are also not immune to such appeals of race, and have often 
resorted to unilateral actions designed to assert their indigenous rights 
(Poata-Smith 1996, 2004). These usually focus on land rights, Treaty 
settlements, issues in Māori language and culture, and responses to 
incidents of racism. Annual Waitangi Day protests against misdeeds of 
Pākehā governments have been taking place regularly at Waitangi since the 
early 1970s. Of note, Ngā Tamatoa (the Young Warriors), protesting treaty 
injustices promulgated by Pākehā, disrupted regularly scheduled activities 
and attempted to destroy the New Zealand flag at the 1971 ceremonies 
(Hazlehurst 1993, Dominion Post 2007a, Minority Rights Group 2008). 
Annual protests at Waitangi have been a feature ever since (Hazelhurst 
1995; Mansfield 2003; McAllister 2007, 2011). Even Queen Elizabeth 
suffered indignities in 1990, and 1995 celebrations ended in chaos when 
dignitaries were spat on, insulted and mooned by Māori activists: 
At the 1990 celebrations, a Maori protestor hurled a black T-shirt in the face of 
Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II, who remains head of state of New Zealand although it 
has long been independent, as she drove past. The protests boiled over in 1995 
when the Governor-General at that time, the Queen’s resident representative, and 
other VIPs were spat on, jostled and greeted with traditional Maori bare-bottomed 
insults. The New Zealand flag was trampled, and the German ambassador, then 
dean of the diplomatic corps, was insulted with anti-German slogans (Barber 1995). 
Also of note are the considerable number of Māori grievances involving 
land. Of particular significance was the Ngāti Whātua occupation at 
Bastion Point from January 1977 to May 1978 (Temm 1990:64, Walker 
1990:215), where Māori refused to relinquish one of their last remaining 
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parcels of land to the National government. Also noteworthy was the 
Māori struggle to regain possession of their land at Raglan, which 
included ceremonial burial grounds that Pākehā had appropriated during 
WWII for use as an airstrip. After the War, the land was not returned, 
becoming a golf course instead. Protesters, led by Eva Rickard in 1978, 
engaged through 1987, when the land was returned to Tainui Āwhiro 
(Thomas & Nikora 1992). For 79 days in 1995, Māori activist Ken Mair led 
Whānganui tribes to occupy Pākaitore (Moutoa Gardens) in support of 
their claim to the Whānganui River, an occupation which ended 
peacefully with the signing of a tripartite agreement between Māori, local, 
and national government (Moon 1996, Praat 1998).
More recent examples of Māori land activism came about after a 2003 
Court of Appeal ruling that gave Māori the right to seek customary title to 
the foreshore and seabed, overturning the Pākehā assumption that it 
belonged to the Crown. Pākehā backlash (white nation anxiety?) had led 
the Labour government to propose drastic new legislation that would 
essentially secure Pākehā control over these areas. This led to the May 2004 
hikoi149 from Northland to Wellington in which Māori protested the 
confiscation of land and resources they had customarily regarded as their 
own. The passing of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 returned control 
of these areas to the Crown. This legislation however, was overturned 
with the passing of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 
2011, returning customary title to Māori (Finlayson 2010, Bess 2011, Boast 
2011, Makgill & Rennie 2011). 
There have been many significant high profile actions undertaken by 
Māori activists (Poata-Smith 2004). These include a January 2005 incident 
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149 a long march or walk.
at a pōwhiri150 at a Waitangi Tribunal hearing at Te Urupatu in which 
Tūhoe activist Tāma Iti fired a shotgun at the New Zealand flag to let 
attending delegates “feel the heat and smoke, and Tūhoe outrage and 
disgust at the way we have been treated for 200 years” (Pouwhare 2005). 
In October 2007, the New Zealand Police and Armed Offenders Squad 
conducted a series of ‘terror raids’ on alleged paramilitary training camps 
in the Urewera ranges in the eastern Bay of Plenty. Property searches in 
Auckland, Waikato, Wellington and Christchurch were also carried out 
where suspected arms were stored. These operations targeted suspected 
terrorist training camps and weapons caches, yet yielded little result (NZ 
Herald 2007, Taylor 2007).151 Additionally, Gerard Teoi Otimi opened up 
his own immigration bureau and sold fake Aotearoa passports to Pacific 
overstayers for $500, although he was subsequently arrested, fined, and 
sentenced in 2011 to 18 months in jail (Hoadley 2003:527-528, Harvey 
2011). Even so, the belief in and desire for a harmonious multicultural 
society is shared by Māori, Pākehā and tauiwi alike. Recent years have seen 
the institutionalisation of such proactive government organisations as the 
Human Rights Commission152 and Settlement Support.153 Māori positions 
on biculturalism have become more firmly entrenched, as bicultural issues 
first need addressing before multiculturalism can proceed. 
With competing bicultural and multicultural discourses, Māori, Pākehā 
and tauiwi have had the opportunity to reexamine their respective world 
views. This reassessment is likely to continue and these discourses are 
likely to remain. Meanwhile, there is a lack of public debate on the nature 
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150 a welcoming ceremony, usually performed on a marae. 
151 These actions were later found to be unreasonable by independent inquiry (Independent Police 
Conduct Authority 2013).
152 The Human Rights Commission supports both a bicultural framework based on the Treaty, and 
a multicultural New Zealand.
153 Formed to help new immigrants acculturate and settle into life in New Zealand.
and meaning of tauiwi in regards to the Treaty. I would suggest that any 
debate on multiculturalism and diversity governance must include 
increased public discussion on the participation and inclusion of tauiwi, as 
this could help advance the debate on multiculturalism and diversity 
governance. 
4.4 The historical context of minority discrimination in New Zealand
During the period that began with European arrival and settlement and 
continued with the exercise of nation building, early New Zealand, like 
other settler societies, was largely preoccupied with maintaining the 
dominion of its European settlers and with keeping New Zealand white. 
Public attitudes towards the relatively small number of Asian migrants 
that were present around the time of the signing of the Treaty were 
institutionalised by the Crown from the arrival of the Chinese who came 
to work the gold mines in Central Otago in the 1860s. Historically, some of 
the earliest publications on Asian immigration were a bigoted reaction to 
the initial waves of Asian settlers. Reeves (1901), Kelly (1911), Macdonald 
(1926), and the White New Zealand League (1927) all discuss the menace 
the new immigrants posed to a nascent and implicitly bicultural society. 
Wellington and Christchurch saw the formation of the Anti-Chinese 
League in the 1890s; in 1907 the Anti-Asiatic League emerged in 
Masterton and Palmerston North; and in the mid-1920s the White New 
Zealand League saw its beginnings in Pukekohe and Auckland (Sedgwick 
1982, Lian 1988, Ip 1995, Palat 1996, Cormack 2007, Murphy 2007, Ward & 
Liu 2012). 
In Pukekohe, Indian market gardeners became the target of a racist 
campaign begun by local vegetable growers who felt their livelihood was 
threatened. This led to the formation of the White New Zealand League in 
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1926-1927, a national movement that opposed both Indian and Chinese 
immigration (O’Connor 1968; Leckie 1985, 2007; Brookes 2007; Cormack 
2007). The rhetoric coming from this newly formed organisation was 
particularly virulent, and perceived Indian and Chinese migrants as “a 
threat to the racial integrity and economic prosperity of European New 
Zealanders” (White New Zealand League 1927).154 At best, such anti-
migrant sentiments called for a tightening of immigration policy; at worst 
they advocated segregation or repatriation. This literature paralleled 
similar anti-Asian propaganda of the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
emerging from other settler societies in Europe, North America, South 
Africa and Australia. 
While bicultural relations had earlier constituted racial discourse, New 
Zealand became progressively xenophobic as Asian migration continued, 
and the rhetoric fanned by the formation and activities of anti-immigrant 
groups became increasingly vitriolic. Successive governments passed 
numerous anti-immigration laws targeting non-European migrants. Most 
were specifically designed to both maintain white European dominance 
and to keep Asian migrants from entering New Zealand.155 These include:
The Chinese Immigrants Act 1881
The Asiatic Restriction Bill 1896
The Immigration Restriction Act 1899
The Chinese Immigrants Amendment Act 1907
The Immigration Restriction Act 1908
The Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Act 1919
The Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 1920
The British Nationality and Status of Aliens (in NZ) Act 1928
The Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 1931
The Immigration Amendment Act 1961
The Immigration Act 1964.
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154 Ironically, Apirana Ngata, a prominent Māori politician and lawyer (1874-1950) engaged in 
promoting and protecting Māori culture, also expressed anti-Asian sentiment, setting up an inquiry 
to investigate the welfare of Māori women workers in Asian-owned market gardens (Simpson 
1992:194, Walker 2001:238, Ip 2003:236-237).
155 See the 1921 census report on on ‘Race Aliens’ which notes the importance of maintaining racial 
purity in New Zealand, warning that the coalescence of white and coloured races was “not 
conducive to improvement in racial types” (Census and Statistical Office 1923:vi, Kukutai 2011a:38). 
While the media published anti-Asian editorial cartoons, the public 
expressed similar attitudes through ‘letters to the editor.’ Both illuminate 
the racism that permeated public discourse. Their inclusion here provides 
evidence of how public sentiment reflected official Crown policies 
racialising minorities as inferior others. Wakelin (1853), for example, wrote 
to the New Zealand Spectator, requesting that Edward Gibbon Wakefield 
refrain from importing Chinese labour, describing Chinese migrants as 
“ignorant, slavish and treacherous.” In the New Zealand Truth (1927): “It is 
time, however, that New Zealand closed its doors to Asiatics, and in its 
advocacy of this policy, the White New Zealand League, which has 
recently been holding meetings in Wellington, has New Zealand Truth’s 
full support.” Editorial cartoons became a popular method for widely 
disseminating propaganda.156 These parodies were widely circulated in 
local newspapers and enjoyed wide support.
Figure 4.1: “Still they come” by John Blomfield (1873-1942), one of the more prolific 
editorial cartoonists of the time (Blomfield 1905). 
Figure 4.1 portrays Chinese men leaping over a wall symbolizing the New 
Zealand border, aided by a pole labeled the “£100 poll tax.” Behind them 
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156 A representative sample of eight editorial cartoons were selected from dozens available that best 
represented public sentiment on Asian immigration at the time. More information on these, and 
many other such cartoons can be found in Ip & Murphy (2005). 
are more Chinese scaling the supposedly unsurmountable boundary. They 
are watched in horror by Richard Seddon and Joseph Ward.157 The cartoon 
refers to the imposition of the poll tax on Chinese immigrants, the 
perception that £100 wouldn’t be enough, and the fear that too many 
Chinese were arriving. This extended caption appears underneath the 
original cartoon (Free Lance 1905): 
Sir Joe: ‘Look, Dick. It’s up to us to do something.’ 
King Dick: ‘Yes, by Jove. The wall’s got to go up a bit higher. If a £100 poll tax 
won’t keep the yellow agony out then we’ll have to slap on another hundred.” 
Underneath, the paper reports “twenty Chinamen arrived yesterday, and 
the Treasury benefited to the tune of £2000” (Free Lance 1905:7). 
Figure 4.2 belies the great number of Indians feared to have arrived in the 
wake of a British memorandum stating “Indians already settled in the 
Dominions should be allowed to bring their wives, subject to the rule of 
monogamy, and minor children” (New Zealand Truth 1917). 
Figure 4.2: “The Hindoo peril, small politicians open the door.” 
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157 Richard Seddon was elected Premier of New Zealand between 1893-1906. Joseph Ward was New 
Zealand’s first Prime Minister between 1906-1912. 
Figure 4.3: “The Coming Artist” (Blomfield 1919); “Will it come to this?” (Glover 1920a).
The first cartoon above portrays an Indian labourer painting a white map 
of New Zealand black, inciting the fear many white New Zealanders felt 
about impending ‘hordes’ of Asian arrivals. The anxiety that New Zealand 
was irrevocably being altered by ‘mass’ immigration was felt by many 
white residents, along with a coexisting inability to effect any preventative 
change. The scene in the second cartoon takes place inside a railway 
carriage or tram. All of the seats are occupied by Asian men, forcing the 
two Europeans, a worker and a digger,158 to stand. The worker turns to the 
digger and comments indignantly: 
Worker: “Well, digger, the only way for us to get a seat is to stop these blokes 
coming into the country at all.” 
Digger: “Righto Mate, if the government won’t do it, we can” (Glover 1920a). 
This cartoon references both European-Asian racial tensions and the 
egalitarian ‘mateship’ that the use of the term ‘digger’ implies. With its 
‘we’ll do it ourselves’ attitude, it encourages the public to act to prevent 
continued Asian immigration. It also attempts to enlist the public in an 
anti-immigrant campaign to goad government into passing stronger 
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158 ‘Digger’ was a military slang term for soldiers from Australia and New Zealand (Dennis et al. 
2008).
legislation keeping the ‘yellow peril’ at bay. The text appearing below this 
illustration notes: “The Auckland watersiders have decided to refuse to 
handle ships landing Chinese or Hindus, as a protest against the number 
of aliens that have been allowed to come into the country. The RSA 
Conference has also registered a protest” (Glover 1920a). 
Figure 4.4 appeared in the Returned Soldiers Association’s Quick March 
magazine, the official organ of the RSA. They believed that the country, 
and the way of life they had fought and risked lives for, was threatened by 
unrestrained Asian immigration. It portrays a returned soldier, watching 
helplessly as an endless stream of ‘aliens’ disembark. The soldier, an 
‘insignificant digger’ utters: “Well, whatever it was we fought for, it was 
neither high prices nor cheap labour. If these new style landing parties are 
going to continue it might be as well to set up an Expatriation Department 
for the benefit of ex-soldiers” (Quick March 1920, Leckie 2007:73). The 
feeling conveyed suggests that the rights of Asian migrants were given 
more importance than the rights of returned soldiers.
Figure 4.4: “And the aliens marched in bunch by bunch” (Quick March 1920).
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Figure 4.5: “The Alien Wave” (Glover 1920b).
Figure 4.5 portrays an unstoppable 
mass of Asians surging ashore 
while a lone, overwhelmed 
European attempts to sweep away 
injustice with a broom labeled 
‘existing legislation.’ It 
underscores the belief Europeans 
felt that policy wasn’t maintaining 
a white New Zealand, and to 
prevent further unwanted 
migrants from entering the 
country. Europeans continued to 
pressure elected officials to pass yet 
stronger anti-immigration legislation. The 1920 Immigration Restriction 
Act159 proclaimed the principle of free entry for all of British or Irish birth 
or descent. Other nationalities were allowed entry only at the discretion of 
the Minister of Customs (Bellamy 2008:3). This Act further 
institutionalised discrimination against migrants from non-traditional 
sources and formalised a ‘white New Zealand’ policy: 
The Bill is the result of a deep-seated sentiment on the part of a large majority of 
the people of this country that this Dominion shall be what is often called a 
‘white’ New Zealand, and that the people who come here should, as far as it is 
possible for us to provide for it, be of the same way of thinking from the British 
Empire’s point of view (New Zealand Statutes 1920; Williams 1976, Leckie 2007, 
Murphy 2007). 
The Act gave Government complete control over who was able to enter 
the country, the culmination of four decades of legislation. It was 
perceived at the time to be the ultimate solution to New Zealand’s Asian 
problem (Murphy 2007:15). 
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159 Introduced to Parliament by the New Zealand Prime Minister, William Massey. 
Yet Asian migration continued, public sentiment supporting renewed 
exclusion legislation grew, and the media continued publishing anti-
immigration editorials and cartoons in the wake of WWI. Stronger 
immigration legislation no longer seemed sufficient and increased noise 
for Asian repatriation followed. The first cartoon in Figure 3.6 expresses 
this sentiment. Its caption reads “A Returned Soldiers’ deputation to the 
Mayor of Wellington suggested that His Worship should make strong 
representations to the Government to check their immigration and 
repatriate all Orientals now in the country” (Glover 1922). Here, a 
returned veteran sits on the 
Figure 4.6: “No man’s land: New Zealand home front” (Glover 1922), and “Your 
Daughter?” (Blomfield 1920).
  
ground with an ‘out of work’ sign, while exaggerated Asian stereotypes 
carry on with their work of market gardening, laundering, and selling 
fruit, vegetables and poultry. This parodies the Crown’s perceived lack of 
action in immigration regulation and portrays European fear of stalled 
legislation. The other depicts a European woman considering marriage to 
an Indian male, provoking Pākehā anxieties of unchecked immigration. 
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Begging the question “Would you want your daughter to marry that 
man?” it constructs Asian exclusion as an exceptionally personal issue.160
What is striking about the media’s anti-immigrant rhetoric is that their 
reaction was out of proportion to the number of Asian migrants. Census 
figures show small numbers of migrants from non-traditional sources, and 
their proportions to the general population were infinitesimally small. 
While Europeans comprised 91.5% of the population and Māori 4.0% in 
the 1921 
Table 4.2: Census total population, by ethnicity (Statistics New Zealand 1851, 1891, 1921).161 
1851 Census 1891 Census 1921 Census
          n    %      n %  n %
European 26,707 100 622,214 93.1 1,209,239 91.5
Māori - - 41,953 6.3 52,751 4.0
Chinese - - 4,444 0.7 3,266 0.3
Indian - - - - 671 0.1
Census, the remaining 4.5% of the population consisted of ‘half castes,’ 
Pacific peoples,162 Fijians, and very small numbers of Chinese, Indians, 
Lebanese, Syrians, and Japanese. Given such small percentages, it is 
noteworthy that the anti-immigration lobby, the media, and its 
sympathetic politicians defending a white New Zealand, created such a 
fervor when facing an adversary that barely registered. 
Anti-immigration sentiments remained elevated over the following years 
and continued through WWII when New Zealand, inspired by the 
creation of the United Nations in 1945 and the acceptance of the 
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160 Below the cartoon is this caption: “The total number of Chinese who have arrived here since the 
beginning of the year is 372. In the same period 154 Hindus have landed at Auckland” (Blomfield 
1920).
161 Māori were excluded from participating in the official state censuses until 1891. 
162 The entire populations of the Cook Islands, the mandated territory of Western Samoa, and the 
Tokelau Islands were all included in the 1921 Census, comprising 3.8% of the total population. 
international human rights legislation championed by Eleanor Roosevelt, 
took on a somewhat more enlightened view of immigration, allowing 
roughly 5,000 European refugees into the country at the end of the war, 
and later filled its labour shortages from other Northern European 
countries (Leckie 1995a:147, McMillan 2006:641, Bellamy 2008:4, Phillips 
2013:13). Post-war immigration regulations, however, remained staunchly 
discriminatory against non-European populations. A 1953 Department of 
External Affairs memo stated:
Our immigration is based firmly on the principle that we are and intend to 
remain a country of European development. It is inevitably discriminatory 
against Asians–indeed against all persons who are not wholly of European race 
and colour. Whereas we have done much to encourage immigration from 
Europe, we do everything to discourage it from Asia (Department of External 
Affairs 1953, cited in Brawley 1993, Beaglehole 2012). 
It wasn’t until the passage of The Immigration Amendment Act 1961 that 
the government took its first tentative steps away from discriminatory 
immigration policies by allowing, for the first time, both British and non-
British migrants to be considered on the same footing (Beaglehole 2012). 
This was followed by the Race Relations Act 1971 which was deemed “the 
first general expression of the policy of full equality between the various 
racial and national groups” (Hill 2010:299). 
Norman Kirk, who became Prime Minister in 1972, famously argued that 
New Zealand’s future lay in the Asia and the Pacific regions (Kirk 1973), 
suggesting that New Zealand needed an immigration policy that ignored 
prospective migrants’ race, colour and religion (Kirk 1975). Kirk’s speech 
inaugurated a series of events which culminated in a record inflow of 
Pacific immigrants163 and, coupled with Britain’s 1973 entry into the 
European Economic Community, triggered “a change in thinking about 
immigration” (McMillan 2006:642). These events set in motion an 
important immigration policy review in 1974 that ended “unrestricted 
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163 See Bedford (1985), Phillips (2006:40-41) and Bellamy (2008:6).
access for British immigrants,” requiring all migrants to obtain necessary 
entry permits before emigration, and “reaffirmed the free access to New 
Zealand of those born in the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau” (Bellamy 
2008:7, Beaglehole 2012). As a result, Pacific migration reached its height 
and Samoans had emerged as the largest, non-European migrant group. 
Trade unions, fearing the loss of jobs to new Pacific migrants, now 
opposed Polynesian immigration (Hoadley 2003:524). 
The 1974 review led to new Asian migration. Greater numbers of Indians 
and Chinese slowly began to trickle in through a door that had only just 
been widened with new policy designed to broaden and intensify New 
Zealand’s engagement with Asia-Pacific. Coupled with net migration 
outflows across the Tasman between 1977-1990, the 1974 review resulted 
in huge net migration losses due to New Zealanders flocking to Australia 
(Phillips 2006:41). The Immigration Policy Review 1986 symbolised a 
major change from the earlier focus on nationality and ethnicity as the 
basis for admission. Instead, those meeting specified skill requirements 
could be admitted regardless of nationality, race, or ethnicity. The 
resultant Immigration Act 1987 finally abolished the principle of 
traditional source countries and stimulated a rapid increase in Asian 
immigration (Bedford 2003, Hoadley 2003:523-525, Wearing 2004, Johnson 
& Moloughney 2006:3, Beaglehole 2012, Phillips 2013). 
The period immediately following the Immigration Act 1987 saw 
moderate rises in both Māori and Pacific populations and phenomenal 
growth in Asian migration. This increase generated specific policy 
challenges (Office of Ethnic Affairs 2002, Peace et al. 2005, Grogan 2008) 
designed to ‘manage’ integrating migrants, and central and local 
government needed to devise robust systems to promote tolerance, tackle 
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racial harassment and counter negative media reporting.164 While the 
period of institutionalised racism formally ended with the Immigration 
Act 1987, discrimination continues to be experienced by minority 
communities in a white New Zealand society (Spoonley et al. 1984, 1991, 
1996, 2007; Chen 1993; Walker 1995b; Ip & Pang 2005; Kolig 2010; Daldy et 
al. 2013). Specifically, the majority community was not adequately 
prepared for Asian encounters. Shortly after Kirk’s Singapore speech, 
Tiwari (1980:2), regarding reactions to Indian migrants, remarked that 
New Zealanders “have little contact with these people. Some know them 
merely at the formal level. The average New Zealander is indifferent, if 
luckily not hostile, in his acceptance and treatment of these people.” 
McGee (1962:204) earlier describes the “social rejection by New 
Zealanders” that contributed to the formation of “tight knit [Indian] 
communities in Auckland and Wellington” and, as a result, their 
“participation in outside institutions was at a minimum.” While Indian 
incorporation into majority society has advanced substantially, especially 
in business, education, sport, and in the celebration of cultural events like 
Diwali,165 further progress in majority attitudes towards minorities 
remains (McGee 1962: 205, Chen 1993, Ip & Murphy 2005, Liu 2005, 
Spoonley et al. 2007, Ward & Masgoret 2008). 
Recent advances in human rights
Along with recent changes in immigration policy were concomitant 
advances in human rights legislation. During and immediately after 
WWII, New Zealand played a significant role in developing an 
international human rights framework. As a founding member of the 
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164 Print media and television news, for example, can be encouraged to offer more balanced 
portrayal of minority populations (see Spoonley & Hirsh 1990, Munshi 1998, Spoonley & Trlin 2004, 
Spoonley 2005, Spoonley & Butcher 2009, Butcher & Spoonley 2011, Voci 2011). 
165 See Johnson & Figgins (2005), Bandyopadhyay (2006:141-144, 2010a), Johnson (2007, 2010), 
Leckie (2007:159), and Watson (2011, 2012). 
United Nations, it helped draw up the United Nations Charter in 1945 and 
draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, to which it 
became a signatory (Aikman 1999, Human Rights Commission 2008). In 
April 2012, New Zealand marked the 40th anniversary of its first piece of 
human rights legislation, the Race Relations Act 1971, which became law 
in April 1971. 
The law was promoted by the then National Government to foster New Zealand’s 
role in international forums as a keen and impartial advocate for human rights. 
New Zealand had been a key player in the drafting and adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948 and this was a further 
step on that path. To enhance New Zealand’s international aims the Government 
sought to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination. To do that required enacting specific domestic laws and so 
the first piece of race relations law was passed, but not without some anxiety (de 
Bres 2012). 
The Race Relations Act 1971 prohibited discrimination on the grounds of 
race, nationality or ethnic origin. It also established the office of the Race 
Relations Conciliator and set up procedures for complaints about racial 
discrimination (Rishworth 2012). 
In 1972 New Zealand ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and in 1978, it ratified the UN 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In so doing, New 
Zealand became legally bound by international legislation to prevent 
discrimination. By act of Parliament in 1978, New Zealand established the 
Human Rights Commission through the Human Rights Commission Act 
1977 and became empowered domestically to protect rights in accordance 
with UN covenants and conventions. This Act supplemented the Race 
Relations Act 1971 by including additional provisions for complaints 
about discrimination on the grounds of marital status, sex, and religious 
and ethical belief. New Zealand later ratified the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1985, an 
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international bill of rights for women that set up a national agenda to end 
such discrimination. In 1989 New Zealand ratified the UN Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (Geiringer & Palmer 2007; Human Rights Commission 2010a, 
2010b, 2010c, 2014). 
Domestically, New Zealand’s human rights obligations are not gathered in 
a single entrenched constitutional document. They are provided for, 
instead, in a range of different pieces of legislation and through common 
law (Human Rights Commission 2010b, US Department of State 2013). 
The Bill of Rights Act 1990 first set out the civil and political rights of New 
Zealand citizens and guaranteed freedom from discrimination and the 
rights of minorities. It states that persons who belong to ethnic, religious, 
or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right, along with other 
members of that minority, to enjoy the culture, to profess and practice the 
religion, or to use the language of that minority (Bill of Rights Act 1990, 
Human Rights Commission 2010a:8). 
The Bill of Rights Act, introduced in 1985 and passed in 1990 (Erdos 2007), 
was criticized internationally and domestically on the basis that it did not 
give judges the power to reject legislation that was inconsistent with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a multilateral treaty 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1966, and which came 
into force in March 1976 (Principe 1993, McLean 2001). More 
controversially, while it includes provisions relating to minority rights, it 
does not specifically protect indigenous rights, and it fails to mention or 
reference the Treaty of Waitangi (Human Rights Commission 2010b:45). 
The Human Rights Act 1993 established the Human Rights Commission, 
whose primary focus is to advocate and promote respect for human rights 
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and to encourage the maintenance and development of harmonious 
relations in New Zealand society. It consolidated the earlier Race Relations 
Act 1971 and Bill of Rights Act 1990. This Act specifically prohibits 
discrimination on the grounds of colour, race, and ethnic or national 
origins, and also (in specified circumstances) racial harassment and 
inciting or exciting racial disharmony. The Act also empowered and 
required the Human Rights Commission to ”promote by research, 
education and discussion a better understanding of the human rights 
dimensions of the Treaty of Waitangi and their relationship with domestic 
and international law” (Human Rights Commission 2010b:45). This Act 
also extended the protections of New Zealanders from unlawful 
discrimination by including new grounds of discrimination—disability, 
political opinion, employment status, family status and sexual orientation. 
It applies to both individuals and government—but only in the context of 
employment, provision of goods and services, accommodation, education 
and access to public places (Rishworth 2012). Like the Bill of Rights Act 
1990, the Human Rights Act 1993 does not prevent Parliament from 
enacting a law that is inconsistent with it. However, the Human Rights 
Review Tribunal may decide that a person has suffered discrimination 
through a particular law. It is then required to make a ‘declaration of 
inconsistency’ regarding that legislation (Rishworth 2012). 
As with the Bill of Rights Act 1990, the Treaty of Waitangi was not 
mentioned in the Human Rights Act 1993. While Treaty settlement 
processes have been especially important in confirming and redressing 
Māori grievances, the Treaty itself has not featured in New Zealand’s 
human rights legislation (Geiringer & Palmer 2007, Rishworth 2012). 
Instead, human rights legislation provides for the principles of the Treaty 
to be given effect, but the Treaty is not directly enforceable in New 
Zealand courts. The courts’ adopted practice is to interpret legislation 
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according to the principles of the Treaty where appropriate, except where 
legislation states that this cannot be done. 
The Human Rights Amendment Act 2001 made significant changes to the 
original Human Rights Act 1993. It consolidated the office of the Race 
Relations Conciliator with the Human Rights Commission and set out 
guidelines for the new Race Relations Commissioner. Provision was also 
made for the appointment of an Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commissioner. In this Amendment, the focus of the Human Rights 
Commission moved from being a predominantly anti-discrimination 
office to one advocating and promoting broader human rights (Human 
Rights Commission 2009b).
It is important to note that the roots of public activism on issues of 
diversity and multiculturalism began after two separate incidents of anti-
Jewish vandalism. These took place three weeks apart in July-August 
2004, in which scores of historic Jewish graves were smashed in separate 
incidents at the Makara and Karori Jewish cemeteries in Wellington, and 
spray painted with swastikas and other antisemitic messages (Barkat 2004, 
Sydney Morning Herald 2004, Levine & Gezentsvey 2005). Following 
these events, 
The New Zealand Parliament unanimously passed a resolution deploring these 
acts, recalling the terrible history of antisemitism culminating in the holocaust, 
and expressing unequivocal condemnation of antisemitism and all forms of 
racial and ethnic hatred, persecution and discrimination. A statement signed by 
Maori, Pakeha, Pacific, Asian and other ethnic community leaders, religious 
leaders, mayors and councillors, business and trade union leaders and 
community groups was tabled in the House supporting the resolution (Human 
Rights Commission 2012a). 
In the aftermath of the Parliamentary resolution, a group of concerned 
individuals166 issued a call to action to Parliament’s forecourt on 23 
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166 These included Joris de Bres, the Race Relations Conciliator at the Human Rights Commission, 
writers James & Helen McNeish, and David Zwartz, a Jewish community leader. 
August. This led to a public seminar and the formation of the Diversity 
Action Programme (DAP) which was formally launched on 24 August 
2004 (Ward & Lui 2012, Human Rights Commission 2012a), and is now 
celebrated annually. 
The Diversity Action Programme brings together organisations taking practical 
initiatives to recognise and celebrate the cultural diversity of our society; 
promote the equal enjoyment by everyone of their civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights, regardless of race, colour, religion, ethnicity or national 
origin; foster harmonious relations between diverse peoples; and give effect to 
the Treaty of Waitangi (Human Rights Commission 2012b). 
The DAP has since become a cornerstone of proactive race relations 
initiatives in New Zealand and now has over 250 member organisations, 
collectively and actively promoting cultural, religious and linguistic 
diversity, and harmonious race relations. Even so, the DAP remains 
unaware that at least one organisation that either actively discriminates, or 
is supported by larger umbrella organisations that discriminate, has made 
its way onto their list of participants.167 For example, the Hindu Council of 
New Zealand, a 2013 DAP member, has ties to the Vishva Hindu Parishad 
(VHP),168 which itself is linked with the Rāshtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(RSS)169 and the Bhārtiya Janta Party (BJP).170 More recently, Mahesh 
Bindra, elected to New Zealand’s 51st Parliament in the September 2014 
general elections and New Zealand First’s 11th List MP, was a member of 
the RSS in India. In an interview, Bindra states: “I come from a politically 
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167 A full list of participants in the Diversity Action Programme can be found at <www.hrc.co.nz/race-
relations/te-ngira-the-nz-diversity-action-programme/participants-2013>.
168 The VHP, or World Hindu Council, is a Hindu religious fundamentalist organisation based in 
India on the ideology of Hindutva, advocating Hindu nationalism and exclusivism. Its main 
objective is “to organise and consolidate Hindu society and to serve and protect the Hindu 
Dharma” (Vishva Hindu Parishad 2014). The VHP operates under an umbrella of Hindu nationalist 
organisations known as the Sangh Parivar, which also includes the RSS and the BJP (Lochtefeld 
1994, Katju 2010). 
169 The RSS, loosely translated as the National Patriotic Organisation, is a right-wing, paramilitary, 
Hindu nationalist group based in India “founded in 1925 on a platform of Hindu nationalism and 
the subordination of non-Hindus” (Horowitz 2001:244), and is decidedly anti-Muslim (cf. Curran 
1950, Atkins 2004:264). 
170 The BJP, or Indian People’s Party, is one of the two major Indian political parties today, and is 
considered the political wing of the RSS (Noorani 1978, Malik & Singh 1994). The BJP, led by former 
Gujarat Chief Minister (from 2001-2014) Narendra Modi, won the Indian national elections in May 
2014, becoming India’s 15th Prime Minister. 
active family. My father was a senior functionary of Jana Sangh, which 
later formed today’s Bhārtiya Janta Party (BJP). My association with the 
Sangh Parivar goes back to the days when I became a Swayam Sevak of 
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) at the age of 14” (Sharma 2014). 
Most Hindu Council members in New Zealand do not overtly profess a 
connection with such fundamentalist and exclusionist organisations, 
proclaiming instead to only support Hinduism and Hindu ideals, and 
remain naïvely unaware of the profound implications of association with 
organisations espousing such extremist convictions.171 The fact that many 
Indian New Zealanders are unaware of their connection with Hindu 
fundamentalist hate groups like the VHP and the RSS has meant that there 
is no broader public awareness of these organisations, which are often 
seen as Hindu ‘cultural’ or ‘religious’ groups.172
Finally, improvements in immigration policy and human rights legislation 
contributed to making New Zealand a desired destination for migrants, 
leading to further immigration. Recent research suggests that human 
rights law provides a viable framework for protecting migrant 
communities and that positive human rights and legal protection in 
destination countries makes certain nations with favourable human rights 
records and progressive immigration legislation more highly desired 
destinations (Motomura 1999, Adams 2002, Castles 2004b, Wexler 2008, 
Mazzeschi 2011). These elements, along with the rise of globalisation, the 
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171 The author has witnessed, on several occasions between 2008-2013, Hindu Council members 
vehemently denying any connection with Hindu fundamentalism. This phenomena is critically 
examined in the US context in Kurien’s (2007) ethnography on an emerging American Hinduism. 
Appadurai (1990:301-2) also notes that “the overseas movement of Indians has been exploited by a 
variety of interests both within and outside India to create a complicated network of finances and 
religious identifications, in which the problems of cultural reproduction for Hindus abroad has 
become tied to the politics of Hindu fundamentalism at home.” Vertovec (2000:145) also mentions 
that right-wing Hindu nationalist organisations are known to gain much support from overseas 
populations. See also Bhatt (1977), Rajagopal (1977, 2000), Raj (2000) and Quddus (2005). 
172 The Human Rights Commission’s Diversity Action Programme needs to more assiduously vet 
its applications for enrollment, as even well intentioned programmes may become potentially 
compromised by association with evidently fundamentalist organisations. 
relative ease of international travel, and the international search for people 
with desired skills for domestic labour markets, have been contributing 
factors to the rise in ethnic and religious minorities in all settler societies.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter scrutinised the Crown’s historically ambivalent policies 
towards Māori and non-Māori minorities, and examined marginalisation 
strategies both designed to assimilate and racialise minorities as inferior 
others. It also provided a necessary backdrop for understanding bicultural 
and multicultural relations and the particular historical dimensions of 
discrimination in New Zealand. I turn now to an examination of the 
pivotal notions of identity and invisibility in the following chapters. Both 
elements are crucial in establishing that the historic suppression of Māori 
and non-Māori minorities, and contemporary shallow diversity 
management policies, have been employed since first encounter and 
continue today. The unpacking of historic Māori-Pāhekā-tauiwi relations 
provided here also provides a necessary context in which future tauiwi 
participation in a multicultural discourse ensues. Such contexts provide a 
necessary pretext for explicating a deeper framework for future diversity 
governance strategies in New Zealand. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
IDENTITY AND INVISIBILITY: 
EARLY INDIAN PRESENCE IN AOTEAROA, 1769-1850
In 1961, when I was traveling in the Caribbean, I remember my shock, my feeling 
of taint and spiritual annihilation, when I saw some of the Indians of Martinique, 
and began to understand that they have been swamped by Martinique, that I had 
no means of sharing the world view of these people whose history at some stage 
had been like mine, but who now, racially and in other ways, had become 
something other (Naipaul 1989:33). 
He tangata atawhai nui ia ki te tāpae kai ki ngā tāngata katoa me ka tae ki tōna kāinga; e 
kore rawa hoki e tukua e ia te tira manuhiri kia haere ana, āpānoa kia takoto he hākari 
māna ki ia tangata ki ia tangata o rātou, te iti me te rahi. 
He was a generous person who provided food to everybody if they visited his 
village; he would never ever let a party of visitors leave until he had laid out a 
feast for each person, whether of lowly status or of importance.
(Te Waka Maori o Niu Tirani 1874:95, in Moorfield 2011, manuhiri entry).
5.1 Introduction
Whether New Zealanders will ever arrive at an agreement on a singular 
definition of their national identity, what is clear is that the process of identity-
making here is dynamic (Liu et al. 2005:11).
This chapter retells the history of early Indian presence in Aotearoa, and 
uncovers new evidence that precedes the previously known first date of 
Indian arrival to one much earlier than was previously established. 
Through uncovering specific historical events relevant to Asian presence 
in Aotearoa, I present evidence of erasure and invisibility of minority 
others that advances state objectives of control and promulgates majority 
authority.173 Such a retelling of events that includes Indian presence at the 
time of Māori-Pākehā first encounter provides insights into the genesis and 
formation of a uniquely Indo-Kiwi identity, reflecting contemporary 
notions of what it means to be a New Zealander of Indian ethnicity. 
Unpacking erased histories provides evidence of normative, ideological 
and operative forms of shallow diversity, which is the purpose of this 
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173 See Wolfe (2006), for example, who, in many settler societies, discusses the erasure of indigeneity 
with the assertion of settler nationalism. 
chapter. At the same time, minority and majority awareness of minority 
participation in invisible histories, such as presence at the very founding 
of the modern nation, may help relevant minorities reclaim association in 
a shared national identity that may aid social cohesion.174 
A bicultural foundation for a national identity necessarily precludes non-
Māori minority inclusion. Majority belief expects migrants to integrate175 
into New Zealand society if they are to be successful (Ward & Lin 2005, 
Ward & Masgoret 2008, Grbic 2010), and this necessarily includes 
conforming to majority models and mores to varying extent. Non-Māori 
minorities are therefore expected to acquire the necessary historical, 
sociocultural and linguistic capabilities, and incorporate an 
understanding of the special nature of biculturalism, for successful 
acculturation. Yet no reciprocal expectation exists that majorities be 
required to learn anything about minorities. The burden of integration 
rests with minorities while majorities undertake management 
responsibility through policy strategising and immigration legislation 
tweaking. What is needed for minority partnership in a shared national 
identity (i.e. realising full inclusion) is the construction of a reimagined 
and realigned specifically Kiwi identity built upon bicultural roots, but 
which incorporates the shared imaginings of minority others. This must 
necessarily be appended to notions of an existing bicultural identity based 
on shared Māori-Pākehā colonial histories176 but likewise must be socially 
reconstructed from new minority appreciation of a shared Māori-Pākehā-
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174 I do not wish to infer here that social cohesion requires any such association. 
175 My use of ‘integration’ here follows from Berry’s (2000) acculturation orientation model and 
Ward & Lin’s (2005) usage in the New Zealand context, in which migrants both adopt to their new 
cultural identity and maintain their cultural heritage. 
176 See Liu et al. (1999, 2005), Liu (2005).
tauiwi history.177 Ward & Lin (2008) have shown that biculturalism and 
multiculturalism are not mutually exclusive entities; they are compatible, 
and there is nothing to suggest that “gains in multiculturalism need be at 
the expense of biculturalism.” 
As socially constructed entities, Pākehā explications of shared bicultural 
identities may be fundamentally different from Māori interpretations. For 
Pākehā, a shared identity may only reach back as far as European arrival in 
Aotearoa, with smatterings of history imagined in readily understandable 
pre-European terms, a wink-wink appellation that singularly validates the 
institution of colonialism and simultaneously erases any notion that 
Māori self-determination previously existed. Such histories are told by 
Europeans for European consumption and have no place in deeply 
diverse societies. Alternatively, Māori need not imagine histories as either 
existing in pre- or post-colonisation, or in terms of non-Māori others, their 
imaginings instead alive through whakapapa and seen as continuums 
stretching back from godly ancestors to the present day with no need to 
demarcate an a priori historical landscape. Like Pākehā, a uniquely tauiwi 
identity in Aotearoa can be established from first encounter, presuming 
that they can regain and repossess the knowledge and history of initial 
Māori-tauiwi encounter. Unlike Māori, tauiwi cannot fashion a distant past 
that stretches back a thousand years. They do however possess unique 
ancestries that reach back to lineal homelands, much in the way that 
whakapapa connects Māori to ancestral dominions in Hawaiki; although 
markedly dissimilar to the history of Pākehā presence, which has been one 
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177 Historically, there have been attempts to strengthen identity formation between Indians and 
Pākehā during colonial times. Of note are the three successful tours of Indian hockey teams to New 
Zealand in 1926, 1935 and 1938, which helped solidify a shared interest in sport between Indian-
New Zealanders and elite Indian Army teams selected by and touring with their British captains 
and chaperones. These tours received wide press attention in New Zealand and aided the 
formation of a shared Indo-British identity based on sporting preferences and a shared colonial 
history (see Watson 2005, 2011). 
of ‘recreating homeland,’ making new reflect old through the 
Europeanisation of Aotearoan landscapes.178
Rooting tauiwi to Aotearoa should involve a decidedly different strategy, 
one that firmly grounds their own encounter history and provides a 
footing for a uniquely tauiwi tūrangawaewae,179 recovering lost (perhaps 
stolen?) histories. This is necessary for the coalescing of a shared 
multicultural identity under a deep diversity framework. In making such 
tauiwi histories available, non-Māori minorities are better situated to 
fashion an emerging, shared, and multicultural national identity that 
draws on the strengths of an imagined Māori-Pākehā-tauiwi triad. Each 
brings considerable provisions to the multicultural table. That is not to say 
that biculturalism will fail as a diversity strategy. Rather, advocating a 
more inclusive governance approach, based on currently existing 
variables and the actors at hand, seems a more appropriate course of 
action. Tauiwi imaginings of a minority-Kiwi (e.g. Indo-Kiwi, Sino-Kiwi) 
identity180 brings them closer to integration with majority society, and the 
bicultural identity that a shared Māori-Pākehā history encapsulates. 
A knowledge of and appreciation for the earliest roles of Indian 
sojourners to Aotearoa can validate and reinforce contemporary Indo-
Kiwi identity formation and maintenance. This is not to suggest that 
identity exists as a continuum from earliest encounter to the present day, 
but rather that the concept of a reclaimed historical identity (based on the 
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178 One prominent example of this was the existence in colonial times of Acclimatisation Societies, 
who’s sole charge was to release invasive species (e.g. blackbirds, thrushes, pheasants, rabbits, 
stoats, weasels) in New Zealand that made British immigrants feel more at home, either through 
familiar birdsong or species that were available for hunting. For more on this topic, see King (1984), 
McDowall (1994), Clout & Lowe (2000), and Wilson (2004). 
179 Moorfield (2011) defines tūrangawaewae as a place where one has rights of residence and 
belonging through kinship and whakapapa; domicile. 
180 My survey results, partially discussed in Chapter Eight, present evidence of an emerging Indo-
Kiwi identity inclusive of shared Māori-Pākehā bicultural histories. 
knowledge that non-Māori non-European ‘others’ were present at the 
very inception of Māori-European encounter) may help inform and 
expand particular imaginings of contemporary tauiwi identity—a claim 
debatable with respect to any community—presuming that all such 
identity constructions are subject to the vagaries of time and varying 
circumstance, as well as to other sociocultural, historical, environmental 
and political exigencies that may influence its formation and maintenance. 
Retaining strong identity affiliations with one’s particular ethnocultural 
heritage is especially important for minorities, as these can often mitigate 
the impacts of peripheral presence at the margins of majority society, and 
are known to moderate the consequences of perceived and experienced 
discrimination (Noh et al. 1999, Mossakowski 2003, Yip et al. 2008). In 
deeply diverse populations181 it is equally essential to receive recognition 
from majority society (i.e. in the form of appropriate governance 
initiatives, accommodation and majority community support for minority 
populations) in order for a stronger national identity to emerge and 
cohere. A state with an inclusive national identity, one that engages the 
various individual and communal identities it encapsulates, and marked 
by an absence of conflict and inter-community antipathy, can be said to be 
a socially cohesive state (Friedkin 2004, Chan et al. 2006). Majority 
recognition and accommodation can therefore be vital in reducing 
instances of pernicious discrimination that appear within society. 
Although clearly multicultural—in that peoples with globally diverse 
ethnicities, languages and religions now inhabit a modern New Zealand 
state—any particularly unique national identity that may emerge from its 
history should be one rooted in bicultural encounter, but also based on 
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181 I prefer the use of the term deeply diverse, instead of ‘super-diversity,’ currently in vogue to refer 
to extensive pluralism in modern western democracies (see Vertovec 2005, 2006, 2007; Spoonley & 
Butcher 2009, Arnaut 2012, Ram et al. 2013, Spoonley 2014). 
shared experiences with non-Treaty peoples. Such a shared multicultural 
national identity is clearly emerging today (Greif 1995, Liu et al. 2005, 
Johnson & Moloughney 2006, Voci & Leckie 2011, Ghosh & Leckie 2015), 
although it tends to ignore the historical contributions of some tauiwi that 
have been present since the founding of the modern state, and renders 
virtually invisible or non-existent any such contributions made since the 
time of Māori-Pākehā or Māori-Asian first contact.182 As subalterns, their 
historical invisibility (along with Māori) renders them as essentially 
impotent actors in the sociopolitical affairs of a dominant society 
controlled by a majority realpolitik. Although non-Pākehā tauiwi 
participation in the political sphere is increasing,183 their effectiveness has 
yet to be substantially gauged. A thorough retelling of such minority 
histories, therefore, is not only relevant but indispensable if a shared 
Māori-Pākehā-tauiwi identity is to emerge. An evolution of and respect for 
such a comprehensive national identity can only happen if diversity 
governance moves away from its shallow roots to a deeper, inclusive 
understanding of collective multicultural histories. 
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182 There have been recent attempts to portray such a shared historical identity (see Brooking & 
Rabel 1995, Ng 2003, Johnson & Moloughney 2006b, Mayo 2011, Ghosh & Leckie 2015), but even 
these do not reach back past the founding of the modern state. 
183 For example, Parliament has had numerous Asian minority MPs in Parliament in recent years: 
Ashraf Choudhary, a Pakistani-New Zealander, was the first South Asian Labour MP from 
2002-2011. Kanwaljit Singh Bakshi (National 2008-present), born in India and migrated to New 
Zealand in 2001, became New Zealand’s first Sikh MP in 2008 (Bhandari 2008). Rajen Prasad, an 
Indo-Fijian, was the former Race Relations Conciliator from 1996 to 2001, and a former Member of 
Parliament (Labour 2008-2014). The September 2014 general election saw Mahesh Bindra, a New 
Zealand First list candidate from Mumbai, elected to Parliament. Pansy Wong (National 1996 to 
2011), Chinese, was the first Asian member of Parliament, and between 2008-2010 was the Minister 
for Ethnic Affairs (Ip 2012b). Raymond Huo, a Chinese New Zealander, has been a Labour MP since 
2008. Jian Yang was elected to Parliament as a National Party list MP in 2011 (Cheng 2011). Melissa 
Lee, Parliament’s first Korean MP, came to New Zealand in 1988 and has been a National MP since 
2008. She is currently the Parliamentary Private Secretary for Ethnic Affairs. Lists of present and 
former MPs with their bios can be found on the New Zealand Parliament website at 
<www.parliament.nz/en-nz/mpp/mps>. Historically, Sir Julius Vogel (1835-1899), a practicing Jew, 
served as New Zealand’s eighth Premier from 1873 to 1875 and again in 1876 (Levine 2013), and the 
current Prime Minister, John Key, is half-Jewish (du Chateau et al. 2008). Sir Anand Satyanand, born 
and raised in Auckland and of Indo-Fijian origin, was the 19th Governor-General from 2006-2011 
(Clark 2006). At a local level, Sukhi Turner, originally born in the Indian Punjab, migrated to New 
Zealand in 1973, and was elected Mayor of Dunedin, from 1995-2004 (Parasher 2001, Singh 2001). 
She was succeeded by Peter Chin, a descendant of earlier Chinese immigrants, who served two 
terms as Dunedin Mayor from 2004 to 2010 (Ip 2012a). 
This chapter reexamines the history of Indian presence in New Zealand 
that begins much earlier than currently known and follows the story of 
their arrival and settlement in Aotearoa that precedes first Indian 
appearance in the census. Of particular note is the distinguishing nature 
of early Indian migration to New Zealand. What differentiates Indian 
arrival in Aotearoa from the other destinations of Indian émigrés during 
this period184 is that these voyages were predominantly voluntary, as 
opposed to the indentured servitude or girmitiya that characterized the 
overwhelming majority of Indian dispersal from South Asia through to 
the mid-1800s.185 This chapter discusses the early fears of Indian migrants 
and how these anxieties have changed through time, stressing the 
importance of identity maintenance for successful integration into 
majority society. The historical reinterpretation considers early Indian 
presence and identity formation, and examines early Indian presence 
during the exploration, sealing and timber voyages between 1769-1820. 
This analysis critically examines early Indian sojourners and settlers and 
extracts important themes in the genesis and formation of a uniquely 
Indo-Kiwi identity. 
5.2 Crossing the kālāpāni
The roots of the modern Indian diaspora can be seen over 4000 years ago 
(Lal 2006a), and the first phase of their dispersal took place during the 
early rise of mercantile trading. Indian merchants were known to be 
involved in maritime trade throughout the Indian Ocean dating back at 
least 4000 years, and by 1500CE they had successfully plied the wider 
routes westward to the Mideast and East Africa, eastward to the Bay of 
Bengal and Southeast Asian ports where Gujarati merchants formed 
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184 e.g. Indian migration to Fiji, the West Indies, South Africa and Southeast Asia. 
185 See Zodgekar (1980:183), Lal (2006) and Leckie (2010:46). 
significant trading communities (Chaudhuri 1985, Davalikar 1991, Qaisar 
1999, Markovits 2000, McPherson 2006). Along with early maritime 
expansion were the established overland Indian caravan trade routes that 
extended into Central Asia, Iran and Russia (Dale 1994; Muzaffar 1994; 
Levi 2002, 2006), and overland to China (Liu 1988). This phase would 
have also included the great numbers of Muslim pilgrims on Hajj to 
Mecca (Metcalf 1990, Pearson 1996). Accounts from the 16th and 17th 
centuries describe huge ships leaving India, carrying 1000 or more 
pilgrims each, often sailing in fleets of at least six ships, making the 
voyage annually (Pearson 2006). 
A second phase of Indian expatriation during the 1700s-1800s would have 
been the great labour migrations of slaves and indentured servants 
brought out to work rubber plantations and sugar cane fields (Tinker 
1974, Carter 2006, Lal 2006b), and the large numbers of āyahs,186 lascars187 
and Indian princes traveling to Britain and other locales during the years 
of the British Rāj (Visram 1986). Lal (1983) records 453,063 Indian 
indentured labourers shipped to Mauritius in the years 1834-1900, nearly 
250,000 each to British Guiana (1838-1916) and Malaya (1844-1910), and 
many more to Jamaica, Grenada, St. Lucia, East Africa, South Africa, 
Surinam, Fiji, and the Seychelles. Many of these workers remained in the 
countries to which they were sent, and their descendants live there today. 
This second phase characterised the beginning of large scale Indian 
emigration in what would later became known as the Indian diaspora. 
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186 a domestic servant or nanny, hired to look after children; nurse. 
187 Originally from the Persian word رکشل (lashkar) which referred to a military camp or an army, 
and later made its way into the Hindustani vernacular as :3!$ in Hindi and رکشل in Urdu. During 
British colonial times, lashkar referred to a seaman or soldier. It was rendered into English during 
the British Rāj as lascar. 
However, not all Indians were keen to travel abroad. There was a deep-
rooted Indian suspicion about leaving one’s homeland and traveling away 
from loved ones to foreign lands (Stiebel 2011, Lal 2006a). The sharing of 
food, sleeping quarters and clothes with members of other castes was 
often unthinkable. For higher caste Hindus there was a fear of where one 
could receive food, as loss of caste could result in accepting food from 
those of lower or no caste. There was also the fear of contracting a deadly 
illness or disease. Nugent (1992:31) writes that early 19th century voyages 
often took four to six weeks, “plenty of time for contagious diseases to 
ravage passengers and crew,” noting that diseases “frequently swept away 
10 percent, and occasionally 25 percent, of the passengers during a 
crossing.” All of this was best avoided as non-traveling Indians looked 
upon those that traveled abroad with suspicion. 
Known and feared by many as ‘crossing the kālāpāni,’ or ‘dark waters,’ “it 
was widely believed that in most circumstances only the desperate 
departed their homeland for strange places, and then, too, under 
compulsion or false advertising by those who enlisted them for various 
jobs” (Lal 2006a:10). The kālāpāni referred to the crossing of the Indian and 
Atlantic Oceans by thousands of economically disenfranchised Indian 
agricultural workers under “a pernicious system of indentured labor that 
lasted from 1838 to 1917” (Mehta 2010:1).
These Indians, the majority of whom were Hindu, were lured to foreign lands 
under the guise of enhanced economic prospects; many were duped by corrupt 
immigration officials and agents or maistrys working for the French and British 
colonials. In collaboration with the imperialist powers, these agents of empire 
perpetuated an inhumane system of contracted labour exploitation despite the 
official ‘abolition’ of slavery 1838 by the British and 1848 by the French. The 
beginning of kala pani as another premeditated form of economic servitude 
ironically coincided with the end of African slavery; the European sugar industry 
still needed a cheap and industrious work force on plantations in the Indian 
Ocean and the Caribbean to accommodate its continued obsession with sugar 
and its insatiable thirst for capitalist profit (Mehta 2010:1). 
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Crossing the kālāpāni was full of peril to the orthodox Hindu because it 
violated caste scruples (Lal 1981). This fear kept many Hindus from 
undertaking such long and arduous journeys (Crooke 1897:326, Tiwari 
1980:6, Kivisto & Faist 2010:24). It held less terror for Muslims and Sikhs 
for whom the institution of caste was, in theory, irrelevant. Perhaps this is 
one reason why Muslim traders during the early mercantile period in the 
16th century and Punjabi Sikhs during the time of indentured servitude 
were such willing recruits. There is no such fear for Hindus now. The third 
wave of Indian emigration would be characterised by an entirely different 
zeitgeist—the status and success of having worked and traveled overseas. 
This wave of Indian migration occurs during the modern era of 
globalisation, extending roughly from the post-WWII period to the 
present, characterised predominantly by voluntary repatriation, mostly 
for economic reasons, better education, or to escape civil or familial unrest 
at home. During this phase, Indians have moved transnationally, across 
and between borders, and not exclusively from India. Many modern 
migrants are descendants of those that emigrated from India during the 
second phase and now travel in search of better jobs with better pay and 
new opportunities for themselves and for their children. They are mostly 
voluntary migrants, (except in certain circumstances, like Fiji, where many 
fled due to civil unrest). They move from Mauritius to the US, from India 
to the UK, and from Fiji to New Zealand.188 Historically, diasporic Indians 
came to New Zealand in small numbers, first as sojourners, then as 
settlers, and more recently as migrants in search of a higher quality of life 
and a better economic future. 
192
188 See Bedford & Levick (1988), Shukla (2003), Brah (2006), Eisenlohr (2006), Lal (2006a), and Sahay 
(2009).
The original anxiety of ‘crossing the kālāpāni’ was distinctive of both the 
first and second phases of Indian migration overseas. These fears were 
often characterised by the apprehension of departure, the uneasiness of 
leaving loved ones behind, and the actual distress of the journey itself—
the crossing into the unknown. There was also the concern that loved ones 
may never be seen again, since journeys were distant and the road back 
fraught with peril. While these fears have largely been relegated to 
history, a new anxiety has slowly emerged for migrant populations in this 
age of globalisation. These are not so much about the journey or the 
distance traveled, or the fear of not meeting loved ones again, as 
technology has made these aspects of the journey less troublesome. 
Today’s trepidations are more about what happens post-arrival, during 
relocation and settlement, and the life that new migrants can expect to 
have in their adopted country. Indian migrants to New Zealand, like most 
migrants moving into settler societies (Chandrasekhar 1982, Berry 1997, 
Portes 1999:465, Takaki 1998, Yip et al. 2008), experience anxiety about 
being accepted by majority society. How to fit in? Find suitable 
employment? Be accepted? Migrants hear news of discrimination and 
racism in the west,189 and are often concerned, as they move from 
inclusion in majority society at home, to exclusion as minorities in their 
adopted homelands. The expectation-reality disparities they face create 
new sources of anxiety and distress than that feared by the dreadful 
crossing of the kālāpāni.190 Appreciating such anxieties is essential in 
considering the various elements that constitute the complex identities of 
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189 As in Paul Henry’s comment about New Zealand’s former Governor-General, Anand Satyanand 
(Nash 2010), or in the public backlash after Nina Davuluri (a Telugu-speaking Indo-American born 
in Syracuse, New York) was crowned 2014’s Miss America winner (see Hafiz 2013, Yang 2013). In 
October 2014, another race relations row was sparked by an Immigration New Zealand official 
who, referring to Radio Tarana (a popular Hindi language radio station in New Zealand), made the 
comment that “New Zealand citizens/residents are unlikely to listen to an Indian radio station” in 
New Zealand (Tan 2014). In the era of globalisation, such xenophobic sentiment travels quickly 
overseas. 
190 There are often additional sources of stress for new migrants, including anxieties about how 
children may grow up without adequate knowledge of the histories, cultures, languages and 
religions of their homeland. 
both early Indian sojourners to Aotearoa and the Indian migrants of 
today. 
Today’s migrants are more concerned with finding suitable employment, 
their ability to earn decent wages, and becoming accepted by majority 
society. Finding support amongst coethnics is often the first crucial step 
towards successful acculturation and integration. Yet often accompanying 
the excitement of beginning a new life abroad, is the angst of potential 
discrimination and racism, the awareness of which often precedes 
immigration and continues as a minority. The difficulty of maintaining 
distinct identities within majorities often adds to the apprehension that 
minorities experience. Despite the pernicious consequences of 
discrimination, recent studies suggest that ethnic identification can play 
an important part in allaying fears of perceived racism and discrimination 
(Noh et al. 1999, Mossakowski 2008, Yip et al. 2008). Having a sense of 
ethnic pride, being involved in and demonstrating a commitment for the 
sociocultural and religious activities and practices of one’s particular 
ethnicity, can be a strong coping strategy for migrants experiencing 
discrimination and racism in their adopted homeland. Portes et al. 
(1993:11, 2005) argue that strong coethnic ties act as protective shields 
against downward assimilation into a racialised ‘underclass.’ This 
strongly suggests that the importance of maintaining or strengthening 
one’s particular ethnocultural identity is essential for successful 
integration. The strong link between ethnic identity and improved mental 
health amongst migrants and minorities has significant implications for 
diversity governance and social cohesion. While ‘crossing the kālāpāni’ no 
longer holds the same meaning, it has been replaced by the spectre of 
discrimination and the anxieties associated with both maintaining one’s 
own identity and the difficulties of passing on one’s culture, language and 
religion to subsequent generations. 
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5.3 Early Indian presence and identity formation in Aotearoa
New Zealand is considered one of the last outposts of human habitation, 
with a shorter human history than any other country (Wilson 2009b). 
Although there is still debate surrounding the actual date of first arrival 
and settlement, there is general agreement that Māori arrival is estimated 
to have occurred during the 13th century,191 and recent evidence points that 
this settlement occurred more recently than previously thought.192 During 
the early period of classical Māori development a thriving indigenous 
culture developed, characterised by the making of practical tools, 
extensive trade throughout the islands, intertribal warfare, and the use of 
local resources for survival.
The first European explorer to the region, the Dutchman Abel Tasman, 
transited the islands in the summer of 1642-1643, although it wasn’t until 
James Cook’s and Jean François Marie de Surville’s first visit in 1769, 
more than 126 years later, that Europeans began to become aware of the 
land ‘down under’ (Owens 1992, King 2003, Dunmore 2012). Cook was 
the first to extensively map the newly ‘discovered’ territory and reported 
back to Europe its large cache of resources, especially of its flax, timber, 
seals and whales, which were, no doubt, of tremendous importance to his 
benefactors. Cook made two subsequent visits to New Zealand 
(1773-1774, 1777) and his reports led to the first European settlers, hungry 
to exploit its resource largess. The first of these to arrive were sealers, 
whalers and traders in the late eighteenth century, followed by 
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191 Holdaway (1996, 1999), however, proposes that Polynesian arrival occurred much earlier, around 
2000 years ago, based on the radiocarbon dating of rat bones, and the assumption that these could 
have only arrived on Polynesian canoes. This is challenged by Higham & Petchey (2000) who state 
that the radiocarbon dating of recovered rat bones is unreliable and unreproducible. Hedges (2000) 
also states that the sample is too small and is inconsistent with other radiocarbon dating to 
accurately base a claim that Māori arrival occurred approximately 2000 years ago. 
192 See McGlone (1989), Anderson (1991), Davidson (1992), Hogg et al. (2003), Howe (2008), 
Wilmshurst et al. (2008), Moon (2013). 
missionaries in the early 1800s, with settlers arriving in large numbers 
from the late 1830s onwards (Graham 1992, Owens 1992, McKinnon 1997, 
King 2003, Moon 2013). The signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in February 
1840 between indigenous Māori and the British representative at the time, 
Lieutenant-Governor Captain William Hobson, ceded ‘sovereignty’ or 
‘governance’193 of the Māori chiefs to the British Queen, in exchange for 
which the chiefs and tribes retained their “full exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries and other 
properties,” along with the granting to Māori their rights and privileges 
as British subjects (Owens 1992). Although the meaning and intent of the 
Treaty is disputable due to the nature of its poor translation into Māori 
and misrepresentations of Māori understanding of what was agreed, the 
Treaty, nonetheless, secured British rule over Aotearoa, marked the 
genesis of the modern nation-state, and provided Māori with a tangible 
base for the settlement of later historic grievances against the Crown 
(Temm 1990; Orange 2011, 2012). 
The reports of the initial visits of Cook and Surville in 1769, and in 
subsequent years, led to a rising awareness in Europe of the Antipodes 
and of the great store of natural resources available for exploitation. 
European sealing, whaling and missionary colonies were soon established, 
and contact made with indigenous Māori. Salmond (1991, 1997, 2003) 
provides detailed historical accounts of first contact between indigenous 
Māori and European explorers and settlers between the years 1642 to 1815. 
The early settlements of European sealers, whalers and missionaries soon 
gave way to more permanent settlements throughout New Zealand, 
bringing further migration from Europe, the Americas and Australia. 
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193 The word ‘sovereignty’ is used only in the the English version of the Treaty, while the word 
kāwanatanga, or ‘governance’, is used in Te Tiriti, the Māori version of the Treaty. 
What is not well known is that small numbers of Indian and Chinese 
migrants were amongst the earliest post-Māori visitors to Aotearoa. 
While the Chinese population has been traced back to a single person in 
Nelson in 1842 (Ng 1993:123), the very earliest Indian presence in 
Aotearoa has remained obscure, hidden in old ship logs from captains on 
early sealing and timber voyages. Scholars researching the history of 
Indian migration and settlement peg the first known record of an Indian 
in New Zealand to a Bengali who jumped ship in 1809 or 1810 to marry a 
Māori woman.194 The exact date has been unclear as some sources give 
1809 as the date (Salmond 1997:373-377; Entwistle 2005:103-106; Leckie 
2006:389, 2007:21; Didham 2010:4; Spoonley & Bedford 2012:104), while 
others give 1810 (Leckie 1995a:136, 1998:163; Friesen 2008a:47; Friesen & 
Kearnes 2008:212; Swarbrick 2012; Pio 2012:2). Bandyopadhyay (2006:125), 
citing Cruise (1824), states “The first Indian ever to set foot on New 
Zealand soil was a Bengali. We do not know his name, but he was a sailor 
who jumped ship in 1809 and was living with a local Māori.” All of these 
sources appear to be based on the 3rd May 1820 entry in the journal of 
Richard Cruise, an English army officer on a ten-month visit to New 
Zealand. Referring to a man of Indian descent, he writes: 
This man had left an East Indiaman195 that touched at the Bay of Islands ten 
years before, and married a woman of the tribe subject to Tekokee, whom he 
considered his chief. Though quite a New Zealander in his dress and habits, his 
diminutive person and dark complexion made him appear to great disadvantage 
among the handsome and athletic people among whom he had settled (Cruise 
1824:315). 
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194 Although there is mention of Indian lascar visits to Aotearoa in the late 1790s (Leckie 2007:21, 
2010:48). 
195 ‘East Indiaman’ (or ‘East Indiamen’ plural) referred to any sailing vessel built in the Indian naval 
shipyards operating under charter or license to any of the India companies of the major European 
trading powers of the 17th-19th centuries. The finest of these made use of Indian shipbuilding 
techniques and were largely crewed by Indian seamen. These ships were of excellent quality, built 
of durable wood, and highly desirable by the European trading powers of the time (Braudel 
1984:506). 
This would account for later authors’ claims of 1809 or 1810 as the first 
known recorded account of Indian presence. Complicating matters, 
Murphy (2007:2) states that “the first known Indian person to come to 
New Zealand was Bir Singh Gill, an itinerant Sikh herbalist who arrived 
in 1890.” The murkiness of the details of the first known Indian is 
discussed below, and presented along with earlier accounts of Indian 
sojourns to Aotearoa, culled from the first-hand accounts and ship logs 
from early voyages of exploration, and later sealing and timber ventures. 
What is certain, however, is that Indian presence in Aotearoa is recorded 
along with the very earliest European explorers,196 an occurrence that is 
little known and absent from official histories, which have generally 
neglected early Asian appearance and settlement prior to the arrival of 
Chinese goldseekers in 1865.197 Of the general invisibility of the Chinese 
from official history, Murphy (2003:282) writes: “Chinese New Zealand 
history has rated barely a mention. Many earlier works compounded the 
neglect with a dismissive racism that reflects the attitude to Chinese New 
Zealanders at the time.” The same is true of immigration histories to New 
Zealand (cf. Taher 1970:38, Borrie 1991,198 Greif 1995, Phillips 2013199) 
which equally ignore earliest Asian appearance. While both Māori arrival 
and settlement, followed by European exploration, exploitation (sealing, 
whaling and the taking of valuable timber), missionisation and 
colonisation, are well-documented in official histories, little or no mention 
is made of the earliest Asian contributions, even though Indian presence is 
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196 There are, however, alternative theories that earlier Indian contact with Aotearoa may have 
occurred with Tamil ships accompanying the exploratory fleet voyages of the Chinese in the 1400s, 
long before the visits of James Cook (Crawfurd 1867, Gosset 1970:16-20, Hilder 1975, Estensen 
1998:96-97, Menzies 2002:209-214, Howe 2008:144-145). These stories, difficult to substantiate, are 
beyond the purview of this thesis.
197 See Rice (1992), Sinclair (2001), King (2003), Smith (2005) and McLauchlan (2014). 
198 Borrie’s Immigration to New Zealand (1991), for instance, begins with the Chinese in 1870. 
199 Phillips’ retelling of the history of immigration, last updated in August 2013 and found in the 
official Te Ara: the encyclopedia of New Zealand, purports to tell “The Full Story.”
recorded on the first visits of European vessels to the Southern Oceans 
from 1769. It is only recently that histories of early Chinese and Indian 
presence have begun to contribute to a wider, more inclusive, retelling of 
tauiwi settlement in New Zealand that is focused on Asian migration and 
settlement,200 yet even these stories are poorly known—excluded from 
general texts of New Zealand history—and all disregard earliest Asian 
appearance and settlement. 
Referring to ethnic migration, McCarthy states:
The years beyond 1890 are also the focus of W.H. McLeod’s study of Punjabis in 
New Zealand, though he similarly identifies some early arrivals. These early 
Punjabis were Malwais or Majhails and were generally hawkers peddling 
various items such as herbs, chutneys, cloth and semi-precious stones. By 
contrast, Chinese migrants have received increasing attention, although, as with 
the historical analysis of other ethnic groups, much scrutiny only embraces the 
nineteenth-century experience as a precursor to a more sustained focus on the 
twentieth-century (McCarthy 2009: 175-176).201 
McCarthy unintentionally conforms to the misguided argument that is 
reflected in and reinforced by the mainstream belief that Asian 
contributions to Aotearoan history only began with the 1860s Otago 
goldrush. She also establishes that this intensifying examination of New 
Zealand’s ethnic past, by both minority and majority researchers, has 
typically only been pursued within the context of referencing and 
interpreting New Zealand’s increasingly ethnic present. While the first 
merely establishes majority ignorance or inability to discern new truths, 
the second reinforces an undeclared conviction that mainstream society 
may not wish to discover earlier alternative histories for fear that they 
may undermine or potentially ‘erase’ their own. 
Such easy dismissal of the very earliest Asian contributions prior to the 
Chinese goldrush, is further reflected in the state reporting of minorities 
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200 See McLeod (1986), Ng (1993-1999, 2003), Ip (2003), Leckie (2007) and McCarthy (2009). 
201 It should be noted that while McLeod’s (1986:51) reference to ‘Black Peter,’ who he states was 
“the first [Indian] to achieve public notice,” is his earliest known individual, as his history of Indian 
presence only begins circa 1890. 
in such official documents as the national census. As early Asian 
sojourners are markedly absent from such histories,202 their appearance is 
insufficiently recognised in official documentation. While not totally 
absent, pre-1860s Asian presence in New Zealand is certainly difficult to 
discern. While newer ethnic histories are becoming increasingly 
accessible,203 the earliest accounts still remain concealed. Much of this can 
be unmasked, however, through the seeking of alternative sources—the 
examination of ships’ logs from early European voyages of exploitation, 
and in the diaries of, for example, the sojourners, missionaries, and 
naturalists that were present in, and deliver documentation of, the earliest 
days of Aotearoan exploration and settlement.204 It is, however, 
unfortunate that we have few surviving logs, records or diaries that can 
be directly attributed to our earliest Asian sojourners.205 We are, 
regrettably, forced to shape our understanding of their presence through 
the only means available to us—the eyes of those Europeans that 
accompanied them on the initial journeys of exploration and exploitation. 
While once removed, they nevertheless give us some insight as to how 
early tauiwi may have lived, and provide record of encounters for which 
we have no other extant sources. It is through such passages that glimpses 
of a proto-Indo-Kiwi identity emerge. 
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202 See Murphy (2003, 2009) for a discussion of Chinese exclusion. 
203 See Ip (2003), Leckie (2007), Bandyopadhyay (2010), Edmond et al. (2011), Voci & Leckie (2011), 
Pio (2012), Spoonley & Bedford (2012), and Ghosh & Leckie (2015).
204 Oral sources, too, have been exceptionally important in revealing family histories (see Budhia 
1979; Leckie 1981, 2007; McDonald 1982; McLeod 1984; McLeod & Buller 1992; Patel 1995; 
Thuraisundaram 1997; Reid & Heke 1999; Bernau 2005, 2006; Winder 2007; Catlin-Maybury 2008; 
Pio 2005, 2007b, 2008; Chhiba 2007; Leckie & Patel 2011; Bola 2014), but oral sources for the earliest 
Indian arrivals are, unfortunately, becoming increasingly inaccessible as the keepers of such lore are 
either exceptionally aged or have since passed away. As a result, it is unlikely that new oral 
histories of the earliest Asian presence in Aotearoa will be revealed. 
205 Regarding the Chinese, Ng states (2003:7) “the vital documents missing in New Zealand are 
those written by the Cantonese themselves. Due to their poor literacy, their written recollections in 
Chinese must be scarce and none have been discovered so far. In English there are only two known 
Chinese accounts: one was written by Ho A Mee, who assisted the migration of Cantonese 
goldseekers to Otago in 1866 and 1871, and the other by Wong Young Wha, who co-authored a 
narrative of the Round Hill goldfield near Riverton.”
Let us first consider the passage mentioned above from Cruise’s 1820 
journal. Cruise’s account, of an encounter with an Indian male in 1820, 
describes him as “quite a New Zealander in his dress and habits, his 
diminutive person and dark complexion made him appear to great 
disadvantage among the handsome and athletic people among whom he 
had settled” (Cruise 1824:315). His brief description serves multiple 
purposes. It provides us with knowledge of a historically important event 
by recording the encounter, which appears as an insignificant footnote in 
an appendix to his journal. Cruise at once describes the subject as being 
both a ‘New Zealander’ (i.e. of this land, or as being similar to Māori with 
which he is compared and with whom he has lived for the previous 
decade) while simultaneously distancing this prototypical Indian male as 
distinct from Māori (i.e. being smaller in stature and as having darker 
skin). Cruise also upholds the colonial ideal of the noble savage by 
describing Māori as “handsome and athletic” while denigrating the 
Indian as “disadvantaged” by comparison. This may be a reflection of the 
low regard the British had for Indians in India during the Rāj, and of 
Indian lascars serving on British ships; in both instances Indians were 
subordinate to their colonisers. Cruise’s colonial attitude towards the 
Indian he encountered is clearly evident in his remark, and encapsulates 
the attitudes Europeans had towards their subjects. More importantly, this 
position of superiority is reflected in the subsequent ways in which British 
colonisers approached the earliest official enumeration and record 
keeping of non-European populations—by treating them as invisible, or 
by lumping them all into homogenous categories that tended to conceal 
their identity.206 Cruise, in stating that this Indian male “married a woman 
of the tribe subject to Tekokee, whom he considered his chief,” 
demonstrates how easily such a ‘brown-skinned’ individual could 
disappear amongst Māori. This may be the reason why so many early 
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206 Discussed in Chapter Six. 
Indian sojourners to Aotearoa (and there were many more than the 
Bengali reported by Cruise) may have gone unenumerated by census 
officials in the early census years. The few that did end up living in Māori 
settlements and having children were likewise uncounted, as Māori were 
excluded from national censuses, and enumerated separately until the 
1951 Census, in which both European and Māori populations appear for 
the first time in a combined national census (Statistics New Zealand 
2013).207
What is important is the sense of individual and collective identity, of 
both early Māori and other ethnic minorities present in Aotearoa during 
initial contact, that was dismissed by European colonisers. Such colonial 
views lumped all non-Europeans into categories that homogenized 
internal distinctiveness and ‘othered’ dissimilar ethnicities. Within this 
context, Māori were seen as either a means through which resource 
exploitation could be maximised, or as group(s) needing to be either 
missionised, civilised or both. This ‘othering’ occurred in the case of 
Asians too, through European references to the pejorative terms Hindoos 
or Chinamen, ostensibly similar to the European use of the Maoris to refer 
to those of indigenous origin.208 By contextualising encounters in this way, 
it is easy to see how early notice of Asian sojourns to Aotearoa remained 
largely unrecorded. 
Missing is a deeper understanding of how early sojourners, such as 
Cruise’s prototypical Indian, saw themselves. While they may have 
suppressed their innate identities to better conform to circumstance, they 
would, nevertheless, still have a sense of their own Indianness, while 
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207 In the early years of European settlement, Māori census taking came under the authority of the 
Native Secretary, and from 1874 separate European and Māori censuses were undertaken in the 
same year (Statistics New Zealand 2013).
208 See Ip & Leckie (2011). 
remaining absorbed in surroundings dominated by Europeans, as upon 
the ships on which they served, or under the protection of whānau or hapū 
with whom they lived. This ‘sense of self’ is not so dissimilar from that 
experienced by many contemporary minorities, in that both iterations 
may seek to retain fundamental elements of self while likely striving to 
integrate into the larger majorities within which they are embedded; 
recognising that not all minorities may share such endeavour. By 
examining such issues today, we may more readily be able to discern the 
similarities between qualities that may have existed then and may 
continue to exist now, such as the presence of feelings of inadequacy (e.g. 
a minority absorbed into a larger majority; having to suppress one’s 
indigenous language, culture or religion in favour of the language, culture 
or spirituality of the majority), or the experience of particular anxieties 
(e.g. the fear of crossing the kālāpāni, the angst of not finding suitable 
employment, the distress of experiencing discrimination, the 
apprehension over the potential loss of cultural transmission to one’s 
progeny). Such intrinsic similarities and differences between an 
archetypal Indian identity and its more modern interpretation provide 
access to a deeper appreciation of the identities of the earliest Indian 
sojourners to Aotearoa. 
Since identity has become such a critical field of inquiry it may be possible 
to contextualise it as a historical construct—to theorise its existence and 
speculate on its composition—but there’s no certain way to know if any 
such assessment is accurate. A lascar serving aboard a European ship may 
have formulated a subaltern identity based on attributes of subservience 
and compliance, but would have probably ascribed qualities of 
ethnocultural identity, and may have aligned additional characteristics of 
adventure and exploration, to his own perception of self. A ship-jumper 
would, of necessity, be forced to take on certain attributes of those with 
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whom he settled (e.g. Māori, missionaries), and this would have impacted 
the nature of his own shifting identity and the need for ‘belonging’ as an 
outsider. What is crucially important here is the realisation that such an 
identity even existed, as historians have traditionally little considered 
subaltern identity as a field of inquiry until recently.209 As an example, 
Ghosh’s Ibis trilogy (2009, 2012, 2015) has skillfully animated historic 
lascar subaltern identity and imbued it with a sense of realism. 
In examining the earliest stories of Indian encounters with both European 
and Māori, any historical misconception that there were only a handful of 
known Indians prior to the 1860s is rectified, and their presence affirmed 
with the very earliest Europeans. There were hundreds of nameless and 
unknown South Asians who accompanied Europeans on the earliest 
voyages of exploration and exploitation to Aotearoa and the Southern 
Oceans. Such a reexamination would thus revise existing scholarship on 
the history of the Indian diaspora here, and alter the majority narrative 
that characterises tauiwi arrival and settlement. The following section also 
aims to connect these early events to the emergence of an Indo-Kiwi 
identity that is grounded in an awareness of historical events, recognised 
by majority society, and accentuated by a contemporary understanding of 
the significance of maintaining one’s ethnocultural identity—an important 
step in moving towards a deeper discourse of minority recognition. 
5.4 Early Indian presence and identity, 1769-1820 
Although it is commonly thought that Europeans were the sole post-Māori 
settlers, few realise that small groups of Indians and Chinese were 
amongst the first non-Polynesian peoples to arrive in Aotearoa. The first 
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209 Critical theorists and postcolonial scholars have only in the last few decades identified such lines 
of inquiry. See Gramsci’s (1971) work on cultural hegemony, and Said (1979), Guha (1982-1989), 
Spivak (1988), Bhabha (1994), and Hall (2007). 
known record of Māori-European encounter was the visit of Dutchman 
Abel Tasman in December 1642. Although Tasman never came ashore, 
four members of his crew were lost in a watery skirmish after an initial 
misreading of first contact at Taitapu.210 One hundred twenty seven years 
would pass before the next known European visits to Aotearoa by Surville 
in 1769-1770 and Cook in 1769-1770, 1773-1774, and 1777.211 These initial 
visits were followed by numerous subsequent voyages by Europeans in 
the late 1700s, all well documented (Tapp 1958; Beaglehole 1968, 1969; 
Dunmore 1981, 2012; Salmond 1991, 1997; Richards 2010). 
After Tasman’s 1642 voyage, Māori-European encounter next occurred 
when Cook and his crew went ashore at Tūranganui212 between 6-11 
October 1769, marking the very first known European landing and 
presence ashore, followed by subsequent encounters during Cook’s first 
voyage on the Endeavour, through 31 March 1770 (Beaglehole 1968, 
Salmond 1991). Twenty-three years later, European sealers who were 
dropped off at Tamatea213 in 1792 (with the uncertainty of a ship’s return 
many months later) are considered the first European ‘residents’ (Grant 
2012), having spent months ashore and providing for themselves while 
awaiting passage on a returning ship. Seamen on the earliest European 
voyages are recorded as having gone ashore, and these excursions mark 
the very beginning of tauiwi presence. Most of the vessels of European 
exploration in the South Pacific were of the British East India Company, 
traveling from India on their way to deliver convicts and supplies to the 
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210 Taitapu is now known as Golden Bay, in the northeastern corner of the South Island. 
211 By extraordinary coincidence, both Surville and Cook passed within thirty miles of each other on 
16 December 1769 as a gale blew Surville up the west coast and around North Cape, while Cook, in 
the Endeavour, was being blown up the east coast around North Cape. The storm had made it 
impossible for the two ships to sight each other as they nearly crossed paths (see Beaglehole 1968, 
Dunmore 1981:42, Salmond 1991:317).
212 Now known as Poverty Bay, near Gisborne on the east coast of the North Island. 
213 Now known as Dusky Sound in Fiordland, on the southeast coast of the South Island.
recently established convict settlements at Botany Bay in Australia and 
Norfolk Island. The British East India Company had played a key role in 
bringing Europeans to Aotearoan shores, with regular sailings between 
India and Port Jackson, Australia. The French India Company, engaged in 
a commercial war with the British for power and control of the east, was 
also pursuing its interests in the South Pacific. Indian sojourners arriving 
on these trips were the first documented South Asians to set foot on New 
Zealand soil.
The story of their sojourns to Aotearoa begins in 1769, with the sailing of 
the French ship Saint Jean-Baptiste, under the command of its captain, Jean 
François Marie de Surville. Surville had been in India looking for trade 
opportunities between French colonies in India and China. Dunmore 
(2012:35) records that Surville set sail from the French colony of 
Pondicherry, India on 2 June 1769 on a voyage of combined exploration 
and trade to the central Pacific. He arrived off the coast of Hokianga214 on 
12 Dec 1769, and looking for suitable anchorage, set off around North 
Cape, eventually stopping for two weeks in Doubtless Bay215 between 
18-31 December. As Surville’s crew was suffering severely from the effects 
of scurvy, he had taken them ashore multiple times to collect water and 
greens that helped restore the crew’s health (Dunmore 1969, 1981, 2012). 
Dunmore’s translation (1981:273-287) of the ship’s Muster Roll of the crew 
reports a total of 53 Indian lascars from a crew of 232 souls, making up 
22.8% of the entire crew.216 Some of the lascars are named in the original 
Roll, and some of their deaths recorded. The first lascar of mention is the 
206
214 Off the northwestern coast of the North Island, south of Ninety Mile Beach.
215 On the eastern side of the northern tip of the North Island.
216 These are recorded as: 3 Indian warrant officers, 47 Indian sailors, and 3 other Indians. 
unnamed serang217 who is recorded as having died at sea, although the 
date is unknown. The second is recorded as “Taudel [?]” (Dunmore 
1981:283), although I suspect that this refers to the serang’s assistant:
The serang aboard ship was assisted by one or more subordinate petty officers: 
tindals (tandail or tandel ‘‘the head of a tanda or body of men’,’ ‘‘a gang boss’’). 
Ship serangs and tindals received higher wages from ship-owners and also 
customary fees from their lascars (Fisher 2006:24).218
‘Taudel’ is recorded as dying at sea on 29 October 1769. The third Indian 
warrant officer is recorded as ‘Kasap,’ a deck supervisor and lamp 
attendant, dying at sea on 10 November 1769. Of the remaining 50 lascars, 
the Muster Roll records three as dying in October, with all but three dying 
in November 1769, just prior to reaching Aotearoan waters in December 
1769. Of the remaining three lascars, one is recorded as the chaplain’s 
servant, a Bengali named ‘Nicolas’ who died of scurvy on 29 November 
1769. Of the total 53 lascars aboard the Saint Jean-Baptiste, it would appear 
that only two survived to reach Aotearoa. The first is recorded as 
‘Mamouth Cassem,’ whose real name was probably Mahmud Qāsim, born 
in Pondicherry about 1755. The second is listed as a Bengali named 
‘Nasrin’219 aged about 16-17 years on the Muster Roll (Dunmore 1981:287). 
Given their names, it can be assumed that both were Muslims. Both are 
recorded as dying in Peru on 14 April 1770, where the ship sailed after 
leaving Aotearoa. Given their recorded survival of the Aotearoan 
excursion, we can be certain that these men would have gone ashore along 
with the other sick crew members of the Saint Jean-Baptiste during their 
two week stay in Aotearoa between 12-31 December 1769 and their 
subsequent departure for South America. While numerous log entries 
attest to the crew’s excursions on land, none of the landing parties are 
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217 Serang is the term given to the chief lascar, or boatswain’s mate (Fisher 2006). It was considered 
his job to provide for the Indian crew, keep them in line, and to be responsible for their actions. 
218 see also Balachandran (1996:206–236).
219 ‘Nasreen’ would be a closer approximation of this Bengali lascar’s name. 
named, although it is known that Surville was quite concerned for their 
health and took sick crewmen ashore for short periods of time during their 
stay.
Sickness and death which appear indistinguishable among our crew have caused 
me to reflect seriously, to see if I could not find a solution more certain than that 
of following the course, planned from the start, which I am now keeping, and go, 
if I can, to New Zealand, and seek there a place of refuge where we can rest 
awhile. After considering the position, I believe that anything we could attempt 
elsewhere would be far less certain than this New Zealand suggestion, and that, 
anyhow, we have no alternative in the state in which we are (Surville’s log entry 
of 23rd November, translated by Dunmire 1981:126). 
Both Surville’s, and his second Guillaume Labé’s, journals record daily 
entries between 18-31 December in which sick crew members were taken 
ashore for fresh air, water and greens to help combat the ill effects of 
scurvy, from which the crew greatly suffered (Dunmore 1981). Since 
arriving,
…our crew has been attacked by scurvy. Only 7 or 8 men are fit. I hope that this 
call will restore them by staying a whole month and putting them ashore. If not, 
we would be in a nasty situation (Labé’s log, 18 December 1769, translated by 
Dunmore 1981:245). 
Both Surville’s and Labé’s log entries discuss the daily excursions ashore 
for the sick to recuperate, and collect fresh water and greens. Although it 
is not recorded which sailors went ashore on which days, it is apparent 
from both logs that the sick were rotated, giving those ill a chance for rest 
and recovery ashore for the day, returning to the ship by nightfall. 
This morning I landed with two boats, one manned like yesterday, and carry 10 
empty barrels with axes and 6 wood cutters, the other carrying only sick cases 
[crew]…I then had the sick landed who walked about without wandering away 
(Surville’s log, 19 December 1769, translated by Dunmore 1981:142). 
The small amount of land air breathed by the sick is doing them immense good 
(Surville’s log, 21 December 1769, translated by Dunmore 1981:144).
At 6:30 this morning I landed with the usual preparations, the sick, etc. It is 
surprising how effective the air of this land and the cress and the wild celery we 
find here has been. The very next day after they first had some they already felt 
better (Surville’s log, 24 December 1769, translated by Dunmore 1981:147).
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Although the landing parties were unable to spend nights ashore, it is 
clear that the landings were of immense value to the infirm, and would 
have enabled the only two remaining lascars to survive to sail for South 
America where they both died on 14 April 1770 in Peru (Dunmore 
1981:287). 
Dunmore (1981:44) records an account of the Saint Jean-Baptiste’s attempt 
to land after sighting the South American coast on 4 April 1770. Having 
endured a horrific trip across the Pacific,220 and desperate to reach land 
and Spanish help to aid their recovery, Captain Surville and a small party 
attempted to cross a treacherous bar to reach landing. 
Labé tried to cross the bar on a boat, but turned back. The captain himself then 
tried, dressed in full uniform with his Cross of St Louis and his sword so as to 
impress the local Spanish and overcome any reluctance on their part to assist 
foreign sailors. He wrote a message for help, which he enclosed in a bottle, tying 
it around the neck of a Pondicherry lascar who was a strong swimmer. The 
Indian managed to struggle ashore, but the boat capsized by the bar. Surville, 
weighed down by his clothing, was drowned, together with two sailors who had 
accompanied him to man the boat (Dunmore 1981:44). 
The Pondicherry Indian would have been the same Mahmud Qāsim 
mentioned in the Saint Jean-Baptiste’s Muster Roll. He died 10 days later 
with the Bengali lascar Nasreen, but the manner of their deaths is 
unknown. While it is impossible to confirm without doubt that Qāsim and 
Nasreen came ashore with the other sick crew members in 1769, the mere 
fact of their survival as the only two lascars attests to the fact that they 
must have been included in the sick crew’s visits ashore, and recuperated 
sufficiently to continue their journey to Peru. As both Surville’s and Labé’s 
logs suggest that all sick crewmen were brought ashore at one time or 
another, it is most probable that Qāsim and Nasreen are the first South 
Asians to set foot in Aotearoa. 
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220 This excursion was known to have been the first European journey across the Pacific from west 
to east in these latitudes (Dunmore 1981:44). 
Cook’s initial voyage to Aotearoa on the Endeavour, sailing from Plymouth, 
England in August 1768, was unlikely to have lascars aboard. Those 
aboard the Endeavour were known to be caucasian. However, Cooks’ 
naturalist Banks was known to have had two black servants in attendance 
on this voyage (McNab 1914b:481, Beaglehole 1968:589-600, Salmond 
1991:107, Wilson 2003:174, Wilkes 2008:81). Ollivier & Hingley (1987:83) 
also mention two ‘black’ slaves from Malagasy and Malabar, one a 
Moorish lascar and the second a Malabar servant, as dying of scurvy in 
Aotearoan waters during Surville’s 1769 visit.
The next European ship to visit was the voyage of Marion du Fresne to the 
Bay of Islands between April and July 1772. Although the Muster Rolls of 
those departing on the two ships of this expedition, the Mascarin and the 
Marquis de Castries, are known (Kelly 1951:18-19), only the officers aboard 
are named while the crew is unknown. As the ships departed from the 
French colony in Mauritius, and called in at Cape Town, South Africa 
before reaching Aotearoa’s west coat at Taranaki, it is unlikely that lascars 
were aboard. Although a shore station was established to help the sick 
recuperate from scurvy221 and to repair their ships (Kelly 1951:29), there is 
no mention of an Indian crew. Having built four small straw huts and 
remaining ashore for several days (Salmond 1991:382), and establishing 
repair camps at various anchorages during the four month stay, these 
camps might be regarded as the first known residence of Europeans in 
Aotearoa. Du Fresne had four black slaves accompany him on this 
journey,222 and these would be amongst the first known Africans in 
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221 Salmond (1991:393) mentions that at one point during their stay in the Bay of Islands, “sixty 
scurvy-ridden men…who could barely walk” were ashore in a hospital tent set up for the 
rehabilitation of sick crew members. 
222 Salmond (1991:382) records one black male from Mauritius, and an additional three black 
women purchased during their earlier visit to Fort Dauphin, the first French settlement in 
Madagascar. 
Aotearoa.223 Kelly (1951:89) records that all four had endeavoured to run 
away from the French, one of the three women was killed with the others 
later returning to the ship. This incident with the black slaves, the tales of 
encounter that ensued, and the accounts of du Fresne’s death, are well 
known and recorded in both European accounts (Crozet 1891, Kelly 1951, 
Le Dez in Ollivier 1985) and in local tribal oral history (Salmond 1991:382). 
No lascars are known to have been aboard Cook’s second expedition to 
Aotearoa on the Resolution, which he commanded, and the Adventure, 
captained by Furneaux, which sailed from England on 13 July 1772. 
Cook’s third expedition on the Resolution, accompanied by the Discovery, 
left Plymouth, England on 12 July 1776224 and reached Aotearoa in 
February 1777. As with Cook’s second expedition, it is unlikely that any 
Indian crew were aboard either ship. Cook’s voyages were considered to 
be largely exploratory and scientific in nature,225 and British engagement 
in the South Pacific only began in earnest as it subsequently solidified its 
trade interests in India and China in the years following Cook’s visits. 
The story of British engagement and lascar involvement in Aotearoa 
begins in 1783, when one of James Cook’s former companions, James 
Maria Matra, had first suggested establishing a permanent British 
settlement in New Zealand in order to supply settlers in New South Wales 
with valuable flax and timber (Tapp 1958:3). At the time, British East India 
211
223 Bolster (1990) presents evidence of American black slaves on early American sealing and 
whaling ships between 1800-1860. As American vessels were known to ply the Southern Oceans, 
and numerous American visits recorded to Aotearoa, it is possible that these ships employed sailors 
of African ethnicity. 
224 On the day of their sailing, the Plymouth harbour was filled with ships and troops preparing for 
war with the American colonists (Salmond 1997:118). 
225 Cook’s instructions were largely those of exploration, to look for the fabled southern continent, 
and scientific, notably to record the transit of Venus from the South Pacific so that the earth’s 
diameter and distance from the sun could be more accurately determined (Salmond 1991:98, Howe 
2008:15-16). 
Company ships were plying the waters between England, South Africa, 
India, Port Jackson, Australia and China. 
Chartered in 1600, the Company was run by a wealthy oligarchy that controlled 
its own army and marine forces, fighting Indian rulers as well as European 
rivals. It held a monopoly over British trade and navigation between the Cape of 
Good Hope and Cape Horn, using fleets of chartered ships crewed by Indian 
sailors, marines and black slaves as well as by Europeans. East Indiamen crossed 
the Atlantic, Indian and western Pacific Oceans in search for profitable cargoes…
When British penal colonies were established at Port Jackson and Norfolk Island, 
East India Company ships were chartered as convict transports and supply 
ships, carrying cattle, rice, dhal, sugar, salted meats and woven cotton to Port 
Jackson and Norfolk, and New Zealand became a handy place to pick up 
homeward cargoes (Salmond 1997:235).
The first named Indian on British ships plying these routes would be the 
Indian Muslim convict named ‘Zimran Wriam,’ who sailed on the Atlantic 
in 1791 on his way to the convict settlement in Port Jackson, Australia 
(Akbarzadeh & Saeed 2001:14). 
In November 1792, John Thomson wrote to Henry Dundas, the British 
Secretary of State at Botany Bay, also suggesting that a British colony be 
established in New Zealand. Thompson first suggested that a colonising 
party from British India consisting of “fifty sober men; one hundred 
sepoys, & 100 convicts” might be sent to New Zealand along with military 
supplies and stores necessary for one year. According to Thompson, the 
people in India were, he thought, “just in that state of civilization proper 
to be made useful” (Salmond 1997:234-235). Many of the ships that plied 
the route between India and Australia during the years 1794-1801, what 
Salmond calls “the timber voyages” (1997:234),226 were crewed by Indian 
lascars and sepoys.227 These ships most often plied the waters between 
India and China, and often detoured to colonies in Australia and New 
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226 See Albion (1965) for a discussion of the difficulties Britain faced during these years in its 
insatiable thirst to acquire timber and spars to repairs damaged ships. Britain was also engaged in 
war with France during this period, and Salmond (1997:237) notes that the Royal Navy was starved 
for timber to help its war effort.
227 Like the word lascar, sepoy is also derived from the Persian, یھاپس (sipāhi), and has come to 
mean soldier in both Hindi (dv_matra15dv_matra+dv_matra) and Urdu (یھاپس). It entered the English lexicon during the 
British Rāj as sepoy. 
Zealand. There are a number of records in ships’ logs and passenger 
manifests documenting Indian crews and landfall in New Zealand, with a 
few records stating that some jumped ship while transiting and stayed, 
and other records recounting landfall and work ashore (Furber 1970, 
Salmond 1997:235, Leckie 2007:21, Kolig 2010:22). 
One of the first of the timber voyages to be recorded making landfall in 
Aotearoa was the Fancy, commanded by Edgar Thomas Dell, who was 
charged with the task of delivering provisions from India to Port Jackson, 
Australia, and procuring the necessary timber and spars to deliver back to 
India, which were desperately needed to repair British ships. The Fancy, 
along with an unknown number of Indian lascars and sepoys, departed 
Mumbai in May 1794, arriving in Port Jackson two months later. After 
delivering its cargo, the Fancy set sail on 29 September 1794. Dell, having 
first stopped at Norfolk Island on his way to Aotearoa, arrived in 
November 1794 at Tokerau. The search for suitable timber led Dell to take 
the Fancy into the same waters that Cook had taken the Endeavour in 1769, 
inland along the Waihou River228 (Salmond 1997:238-251). Dell’s diary 
records:
At 4:00am on 23 November, the brig’s boats were lowered, and at ten o’clock 
[we] went off in the longboat accompanied by six Europeans, two Lascars and 
five Sepoys; and the third officer Alms was in the jolly boat with two Europeans 
and two Lascars, to take soundings of the river (Dell 1795, as reported by 
Salmond 1997:245).229
Dell’s account records Indian crew in nearly equal numbers as Europeans. 
It is only the second known European visit to the Waihou River after 
Cook’s initial shore party in 1769. Yet while both accounts are known, the 
fact that the second visit was accompanied by so many Indian sailors is 
not. 
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228 The Waihou is located near present day Thames in the Hauraki Gulf.
229 Dell’s original journals form part of the Colonial Office correspondence between London and 
Port Jackson, held in the Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, in Sydney. 
Dell recounts his visit ashore, numerous encounters with Māori, and the 
procurement of the necessary timber to transport back to India. Another 
log entry from 3 December 1794 records that “Denniston and Alms went 
with the carpenter, the sawyer, six Lascars and two Sepoys in the longboat 
to begin felling trees” (Dell 1795 in Salmond 1997:248). A third log entry 
dated 5 December records that Dell took “a party of nine Europeans, a 
Sepoy and four Lascars up the river, where they cut down two tall trees, 
and four more at another place where trees had already been felled” (Dell 
1795 in Salmond 1997:249-250). These three references in Dell’s journal are 
the first confirmed record of Indians ashore in New Zealand, although 
lascars serving on Surville’s 1769 visit are presumed to have gone ashore. 
Regarding British visits, Angus reported that a total of “seven vessels had 
arrived in Port Jackson before 1795 with timber from New Zealand” and it 
is likely that many of these would have been carrying Indian crew, and 
perhaps convicts, on their journeys between India and Port Jackson (Tapp 
1958:51).
The brief entries in Dell’s journal reflect his objectivity in recording events 
as they occurred, for they portray Indian lascars as hardworking members 
of a crew sent ashore to procure timber, no different from other members 
of the crew with which they served. In this sense, Indian identity at the 
time could be conceived as one of both industriousness and servitude, 
perhaps holding a key to the significance of the twin elements of identity 
and discrimination, central to the formation of a minority perception of 
self today. A keen desire to work and achieve (industriousness) coupled 
with a sense of subjugation (servitude) are strongly evident in early 
accounts of Indian lascars, due to the fact that this history was recorded by 
European ‘masters.’ More realistically, Ghosh, in his Ibis Trilogy (2009, 
2012, 2015), paints a portrait of lascars not as unidimensional servants, but 
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instead as actors with considerable agency, no doubt oppressed, but alive 
in spirit and action. Shared notions of colonialism figure strongly in the 
formation of individual and community identity, especially amongst 
minority communities (Said 1979, Naipaul 1989, Bhabha 1994, Sen 2006), 
evident in past accounts of early Indian sojourners. As prototypical events, 
best exemplified by the lascars on Surville’s 1769 and Dell’s 1794 visits, a 
modern Indo-Kiwi identity could perhaps reference these initial points of 
historical presence, and reflect upon the sense of industry (the desire to 
work) and servitude (subjugation by colonisation) that was experienced 
by early Indian sojourners. Early notions of servitude have since been 
replaced by postcolonial experiences of discrimination in which subjects 
no longer remain demure against authority, but one in which the colonial 
burden rests on the shoulders of European colonisers, as both the source 
of, and reason that, discrimination exists. Minorities, in this sense, are no 
longer seen by the majority as subjects, and the majority’s need to 
dominate has since been replaced by the perpetuation of discrimination. 
These archetypical identity patterns are evident in both Indian migrants of 
the second phase (characterised by the indenture of Indian workers on 
sugar cane plantations)230 and in modern economic migrations of today 
(characterised by voluntary migration, economic gain, and the search for a 
better quality of life), although they are not necessarily continuous or 
unchanging. Such patterns are periodically revealed in liberal democracies 
with a colonial past in the form of anti-immigrant diatribes, such as the 
2013 Invercargill taxi harangue,231 and other such examples of intolerance 
and bigotry towards minority communities. The existence of such 
regularly occurring incidents is a reflection of the inadequacy of shallow 
diversity management. 
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230 As earlier mentioned in Section 5.2 ‘Crossing the kālāpāni.’ This specifically refers to Indian 
indenture in the East Indies, Malaya, South and East Africa, the Seychelles, and Fiji (see Lal 2006a). 
231 Originally referred to in Section 2.1.
In addition to the timber voyages, ships were also outfitted for sealing232 
on which lascars served. Although Cook first visited Tamatea233 in 1773 on 
the Resolution, and his sailors are reported to have killed a number of seals 
for food, the first known sealing expeditions to the South Island were not 
organised until 1791-1793. Although there were earlier sealing visits to the 
Macquarie and Antipodes Islands (Richards 1994), the first known sealing 
ships to reach the two main Aotearoan islands, and the second European 
visit to Dusky Sound, were the Discovery, captained by George Vancouver, 
and Chatham, commanded by William Broughton, in November 1791 
(Salmond 1997:518), following charts described during Cooks’ visit 
eighteen years earlier. Since both ships sailed from England in April 1791, 
and the Muster Rolls for both vessels contain the names of only British 
sailors,234 it is unlikely that either had lascars aboard (Lamb 1984). 
Sealing began in earnest in October 1792 with the arrival of the Britannia235 
in Tamatea. The Britannia had earlier left England with the task of 
delivering convicts to the penal colony at Australia’s Botany Bay, 
subsequently sailing to Aotearoa to procure seal skins for the Chinese 
market. Under the command of William Raven, the Britannia had left 
behind a gang of 11 sealers. This was not an unusual practice as many 
sealing gangs were left ashore to exploit the rookeries until their ships 
returned (Richards 2010:165).236 When the Britannia did not return as 
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232 A sealer to the southern oceans, Jules Poret de Blosseville, noted in his diary “Besides providing 
excellent ports of call, New Zealand offers brilliant possibilities for the sealing trade. Fur seals are 
very numerous on her coasts and in her bays” (McNab 1907:211-228, Richards 2010:161). 
233 Dusky Sound in Fiordland, South Island. 
234 These can be viewed online at <memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mymhiwe:@field(DOCID
+@lit(mymhiwef897p9m4div13))>, last accessed 11 August 2014. 
235 The Britannia (ii) was a 300 ton whaler built in 1783 in England, and was wrecked off the New 
South Wales Coast in 1806 (Parsons 1967). 
236 It is possible that lascars were also a part of this landing party, although I cannot confirm this at 
this time.
scheduled, the sealing gang had abandoned hope and had begun 
constructing a schooner of about sixty tons, made entirely from New 
Zealand timber. This half constructed boat was left behind when the 
Britannia and Francis finally arrived, 10 months later, to pick up the sealing 
party in September 1793 (Richards 2010:174). As most of these ships also 
plied the waters between Port Jackson (Australia) and India, and stopped 
in Aotearoa to fetch sealskins, it is likely, though improbable, that lascars 
were aboard these ships.237
News of the partly-built boat that had been left behind by the Britannia 
party attracted the next visitors to Tamatea in September 1795, when two 
ships, the East Indiamen sealing supply ship Endeavour and the small brig 
Fancy, arrived to collect sealskins, oil and meat, all of which would have 
fetched profits in European and Chinese markets. This visit records “244 
people had arrived in the Sound, including European ex-convicts, 
escapees, deserters, passengers, officers and sailors,” and “also carried 
Lascars and Sepoys” and the extensive ship’s log records the movements 
of these men while on the coast sealing and cutting timber to repair their 
boats (McNab 1914a Vol. II:518-534, Salmond 1997:290, Richards 2010:174). 
The Endeavour made it into harbour after crossing the Tasman Sea in a 
raging storm, but it was badly damaged when it made it to Tamatea and 
had to be run ashore and left behind. This ship is the first Aotearoan 
shipwreck recorded by Europeans (Hutching 2011). Good timber that 
could be salvaged from the Endeavour was added to finish the construction 
of a new boat that was built from the half-constructed ship that the 
previous party had left behind. This newly constructed boat was named 
Providence (Richards 2010:174).238 In January 1796, after four months 
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237 Further research may reveal Indian presence in Aotearoa on these earliest sealing ships between 
1791-1793. 
238 Incidentally, the Providence was the first ship to be built entirely of New Zealand timber 
(Salmond 1997:292).
‘settlement’ sealing and building boats, the Fancy and the Providence set 
sail for Norfolk Island. Not all of the original crews from the Endeavour 
and Fancy were allowed to board, and about thirty-five men, including 
several Indian seamen, were forced to stay behind, “their dependance for 
provisions being chiefly on the seals and birds which they might 
kill” (Collins 1798 Vol. II:460, cited in Richards 2010:174).239 Upon arrival 
of the two ships in Norfolk Island, supplies were loaded and “several 
Lascars and Portuguese seaman, and forty-eight half-starved passengers” 
were put ashore before carrying on to China to sell their cargo (Collins 
1798 Vol. I:460-41, McNab 1914a Vol. II:553; Salmond 1997:292, Richards 
2010:174). An American boat, the Mercury, was later dispatched to 
Fiordland in 1797 to rescue the castaways, picking up “thirty-five half-
starved survivors, finally landing them in Norfolk after a stay of more 
than eighteen months on their own in the Sound (Collins 1798 Vol II:48-49, 
Salmond 1997:294, Richards 2010:175). Sealing did not last very long in 
Aotearoa as the rookeries were soon depleted and the value of the 
procured skins had diminished. Richards (2010:183) records the startling 
brevity of the sealing heyday which had collapsed by 1809. This helped 
focus the attention of European merchant ships back to the lucrative 
timber trade. 
These tales tell of the hardships experienced by the very earliest of the 
sealing gangs left behind in Fiordland between the years 1791-1797. While 
it is commonly believed that these parties consisted of only Europeans, it 
is evident from the above, that Indian lascars were also present, and not 
only served as sailors aboard the vessels that plied these waters, but 
worked ashore as an integral part of the sealing and boat-building crews. 
While I have been unable to confirm earlier Indian presence on the 
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239 This pathetic company of castaways, which included Indian lascars, was in effect the second 
sealing gang to be ‘stationed’ in New Zealand (Richards 2010:175).
1791-1793 sealing visits, it is clear that lascars were present in Tamatea 
between 1795-1797. While these accounts may be found in numerous 
sources, the presence of Indian lascars with Europeans on the very earliest 
voyages of exploration in 1769, and on subsequent sealing and timber 
ships to Aotearoa, is only recorded in historical footnotes. We can be 
certain, however, that Indian sailors were here at the beginning, aboard 
vessels of European explorations and exploitation, and that they are 
equally entitled to claim their place in the history of the exploration and 
settlement of New Zealand. 
What we have instead is a dominant discourse of a sequence of events that 
begins with Māori arrival and settlement, followed by European arrival 
and colonisation, which is later followed by Pacific and Asian migration 
and settlement, with New Zealand moving from a bicultural state to a 
multicultural state since the immigration reforms of 1987. This discourse is 
misinformed and largely a result of European control of historical 
narrative. Aotearoa, from the very earliest appearances of Europeans ashore, 
was markedly multiethnic in nature. Some of the accounts above suggest 
that Indian lascars aboard early European sealing and timber vessels were 
more numerous than I have suggested, and in some instances, may have 
outnumbered their European crew. Crews on these early merchant vessels 
may have contained sizable populations of Indian lascars. British retelling 
of events often reported and named only British officers that served on 
board or went ashore. There are numerous references to named British 
officers going ashore for retrieving timber or seals, and any accompanying 
Indians, if documented, were only mentioned in passing, along with a 
record of their number. As unnamed participants, they remain invisible, 
and hence absent from the earliest history of European exploration, 
exploitation and settlement in Aotearoa. 
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Overcoming historical colonial attitudes is vital in the recognition of the 
significance of both minority and national identity for today’s minority 
communities. Acknowledging Asian presence at the very founding of the 
modern state, along with recognising earliest Asian participation in nation 
building, must be an integral part of any redress offered by majorities to 
minorities. Such an act would be seen as similar to government apologies 
and settlements offered to Māori under the Waitangi Tribunal for previous 
injustice. Rectifying Asian history in New Zealand is, therefore, not a big 
ask, but one that would be a vital first step to establishing a deep diversity 
framework in New Zealand. 
Reaffirming such narratives can also provide genuine sources of minority 
self-esteem and a catalyst for restoring lost self-respect in the wake of 
colonial hegemony. That an Indian minority in today’s New Zealand can, 
and should, claim an integral part in the history of nation building would 
help fortify and invigorate a shared national identity, allowing Asian 
populations to claim, along with Māori and European, a share of New 
Zealand’s history. Kelman (1997a, 1997b) states that failure to adequately 
recognise ethnocultural contributions to a shared national identity 
promotes the destruction of human dignity and that a reconceptualisation 
of national identity needs to take place for social justice and reconciliation 
between parties. While this process is currently underway with Māori 
through reconciliation of the Waitangi Tribunal, it is not complete, and 
acknowledging past injustices towards other non-Māori minorities has 
barely begun. The Crown, for instance, during Helen Clark’s 
administration, formally apologised on 12 February 2002 to Chinese New 
Zealanders whose ancestors had paid the Poll Tax that was imposed on 
Chinese immigrants during the 19th and early 20th centuries. (Clark 2001, 
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2002; Hawkins 2002).240 There have been no subsequent Crown apologies 
for other injustices that minority communities may have suffered. While 
Kelman (1997a, 1997b) maintains that reconceptualising national identity 
to include ethnic minorities, and developing new norms for their 
accommodation, would aid minority inclusion in a shared national 
identity, no such attempts by the majority have been achieved. Majority 
recognition of early Asian presence and participation has the potential to 
enhance minority participation in society and reinvigorate minority 
identity through a sense of pride and accomplishment. This could be 
achieved through formal state recognition of the importance of historic 
minority contributions to the founding of the nation, a more equitable 
allocation of resources for social uplift, integration and settlement support, 
and recognition of current minority political and economic contributions 
to society. Such recognition could be demonstrated either thru formal 
apologies for past injustice or other appropriate forms of redress that are 
mutually acceptable to both parties. This could include enhanced state 
initiatives designed for majorities to mitigate the perpetuation of racism 
and discrimination, rather than the marginalisation that is often 
experienced by minorities today.241 Formal minority recognition by the 
crown, however, in and of itself, can not mitigate racism, as best evidenced 
by Māori through the continued occurrence of discrimination and 
marginalisation, despite formal recognition and redress. This is why deep 
diversity emphasises majority contributions towards social cohesion. 
Much of the existing historical narrative of Asian sojourn to Aotearoa 
doesn’t end in 1797, and there are additional anecdotes of early Indian 
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240 Under this system, every Chinese person entering New Zealand was required by law to pay a 
£10 tax, and only one Chinese immigrant for every 10 tons of cargo was allowed entry. This was 
increased in 1896 to £100 per head, with only one Chinese immigrant allowed for every 200 tons of 
cargo. The Poll Tax was effectively lifted in the 1930s following the invasion of China by Japan, and 
was finally repealed in 1944 (Office of Ethnic Affairs 2012). 
241 See Zubrzycki (1976), Banducci et al. (2004). 
presence to recount that are poorly known or only briefly mentioned by 
the handful of historians of the Indian diaspora in New Zealand. Existing 
historical narratives for the Indian population begin about 1809-1810, with 
the Bengali who jumped ship, and the first known appearance of Chinese 
presence is in 1842 Nelson. Mention of an earlier Asian presence is a 
passing observation, e.g. “The first contacts between Indians and Maori 
occurred when British East India Company ships, crewed by Lascars and 
carrying sepoys, landed in New Zealand during the late eighteenth 
century” (Leckie 2006:21),242 along with Ip’s reference that “The 
relationship between Chinese and Māori is traced from the earliest 
encounters in the mid-nineteenth century” (Ip 2009:1). Such 
documentation has lain dormant as most of the earliest sojourners were 
unnamed, lacking identity.243 Unacknowledged historic Asian sojourners 
remain faceless much in the way that today’s minorities lack appropriate 
representation. Remaining either unidentified as historical actors or poorly 
represented as contemporary players can be interpreted or construed as 
being without identity. In recounting such histories, minorities are better 
able to reclaim and participate in a shared national identity, while 
majorities must become familiar with, and take responsibility for, 
embracing new historical narratives. 
As sealing in the Southern Ocean was in decline during the early years of 
the nineteenth century, the focus of European merchants returned to the 
timber trade. There were four subsequent visits, not previously 
mentioned, by European ships to the northeast to collect timber in the 
years since the 1794 sailing of the Fancy. These occurred between the years 
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242 Even Leckie’s statement shows preference for “British,” as opposed to ‘European,’ ships, as we 
now know that first Indian appearance in Aotearoa occurred during the French India Company’s 
visit in December 1769. She does, however, in her later work (Leckie 2007), refer to Salmond’s (1991, 
1997) mention of lascar presence aboard European ships. 
243 Although we now have names and religious identities to attach to the very first Indians in 
Aotearoa. 
1798-1800244 and some of these may have had Indian lascars aboard.245 
Confirmation of lascar presence reemerges in the 1801 crew manifest of the 
Royal Admiral, on its way from London to China via Port Jackson, which 
sailed into the Hauraki Gulf on 20 April 1801 “heavily armed and manned 
by a crew of eighty-three European sailors and fifteen lascars” to obtain 
timber to sell in China. The crew manifest of Captain William Wilson, 
(cited in Salmond 1997:256), gives lengthy accounts of more crewman 
going ashore to collect timber. From these and other accounts it is clear 
that numerous ships entered the Hauraki Gulf and the Waihou River in 
search of timber for spars and the lucrative markets in China. Although 
not always recorded in the ships’ logs, most of these ships would have 
been carrying lascars and, undoubtedly, many of these would have gone 
ashore with the ships’ officers to help fell timber and transport it back to 
the ship. After the arrival of the Royal Admiral in March 1801, there are 
over fifty European vessels recorded reaching northeastern Aotearoa246 
between 1801-1809, when the Bengali lascar who ‘jumped ship’ first 
appears. 
As the presumptive ‘first Indian’ on New Zealand soil (Bandyopadhyay 
2006:125) it is important to recount the incident and embed it within its 
broader historical context. Although hundreds of South Asians may have 
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244 These would be the voyages of 1) the Cornwall under Captain William Swain in August 1798, 2) 
the voyage of the Hunter i Captained by James Fearn in August 1798, 3) the visit by the Hunter ii 
under Captain William Hingston, 4) the voyage of the Betsey i with Captain Glasse (Salmond 
1997:525). 
245 Of these four visits between 1798-1800, not much is known. The Cornwall left Port Jackson to go 
whaling in New Zealand. The Hunter i, collected timber in the Hauraki and then continued to 
China. This ship is recorded as sailing for Campbell and Co. of Calcutta, so it is likely that Indian 
lascars were aboard on the outward bound journey from Calcutta to Port Jackson. It is not known if 
any lascars were aboard, although it is likely. The Hunter ii, under the command of Captain William 
Hingston, is known to have sailed from Port Jackson in October 1799 to the River Thames in 
Hauraki to collect timber, and then on to Calcutta to deliver timber for ship building there. Four 
crew members are known to have jumped ship and stayed behind with Māori at Waihou. This ship 
is recorded as arriving in Calcutta in 1800. The Betsey i sailed from London to Port Jackson, then 
spent three days in the Hauraki collecting timber before continuing on to Peru. It is not known if 
any lascars were aboard (see Salmond 1997:525). 
246 See Salmond (1997:525-530).
left footprints prior to this event, it nonetheless remains significant as the 
first well-documented symbol of Indian presence. Entwistle (2005:103-106) 
records an Indian of Bengali descent deserting the ship City of Edinburgh in 
1809 in the Bay of Islands to live with his Māori wife. Salmond 
(1997:373-377) records in great detail the visit of this ship to the Bay of 
Islands March-May 1809, having departed Port Jackson in January. 
Captain Alexander Berry, a Scottish-born merchant and explorer, sailed for 
the British East India Company (Berry 1912:1, Perry 1966).247 His memoirs 
record his October 1806 trip to India to engage in trade which proved 
profitable (Berry 1912:3). In 1809, Berry sailed from Australia to New 
Zealand with the intent to repatriate two Ngāti Manu chiefs to the Bay of 
Islands, and the hope of procuring much needed timber for spars (Perry 
1966, Swords 1978, Salmond 1997:373, Macdonald 2005).248 While under 
the protection of the two Māori chiefs in the Bay of Islands, Berry (1912) 
records an accompanying Bengali servant (Salmond 1997:375). It is certain 
that this servant is the same one recorded as deserting ship to marry and 
settle with a Māori women (Entwistle 2005:103-106, Swarbrick 2012). 
While certainly not the first record of Indian presence, this Bengali is 
evidently the first known reference to prolonged Indian settlement rather 
than one left ashore with a sealing crew or landing for a few nights to 
procure timber. While encounters between sealing gangs and local Māori 
on the South Island are recorded, and there are numerous instances of 
European and Indian encounters with local Māori on the North Island, 
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247 Berry was one of the more successful merchants and had enjoyed the respect of the colonials and 
administrators in Port Jackson based on his reputation for honesty and fair dealing (Macdonald 
2005:11). 
248 Perry (1966) records that the City of Edinburgh then set sail for Fiji for sandalwood, and returned 
to New Zealand in October 1809 to procure more timber and to rescue the survivors of the 
infamous massacre of the Boyd, a fascinating tale (Berry 1810, 1819, 1912; Swords 1978; Salmond 
1997:368-394; Macdonald 2005). The ship later left the Bay of Islands in January 1810 and sailed 
across the Pacific to South America. On this voyage the City of Edinburgh lost her rudder, and 
limped into Valparaiso, Chile and then on to Lima, Peru, where she was repaired. Berry sold his 
timber profitably while in South America, and continued his journey, eventually reaching London 
again in late 1812, and eventually settling in Sydney, Australia in 1819 (Perry 1966, Salmond 
1997:386-387).
this record is perhaps the earliest known that describes Indian settlement 
with local Māori, and hence it becomes significant as a first recorded 
instance of Māori-Indian intermarriage and potential offspring.249 
This event is noteworthy as a foundational symbol of Indian identity in 
New Zealand. If the first Māori-Indian encounters were documented, no 
records exist save those sieved through European filters. Only written 
records of Māori-Pākehā encounter exist, written from a European 
perspective, and Māori oral history has also passed on such engagements. 
There are neither oral nor written records of early Māori-Indian encounter 
except those recorded by Europeans, and what little there is lacks detail. 
One can only guess what the earliest Indians experienced as they dealt 
with European and Māori. Perhaps some of the earliest Indian sojourners 
felt drawn towards the indigenous experience as either a remedy for 
hardships encountered while serving aboard European vessels, or as an 
expression of affinity with distinctly Māori ways of being. The very act of 
jumping ship would be one of flight from subjugation to freedom, filled 
with the security of Māori guardianship and the protection of Tekokee, 
whom Cruise (1824:315) identifies as the chief of the tribe within which 
the Bengali settled. Perhaps this is what may have led him to jump ship 
and settle amongst Māori. 
The visit of the City of Edinburgh in 1809 is also noteworthy for it records 
the presence of an Indian-Portuguese servant, and both a Chinese 
blacksmith and a Chinese carpenter aboard ship (Salmond 1997:379), 
which dates Chinese presence in Aotearoa much earlier than the currently 
believed 1842.250 Ships that plied the routes between Europe and its 
colonies not only carried Indian seamen, but others of Asian and African 
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249 There is now a large and thriving Indo-Māori community, which is the subject of an Office of 
Ethnic Affairs publication (Pio 2012).
250 See Ng (1993). 
ancestry as well. Since many of these sailed for the British East India 
Company and often made China a port of call for trade, small numbers of 
Chinese would also have served aboard European vessels. 
There are further reports of Indians on ships plying these routes in the 
early 1800s, all of which brought Indians into closer contact with Māori 
and helped forge early Indo-Māori identity. McNab (1907:184-185) records 
the 1812 visit to Macquarie Island251 of the ship Campbell Macquarie, which 
was built and registered at Calcutta. Under the command of Richard 
Siddons, while searching for new sealing sites south of New Zealand, the 
Campbell Macquarie ran aground on Macquarie Island on 10th June 1812 
and was destroyed. 
Her crew of 12 Europeans and 30 lascars were all got ashore. She had nearly 
three suits of sails, and when the weather cleared up the crew succeeded in 
getting these ashore, where they were stored in a hut, which was afterwards 
accidentally destroyed by fire. All her stores were lost, independently of which 
she had on board 2,000 prime skins, 36 tons of salt, and 118 tons of coal taken in 
lieu of ballast. Captain Siddons, Mr. Kelly, chief mate, and the crew remained 
ashore from 10th June to 11th October, when they were taken off by the 
Perseverance and given passages to Sydney, where they arrived on 30th October at 
Broken Bay. While on the island four of the lascars died, also a seaman of the 
Mary and Sally named Thomas McGowen (McNab 1907:185-186). 
This incident is noteworthy in that its British crew were considerably 
outnumbered by Indians. It records four unknown lascars who perished 
on the island. It is ironic that while the names of the Europeans are well 
documented and recorded, early mariner historians did not deem the 
reportage of the names of the Indian sailors necessary, giving some 
indication of British regard for the lascars. Their historic invisibility is 
palpable given that this is another recorded incident that tells of the death 
of Indian crew in the Southern Oceans, not unlike those aboard Surville’s 
1769 visit on the St Jean Baptiste. This incident chronicles a tale of extreme 
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251 Macquarie Island lies in the southwest corner of the Pacific Ocean, about half-way between New 
Zealand and Antarctica. Politically, it has been a part of Tasmania, Australia since 1900. The 
Australian-Briton Frederick Hasselborough discovered the uninhabited island accidentally on 11 
July 1810 when looking for new sealing grounds. He claimed Macquarie Island for Britain and 
annexed it to the colony of New South Wales in 1810 (Scott 1993:14).
hardship and perseverance by early Indian sojourners, thus substantiating 
their resilience and corroborating their endurance for exploration and 
their will to survive. Such events are worthy of recognition and 
remembrance and are essential to the evolution of an Indo-Kiwi identity. 
Further incidents of Indo-Māori engagement are crucial to this 
development. Otakou252 was also visited by occasional ships in the years 
after Cook’s voyages, most probably searching for seal rookeries. One 
such visit involving lascars was that of Captain Fowler and the Matilda in 
August 1813 (McNab 1907:216, Salmond 1997:524). He had entered Otago 
Bay “in some trepidation since his crew of lascars were emaciated by 
fatigue, being for a length of time without vegetables or fresh provisions 
and with only a few gallons of water left” (Richards 2010:193). Fowler 
reports being favourably treated by local Māori, but also recalls an 
incident in which he lost 
14 of his men on the coast of New Zealand, together with three of his boats. One 
was stolen by the natives, another was carried off by six of his crew of lascars. 
The third was sent with his chief officer (Brown), two Europeans and five lascars,  
all of whom are supposed to have foundered as no tidings were got of either boat 
or crew (Carrick 1903:172, McNab 1907:115, Richards 2010:192). 
Both Entwistle (2005:103-106) and Leckie (2006:389, 2007:21) record this 
anecdote in which six Indian sailors deserted the Matilda, making off with 
one of its boats.
Three were reportedly killed by Maori but three survived, probably settling near 
Whareakeake in Otago until 1823. This means they were some of the earliest 
long-term non-Maori residers of the Dunedin area. During this time, they 
assisted Ngai Tahu with strategies for attacking European ships (Leckie 2007:21, 
as cited in Bishop Selwyn’s notes in an appendix in Basil Howard 1940:379). 
These passages are noteworthy for they record the first instance of the 
theft of British property by Indian sailors.253 While their European crew 
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252 Otakou is the name for an early Māori settlement on the Otago Peninsula, South Island, near 
present day Dunedin. 
253 While the 1916 Census (page 146) records the first official incident in which an Indian male is 
“under legal detention,” it is obviously not the first. 
may have labeled them deserters and sent others for their capture (those 
sent to retrieve both the boat and the ‘thieves’ also never returned), it is 
possible that the Indians, desiring a change of scenery, left with whatever 
means they had at their disposal. Leckie (2007:21) notes that three of the 
six Indians were reportedly killed by Māori. McNab offers an alternative 
and contradictory account:
Later on evidence was discovered of the fate of the men. De Blosseville 
ascertained in Sydney, in 1823, that of the six lascars in the second boat, three 
were killed by the natives and the others were kept alive and taught the natives 
how to dive and cut the ship’s cables during the night and how to reduce the 
efficiency of firearms by attacking in wet weather. Mr. Kelly was told by one of 
the surviving lascars of the Matilda that Mr. Brown, with six men, had been 
killed and eaten by the natives (McNab 1907:217). 
History may never fully ascertain the veracity of Selwyn’s or De 
Blosseville’s statements regarding the fate of those the Matilda left behind. 
It is evident, however, that some survived, and those that did aided local 
Māori in managing European presence in Otakou. Living under Māori 
kaitiakitanga254 may have been what the Indian ‘thieves’ had intended. 
In recounting these events, it is possible to perceive an instance of identity 
conflict amongst early Indians in Aotearoa. While some may have jumped 
ship preferring to live amongst Māori rather than European, Carrick 
(1903:172), McNab (1907:115) and Richards (2010:192) record that “two 
Europeans and five lascars” were sent, in the charge of the European 
Officer Brown, after the ‘thieves’ to retrieve them and the boat they had 
taken. What might these five lascars have thought? Were they to betray 
their deserting shipmates? And what of the three Europeans? While the 
eight in the ‘retrieval party’ never returned to their ship, one can only 
speculate on what identity conflicts may have occurred amongst the five 
lascars sent to return their compatriots. At best, these anecdotes are useful 
for revealing other possible explanations; namely, that alternative 
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254 Guardianship.
interpretations of historical events, as recorded by Europeans, are indeed 
plausible if we are to question existing historical evidence. Other 
unconventional readings from contrasting points of view should be 
equally considered, especially when minorities are involved and the only 
surviving accounts are European. Identity, therefore, becomes critical as a 
means through which historical evidence is queried. 
History records subsequent events regarding the fate of those that did not 
return to the Matilda in late 1813. A subsequent sealing visit a few years 
later reveals what happened to the third boat and the members of the 
‘retrieval party.’ Some of the Indians that did not return exchanged goods 
or passed on valuable new technologies and skills to local Māori. 
They taught the natives the manner of attacking the Europeans during the heavy 
rains when their guns could not be used, and also how to dive in order to cut the 
cables of the vessels during the night (Richards 2010:193). 
One survivor, said to be from Surat, spoke English and Maori, and was given the 
name Te Anu. He took the moko and was noted by Bishop Selwyn to be living 
with his Maori wife and son at Potirepo (Port William) on Rakiura (Stewart 
Island) in 1844 (Leckie 2007:21, as cited in Bishop Selwyn’s notes in an appendix 
in Howard 1940:379). 
One lascar became a tattooed ‘pakeha Maori’, fully integrated into this adopted 
tribe, and was still living among them thirty years later when the Rev. Johann 
Wohlers and Bishop Selwyn visited Stewart Island in 1844 and 1851 (Beattie 
1919:221, Selwyn in Howard 1940:379). 
The use of the term “Pākehā-Māori”255 to describe an Indian who lived 
amongst, and had taken on the customs of, local Māori is curious. Perhaps 
Europeans at the time could only explain events through reference to their 
own experience.256 By contemporary standards, however, those with 
Asian ancestry do not consider themselves Pākehā, and it is odd that 
Europeans of the time did. As colonialism dictated an ‘othering’ of their 
subjects why would a European refer to an Indian using the same term 
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255 For more on the subject of Pākehā-Māori, see Bentley (1999). 
256 Referring to Asian minorities as ‘European’ is a common occurrence in the early New Zealand 
censuses, as discussed in Chapter Six, as there were no categories in use at the time to classify them. 
that Māori had used to describe them? The most plausible explanation is 
that Pākehā referred to ‘non-Māori’ at the time. Nonetheless, has been 
interpreted today by both Māori and Europeans as referring specifically to 
those of European descent.257 This passage is pivotal as it reintroduces the 
genesis of a particularly Indo-Māori identity, one seen previously with the 
Bengali who jumped ship in the Bay of Islands. Such beginnings are 
noteworthy historical tidbits in the establishment of such an identity. 
Indians were not the only ones to have ‘jumped ship,’ as Europeans also 
did so. Both had settled amongst Māori, but it is not known whether they 
had lived in the same villages. What is known is that Indians had settled 
and intermarried into hapū at the earliest stage of European presence, 
events not well recognised today. Why, then, is the early history of Māori-
Pākehā intermarriage so well known258 while the parallel history of Indo-
Māori union remains virtually invisible?259 
A “Pākehā-Māori” Indian versed in European ways would have been 
exceptionally useful to Māori for facilitating trade, passing on unknown 
skills and technologies, and explaining foreign attitudes. Richards 
(2010:195) records several Indian sailors living at Port Daniel260 with 
Otakou Māori from 1814, but offers no further insights into their condition 
or fate. Pybus records that Port Daniel was visited by occasional stray 
sealing ships and recounts the same tale of the Matilda in 1813, but also 
offers an alternative interpretation of a possible reason why Māori may 
have killed some of the Indian sailors. 
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257 Moorfield (2011) describes Pākehā as meaning English, foreign, or European, also as a New 
Zealander of European descent. 
258 See Harré (1966), Anderson (1991b), Bentley (1999), Grimshaw (2002), Wanhalla (2008). Thorp 
(2003:2) states: “Englishmen were reported to be living among the Maori as early as 1801, and by 
the early 1830s the term ‘Pakeha Maori’ had been coined to describe them.” 
259 The only known published work in this field to date has been Edwina Pio’s Caste away? 
Unfolding the Māori Indian (2012).
260 In Otago Harbour. 
Captain Fowler was obliged to take shelter and refit his ship which was much 
damaged due to violent storms. He was well received by the Maori people and 
their chief, whom they called Papui, proved himself a very hospitable host. The 
ship’s rigging was repaired with ropes made by the natives, and the ship’s stores 
were replenished with fish, potatoes and fresh water. At the next place of call the 
Matilda met with disaster. In the south, probably Port Molyneux, some of the 
crew deserted, and quite a few were murdered by the Maoris, no doubt due to 
their having broken the law of tapu. One of the crew, a lascar, was found four 
years later living at Otakou (Pybus 1954:59). 
This surviving Indian is fairly well recorded in the ship’s log of Captain 
James Kelly of the Sophia. 
Mr. Kelly made the chief of the village a small present of iron, and proceeded to 
his dwelling to barter for potatoes, leaving one man to look after the boat. On 
reaching the house of the chief Mr. Kelly was saluted by a Lascar, who told him 
that he had been left there by the brig Matilda, Captain Fowler. During a long 
conversation Mr. Kelly inquired after a boat’s crew that was said to have been 
lost near Port Daniel, and learned that Brown, who had charge of the boat, with 
six men, had been killed and eaten by the natives. The Lascar then offered his 
services in bartering for potatoes for the vessel, and appeared familiar with the 
native tongue (McNab 1907:226). 
At once the captain made friends with the Maori people and all seemed to be 
favourable. Next day, with a few sailors he proceeded outside the heads to 
Whareakeake, now known as Murdering Beach, where he traded with the people 
for potatoes. He found the people unfriendly, and a lascar, formerly of the 
Matilda, who was living with the natives, tried to warn the visitors of their 
danger (Pybus 1954:59). 
The day after arrival he rowed with six men to a small native village outside the 
harbour heads, at a spot still called Murdering Beach. Landing there, he began to 
bargain with the Maori for a supply of potatoes. A Lascar sailor, who was living 
with the savages, acted as interpreter. The natives thronged round the seamen. 
Suddenly there was a yell, and they rushed upon the whites, of whom two were 
killed at once. Kelly, cutting his way through with a bill-hook he had in his hand, 
reached the boat and pushed out from the beach. Looking back, he saw one of his 
men (his brother-in-law, Tucker) struggling with the mob. The unhappy man had 
but time to cry, “Captain Kelly, for God's sake don’t leave me!” when he was 
knocked down in the surf, and hacked to death. Another seaman was reeling in 
the boat desperately wounded. Kelly himself was speared through one hand 
(Reeves 1898:96). 
These incidents portray the “Pākehā-Māori” Indian first as an interpreter, 
but also as one who may have been concerned for the Europeans’ welfare 
by warning of imminent danger. By 1817, this particular Indian had been 
fully immersed in a Māori environment, yet this incident displays similar 
qualities as the 1813 desertion of the Matilda: does he side with his Māori 
guardians or help the Europeans, who were in a desperate situation? It is 
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not possible to answer, but it is known that the Indian survived and 
eventually made his way to Rakiura261 where he is next found by Bishop 
Selwyn in 1844 and 1851 (Beattie 1919:221, Selwyn in Howard 1940:379). 
There are further isolated incidents of Indians being left behind. McNab 
(1914a:202) records that four lascars were left under the charge of the 
missionaries at the Bay of Islands in 1814, while the Europeans amongst 
them proceeded in the Active to Tahiti. After the Sophia incident in 1817, 
there are few detailed accounts of Indian sailors ashore. However, there 
are literally hundreds of newspaper accounts that record the comings and 
goings of ships in the various ports and settlements from the early 1800s 
onwards. Newspapers, like the Sydney Gazette, regularly reported the 
movements of European vessels along with their ports of call, including 
destinations, cargo and passenger lists. Accounts of crew movement were 
likewise considered important news. Many of these describe the numbers 
of Indian sailors arriving or departing, with names withheld, and little is 
known of their activities. They remain invisible. 
The first Indian to achieve notoriety was an Anglo-Indian from Goa who 
arrived in 1853, having previously worked the California gold fields. 
Edward Peters, later known as “Black Peter,” was a farm labourer and 
gold prospector. Although the Australian Gabriel Read is credited with 
discovering gold at Tuapeka in Otago, it was Peters who told him where 
to find it (McLintock 1966a:820, 1966b:55; Leckie 1981:190, 2007:21, 
2010:48, 2011:54; McLeod 1986:51; Dwyer 1990; Swarbrick 2012), leading to 
the first workable gold claim at Glenore, Otago (Ip & Leckie 2011:162). His 
gold prospecting in central Otago brought about the goldrush upon which 
much of Otago’s wealth was built, but Peters received very little attention 
(Leckie 1998:163). Instead, historians focused on honouring the European 
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261 Stewart Island.
Read as the discoverer of Otago gold (Leckie 1998:163, Ip & Leckie 
2011:162). Peters later died as a resident of Dunedin’s Benevolent 
Institution in 1893 (Leckie 2007:21, Williams 2009, Ip & Leckie 2011:162).262
Figure 5.1: Edward Peters, aka ‘Black Peter’ (Otago Daily Times, 6 Nov. 1990.)263
Of note, however, is the fact that a named 
Indian, one that history records as the 
discoverer of gold in Otago, has remained 
virtually invisible,264 obscured by a 
European history dedicated to retelling its 
revisionist colonial tale. Through peopling 
the historical record with what European 
versions of history have expunged, a 
contrasting narrative emerges. Reinserting 
Asian presence into an overwhelmingly 
European history has produced a more thorough, and inclusive, 
account.265 
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262 What little is known of Peters comes predominantly from a few main sources (Mayhew 1949, 
McLeod 1986:51, Dwyer 1990, Williams 2009). 
263 The original photo is referenced as “Edward Peters. Ref: 1/2-008040-F. Alexander Turnbull 
Library, Wellington, New Zealand, available at <http://natlib.govt.nz/records/22869763>, copyright 
not required.
264 As an example, Te Ara, the official online encyclopedia of New Zealand, states that “Otago’s first 
gold rush was in 1861, after Gabriel Read found gold in what would be called Gabriel’s Gully. 
Thousands of diggers, later including men from China, went there to make their fortune” (Walrond 
2012). Of Peters, Walrond writes “On 23 May 1861 Gabriel Read gained esteem and provincial 
government bonuses when he found gold. He also saw his name given to the locality of the find, 
Gabriel’s Gully, near Lawrence. Another character, Edward Peters, had found gold earlier than 
Read in the same area, but he had not proven that the deposits were extensive enough to be 
economically worked. Eventually he was awarded a smaller bonus” (Walrond 2012:3). Even though 
Peters had discovered the gold at Otago, the European, Read, was the one to remain historically 
visible, while Peters is relegated to a historical footnote. 
265 The first step towards rewriting this historical inaccuracy was the publishing of William’s (2009) 
book, and the recent erecting of an interpretive monument to Edward Peter’s discovery of gold in 
Otago (Phillips 2009). 
As the advent of the goldrush coincides with the first visible Indian in 
Aotearoa to be named (McLeod 1986:51),266 and details of his doings can 
be found in the historical record,267 this period marks the end of this early 
narrative as it transitions from a period of early sojourner to that of the 
more visible early Indian settler. The history of Indian settlement that 
follows is exceptionally well documented by Leckie (1998, 2006, 2007, 
2011) and others.268 As many historians and researchers269 cite the period 
that coincides with the Otago goldrush as the beginning of Asian 
migration to New Zealand, I shall end the retelling here. 
Presently, new histories emerge that illuminate Asian presence and 
participation in nation building. While these histories have only recently 
been retold,270 they stretch back only so far, and rarely do they reach first 
instances of Māori-European encounter. Shifting the goalposts demands 
not only a critical rethink of how collective histories are interrogated, but 
a thorough lens-cleansing through which such events are viewed and 
interpreted. A retelling of historical anecdotes may contribute to a 
renewed sense of identity for all minority communities in a contemporary 
New Zealand. Bringing earlier accounts to light, within a context of 
increasing minority assertion, can only facilitate a more fulfilling 
appreciation of how deeply diverse New Zealand has become. 
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266 As earlier described, Selwyn (see Howard 1940 and Leckie 2010:48) mentions the Indian who 
settled in Otago with a Māori tribe, took moko and was renamed Te Anu. As his Indian name is lost 
to history, his region of birth in India and his religion will also remain obscure. 
267 see McLintock (1966a, 1966b) and Williams (2009).
268 See McGee (1960, 1962, 1993), McLeod (1980, 1984, 1986), Tiwari (1980), Zodgekar (1980, 2010), 
McLeod & Bhullar (19920, Kolig (2010) and Ip & Leckie (2011). 
269 See Graham (1992:116), Ng (2003:7), Ip (2003:xi, 2009), Ip & Pang (2005:175-176), Ward & Lin 
(2005:156), Ip & Leckie (2011:161) and Harnett (2013).
270 see Ng (1993-1999), Ip (2003b, 2009), and Leckie (2007).
CHAPTER SIX: 
INDIAN SETTLEMENT AND 
THE NEW ZEALAND CENSUS, 1851-2001
It is important to note the paradoxical nature of the census: it presents a portrait of the 
whole nation and yet it does so by emphasizing the discrete units and different identities 
that make up (or do not make up) the whole. There is tension in its objectives, and there is 
tension in the power of its effects. The power of classifying and counting can be 
aspirational, harnessed for inclusion and recognition, and it can be disciplinary, applied in 
ways that exclude and erase (Mezey 2003:1713). 
Identity is a fundamental organising principle in the enactment of power, in the 
mobilisation for and the allocation of resources, and a critical marker of inclusion and 
exclusion in social organisation (Liu et al. 2005b:15).
It is possible that, by 2050, today’s racial and ethnic categories will no longer be in use 
(Migration News 2004). 
6.1 Introduction and theoretical considerations
The previous chapter revealed that accounts of early Asian presence have 
been largely ignored by currently accepted histories, reconfiguring the 
date of earliest known Indian presence in Aotearoa from 1809 
(Bandyopadhyay 2006:125, Leckie 2007) back to 1769 and earliest known 
Chinese presence from 1842 (Ng 1993) to 1809. The implementation of 
census enumeration is symbolic as it marks the move from Indian presence 
to Indian settlement, as initial instances of domicile appear. Yet, like 
historical accounts of early presence, census records obscured early Asian 
settlement. This chapter looks first at the theoretical drivers behind census 
classification in New Zealand, relating these to the similar experiences of 
the US,271 and second, reveals earlier evidence of Indians in the census 
then previously known, as notations were often relegated to insignificant 
footnotes or concealed in ambiguous census categories that obfuscated 
their tabulation. Examining these categories provides insight into early 
state reportage of Asian presence in New Zealand, as much of what is 
presented is as much relevant for early Chinese settlement as it is for 
Indian. 
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271 These would be similar for other settler societies, like Australia, the UK and Canada. 
While early censuses record Indian ethnicity, these are not as readily 
accessible as the historical anecdotes presented earlier. Early censuses 
constructed a past in which minorities are thoroughly absent, reaffirming 
a predominantly colonial narrative. A review of early New Zealand 
censuses also reveals how enumeration has changed, and recent censuses, 
through steadily increasing numbers, demonstrate minority resurgence 
and empower emergent communities. Historical census inquiry also 
reflects European treatment of minority populations. This chapter reviews 
historical census records of Indian settlement272 from the first national 
census in 1851, picking up where the narrative from Chapter Five roughly 
ends, to 2001, demonstrating repeating patterns of state hegemony in the 
presentation of minority statistics. This sets the stage for a discussion of 
the 2006/2013 Census data in Chapter Seven and my survey results in 
Chapter Eight. 
Censuses have had substantial social ramifications and considerable 
policy implications, which have been, over the course of their history, 
fueled by discriminatory practices and the problems associated with 
ethnic classifications, and fanned by increasing waves of immigration.273 
These have lead to theoretical considerations supporting the emergence 
and increasing importance of identity and the “growing strength of 
national and ethnic loyalties” (Kertzer & Arel 2002a:1), which have 
allowed minorities to more assiduously assert themselves politically, over 
the course of census history. While such assertion may have intensified 
rising ethnic nationalist movements in some countries, this is not the case 
in New Zealand, where increasing minority identification on the census 
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272 This includes, by extension, Chinese settlement, as the two are inextricably linked as the most 
prominent non-Māori minorities with whom census enumerators at the time had to contend. 
273 See Brown (1984), Anderson (1988), Kertzer & Arel (2002a), Nobels (2002), Morning & Sabbagh 
(2005) and Kukutai (2011a). 
has generally resulted in increased recognition and greater socioeconomic 
and political representation. It is therefore paradoxical that census history, 
which began with overtly racist enumeration techniques, is, in New 
Zealand at least, currently represented in increasing minority 
participation; though this is not to say that greater assertion is a result of 
early discrimination, nor that such advances have solved all the problems 
brought about by European domination of the discourse, even though 
they may have eased somewhat. Such an understanding of minority 
advancement, however, theoretically frames and informs this chapter as 
minority treatment in the history of the New Zealand census is discussed 
below. 
This chapter divides the history of Indian presence in the New Zealand 
census into essentially three periods: 1) exclusion and minority invisibility 
in the 1851-1911 censuses; 2) biological determinism, maintaining racial 
purity, and consolidating minority reportage in the 1916-1981 censuses; 
and 3) minority inclusion and aspiration, demonstrated in the 1986-2013 
censuses in which larger minority groups begin to receive limited 
recognition, which gradually increases. A discussion of these periods (see 
Table 6.1) illuminates a primary objective of deep diversity, which 
highlights the importance of self-identification, and the historic invisibility 
and continued discrimination of minorities. All three census periods 
provide practical examples of shallow forms of diversity management and 
are analogous to similar historical and theoretical treatments of minority 
reportage in censuses both globally,274 and domestically.275 
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274 See M. Anderson (1990), Lee (1993), Bennett (2000), Kertzer & Arel (2002a), Nobels (2002), Mezey 
(2003), Tishkov (2005), Hochschild & Powell (2008) and Morning (2008) for similar treatments.
275 See Brown (1984), Callister (1996, 2004, 2006, 2007), Gould (2000), Ip & Pang (2005), Zodgekar 
(1980, 2010), Kukutai (2003, 2011), and Kukutai & Didham (2012) for discussions of the New 
Zealand situation. 
These three phases also reflect the difficulties of categorising race and 
ethnicity in censuses over time, and follow minority reportage from first 
phase exclusion to second phase biological determinism to third phase 
inclusion through identity affirmation. The first phase is exclusionary, 
where 
Table 6.1: Theoretical and historical periods evident in the New Zealand Census.
Census period: First Phase
1851-1911
Second Phase
1916-1981
Third Phase
1986-2013
Theoretical 
indicators:
Exclusion Biological 
determinism
Inclusion
Defining 
characteristics:
Minority invisibility, 
European 
domination, 
Assertion of racial 
supremacy, 
Exclusionary 
policies,
Inconsistency and 
error,
Earliest Indian 
presence first 
detected
Continued assertion 
of European 
domination & 
racial superiority, 
State consolidation & 
standardisation of 
minority reportage,
‘Race Aliens’ as a 
census category
Aspirational,
Affirmational, 
Minority political 
assertion,
Self-reported identity
Preoccupations: Keeping New 
Zealand white, 
maintaining racial 
purity;
Intolerance of 
minorities, 
Prejudice and 
bigotry
Keeping New 
Zealand white, 
maintaining racial 
purity; Prejudice;
Measuring blood 
quantum
Minority struggle for 
recognition, 
Tolerance,
Mitigating racism 
and discrimination
Minority 
treatment:
Māori exclusion, 
Minority invisibility, 
Identities imposed 
by enumerators
Referred to as ‘Race 
Aliens’
Māori finally 
included in 
national census in 
1951
Self-identification
Focus on ethnicity 
instead of race
Recognition of 
multiple 
ethnicities
Better minority 
access to state 
resources
racial and ethnic categories reflected the exclusionary policies and 
ideologies already at work. The second phase is characterised by the 
preoccupation with biological determinism and maintaining racial 
superiority and purity through the precise measurement of blood 
quantum. The third phase is predominantly aspirational, marked by 
238
increasing minority inclusion, and sees, borrowing Taylor’s (1994) phrase, 
the emergence of a ‘politics of recognition’ in which minorities are 
motivated by affirmational goals to receive greater access to state 
resources, and attain increasing political recognition. All three phases, 
however, represent shallow forms of diversity management. 
Government statisticians and politicians in predominantly white settler 
societies276 during the first census period were largely beholden to and 
responsible for the polity’s concern with keeping the nation ‘white’ and 
ethnically cleansed of ‘degrading’ influences. While legislation in settler 
societies made Asian migration difficult, if not largely impossible,277 
census enumerators went about the task of either categorising and 
assigning external ‘identities’ to minorities, or were instructed to explicitly 
exclude particular ethnic groups, such as Native American populations in 
the US who were excluded as ‘Indians, not taxed’278 (Bennett 2000, Mezey 
2003, Hochschild & Powell 2008), or Māori populations in New Zealand 
who were enumerated separately and excluded from national censuses for 
a hundred-year period that ended in 1951 (Kukutai 2011a:36, Statistics 
New Zealand 2013). In so doing, census enumerators, and the government 
departments or agencies that empowered them, imposed externally 
designated racial, ethnic, regional or national classifications that did not 
equate with how both individual members of minority populations or 
their larger collectives may have viewed themselves. Such categories serve 
to discipline and coerce individuals into groupings that align with a 
political or ideological agenda of the majority.279 As I will show, this 
imposition extended to other non-ethnic categories like religious 
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276 e.g. the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
277 See Murphy (2007) for historical legislation affecting Indian populations and Murphy (2008) for 
legislation affecting Chinese populations. Together, they offer an excellent and complete 
compendium of Asian exclusion via legislation and immigration law in New Zealand. 
278 This occurred in US decennial censuses beginning in 1790 and ended in the 1870 Census. 
279 See Foucault (1977).
affiliation and birthplace. Not only did majority political actors utilise and 
distribute such terms horizontally, they employed these classifications into 
vertical hierarchical schemes that privileged white Europeans280 above 
others, relegating non-Europeans to the bottom of the heap. This first 
phase of census enumeration also conceals non-European populations by 
either exclusion (e.g. Māori), or by inclusion, enumerating non-European 
non-Māori ethnicities as white Europeans, as no official category for such 
individuals existed. In some instances, discussed below, it is difficult to 
distinguish Chinese and Indian populations as ethnically distinct, as they 
were often classified in ‘European’ categories. Likewise, non-Christian 
religious affiliations are also clearly discriminatory, such as the use of 
‘heathens’ to refer to census respondents of non-Christian religions, 
documented below. Such enumeration strategies establish European 
hegemony and control over the racial discourse, and are not only 
indicative but emblematic of this first phase of census classification and 
categorisation. 
The second phase (1916-1981) is predominantly characterised by 
biological determinism281 and the preoccupation of maintaining racial 
purity. This period saw the reorganisation and recategorisation of 
particular racial or ethnic categories that were externally defined, to one 
preoccupied with racial superiority and the tracking of blood quantum in 
mixed-race populations. This belies a similar biological determinism 
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280 It is noteworthy, however, that even ‘white European’ was sometimes seen as an arbitrary 
classification. Thus some European immigrants faced early discrimination; e.g. the Kauri Gum 
Industry Act 1898, and the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 1920, were used to exclude 
non-British migrants (e.g. Dalmatians, Irish, Italians) from entering New Zealand, in addition to the 
restrictions placed on Asians (see Spoonley 2012, and the New Zealand government’s ‘New 
Zealand Legislation’ website at <www.legislation.co.nz> for sourcing specific historical 
immigration legislation).
281 Here, I refer to the discredited notion that most human characteristics are biologically 
determined at conception by hereditary factors, rather than socially constructed. Biological 
determinism implies a rigid causation largely unaffected by sociocultural and environmental 
factors, i.e. scientifically speaking, there is no such thing as ‘race.’ See Lewontin et al. (1984) and 
Lewontin (1991).
evident in the census histories of other settler societies.282 This phase is 
marked by an overzealous concern with miscegenation and maintaining 
racial purity, critical to maintaining existing social hierarchies based on 
race, while the third phase saw its demise.283 This period further solidified 
the reportage of ‘race’ and fixed ‘racial’ categories based solely on 
discernible physical qualities until the 1981 census, the last to require 
respondents to indicate their ‘ethnic origins’ (e.g. race) either in terms of 
‘full’ or ‘fractions’ of distinct ‘races.’284 During this period, categorisation 
was largely based on perceived race, rather than ethnicity, although the 
contemporary concept of ethnicity was only beginning to gain credence 
towards the end of this period.285 This period corresponded to the US 
fixation on the exact enumeration of mulattos, quadroons and 
octoroons,286 in attempts to measure racial fractions of ‘whiteness’ 
amongst the black population (Anderson 1990, Mezey 2003, Hochschild & 
Powell 2008). In New Zealand, this period was likewise characterised by 
the tracking of both full-blooded ‘race aliens’ and their mixed-race 
counterparts. These were enumerated in great detail in the census 
schedules 1867-1966, especially for European, Māori, Indian and Chinese. 
Although the 1970s saw large increases in Pasifika populations, this 
period is still very much dominated by majority discourse, until 
comprehensive changes in immigration legislation ushered in the next 
phase. 
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282 See, for example, Stephen Jay Gould’s The mismeasure of man (1996) for an account of early 
attempts to classify people according to observable physical features. 
283 The first appearance of the measurement of blood quantum is found in the 1896 Census (p. 47), 
which mentions ‘half-caste’ Chinese. This became established practice in the first phase and 
continued throughout the second phase, making its last appearance in the 1981 Census. Māori 
‘half-castes’ are first mentioned in Appendix B of the supplementary 1901 Census estimates. 
284 See Errington et al. (2008). 
285 For more on the origins of the modern concept of ethnicity, see, in particular, Barth (1969), 
Weber’s (1978) section ‘Ethnic Group’ (Volume One, Part Two, Section V), Cohen (1978), Stone 
(1995), Banton (2007), and Wimmer (2013).
286 In the US, the word ‘mulatto’ began appearing in the census in 1850, and became a permanent 
fixture  recording mulattos, quadroons and octoroons, during the Censuses of 1890 through 1920 
(Mezey 2003).
The third phase, from 1986 to the present, is marked by inclusion, and 
begins with large minority population gains that resulted from the change 
in immigration legislation instituted by the 1987 Immigration Act. The 
impact of new minority settlement that resulted from this legislation was 
first reported in the results from the 1991 Census and hence marked the 
beginning of a new phase focusing on minority growth and rapid 
demographic change. While the first phase focused on ‘race’ reportage 
and externally-observed physical characteristics, and the second on blood 
quantum, this period is marked by the self-awareness of one’s sense of 
belonging to particular groups based on sociocultural, linguistic or 
religious affiliations. As well as birthplace, the emphasis in this phase 
focused on self-reported identity as socially constructed and self-
discernible, as opposed to ideologically constructed, and imposed, in 
earlier periods. 
The reportage of multiple ethnicities by individual respondents was 
allowed for the first time during in the 1986 census.287 Given the historical 
bias for single race classification, the movement away from measures of 
racial fractions to the recognition of multiple ethnicities288 was indeed 
significant. This enabled more appropriate forms of identity expression, 
constricted in earlier phases, and recognised emerging ethnic associations 
that focused on one’s chosen identity(ies) rather than externally imposed 
racial identification. 
The third phase also reflects more sophisticated minority use of statistics 
as a political tool to further aspirational goals, resulting in a series of 
political actions aimed at increasing minority access to state resources and 
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287 By contrast, this ability was instituted for the first time in the US in its 2000 Census. 
288 This was accomplished by ticking various boxes for the ethnicity question. 
advocacy for greater minority recognition.289 In many western 
democracies today, state or federal laws often mandate particular policies 
pertaining to appropriate political representation, civil rights, the support 
for disadvantaged or marginalised minority groups, and the monitoring 
or enforcement of human rights protocols that implement anti-
discrimination measures. In this sense, affirmative action programmes 
targeting equal rights in a variety of sectors has dramatically helped 
minority populations overcome invisibility and achieve greater political 
recognition. 
This phase, and its more representative ethnic categories, especially those 
emerging since 1987 immigration reform, has allowed additional ethnic 
identities to emerge that had previously remained suppressed. Yet the 
particular ethnic identities that are available to tick on the census form, 
however aspirational, continue to conceal subgroup populations within 
larger groups. This is most evident in the Indian population that has 
numerous ethnic, regional, religious, caste, indigenous and linguistic 
affinities, as well as birth countries, that set them apart from both the 
‘Indian’ population (e.g. Gujarati, Malayali) and other ethnic minority 
groups in New Zealand (e.g. Chinese, Korean).290 Each of these subgroups 
is, in itself, a separate and distinct identity, with most Indians favouring 
regional or linguistic affiliations in addition to ‘Indian.’291 As subordinates 
amongst dominants, most Indians prefer to identify themselves as ‘Indian’ 
in New Zealand, as it is easily identifiable by majority populations and 
distinguishes them as distinct from other ethnicities. Furthermore, the 
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289 See M. Anderson (1990), B. Anderson (1991), and Lee (1993). See also Morning & Sabbagh (2005) 
for a discussion of how the census shifted from an exclusionary tool to one of political agency for 
blacks in the US. 
290 This is further discussed in Chapter 8, which presents select survey results of the Indian 
population. 
291 Sheth (1995:169-198) points out that Indian immigrants usually identify themselves with 
particular regional-linguistic subgroups, not with the Indian national origin group. 
claiming of the meta-ethnicity ‘Indian’ on the census reflects both an 
overarching identity and becomes the basis for cultural solidarity and 
political representation, i.e. it becomes strategically useful, even if it does 
gloss over regional, linguistic, cultural and religious differences. When 
amongst themselves, or in their country of origin, self-identification 
follows the particular ethnic, regional, linguistic, religious, caste 
affiliations or country of birth with which one most identifies, rather than 
as ‘Indian.’ 
6.2 Exclusion and minority invisibility, 1851-1911
This first census period is generally marked by the steady increase of 
European populations while Māori populations decline (Pool 1991, Belich 
2007). European growth during this period is largely attributed to 
colonisation and natural births, while Māori decline was due to increasing 
exposure to introduced diseases (with mortality reducing absolute 
numbers), while ‘swamping’ by Pākehā reduced their relative share of the 
total population. Māori exclusion from the national census is noteworthy, 
although there were early attempts at estimates and later enumerations 
that were conducted separately.292 Other minority populations, while 
inconsistently recorded, are largely invisible in 19th century censuses. 
While they begin to appear in census records during the middle of this 
period, their identities are often obscured as census enumerators 
struggled to classify minorities into existing categories due to their 
inadequate definition. 
Although Indian sojourners have been recorded entering and leaving 
Aotearoa since 1769, it wasn’t until the third national Census of 1861, that 
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292 The first attempt to count (rather than estimate) the total Māori population was a census of 
Māori taken over a year between 1857 and 1858 (Fenton 1859). 
their official enumeration began.293 Many of the Indians present in 
Aotearoa between 1769-1861 had either come for a brief period lasting 
days or months (i.e. the fleeting visits of Indian lascars on European ships, 
or the more prolonged stays of European sealing parties ashore), or while 
transiting on ships that plied the international trade routes between 
Europe, India, Australia and China. The majority of Indians present 
during these years would have been considered sojourners, not settlers. 
Although there were instances of Indians jumping ship, settling under 
Māori protection, marrying into hapū, and others who came to prospect 
for gold, only a few of these early sojourners and settlers were recorded in 
early New Zealand censuses. 
While the comings and goings of ships’ crews are well recorded in the 
arrival and departure records of main ports or in ship captain’s logs, it is 
unclear how many Indians may have arrived, however briefly, during the 
period 1769-1861.294 Old newspaper accounts of arrivals and departures of 
Indian lascars on transiting ships suggests the possibility that dozens of 
Indian sailors were domiciled in New Zealand before they begin to appear 
in the census. Since these are ‘newsworthy’ stories, many refer to 
extraordinary situations (e.g. lascars arriving in ports in emaciated states, 
ill treatment at the behest of European superiors, or having been left 
ashore in sealing parties) or anti-social behaviour, while others refer to 
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293 New Zealand’s first national population census took place in 1851, although smaller regional 
official enumeration goes as far back as 1842 (Statistics New Zealand 2013).
294 A cursory search of old New Zealand newspapers in a data base held by the National Library 
<paperspast.natlib.govt.nz> reveals 31 newspaper references to the search entry ‘lascar’ between the 
dates 1839 (the first year that the National Library holds records of digitized newspapers) and 1861 
(the Census year in which Indians first show up in the New Zealand Census). This does not mean 
that 31 Indians may have come and gone on ships during this period. It means only that the term 
“lascar” appears in a New Zealand newspaper during these years. It also does not mean that these 
references occurred in New Zealand, as quite often these recorded news from other ports (e.g. 
Sydney, Norfolk Island) in addition to New Zealand. However, many lascars would have transited 
through New Zealand on their way to and from these ports. A larger search of the entire database 
(from 1839 through 1945), reveals 3,927 references to ‘lascar.’ An analysis of this material is beyond 
this thesis’ purview. 
specific crimes committed by both Europeans and Indians, or lascars 
remanded to jail. 
This section discusses the earliest references to Indian ethnicities or 
religions in the 1851-1911 censuses. I have chosen to end this phase with 
the 1911 Census as censuses from 1916 had standardised ethnicity 
reporting, and the enumeration of Indian ‘ethnics’ were clearly and 
continually reported.295 The religious affiliation of census respondents has 
been recorded from the very first census and continues today. It is in these 
records that the very first references to those of Indian ethnicity appear. 
This is probably why other researchers, examining census records for 
those of Indian ethnicity, overlooked footnotes to religious affiliation 
tables and pegged Indian enumeration to later dates. 
Early censuses recorded predominantly European Christian adherents and 
great detail was paid to the particular denominations to which 
respondents belonged. Like practices in other national censuses based on 
race,296 early religious affiliation in New Zealand was described solely in 
terms of ‘Christian’ or ‘non-Christian’ dichotomies. The 1851 Census 
records the only non-Christians as ‘Jews,’297 along with those recorded as 
‘Non Sectarian, professing to belong to no Sect, or neglecting or refusing 
to state their adherence to any.’298 If ethnic Indians were enumerated in 
1851, they would have been included in this category. In that year, 97.8% 
of the population were recorded as ‘Christian,’ tabulated under entries 
denoting their particular denominations. 
246
295 I have summarised census findings on ethnicity and religious affiliation in Appendices A and B, 
which are referenced throughout this chapter. 
296 As in ‘white’ and ‘non-white.’
297 The 1851 Census records a total of 65 Jews in New Zealand, comprising 0.25% of the total 
population (excluding Māori).
298 Those recorded as Non-Sectarians in the Census of 1851 numbered 496, or 1.93% of the total 
population (excluding Māori).
The second national census of 1858 recorded similar categories of 
Christian denominations, although the category ‘Jews’ was changed to 
‘Hebrews,’299 and ‘Non-sectarians’ was categorised as ‘No Denomination 
or Not Described.’ This census also introduced the category ‘Other’ which 
is not further defined, although it is presumed to include those of other 
Christian sects or denominations that do not otherwise appear in the 
religious affiliation tables. If ethnic Indians were recorded in 1858, they 
would have been listed as ‘Others,’ which accounted for 1.6% of the 
population. In this year, ‘Christians’ represented 95.5% of the total 
population, ‘Hebrews’ 0.3%, and ‘No Denomination or Not Described’ 
comprised the remaining 2.6%. As with the first national census, only 
European populations appear to have been tabulated, although separate 
estimates of the Māori population were appended. 
In subsequent censuses the categorisation of religious affiliation grew 
more complex.300 The third national Census of 1861 is important to 
historians of religious diversity as it includes the first genuine tabulation 
of those with ‘Other’ religious persuasions, referring to non-Christian or 
non-Jewish Europeans. This census is significant301 as it records a total of 
fourteen ‘Hindoos,’302 four ‘Mahometans,’ and three ‘Buddhists’ in a 
footnote to the ‘Other’ category that appears in the original tables in the 
census documents (Figure 6.1). Although it is not clear if the ‘Hindoos’ or 
‘Mahometans’ recorded here are from India or whether they represent 
Europeans who recorded their affiliations as such, given the general anti-
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299 Jews continued to be recorded as Hebrews in the Censuses of 1858 until the Census of 1871. They 
reappear as Jews from the Census of 1874 through the Census of 1886. From the 1891 Census 
through the 1926 Census, they are enumerated again as Hebrews. 
300 See Appendix B for a full break down of Religious affiliation in the early census years.
301 This notation uncovers an earlier appearance of Indians in the New Zealand Census than 
previously known. 
302 The spelling “Hindoo” is considered a pejorative term by present day standards, and may refer 
to other Indians of Muslim origin. It is unclear if the 4 ‘Mahometans’ are from India or elsewhere.
Figure 6.1: Religious affiliation in the Census of 1861.303 304
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303 See Table No. 13 in the publication entitled Statistics of New Zealand for 1861, including the results 
of a Census of the Colony, taken on the 16th of December in that year, published in Auckland by “C. 
Wilson for the New Zealand Government,” 1861, reprinted above.
304 Note the specific reference to the fourteen ‘Hindoos’ (11 males and three females) in the second 
line up from the bottom of the footnote. 
Asian sentiment of Europeans during early colonisation,305 it is unlikely 
that Europeans would record a ‘Hindoo’ or ‘Mahometan’ affiliation. It is 
more likely that these fourteen ‘Hindoos’ are actually Indians recorded in 
the religious affiliation tables who were not elsewhere classified, as 
ethnicity was not formally recorded until 1916.306 This meant that 
‘Hindoos’ were enumerated and categorised as Europeans. The four 
‘Mahometans’ recorded in this census would be more difficult to place. It 
is likely, however, that they were brought here on European ships,307 
making it possible that some originated on the Indian subcontinent as 
lascars, or were Chinese Muslims coming to work the Otago goldfields. It 
is not possible to state with any certainty based solely on available data 
presented in the census record. 
If ‘Hindoos’ are to be considered ethnic Indians, then presence in the 1861 
Census has not been previously uncovered by other academic researchers 
of the history of religious diversity or of the Indian diaspora in New 
Zealand, and this notation represents the earliest known or published 
citation of their presence in a census. Taher (1965:44), McLeod (1984, 
1986:52), and McLeod & Bhuller (1992:5) all mention that the first Indians 
to appear in census returns were six recorded in the 1881 Census,308 and 
Taher categorically states that “statistics showing arrivals of Indians 
before 1897 are not available” (Taher 1970:39). Leckie, possibly following 
earlier references from Taher and McLeod, also makes reference to the 
three Indian males noted as living in Canterbury on the Census of 1881 
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305 Discussed in Chapter 4.
306 Many of the early censuses record ethnic Indians in the religious affiliation tables, but these, 
curiously, were subsumed in the European category before the section on Race Aliens was introduced 
in the 1916, and subsequent, censuses.
307 From London to Africa, India and China, with stops in the colonies of Australia and New 
Zealand, as previously described in the last section.
308 This citation is most-probably sourced from the ‘Birthplace’ tables from the 1881 Census that 
records the numbers of both ‘European’ and ‘Asiatic’ populations born in India. There are six 
‘Asiatics’ recorded as being born in India in the 1881 Census.
(Leckie 2007:22, 2010:48) as being the first, but prior to this no other earlier 
citation of Indian presence on the census exists. Consider the following 
passages:
The earliest record of Muslims in New Zealand is to be found in the 1874 census 
records, which lists seventeen ‘Mahometans,’ all males, of whom—if all the 
information given is to be accepted—fifteen were Chinese and fourteen worked 
in the gold fields (Shepard 1980:150).
The census records report small numbers of Muslims from 1874 on, but those 
that came before the early twentieth century left no further record (Shepard 
2002:234). 
The census records of 1874 contain the earliest mention of Muslims in New 
Zealand (Kolig 2010:21). 
Some 17 ‘Mahometans’, as Muslims were then known, all male, and of whom 15 
were Chinese working the goldfields in the South Island, were recorded in the 
government census of April 1874 (Pratt 2010:398). 
The first Muslims recorded in New Zealand were mostly Chinese working in the 
goldfields in the South Island in the latter part of the 19th century (Pratt 
2011:744). 
As shown above, these statements are incorrect, as Muslims appear as 
‘Mahometans’ in the religious affiliation tables in the 1861 Census.309 
Likewise, Drury (2000, 2006), McCormack (1999), and the Federation of 
Islamic Associations in New Zealand (FIANZ 2014)310 all incorrectly cite 
the 1874 Census as having the first known census record of Muslim 
presence in New Zealand, probably all based on Shepard’s (1980) 
assumption.311 
After an absence in the censuses of 1864, 1867 and 1871, Muslims and 
Hindus next appear in the 1874 Census; and Buddhists, who also first 
appear in the 1861 Census, do not specifically reappear as ‘Buddhists’ in 
the religious affiliation section until the 1896 Census, although ethnic 
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309 See Figure 6.1.
310 The Federation’s website states that “the first Muslims arrived here in 1874. They were of 
Chinese origin involved in the mining industry but when the industry declined they left” (FIANZ 
2014). 
311 Chapter Five confirms that Indian Muslims were present and recorded in Aotearoa in 1769. 
Chinese first appear in the Census of 1874, and in all successive census 
records.312 It is unclear if the early reference to three ‘Buddhists’ in the 
1861 Census actually refers to Buddhism as a religious affiliation, as the 
category ‘Buddhist,’ used as a proxy for race or nationality similar to 
‘Hindoo,’ cannot be easily discounted. It is possible that this 1861 
reference represents the earliest appearance of Chinese in the national 
census. 
Indian presence in the fourth Census of 1864 is wholly absent. While 
Indians were recorded in the previous census, their non-appearance here 
is likely due to inconsistent application of census categories, census 
enumerator inexperience, their disappearance into Māori communities, or 
the possibility that none were present during enumeration.313 Numbers of 
Chinese continued to grow during the Otago goldrush just underway, and 
some of these would have been Muslims, Buddhists or Confucians. The 
fifth 1867 Census marks the beginning of measuring racial fractions, as 
‘Half-castes’ are included for the first time in the European totals. 
Presumably, this would include the first children of European-Māori 
descent. Although Māori exclusion continued, children that were part-
Māori and living with Europeans were not. ‘Half-castes’ of Māori-
European descent and living with Māori were included in the separate 
Māori estimates published from 1874. The use of the terms ‘European-
Maori’ (used to refer to those children of mixed marriages who were 
living with Europeans), and the parallel term ‘Maori-European’ (which 
referred to the children of mixed marriages who lived within Māori 
settlements), are also noteworthy.314 
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312 However, Chinese do appear in the religious affiliation tables in the 1867 Census.
313 The 1916 Census attempts to correct the record with a full accounting going back over 50 years 
(see Table 6.4), and states that early Indian appearance was underreported in the very earliest 
censuses. 
314 For a fuller treatment of Māori ‘half-caste’ populations and their enumeration, see Brown (1994).
Throughout the early census years, birthplace of the European population 
was recorded, and the category ‘Other Foreign Countries’ was mentioned 
although not further described. The 1867 Census is also the first to 
mention ‘Other Foreign Countries’ in more detail, and the new category 
‘China’ is included for the first time in the ‘Birthplace’ section. This 
records 1,219 China-born persons although it is unclear if these are ethnic 
Chinese. Since the total population of 218,668315 matches the number of 
Europeans, one might conclude that these are all of European ethnicity, 
although it is possible that some, many, or most of these were ethnic 
Chinese, and census enumerators would have recorded them as 
Europeans.316 If this is the case, it is unclear why official statistics exclude 
Māori and presumably include those of Chinese ethnicity. In this year, the 
category ‘Other Foreign Countries’ records 2,448 persons born in either 
Europe, North America, New Zealand, Australia, ‘Other British 
Dominions,’ ‘At sea,’ or ‘China,’ so it is possible that of these 2,448 
individuals, some may have originated in South Asia. In this census, it is 
impossible to determine if all of those born in ‘Other British Dominions’ 
are European, as I have previously shown above that some of these 
numbers referred to ‘Hindoos’ and ‘Mahometans.’ 
The 1867 Census marks the first appearance of the novel category ‘Pagans, 
Chinese and Heathens’ conflating ethnicity and religion in the religious 
affiliation tables. This category recorded 1,111 persons, or 0.5% of the total 
population. The practice of labeling those of ‘Other’ religious persuasions 
in this way continued from 1867-1891, although the category was slightly 
altered to read simply ‘Pagans’ in the 1874, 1878, 1881 and 1891Censuses. 
The name was again changed to ‘Buddhists, Pagans and Confucians’ in 
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315 Entitled “Table showing the places of birth of the population, exclusive of aboriginal natives, in 
New Zealand” 1867 Census, Part 1, Table 11.
316 It is likely that these were ethnic Chinese due to the large numbers known to have come for the 
Otago goldrush. 
Figure 6.2. Religious affiliation in the Census of 1867.317 
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317 Source: 1867 Census, Part 1, Table 15. 
the 1886 and 1891 Censuses. This practice was abandoned in the 1896 
Census, which enumerated ‘Buddhists and Confucians’ in a combined 
category,318 with any remaining ‘Pagans’ presumably enumerated in the 
‘Other Denominations’ sections of the religious affiliation tables.319 Similar 
to ethnic ‘othering,’ the ‘Pagans’ category further subordinated non-
Christian minorities already denigrated by racial superiority, thereby 
perpetuating majority-minority discourses. 
Since 1,101 of the 1,111 categorised in 1867 as ‘Pagans, Chinese and 
Heathens’ are recorded from Otago, it is assumed that these were Chinese 
miners working the Otago goldfields. It remains unclear why the Chinese 
continued to be included in the ‘European’ population totals in 1867. 
Although they are copiously mentioned in earlier censuses, the Chinese 
are first listed as a distinct population in the 1874 Census.320 Based on this, 
it can be assumed that many or most of the Chinese recorded domiciled in 
New Zealand would have been either recorded in the ‘European’ totals in 
the 1851 through 1871 Censuses or excluded altogether. Europeans were 
the sole ethnicity recorded in the 1851 through 1871 Censuses, with the 
exception of Māori, whose numbers continued to be estimated 
independently. 
The 1871 Census is the first year that respondents were allowed to 
officially object to answering the religion question, as required by the 
Census Amendment Act of 1870. This Act affirms one’s right to object: 
“When any person objects to state whether he belongs to any or what 
religious denomination, he may enter the word object in the census 
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318 This practice continued in the 1901, 1906 and 1911 Censuses, after which (from the 1916 Census 
on), Buddhists and Confucians were enumerated independently.
319 In Figure 6.2, note the third column from the right, entitled ‘Pagans, Chinese and Heathen.’
320 This practice continues today. 
form.”321 The number of such objectors in this year was 8,630, or 3.4% of 
the total population. This year also includes the category ‘Pagans, 
Chinese, and Heathen’ that began in the previous 1867 Census, of which 
2,612 individuals are recorded, comprising 1.0% of the total population 
(excluding Māori). This marks the continued blurring of boundaries 
between religious affiliation and ethnicity, most prevalent during this 
phase. 
‘Half-castes’ (those children of European-Māori mixed marriages) in 1871 
were again included322 in the ‘European’ totals, which referred to those 
living European lives, as opposed to those living as Māori, who were 
counted as Māori. Porous boundaries and inconsistent use of terms 
prevail, and ‘Birthplace’ tables, inconsistently used as a proxy for ethnicity 
where non-Europeans were included, largely reflected colonial attitudes of 
the time as these consisted mostly of British citizens born in overseas 
colonies. 
In considering the tables of birthplaces, it should be borne in mind that the 
numbers given as born in any country are not necessarily natives of that country, 
the children born of British parents being included (1871 Census, p. 10). 
The use of “not necessarily natives” in the 1871 Census demonstrates the 
ambiguity of the Birthplace tables as being unreliable markers for 
ethnicity. ‘Other British Possessions’ lists 713 persons as born in India, 
although many (or most) of these were of European ethnicity.323 
There are two possible exceptions to the 1871 Birthplace tables. One lists 
those born in China, which records 2,641 persons, of which 2,576 were 
recorded in Otago. At least 2,576 of these were ethnic Chinese. However, 
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321 Census of 1871, p.3. 
322 See Table No. 1, on the opening pages of the 1871 Census.
323 See Table IV, page 80 of the 1871 Census, which shows the “Nationalities.—Subdivisions of 
groups” and divides the population according to birthplace.
Table V of the 1871 Census,324 records 4,828 persons born in China, with 
4,431 of these living at the Otago goldfields. It is possible that the earlier 
table records China-born Europeans and the second ethnic Chinese, 
though this is impossible to confirm. The second exception is the entry for 
231 individuals born in ‘Other Countries.’ Of these, 134 persons were 
recorded as living in the Auckland region. Since these have been 
separated out from the European populations born in the British colonies, 
it may be reasonable to conclude that these are members of other 
ethnicities, for why else would they be enumerated separately? As with 
the first exception, an additional table appears showing 893 people born in 
‘Other Countries,’ all of whom are presumed to be of the native ethnicity 
of the listed country, rather than of European ethnicity born in those 
countries. Of these, a few categories are of note: the category ‘Asia 
(country not named)’ lists two persons, ‘Fiji’ lists 29 (some of whom may 
be of Indian ethnicity), along with a variety of other birthplaces.325 These 
two exceptions represent ‘Birthplace’ as an ambiguous census category, 
providing no way to distinguish European from other ethnicities. 
There are a few interesting footnotes scattered throughout the 1871 
Census regarding the Chinese. These are significant in that they represent 
the first time a non-European non-Māori minority is mentioned outside 
the enumeration tables. These footnotes offer the first textual references in 
the census about how such minorities should be ‘dealt with’ and suggest 
that official thinking is one of transience rather than settlement. 
In dealing with this subject the exceptional condition of the Chinese population 
should not be overlooked, as they do not come to the colony with a view to 
permanent settlement, and do not bring their women with them. Of the two 
women returned as Chinese, one dwells in Otago, the other in the Chatham 
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324 This Table is entitled “Showing the Number of Persons, Males and Females of different 
Nationalities in the Colony of New Zealand (exclusive of Maoris), in the Towns (of a Population of 
500 and upwards), outside Towns, and on Goldfields,” and appears on page 82 of the Census of 
1871.
325 See page 81 of the 1871 Census.
Islands, and it is doubtful if the latter is of purely Chinese extraction (1871 
Census, p. 3). 
The 1871 Census is also noteworthy for singling out Chinese in the 
introduction while Māori remain excluded. 
Of the Chinese population 918 dwelt in houses, 2,288 in huts, 12 on shipboard, 
1,588 in tents, and 10 were camping out (Census of 1871, p. 3). 
The section “Part V: Conjugal Condition of the People” records in a 
footnote that 28 Chinese men were married, one of whom had a Chinese 
wife, with the remaining 27 Chinese being married to European women.326 
These notations are relevant as they point out specific, although 
inconsistent, references to other Asian ethnicities that are not provided in 
earlier accounts. 
Although respondent ethnicities were not formally enumerated, the 1874 
Census does, however, make continued reference to Chinese presence in 
various tables and footnotes throughout, which are inconsistently applied 
with no particular reasons given for exclusion or inclusion in individual 
tables. Note that while Chinese and ‘Half-Castes’ are recorded in 
numerous tables, Māori remain excluded, with population estimates 
appearing separately in an appendix.327 This census marks the first year in 
which the ‘Half-castes’ category is applied to non-Māori populations. Also 
noteworthy is Table 1, in the opening summary pages for the 1874 Census, 
which describes the total population of the colony in terms of Chinese 
ethnicity (see Table 6.2). It is remarkable that the Census summary of the 
entire population is defined by one’s Chinese-ness, while Māori remain 
excluded from the descriptions of the population in the general tables. 
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326 See page 11 of the 1871 Census. 
327 As an example, the following appears on the note to Table 17 of the 1861 Census: “Table XVII.—
Showing the Population (exclusive of Maoris); the Number of Chinese and the Number of Half-
Castes; the Number of Houses Inhabited, Uninhabited, and in course of Erection, classified 
according to the Materials of which they are constructed and the Rooms they contain. Also, the 
Number of Europeans and Chinese living in Houses of different Materials, the Number on 
Shipboard, and the Number Camping Out.”
This demonstrates the considerable level of inconsistency that marks 
census reporting during this phase.
Table 6.2: Summary description of the population of the Colony, 1874 Census. 
Population Persons Males Females
Exclusive of Chinese 294,698 166,167 128,532
Chinese 4,816 4,814 2
Total: 299,514 170,981 128,533
In the absence of any formal ethnic categorisation, the religious affiliation 
tables provide the best evidence of non-European non-Māori populations. 
Thirty-eight of the Chinese population of the colony were returned as professing 
Christianity: they belonged to the under-mentioned denominations:—Church of 
England, 20 Males, 2 Females; Presbyterians, 7 Males; Wesleyans, 4 Males; 
Roman Catholics, 5 Males. 15 were returned as Mahometans; the remainder were 
stated to be Pagans or Confucians; but some doubt existing as to whether the 
latter word was used advisedly by the Sub-Enumerators, the whole are given in 
the Tables as Pagans.”328 
This is the first reference or admission to census enumeration as a tricky 
task. If the 15 ‘Mahometans’ mentioned above were Chinese, that would 
leave two Muslims unaccounted for during this year (which shows 17), so 
it is possible that the two remaining Muslims were Indian. The above 
reference continues the theme of European domination and the 
obfuscation of minority reporting that characterises this census period by 
differentiating non-Christian religions as ‘Pagans’ and the use of 
‘Confucians’ as a proxy for Chinese ethnicity, as in earlier uses of ‘Hindoo‘ 
or ‘Hindu’ that referred to the people of India, thus 
 conflating religion with Indian ethnicity. 
Interestingly, nine ‘Hindoos’ appear in the religious affiliation tables in the 
1874 Census, thirteen years after the first known appearance of Indians in 
the 1861 Census, and seven years before the previous earliest-known 
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328 Footnote to“Table IV, Religion.—Subdivision of Groups,” 1874 Census, pg. 57. 
reference in the 1881 Census. This would account for two earlier 
confirmed citations329 than those referred to by others330 as being the first 
known census record. 
The 1878 religion tables described the Chinese as belonging to either of 
three categories: ‘Christians,’ ’Pagans’ or ‘Confucians,’ in which, as in the 
1874 Census, ‘Confucians’ could either be a proxy for Chinese, while 
‘Pagans’ would presumably refer to all Chinese not returning a Christian 
affiliation (e.g. Buddhists, Muslims). It is unclear why ‘Confucians’ would 
not be included in the category ‘Pagans’ while Buddhists and Muslims 
presumably are, unless ‘Confucians,’ as above, referred to those of 
Chinese ethnicity who were not Christian. 
Fifty-four of the Chinese population of the colony were returned as professing 
Christianity: they belonged to the under-mentioned denominations: Church of 
England, 32 males, 4 females; Presbyterians, 3 males; Wesleyans, 7 males; Roman 
Catholics, 8 males. The rest were Pagans or Confucians (1878 Census, footnote to 
‘Table IV,’ p. 255). 
Such inconsistencies highlight European (and Christian) superiority 
during this phase, to the extent that Chinese were often enumerated as 
‘Pagans’ in the religious affiliation tables nor counted as an ethnicity/race 
in the general population tables. 
The 1878 Census also distinguishes both ‘Chinese’ and ‘Half-castes,’331 as 
well as Chinese living aboard ships, enumerated in the summaries in the 
opening pages of the general census.332 Regarding birthplace, 905 people 
are listed as born in India, but presumably these are of European ethnicity 
rather than ethnic Indians, although impossible to verify. The 4,492 listed 
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329 Namely, the 14 ‘Hindoos’ I’ve recorded in 1861, and the nine recorded in 1874. 
330 Taher (1965:44, 1970:39), Shepard (1980:150, 2002:234), McLeod (1984, 1986:52), McLeod & 
Bhuller (1992:5), Drury (2000, 2006), Leckie (2007:22, 2010:48), Kolig (2010:21) and Pratt (2010, 2011). 
331 For examples, see Table XVII, page 12, or Table XXI, page 16, of the Census results for 1878.
332 See ‘Table XX: Population on Shipboard,’ page 15 of the 1878 Census.
as China-born are explained in a footnote333 stating “9 persons were 
returned as born in China who were not Chinese.” ‘China’ is the only 
birthplace listed that identifies individuals by either nationality or 
ethnicity. As these are noted independently, this provides strong evidence 
that other listings (e.g. India’s 905 individuals) are of European ethnicity. 
Those born in ‘Other Countries’ are listed with 1,160 individuals, but 
these are not further defined. Table IV334 includes ‘Birthplace Unspecified’ 
which has two distinct sub-categories entitled ‘British Names’ (686 
individuals), and ‘Foreign Names,’ which accounts for 26 persons (19 
males and seven females) living in New Zealand in 1878 with non-British 
names.335 These 26 are distributed through the colony as five (four males 
and one female) in Wellington, 11 (six males and five females) living in 
Nelson, three males in Canterbury, and seven (six males and one female) 
in Otago. It is possible that this earlier record of three males with foreign 
names living in Canterbury are the same Indian males referred to in the 
1881 Census336 (McLeod 1986; Leckie 2007:21, 2010:48; Beattie 2011:142), as 
the servants of Sir Johan Cracoft Wilson, a retired magistrate from the 
British Civil Service in India, who settled in New Zealand after his years 
of service to British India along with his Indian servants. It is likely that 
their ethnicity became obscured by census enumerators in 1878. If these 
are indeed the same Indians, it would uncover an earlier reference for 
birthplace (i.e. those of Indian ancestry or ethnicity) than that of the 1881 
citation. 
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333 See ‘Table IV: Nationalities—Subdivisions of Groups’ on page 229.
334 See p. 230 of the 1878 Census.
335 This would presumably include non-Māori and non-Chinese names as well.
336 See below.
The Chinese are extensively referred to throughout the 1881 Census, 
whereas Indians are only briefly mentioned.337 Ethnic Indians receive no 
mention in the religion tables this year, but there is a solitary reference in 
the ‘Birthplace’ tables338 that separates the 1,106 Europeans from the six 
‘Asiatics’ born in India. This listing confirms that six Indian males are 
included in the European ethnicity totals, as they are not elsewhere 
accounted for. This would appear to be the first confirmed reference to 
Indian ethnicity in the census, although not the first reference for religious 
affiliation. 
Indian presence in the 1881 Census is corroborated by McLeod (1986:51) 
and Leckie (2007:22, 2010:48), who make reference to a retinue of 
seventeen Indian servants eventually brought to Canterbury by Sir 
Wilson.339
Several of the Wilson retinue deserted their master when they discovered that 
they could earn better wages elsewhere. Most of them, the loyal and the 
deserters alike, are said to have married Māori wives. If indeed they can be 
regarded as a community it was a transient one, obscure while it existed and 
eventually merging in the society which surrounded it (McLeod 1986:51-52).
Leckie (2007:21-22, 2010:48) records some of the original Indian settlers 
that arrived with Wilson, and their descendants, as the Sohman and 
Bussawan families, who have subsequently married into both Māori and 
Pākehā families, taking on new identities. There is, however, a claim that 
the six Indians mentioned in this census were independent Punjabi 
settlers rather than in Wilson’s service:
According to an old Indian resident of Pukekohe, the six Indians recorded in the 
1881 census were Punjabis and North Indians who, destined for Fiji, had stayed 
here instead, for a few years (Taher 1965:44). 
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337 This, however, would be expected, with 5,004 ethnic Chinese and only 6 ethnic Indians listed in 
1881. 
338 See Table IV, p. 192, of the 1881 Census.
339 This small enclave that served under Wilson is perhaps the first known settled Indian 
community in New Zealand. 
McLeod (1986:52) states that this is unlikely to be true. Gillion (1977:131) 
records that the first free Punjabi immigrants reached Fiji in 1904, which 
would render Taher’s citation incorrect, leaving McLeod’s and Leckie’s 
accounts more likely to be accurate. 
Five additional Asians are recorded in the 1881 Census in the birthplace 
tables,340 although they are listed as ‘Asia (country not named)’ leaving it 
impossible to determine birthplace. There are also 24 individuals (11 males 
and 13 females), not otherwise accounted for, listed as ‘Birthplace 
Unspecified’ and as having ‘Foreign Names,’ similar to those recorded in 
the 1878 Census. Of these, 12 (five males and seven females) were 
recorded as living in Auckland, five (two males and three females) living 
in Taranaki, a single female in Wellington, one male and one female living 
in Hawke’s Bay, two females living in Marlborough, and two males living 
in Otago. Although it is unknown where these persons were born, the 
possibility that some of these may have been ethnic Indians, or some of 
the unaccounted-for servants of Sir Wilson, cannot be discounted. 
The religious affiliation and birthplace tables of the 1886 Census make no 
separate reference to ethnic Indians or the religious affiliations of Hindus 
or Muslims, although it can be stated that if these did exist, they would 
either be listed as ‘Other denominations-Pagans,’ which recorded a total 
of 4,472 individuals (4,466 males and six females), or as ‘Other 
denominations-others (variously returned),’ which recorded a total of 179 
individuals (111 males and 68 females). As the Chinese population is not 
elsewhere included in the religious affiliation tables this year, it is likely 
that the majority of those returned as ‘Pagans’ are ethnic Chinese, 
although some of the remainder, and those returned as ‘others (variously 
returned),’ are likely to be ethnic Indians. The ‘Birthplace’ category makes 
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340 See p. 194 of the 1881 Census.
the explicit mention that those included in the tables are those with 
‘British names’ only, so ethnic Indians can be discounted as having been 
included in the birthplace tables this year. 
The same convention for birthplace and religious affiliation continued in 
the 1886 Census, so no ethnic Indians or revealing religious affiliations can 
be ascertained from the tables and no further footnotes mention either. 
The 1896 Census records 46 Indian males,341 43 of whom are listed as 
‘Mahometans’ while three are listed as ‘Hindoos.’ Leckie corroborates: 
Religious returns indicated that most of these were Muslims. Only three people 
in New Zealand that year declared themselves as ‘Hindoos’ (Leckie 2007:22).  
The 1896 census also represents the first appearance of Zoroastrians in the 
religious affiliation tables. As the 46 Indian males are already accounted 
for, it would appear that the two Zoroastrian individuals listed are from a 
country other than India, most presumably Persia,342 being the birthplace 
of Zoroastrianism. The birthplace tables state343 that four Persian ‘Asiatics’ 
were resident in New Zealand this year (three males and one female), so it 
is likely that the first two Zoroastrians in New Zealand were from Persia, 
although the possibility that they migrated from India344 cannot be 
discounted. 
The religious affiliation tables of the 1901 Census list two male ‘Brahmins,’ 
41 male ‘Mahometans’, and three ‘Zoroastrians.’ The two male ‘Brahmins’ 
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341 These appear in Table VI of the Census of 1896 (p. 124), which lists 1,192 Europeans (664 males 
and 528 females), and 46 ‘Asiatics” (all male), as being born in India. It is assumed that all 46 males 
would be of Indian ethnicity.
342 Modern-day Iran.
343 See ‘Table VI: Birthplaces,’ p. 124, 1896 Census.
344 Zoroastrian communities have been living in India since the 8th century, where they first fled to 
avoid persecution by Muslim invaders (Hodivala 1920:88, Paymaster 1954, Palsetia 2001, Hinnells 
2005).
would certainly be Indian Hindus, although it is unclear which countries 
the 41 Muslims are from. This reference is the first to conflate Indian caste 
affiliation with ethnicity. As the majority of Chinese returned to China at 
the end of the Otago goldrush, the likelihood that they consist of Muslims 
from countries other than China would be greater than in previous 
Censuses.345 The three ‘Zoroastrians’ listed in the religious affiliation 
tables are enumerated as two ‘Zoroastrians’ and one ‘Parsee,’ which 
would indicate that the Zoroastrians were probably of Persian descent, 
and, as Zoroastrian Indians are generally known as ‘Parsis’ (or ‘Parsees’), 
the sole ‘Parsee’ listed in the 1901 Census would most certainly represent 
the first confirmed Indian Zoroastrian. In addition to the entries in the 
religious affiliation tables, the birthplace tables list a total of 24 Indian 
‘Asiatics.’ Of these 24, two would be male ‘Brahmins,’ one ‘Parsee,’ and 
the remainder presumably Indian Muslims. 
Birthplace and Religious Affiliation tables in the 1906 Census continue to 
serve as proxies for ethnicity. This year records six India-born male 
‘Asiatics’ along with 1,224 India-born Europeans (695 males and 529 
females).346 In the religious affiliation tables, ten Hindus are described, 
consisting of nine ‘Brahmins’ and one ‘Hindoo,’ all of whom are certain to 
be ethnic Indians. There are also 17 Muslims described, 16 as 
‘Mahometans’ and one returning as ‘Islam.’ A single ‘Zoroastrian’ is also 
enumerated. These tables record two ‘Vedantists,’ but it cannot be said 
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345 The Chinese population, drawn by the Otago goldrush in the 1860s and 1870s, began to be 
officially enumerated as ethnic Chinese in the Census of 1874, and in all successive census years. 
They had previously appeared in the religious affiliation tables prior to 1874, although it is difficult 
to ascertain their exact numbers from these. They reached their zenith of 5,004 individuals in the 
1881 Census and began to drop steadily as the gold reserves became depleted, reaching a nadir of 
2,147 individuals in the 1916 Census. This steady decline indicates that the many ethnic Chinese 
that migrated to New Zealand to mine gold, returned home once these stockpiles were depleted. 
Their numbers began to increase again from the Census of 1921, when those Chinese that chose to 
remain in New Zealand began to send for their families, which signaled the arrival of new Chinese 
populations that came to New Zealand to settle permanently. The increase in the Chinese 
population continues to this day.
346 See the 1906 census, page 165.
with any certainty that these are ethnic Indians.347 It is unclear why only 
six ethnic Indians are enumerated in the birthplace tables as ‘Asiatics’ 
while ten Hindus are mentioned in the religion tables, so it is likely that 
the actual number of ethnic Indians recorded in the 1906 Census is slightly 
greater than six. These examples underscore the great number of 
inconsistencies throughout this census phase. It also demonstrates the 
difficulty early census enumerators experienced in recording ethnicity in 
the field, as the concept was poorly described by census bureaucrats to 
insufficiently trained enumerators. Instead, religious affiliation, birthplace, 
race, or skin colour often substituted for ethnicity. 
The 1911 Birthplace tables record 15 India-born male ‘Asiatics’ along with 
1,191 India-born Europeans (677 males, 514 females), so at least 15 ethnic 
Indians were recorded this year. The religious affiliation tables record two 
male ‘Hindoos,’ 12 male ‘Mahometans,’ and two male ‘Zoroastrians.’ The 
first ‘Sikh’ in New Zealand is also recorded,348 unsurprisingly categorised 
under ‘No Religion,’ which explains why it was previously overlooked by 
other researchers. McLeod (1980:115, 1986:53) correctly states that the very 
first known Punjabi immigrants, two brothers, Phuman and Bir Singh, 
most likely came to New Zealand in the early 1890s, with the first census 
record of an Indian domiciled here in 1881 (1986:52), which is incorrect.349 
While the Bir brothers, of whom much is already known (McLeod 1980, 
1986; McLeod & Bhullar 1992; Leckie 2007), may have arrived circa 1890, it 
does not necessarily mean that they were the first Punjabis to reach New 
Zealand nor the first Punjabi settlers, as others could have arrived earlier 
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347 Ethnic Indians were unlikely to report a Hindu religious affiliation as ‘Vedantist,’ although 
Vedanta philosophy had become fashionable in European circles due to the writings of Thoreau 
and Emerson. 
348 See the 1911 Census, page 103.
349 As mentioned earlier, the first census record of Indian presence would be the 1861 reference I 
have previously mentioned, with this 1911 census citation being the first of a Punjabi Sikh in the 
New Zealand census. 
and were unreported. However, this 1911 Census citation is the first to 
record a Punjabi Sikh in New Zealand, and, following McLeod, it is 
entirely possible that they may have arrived, and appeared on a census, 
long before this, although such references would not be distinguishable 
from other ethnic Indians enumerated in earlier census years. Of note, the 
1911 census contains the first appearance of a detailed section outlining 
the various ‘Places of Worship’ throughout New Zealand, listing 1,971 
churches and five ‘Hebrew’ temples.350 This Census is the first to include a 
detailed accounting of non-Māori minority employment habits, with the 
inclusion of a special table of the ‘Occupations of the Chinese.’351 
In sum, this census period is marked by inconsistencies in race and 
religion reporting, and the relative invisibility of non-European 
populations. While exclusionary legislation prevented Asian populations 
from immigrating, and ideologues campaigned to keep New Zealand 
racially white, the low numbers of Indians and Chinese reported appear 
out of proportion to the exaggerated emotions stirred by fervent anti-
immigration campaigners.352 As a result, this period was mostly 
characterised by ideological concerns at play by both political actors in the 
legislative realm and those charged with the collection and presentation of 
census statistics designed to reflect such principles. 
6.3 Biological determinism & the consolidation of minority reportage, 
1916-1981
Ethnicity, as a distinct table, did not appear in a national census until 1916, 
which saw the introduction of a novel section entitled ‘Race Aliens.’353 The 
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350 See the 1911 Census, page 136.
351 See the 1911 Census, page 98.
352 e.g. the White New Zealand League. See Chapter 4, and Leckie (1985) for a discussion of this 
period. 
353 See the 1916 Census, page 138.
use of this term to refer to racialised ethnic ‘others’ categorises non-
European non-Māori populations as ‘alien,’ i.e. without ‘race.’ This 
confirms their ambiguous status as neither belonging nor welcomed, and 
elevates those with ‘race’ (Europeans), as racially superior to others alien 
to ‘race.’ The 1916 Census, therefore, marks the beginning of a distinct 
phase of minority statistical reporting that, over a period of 65 years, saw 
the ideologically driven elements of the first phase give way to a more 
embedded racialisation in the second. A defining characteristic of this 
phase was the notion of biological determinism and racial superiority that 
defined it. This was marked by the dogged persistence to record and 
report the details of “all conceivable kinds of ‘racial mixtures’” (McKinnon 
1997:76) in the greatest detail possible. The preoccupation with keeping 
New Zealand white is most easily demonstrated in the ‘Race Alien’ tables 
of this period, and in the continued tracking of blood quantum, which 
began in the 1896 Census with ‘half-caste’ Chinese354 and continued 
through the 1981 Census, which marked its last appearance.355 The 1986 
Census began to chart a different course that no longer required such 
detail. This period ends with the 1981 Census as the collection and 
distribution of statistics in subsequent censuses had clearly defined 
categories and collection methodologies, and minority populations, due to 
transformational adjustments in immigration legislation, increased in 
numbers and found voice (Park 2010, Spoonley & Bedford 2012b). 
Regarding the first appearance of ethnic Indians, Vasil & Yoon (1996:2) 
state “It was only with the 1916 Census that Indians began to be listed 
separately as a distinct ethnic segment.” While technically correct, earlier 
references to religious affiliation, the 14 ‘Hindoos’ in the 1861 Census, 
cannot be so easily dismissed. Prior to 1916, Indians were not officially 
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354 See 1896 Census, p.47, which reports on “Half-caste Chinese” 
355 See Volume 7 of the 1981 Census, Table 19. 
enumerated as a distinct ethnic category, although earlier censuses list the 
numbers of Chinese, Māori, Chatham Islands Moriori, and Pacific 
populations over which New Zealand had dominion. Although Indians 
do indeed appear in earlier censuses, they regularly appear in the ‘Race 
Alien’ tables begun in 1916. The ‘Race Aliens’ section also included 
minority breakdowns of religious affiliation for the very first time: 
The principal religions of the Hindus356 were: Hindu, 53; Mohammedan, 25; 
Vishna,357 22; Sikh, 15; Brahmin, 12; while 20 returned themselves as belonging to 
the Church of England (1916 Census, pp. 143-144). 
While the first instance of ‘Hindu’ used above refers to those of Indian 
ethnicity, and the second to religion, it is unclear why ‘Vishna’ [sic] and 
‘Brahmin,’ both of which should clearly fall under the religious use of the 
term ‘Hindu,’358 are listed separately. This is most likely due to census 
enumerator error or ignorance, or perhaps they were instructed to record 
exactly what respondents returned when questioned. The above quote 
also indicates that by 1916, over half (25 individuals) of the 47 Muslims 
enumerated in the religious affiliations tables were Indian Muslims. This 
provides insight into earlier enumerations, which record the total number 
of Muslims, but provide no ethnicities or birthplaces. Extrapolating 
backwards, this reference provides further evidence that the known 
Indian Muslim population in earlier census years may have been 
underreported,359 with the balance being ethnic Chinese. 
The 1916 Census introduced a new approach to enumerating religious 
affiliation. This census references the categories of ‘Christians,’ ‘Non-
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356 The Census of 1921 was also the last to refer to ethnic Indians as ‘Hindoos’ or ‘Hindus,’ and from 
1926 on, those returning a Hindu religious affiliation were identified as such and appropriately 
distinguished from Indians of other religious affiliations.
357 ‘Vishna,’ instead of the correct ‘Vishnu’ or ‘Vaishnavite’ is how it appears in the Census.
358 Vaishnavites comprise the largest of the Hindu sects, while ‘Brahmin’ is a caste term, referring 
exclusively to Hindus who belong to the highest caste. 
359 Earlier censuses record the total Muslim population as follows: 1861 (4 Muslims), 1874 (17 
Muslims), 1878 (39 Muslims), 1881 (7 Muslims), 1896 (43 Muslims), 1901 (41 Muslims), 1906 (16 
Muslims), and 1911 Censuses (12 Muslims).
Christians,’ ‘Indefinite,’ and ‘No Religion,’ which when totaled equal the 
sum of those that specified a religious affiliation.360 The ‘Christian’ 
category, which  earlier censuses may have used to denote a second layer 
of symbolic ‘whiteness’ behind ‘European,’ lists the subdivisions of 15 
distinct denominations. The ‘Non-Christian’ category lists the 
subdivisions of ‘Hebrews,’ ‘Mohammedans,’ ‘Buddhists/Confucians,’ and 
‘Other,’ thereby ‘othering’ European ‘Hebrews’ by placing them in the 
new ‘Non-Christian’ category, where previously they had been included 
with the Christian denominations. The ‘Indefinite’ category includes six 
subdivisions; and the ‘No-religion’ category lists the subdivisions of 
‘Atheist,’ ‘No Religion,’ and ‘Other.’ The categories ‘Object to State’ and 
‘Unspecified’ are also provided. Similar conventions for enumerating 
religious affiliation are followed in successive censuses. It is clear that the 
1916 Census set a precedence for enumeration of those returning non-
Christian affiliations that continues to the present day. 
The Birthplace tables in the 1916 Census, however, revert to earlier 
practices of not separating India-born Europeans from India-born 
‘Asiatics,’ so it is impossible to determine the number of ethnic Indians in 
1916, although 32 individuals are described as born in ‘Foreign Countries’ 
in the sub-category ‘Asia’ that are not further described. It is possible that 
many or some of these are ethnic Indians. The 1916 Census also marks the 
first appearance of a distinct sub-category of the ‘Occupations’ section that 
records the various trades in which 167 male and 14 female ‘Hindus’361 
were engaged in at the time. Table 6.3 is remarkable for what it reveals. Of 
the 167 Indian males “38 were engaged in dealing in food, &c,362 26 in 
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360 This had not been clear in earlier censuses due to the muddled nature of non-European 
reporting.
361 In this census year, as in previous years, ‘Hindus’ refers to those of Indian ethnicity.
362 The symbol ‘&c.’ is an older English form of abbreviating the latin ‘et cetera’ and appears 
throughout early censuses. 
pastoral and 24 in agricultural pursuits.”363 This table demonstrates that 
58.0% of all Indians at the time were employees, while 30.4% were either 
employers or self-employed, establishing the emergence of an Indian 
entrepreneurial class as early as 1916. 
Table 6.3: Occupations of 181 ethnic Indians recorded in the 1916 Census.364 
Occupations Males Females Total Percent
Employer 6 0 6 3.3
Self-employed 49 0 49 27.1
Relative assisting 4 0 4 2.2
Wage earner 99 6 105 58.0
Wage earner unemployed 0 0 0 0.0
Not applicable 9 8 17 9.4
Not stated 0 0 0 0.0
Totals: 167 14 181 100.0
Another table details the occupations of selected ‘Race Aliens’ (i.e. 
“Chinese, Hindus, Syrians and Others”) for comparison.365 This table 
provides insights into the working lives of the Indian population in 1916. 
The largest number worked in agricultural or pastoral pursuits (27.6%), 
followed by those selling food and drinks (21.0%), followed by those 
dependent on natural guardians (7.7%), and those engaged in domestic 
service (7.2%). This table provides earlier and more detailed employment 
records than has been previously published in academic accounts of the 
earliest Indian settlers (Taher 1970, Palakshapa 1973, Tiwari 1980, McLeod 
1986). McGee (1962:215) and Zodgekar (1980:195-196) provide similar 
tables, but only beginning with the 1921 Census, and Leckie (1998:169-170; 
2007:36-65) discusses the diversification of the employment of early 
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363 See the 1916 Census, page 146.
364 This table is based on two tables presented on page 146 of the Census of 1916. I have added the 
percentages column. 
365 The detailed information on ethnic Indians is extracted and presented in full in Appendix C, 
along with an additional percentages column. 
Gujarati and Punjabi settlers during this period and beyond in great 
detail, based on her ethnographic research. 
Another table,366 specifically details the number of years that 181 Indians 
have lived in New Zealand. Of these, 165 are recorded as ‘Full-blooded’ 
and 16 as ‘Half-castes.’ The number of ‘half-castes’ recorded provides 
early evidence of Indian intermarriage with European and Māori 
populations, as the second parent’s ethnicity is unclear. This Table 
provides evidence of settlement 40-50 years prior to 1916, that three males 
were settled as far back as 1876-1886. 
Table 6.4: Length of residence of the Indian population in 1916.367 
Length of 
residence 
(years):
Years
Full-blooded Half-caste
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Under 1 1915-1916 31 – 31 1 – 1
1 and under 2 1914-1915 3 – 3 – 2 2
2 and under 3 1913-1914 16 1 17 2 1 3
3 and under 4 1912-1913 42 – 42 – 1 1
4 and under 5 1911-1912 21 1 22 – – –
5 and under 6 1910-1911 7 – 7 1 – 1
6 and under 7 1909-1910 – – – – – –
7 and under 8 1908-1909 2 – 2 1 – 1
8 and under 9 1907-1908 1 – 1 – – –
9 and under 10 1906-1907 1 – 1 1 – 1
10 and under 15 1901-1906 4 – 4 – – –
15 and under 20 1896-1901 3 1 4 – – –
20 and under 30 1886-1896 8 – 8 – – –
30 and under 40 1876-1886 3 – 3 – – –
40 and under 50 1866-1876 3 – 3 – – –
50 and over Prior to 1866 – – – – – –
Not stated 11 – 11 – 2 2
Born in New 
Zealand 4 2 6 1 3 4
Totals: 160 5 165 7 9 16
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366 Entitled “Table showing the number of Hindus in New Zealand classified according to Length of 
Residence in the Dominion, Census.” (1916 Census, p. 149).
367 1916 Census, pp. 148-149.
It will be noted that of 145 full-blooded male Hindus born abroad whose 
length of residence is known, 113 had been under five years in the country; and 
of 6 half-caste males 3 had been under three years in the country, 4 under six, 5 
under eight, and all under ten. These figures clearly show the increase in the 
number of persons of this race in the Dominion. It will also be noted that 6 full-
blood and 4 half-caste Hindus have been born in the country.  The table affords 
good evidence that until recent years at least a large proportion of the Hindu 
arrivals in the country merely stayed here a few weeks in transit to, or from, 
the Pacific Islands. A comparison of the arrivals of Hindus during each of the 
ten years ended 1916 with the approximate year of arrival of those included in 
the above table gives the following results (1916 Census, pp.148-149):
Table 6.5: Indian arrivals in the Colony, 1907-1916.368 
Year Arrivals during Year Number in Dominion in 1916 who arrived in same year
1907 20 2
1908 24 1
1909 157 3
1910 80 0
1911 190 8
1912 325 22
1913 133 43
1914 257 20
1915 13 5
1916 92 32
Table 6.5 provides evidence that the majority of the early Indian arrivals 
recorded in the 10 years before the 1916 Census were transient, for 
instance, of the 325 ethnic Indians that arrived in New Zealand in 1912, 
only 22 were still recorded as domiciled in New Zealand. If cross-
referencing the list of Punjabi immigrants provided by McLeod (1984) 
with the years of arrival above, it might be possible to put names to many 
of the numbers mentioned. 
Note the discrepancy between the numbers of Hindus recorded in the 
religious affiliation tables in 1916 (88 individuals), versus the number of 
‘Hindu’ (i.e. Indian) ‘Race Aliens’ (181 individuals). This means that only 
48.6% of the ethnic Indians recorded in 1916 were Hindu, with the 
remainder most likely being Muslims or Christians. Of the 181 ethnic 
Indians recorded, 165 were full ethnic Indians and 16 were children of 
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368 Source: extracted from the 1916 Census, p. 139.
mixed marriages, 4 of whom were New Zealand-born, 10 born overseas 
(possibly the progeny of European-Indian marriages born in India), and 2 
unknown.369 
Zodgekar (1980:183) records that “Indians have largely arrived since the 
suspension of the indentured system in 1917 and its abolition in 1920” and 
notes that many of the early arrivals came from Fiji as a result of the end 
of the indenture system.370 This is corroborated by Kondapi (1951), and 
was the major source of the dramatic increase in ethnic Indians in the 1921 
Census. This year saw an increase from the 181 individuals noted in the 
1916 census to 671 individuals in the 1921 Census. Although Zodgekar 
notes the presence of ethnic Indians based on census figures from 1916 
onwards, he does not record any earlier Indian presence in census records 
before 1916. 
The 1921 Census continues the ‘Race Alien’ section begun in 1916:
Third in numerical importance371 among the race-alien communities are the 
Indians. The Indians arriving in New Zealand are British subjects, and in that 
respect differ from the bulk of other race-alien immigrants.372 Until very recent 
years there was scarcely a handful of Indians resident in the Dominion. Figures 
quoted in the table subjoined for years prior to 1916 are probably subject to the 
same remarks as in the case of Syrians in the paragraph immediately preceding373 
(1921 Census, p. 118)
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369 See page 139 of the 1916 Census.
370 Historical evidence, however, suggests that the increase in arrivals of Indians in New Zealand 
may be more due to the increasing awareness of impending immigration restrictions in New 
Zealand rather than the end of the indenture system in Fiji. Leckie (1998, 2007) also considers that 
increased chain migration from Gujarat and Punjab to New Zealand were important factors.
371 The Chinese and Syrians, respectively, are the other two ethnicities. 
372 New Zealand had difficulty classifying Indian arrivals during this period as Britain governed 
colonial India until 1947 and Indians under the British Rāj in India were considered British citizens. 
This created conflict for anti-Asian immigrationists in enacting suitable legislation upholding a 
white New Zealand policy that prevented further Indian and Chinese immigration. See Murphy 
(2007 and 2008) for the legislative differences between the Indian and Chinese populations 
respectively. 
373 The previous paragraph in the census reads: “In earlier years for which figures are given 
hereunder the procedure apparently was that an examination was made of cases where the place of 
birth was recorded as China, Syria India, &c. and by scrutiny of names and other particulars 
decisions as to whether individuals were Asiatics or Europeans were arrived at. It follows then, that 
the earlier figures quoted below comprise simply persons, apparently Asiatics, who were born in 
Syria (China or India), and are therefore likely to be slightly understated” (1921 Census, p. 118).
This exemplified the rather ambiguous positioning of Indian immigrants 
at the time, as their status as British subjects did not translate into a more 
favourable immigration status (see Murphy 2007). 
Table 6.6. Summary of Indians noted in previous Census years (1921 Census, p. 118). 
Census year Males Females Total:
1881 6 - 6
1886 - - -
1891 - - -
1896 46 - 46
1901 - - -
1906 6 - 6
1911 15 - 15
1916 167 14 181
1921 622 49 671
The intercensal increase between 1916 and 1921 was 409, or 270 percent. It is 
however, believed that the number in 1916 was slightly understated owing to the 
method of inquiry presenting a possible defect, remedied in 1921 (1921 Census, 
Race Aliens, p. 118). 
This census table clearly shows that Indians who do not appear in earlier 
censuses, were indeed present and recorded, most probably as ‘Others.’ 
This table confirms the first recorded instance of ethnic Indians present, 
although not separately enumerated, in earlier censuses, even though it 
remained unrecorded until 1921. 
The religious professions of ‘Race Aliens’ in the 1921 Census are also 
described, as follows:
Speaking generally, non-Europeans are comparatively illiterate, and this fact 
combined with language difficulties and customs foreign to New Zealand 
practice tends towards a reduction in the degree of accuracy in census statistics. 
It seems probable that statistics of religions are among those more affected. A 
large number—2113—of the race aliens was recorded as Christian, comprising 24 
percent of the males of full blood and 76 percent of the females. Half-castes were 
almost all (males, 92 percent; females, 97 percent) described as Christians. The 
various churches with their adherents are briefly tabulated (1921 Census, p. 121). 
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Table 6.7: Religious affiliation for ‘Race Aliens,’ 1921 Census. 
Religious affiliation Number
Church of England 703
Presbyterian 198
Roman Catholic 756
Methodist 112
Baptist 117
Other Christian churches 227
Confucianism 2,081
Hinduism 371
Buddhism 36
Others 837
Total: 5,438
Only about one-sixth of the Chinese are Christians, belonging principally to the 
Church of England, Presbyterian, and Baptist Churches. The great majority were 
returned simply as followers of Confucius. Syrians, who were almost all 
Christians, are chiefly adherents of the Roman Catholic Church. Such few of the 
Indians as claimed Christianity were mainly attached to the Church of England. 
The great bulk were Hindus or Mohammedans (1921 Census, p. 121). 
This table confirms that the majority of ethnic Chinese that came to work 
the Otago goldfields in the late 1860s were largely recorded as Confucian 
(63.7%, or 2,081 Confucians recorded from 3,266 ethnic Chinese).374 The 
371 Hindus recorded in this table account for 55.3% of the 671 ethnic 
Indians recorded in the ‘Race Alien’ table, which would mean that of the 
remaining 300 ethnic Indians, the majority would have been Muslims,375 
with a smaller number of Christians. 
There are 386 ‘Hindus’ listed in the religious affiliation tables376 for all 
respondents (371 of whom are Hindus accounted for in the religious 
affiliations of the ‘Race Aliens’ table above). However, a closer inspection 
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374 It is unclear if these are Confucians or a proxy for Chinese ethnicity, as in the use of ‘Hindoo.’
375 Muslims are not specifically included in Table 6.7 above, unless included as ‘Others.’
376 See the 1921 Census, page 125.
under the section ‘Non-Christian Religions’ in the general tables for all 
respondents (not just for ‘Race Aliens’) reveals further breakdowns into 
Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus: “Mohammedans, Buddhists, and 
followers of one or other of the group of religions associated under the 
generic name of ‘Hindu’377 compose the greater part of the remainder.”378 
Those labeled ‘Hindu’ in the religion section are those of Indian ethnicity 
answering the religion question, and include Muslims and Buddhists. As 
Muslims are not specifically mentioned there is no way to confirm the 
numbers present in 1921, although the figure of 837 ‘Others’ provides 
some insight. 
The ‘Industrial Distributions’ of ‘Race Aliens’ are given in great detail in 
the 1921 Census. Table 6.9 represents the 671 ethnic Indians recorded this 
year.379 
Table 6.8: Industrial distribution of ethnic Indians, 1921 Census. 
Type of employment Number Percent
Sale of vegetables and fruit 102 15.2
Staff of licensed hotels 42 6.3
Dependent on hosts or natural guardians 41 6.1
Brick and tile making 42 6.3
Dairy-farming 36 5.4
Hawking 32 4.8
Land-drainage 31 4.6
Dealing in scrap metal, used bottles, &c. 30 4.5
Shipping 28 4.2
General farming 27 4.0
Others 260 38.7
Total: 671 100.0
Chinamen are comprised very largely of market-gardeners, laundrymen, and 
fruiterers. Industries followed by Indians are very much more varied and of 
considerably different character (1921 Census, p. 121). 
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378 See the 1921 Census, p. 126.
379 I have removed the Chinese data to simplify the table and have added percentages of the total 
population. 
Table 6.9: Grade of Occupation of ‘Race Aliens’ described in the 1921 Census.380
Grade of Occupation Chinese Syrians Indians Others Total
Employer 487 34 21 24 566
Working on own account 698 101 187 39 1,025
Relative assisting 43 5 12 4 64
Wage-earner 1,417 112 363 343 2,235
Wage earner, but unemployed 135 14 24 14 187
Not applicable 480 441 64 364 1,349
Unspecified 6 - - 6 12
Total: 3,266 707 671 794 5,438
The 1926 ‘Race-Aliens’ section is quite extensive. It records 987 ethnic 
Indians, and the first children of Indian-Māori marriages (‘half-castes’).381 
Table 6.10 lists the religious affiliations of all 987 ethnic Indians, and 
continues to highlight the preoccupation with reporting mixed races.382 
This table shows that 35.7% of ethnic Indians in 1926 recorded a Hindu 
religious affiliation,383 32.4% Christian, 9.9% Sikh, 5.5% Muslims, with 
9.7% objecting to answer the question. However, while 338 ‘Hindus’ 
returned as ethnic Indians under ‘Race Aliens,’ an additional 21 ethnic 
Indians (15 ‘Brahmins,’ one ‘Rajput,’ one returning as ‘Temple of India,’ 
and four stating their religious affiliation as ‘Vedic’) would bring the total 
to 359. Also of note is the large increase in the Sikh population (97 
individuals) up from a population of 18 recorded in 1916, and the first 
Indian ‘Jain’ appears in 1926. It is evident from the overall number of 
Muslims in the 1926 Census (76 ‘Mahometans’ and four ‘Sufis’ recorded in 
the general religious affiliation tables), that 54 were of Indian ethnicity 
with 22 originating in other countries, possibly China. 
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380 1921 Census, p. 122.
381 The 1926 Census lists a total of nine ‘Indian-Māori,’ enumerated in the Race Alien tables.
382 This is sourced solely from the section on ‘Race Aliens,’ although I have added a percentages 
column. 
383 This consists of the 34.3% who returned ‘Hindu’ plus the 1.1% that returned ‘Brahman.’
Table 6.10: Religious professions of the Indian population, 1926 Census.384 
Religion:  
Males Females Total
Full blood mixed Full-blood Mixed Number Percent
Church of England 10 57 2 45 114 11.6
Roman Catholic 12 13 6 25 56 5.7
Presbyterian 2 34 3 45 84 8.5
Methodist 7 8 5 9 29 2.9
Baptist - 2 - - 2 0.2
Salvation Army 3 6 - 13 22 2.2
Missions 1 - - - 1 0.1
Latter Day Saints 1 3 - - 4 0.4
Protestant, nfd 1 - - - 1 0.1
Bretheren 1 1 - - 2 0.2
Christian, nfd - 1 - - 1 0.1
Christian, other 3 - - 1 4 0.4
Hindu 333 2 3 - 338 34.2
Buddhist 4 1 - - 5 0.5
Sikh 90 1 7 - 98 9.9
Mohammedan 49 5 - - 54 5.5
Brahman 11 - - - 11 1.1
Theosophist 4 - - 1 5 0.5
Other non-Christian 11 - - - 11 1.1
No religion 1 1 - - 2 0.2
Other beliefs 10 1 3 2 16 1.6
Object to state 78 12 1 5 96 9.7
Not specified 29 1 - 1 31 3.1
Total: 661 149 30 147 987 100.0
The 1926 Census also reports in detail the number of male and female 
Indians engaged in different industries. These tables reveal a far wider set 
of occupational skills than has previously been recorded for the Indian 
population. For example, Leckie states: “Most Indian pioneers worked 
long hours, in hard work, and travelled widely as hawkers, rural 
labourers or as domestic workers. These men were part of New Zealand’s 
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384 Census of 1926, Vol. 6—Race Alien Population, Tables 12 & 13, pp. 26-27.
working class” (Leckie 2010:51). Others scholars described this early 
period of Indian settlement, approximately 1910-1930, in this way:
The majority of Indians intended to take up farming and a few of the artisans 
hoped to continue with their trades such as shoemaking. But as land was too 
expensive to buy, they were forced into rural labouring jobs such as road-
building, or rural industries such as brick and tile making. The artisans found 
their intentions frustrated by the trade unions. The Indians in the urban areas 
were forced into the hawking of fruits and vegetables, bottles and rags. Here, at 
least, hard work and long hours could yield some return. Others became servants 
or washerman. Everywhere the Indians met with occupational prejudice and 
were forced to take jobs which limited the form of their contact with the host 
society (McGee 1962:214).
The history of Indians in New Zealand has been closely bound up with the dairy 
and market-gardening industries but at the early stages of their immigration they 
sought employment as flax workers, bottle-collectors, drain diggers and scrub 
cutters (Tiwari 1980:7). 
These statements are not necessarily true, and were probably based on 
anecdotal or interview evidence, rather than statistical data. Table 6.11 
demonstrates a broader degree of expertise noted by the higher 
percentage of skilled jobs (e.g. administrators, shop owners, teachers, 
lawyers) that Indians were employed in 1926, and many of these might 
Table 6.11: Industries of the ethnic Indian population, Census of 1926.385
INDUSTRY:
Gender Total
Males Females No. Percent
Agricultural and pastoral: 158 – 158 16.0
Forestry: 22 – 22 2.2
Mining and quarrying: 3 – 3 0.3
Manufactures and industrial: 66 5 71 7.2
Building and construction: 30 – 30 3.0
Transport and communication: 49 – 49 5.0
Commerce and Finance: 223 2 225 22.8
Public administration and professional: 10 9 19 1.9
Recreation: 3 – 3 0.3
Personal and domestic service: 78 28 106 10.7
Other industry, or not specified: 168 133 301 30.5
TOTAL: 810 177 987 100.0
279
385 1926 Census, Vol. VI ‘Race Aliens,’ p. 28-29. I have added the percentages and totals for each 
sector for easier comparison. Appendix D provides the complete table along with the subcategories 
that have been omitted above for brevity. 
have been civil servants in the British Rāj (i.e. telegraph operators, 
government service) prior to emigration. Based on an analysis of the 
above table, only 16% of the total Indian population in 1926 was involved 
in agricultural and pastoral industries, 2.2% involved in clearing bush 
(forestry), 0.3% in the mining and quarrying industry, 4.2% in milling flax, 
2.2% in land drainage, 1.9% in scrap metal and bottle collecting, 2.5% in 
hawking and street selling, for a total of 29.4% of the population involved 
in menial labour. A considerable percentage (21.9%) were dependent on 
their ‘natural guardians,’ demonstrating the increasing numbers of 
children of Indian migrants, or recently arrived Indian wives not 
otherwise employed, while 1.3% of the total population were either in 
hospitals, wards, mental institutions or jail. A further 0.3% of the 
population was retired. This accounts for a total of 52.9% of the total 
population. An additional 7.0% of the population is not specified. The 
remainder (40.1%), forming the majority, were involved in other 
manufacturing and industrial pursuits; the building and construction, and 
the transport and communication sector; commerce and finance; public 
administration and professional employment; recreation; and personal 
and domestic services. In sum, approximately 30% held low-waged 
menial jobs, approximately 30% employed in other services, while 
approximately 40% were involved in more settled, higher-waged 
positions. 
Many of the early Indian and Chinese settlers are often portrayed as 
market gardeners in the 1920s, and the difficulties they faced in making 
ends meet were emphasised (Tiwari 1980:7-9; Leckie 1985, 2007). 
However, Table 6.11386 reveals that only six ethnic Indians were recorded 
as market gardeners in 1926, while 1,144 ethnic Chinese held the same 
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occupation.387 Many more Indians at the time were engaged in mixed 
farming practices, or in bush- and scrub-cutting, trades or commercial 
occupations. Table 6.12 records the occupations of ethnic Indians in the 
1926 census. These are only presented once, in the detail in which they 
appear in the census, in order to reveal and substantiate the wide range of 
economic activities in which the Indian population was engaged at the 
time. A thorough accounting of the breath of occupations has not 
previously been presented outside of the original census.
Table 6.12: Reported occupations of the ethnic Indian population, 1926 Census.388
OCCUPATIONS:
Indians Total
Males Females No. Percent
Agricultural and pastoral occupations: 132 – 132 13.5
Forest occupations: 58 – 58 6.0
Miners and quarrymen: 2 – 2 0.2
Non-precious metal workers, electrical fittings, &c. 5 – 5 0.5
Workers in fibrous materials other than clothing 17 – 17 1.7
Workers in clothing and dress 7 4 11 1.1
Workers in food, drink, and tobacco 3 – 3 0.3
Workers in wood 11 – 11 1.1
Workers in building and construction, n.e.i.: 35 – 35 3.6
Workers in transport and communication: 44 – 44 4.5
Commercial occupations: 211 2 213 21.9
Public administration: 1 4 5 0.5
Clerical and professional occupations 7 5 12 1.2
Occupations connected with sport & recreation: 2 – 2 0.2
Personal and domestic occupations: 84 29 113 11.6
Other ill-defined occupations: 92 2 94 9.6
Persons not actively emplyd in gainful occupation: 99 131 230 23.6
TOTAL: 810 177 975 100.0
(Notes: *n.e.i. = not elsewhere identifiable, n.o.d. = not otherwise described.) 
281
387 See the 1921 Census, page 28.
388 1926 Census, Vol. VI ‘Race Aliens,’ p. 30-32. I have added a percentages column, with sector 
totals, for easy comparison. Appendix E provides the complete table along with the subcategories 
that have been omitted above. 
The wide array of skills and occupations, including a doctor, and 
shopkeepers389 is evident. This information shows that the early Indian 
settlers of this period were a mix of highly skilled and unskilled labourers, 
and not just flax and scrub cutters, hawkers, market gardeners or bottle 
collectors as is often portrayed in histories of the Indian diaspora in New 
Zealand. Many held reputable positions, owned shops, had employees, 
taught school, drove trains, and were cooks. This data further supports 
my earlier assertion that saw the emergence of an Indian entrepreneurial 
class as early as 1916. Additionally, as three (2 males, 1 female) are listed 
as students, this may be the first reference to Indians attending public 
school, demonstrating settlement. 
From 1926, enumeration of ethnic Indians continued in this fashion, so 
further descriptions are unnecessary, as subsequent history is well 
described (Leckie 2007). Minority presence in the census continued to 
increase throughout this period, and a greater transparency is evident in 
improved, more consistent, ethnic reporting. The eventual inclusion of 
Māori in the 1951 Census marks an important turning point roughly 
halfway through this phase, and provides an example of the increasing 
participation of minority populations in the national arena, although the 
inclination to maintain racial purity remained a primary concern of the 
majority. This second phase is bounded by the historical significance of 
allowing individuals to report multiple ethnicities for the first time in the 
1986 Census, largely brought about by significant sociopolitical changes 
occurring in New Zealand society leading up to the transition. Such 
macro-political factors390 neutralised the need for the continuation of ‘Race 
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389 See Appendix E.
390 e.g. significant changes in immigration policy, rapid demographic change, increased bicultural 
discourse, Māori cultural resurgence and the beginnings of Treaty of Waitangi claims. 
Alien’ reporting and categories that identified and highlighted 
miscegenation.
6.4 Minority inclusion and aspiration, 1986-present. 
The third census phase is marked by the emergence of ethnicity as the 
central concept for minority reporting in the national census. The 1986 
Census is a critical starting point for this transition as it marks the move 
away from the previous preoccupation with blood quantum and ‘race 
alien’ reporting to that of self-identification with the particular ethnicities 
of one’s choice. The first appearance of the ability to tick affiliation with 
more than one ethnicity is one of this phase’s chief characteristics. This 
adaptation parallels the corresponding transformations that were 
occurring in immigration reform at the time, which ceased to rely on the 
traditional source countries of Western Europe,391 and opened up 
migration from non-traditional sources, including Asia. The focus on 
ethnicity, rather than physical characteristics, replaced the nomenclature 
of race, but the classifications and categories continued to conflate 
birthplace, ancestry, nationality and culture. Ethnic self identification 
coincided with general improvements of minority performance in a 
variety of socioeconomic indicators (Callister 2007, Poata-Smith 2013), the 
emergence of political representation (Banducci et al. 2004, Park 2010, 
Sullivan 2010), and the commencement of inclusion in a common national 
identity (Greif 1995, Ip 2003, Ip & Pang 2005, Bandyopadhyay 2006, 
Dobson 2011). Such recognition allowed advancement of both government 
and minority interest in improving inequality and in better addressing 
minority aspirations (Park 2010, Kukutai 2012:28). 
283
391 and more recently, the Pacific Islands. 
These changes brought about, or are a result of, identity politics based on 
increasing minority recognition, as this period witnesses the substantial 
growth of minority communities.392 Demographic change can best be 
observed in the increases in intercensal growth in minority populations 
during this phase. The growth in the Indian population is highlighted in 
Table 6.13, which grew 877% between 1981 and 2013. While intercensal 
growth reached its zenith of 93.6% in the 1986-1991 period, in the wake of 
the passing of the 1987 Immigration Act, the Indian population continued 
to increase. The 2006 Census identified an Indian population growing at a 
faster rate than the Chinese for the first time, and this trend was recently 
confirmed by the 2013 statistics.393 
Table 6.13: Intercensal growth in the Indian population, 1981-2013.394
Census 
year
Indian ethnicity 
(n)
Total population 
(%)
Intercensal 
growth (%)
Change since 
1981 (%)
1981 11,244 0.4 - -
1986 15,810 0.5 40.6 40.6
1991 30,606 0.9 93.6 172.2
1996 42,408 1.2 38.6 277.2
2001 62,196 1.7 46.7 453.1
2006 104,625 2.6 68.2 830.5
2013 154,449 3.6 47.6 876.9
Along with rapid and consistent population growth came an increased 
need for sociocultural groups, as a larger population brought about a 
communal shift away from primary economic pursuits and the business of 
survival, evident in the first two phases, towards a greater enjoyment and 
celebration of one’s heritage and cultural roots, which became important 
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392 See Morning & Sabbagh (2005) regarding the similar shift occurring in the US at the time and its 
impact on the US Census. 
393 The 2013 Census ethnicity statistics were released in May 2014. 
394 Base figures sourced from Statistics New Zealand, 1981-2013 Censuses. Indian ethnicity includes 
those returning “Fijian-Indian.”
in the third phase. Greater political organisation and representation also 
emerged during this period. Rapid population growth mirrored 
significant changes in the number and extent of organisations and 
associations that cater to the thriving Indian population today. Prior to 
1986, there were only a handful of organisations and associations that 
represented the needs of the Indian community. The first to form was the 
New Zealand Indian Central Association. 
Ironically, it was the vehement opposition to their settlement in New Zealand that 
induced Indians to form a national association in 1926 that would long outlive the 
White New Zealand League (Leckie 2007:140). 
The early formation and expansion of such cultural, religious and political 
networks, along with the growth of an increasingly expressive Indian 
identity, is well chronicled by Leckie (2007:140-168). Today, there are 
hundreds of organisations and associations that represent the needs and 
aspirations of the various regional, cultural, religious, linguistic, sporting, 
women’s, professional groups and trade organisations that now operate in 
New Zealand.395 This list, however, does not represent the continued 
growth and influence of Indian enterprise in the economic sector and the 
steady drive towards a New Zealand-India free trade agreement, 
currently underway. Furthermore, whereas there was scant political 
representation of the Indian community in New Zealand, there have been 
a number of key representatives and elected officials at local, regional and 
national levels, including a mayor and several MPs, since the beginning of 
this census phase. These changes all represent minority aspiration and 
affirmation for greater political voice in the national arena that is a 
defining characteristic. Figure 6.3 demonstrates that the proportion of the 
Indian community to the total New Zealand population stating an 
ethnicity (solid line), is in close approximation to the proportional 
representation of Indian MPs elected to the New Zealand Parliament 
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395 See the list of current Indian organisations and associations in Appendix K. 
(dotted line). The first South Asian elected to Parliament was Dr Ashraf 
Choudhary in 2002, at which point the total Indian population 
represented 1.7% of the total New Zealand population. As the only elected 
South Asian member, his representation in Parliament amounted to 1 of 
120 seats, or a proportion of 0.8%, less than half of what proportional 
representation should account for, and well below parity. This scenario 
was repeated in Parliament’s 48th session, which had 121 members. Near 
parity was reached in the 49th and 50th Parliaments, both of which saw a 
total of three South Asians MPs. 
Figure 6.3. Indian representation in New Zealand’s Parliament396
As the next Chapter demonstrates, The Indian population reached 3.9% of 
the total New Zealand population stating an ethnicity. Due to the dramatic 
rise in the Indian population as per the 2013 Census data, and the fact that 
only three Indian MPs made it into Parliament in the September 2013 
elections, the 51st Session has again fallen below parity. It should be 
noted, however, that each of the South Asians that made their way into 
Indians as a percentage of the total New Zealand population that stated an ethnicity
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396 The figures for 47th and 48th Parliaments are based on statistics from the 2001 Census, the 
figures for the 49th and 50th Parliaments are based on statistics from the 2006 Census, and the 
figures from the 51st Parliament are based on statistics from the 2013 Census. 
Table 6.14. Details of South Asians in recent New Zealand Parliaments. 
Name: Party Dates served Religion
Electorate 
or List MP Born
Country 
of birth
Year of 
migration 
Dr Ashraf 
Choudhary
Dr Rajen 
Prasad
Kanwaljit 
Singh Bakshi
Mahesh Bindra
Dr Parmjeet 
Parmar
Labour 2002-2011 Muslim List MP 1949 Pakistan 1976
Labour 2008-2014 Hindu List MP 1946? Fiji 1964
National 2008- Sikh List MP 1964 India 2001
NZ First 2014- Hindu List MP ? India 2002
National 2014- Sikh List MP ? India 1995
Parliament were List MPs and not Electorate MPs, i.e. they were not 
elected by the constituency of their electorate. This has allowed, for 
example, New Zealand First MP Mahesh Bindra (ranked 11 on the New 
Zealand First party list) to be awarded a seat in Parliament on the coattails 
of New Zealand First’s party vote, even though he received a total of only 
717 votes of the 34,097 received in his Mount Roskill electorate (2.1% of 
the total number of votes cast in his electorate), losing to Phil Goff, who 
received 18,637 votes (or 54.7% of the total votes cast in the electorate).397 
The differential between the two lines in Figure 6.3 reached its largest gap 
in the current 51st Parliament (a difference of 1.4%, compared with the 
lowest, achieved in the 49th Session, of 0.1%), since South Asians first 
appeared in the New Zealand Parliament during its 47th Session. This 
would be due to the increase in the Indian population without a 
concomitant rise in the number of Indian MPs entering Parliament in 
October 2014. It will be interesting to continue tracking proportional 
representation in Parliament in this way as minority populations continue 
to increase. What remains then, would be for Indian political 
representation to achieve or exceed parity in proportion with the 
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397 The data presented here is available on the New Zealand Electoral Commission’s website 
(Electoral Commission 2014). 
percentage of Indians in the total New Zealand population. One 
normative condition of shallow diversity398 would therefore exist when 
the proportion of minority MPs in Parliament falls below the proportion 
of the Indian population in relation to the total New Zealand population. 
A condition of deep diversity could similarly be reached when the 
proportion of minority MPs exceeds the minority proportion of the total 
New Zealand population. The model presented here may be one way, 
among others, in which deep diversity may be quantified in terms of 
political representation, however, there is neither sufficient data nor a long 
enough track record in New Zealand at present to consider any such 
analysis robust. It does, however, suggest that there may be merit in the 
possibilities of quantifying shallow and deep approaches towards 
diversity in New Zealand. This should change as the minority proportions 
continue to increase in relation to majority decreases, and suggests that 
such models may be employable in other western democracies with 
highly pluralised societies. 
6.5 Summary analysis
Three particular themes emerge, distinct from the three identified phases 
in New Zealand’s census history. First would be the interpretation of race 
as physically determined by observable skin color. This is evident in the 
first census period where the term ‘white,’ and the preoccupation for 
keeping Asians out, were major occupations of majority society. At the 
time, a dichotomy based on skin-colour was quite evident, i.e. ‘white’ and 
‘non-white’399 populations, similar to what occurred in the US.400 While 
colour-based census distinctions are still evident in the US today, New 
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398 See Table 2.2 on the key values and assumptions of the diversity discourse. 
399 With ‘non-white’ referring to everything else, e.g. Māori, Chinese and Indian populations.
400 See M. Anderson (1990), Lee (1993), Bennett (2000), Mezey (2003), and Hochschild & Powell 
(2008). 
Zealand moved away from the use of such categories, to those specifying 
ethnicity as the primary form of categorisation. However, during the first 
two census phases, there was much confusion over where to place 
particular races that were neither white nor Māori. For instance, Indians 
first appear in the 1861 Census in the religious affiliation tables, yet 
because no ethnicity categories existed they were tabulated as Europeans. 
Likewise, the first appearance of Chinese in the census saw them classified 
and counted as ‘white,’ i.e. enumerated in the ‘European’ category.401 This 
is similar to the US, in which particular ethnicities, e.g. Mexican and 
others of Spanish descent (what would now be termed ‘Hispanic’), and 
‘Asian Indians,’ were placed in the ‘white’ category, as they neither fit in 
nor could be classified as ‘black’ or ‘native American’ (M. Anderson 1990, 
Lee 1993, Bennett 2000, Mezey 2003, Hochschild & Powell 2008). 
Second, the early interpretation of religious affiliation also follows similar 
lines as ethnicity with populations in early census years defined by 
either/or dichotomies of ‘Christian’/‘non-Christian.’ ‘Non-Christian’ 
minorities were often reported as tiny footnotes, or subsumed under 
‘Other’ categories that were not further defined. Similarly, categories like 
‘Hindoo,’ often used in early census reportage in New Zealand and other 
settler societies, referred to all those of Indian descent, regardless of ethnic 
or religious affiliation. This type of enumeration obscured early minority 
reportage. 
Third, and more importantly, would be the conflation of the terms race 
and ethnicity402 which were inadequately defined, and which today have 
separate definitions and implications. The confusion between such terms 
as race, ethnicity, birthplace, region, ancestry, nationality, and citizenship, 
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401 The ambiguity over 1867 records that listed ‘China’ as a birthplace has led me to conclude that 
these are ethnic Chinese. This is detailed in the earlier discussion of the 1867 birthplace records. 
402 Scientifically, there is no such entity as race, although it exists as a social construct. See Peterson 
(1987), M. Anderson (1990), Lee (1993:81), Gould (1996) and Hochschild & Powell (2008). 
and between cultural, linguistic and religious affiliations and 
designations, is evident throughout the first two census periods, which 
makes it difficult to differentiate categories. Such blurring often resorted 
in the erasure or invisibility of minority presence. In early censuses, 
religious affiliation and birthplace were often considered proxies for 
ethnicity, as the concept was either unknown or poorly defined in the first 
two phases. Questions of more easily discernible race or colour were 
central, while distinctions based along sociocultural, linguistic, regional or 
religious lines, were more difficult to discern and enumerate. Such 
dilemmas highlighted porous group boundaries and gave way to clearer 
definitions and demarcations between the meanings of these terms in the 
third phase. 
As the 1916 Census marked a specific change in how non-Māori 
minorities were categorised and enumerated, and ushered in the second 
phase of ethnic reporting, it is useful to note how the New Zealand census 
has, over time, variously interpreted minorities in relation to their 
European enumerators. While the first phase was characterised by 
inconsistency, error and invisibility, this second phase, beginning in 1916, 
brought about specific structural changes to reportage with the 
introduction of new categories better designed for consistency in both 
ethnic and religious reporting. This signified an evolving classification 
scheme in which minorities moved from relative invisibility towards one 
that sought to standardise their categorisation, mirroring population 
increases. While the vocabulary of ethnic classification was poorly defined 
during this 1916 transition, the perception that the state needed to 
improve its minority reporting was nonetheless discernible. This is 
perhaps best exemplified by the 1916 Census’s specific reference to the 
Indian population: “The other class of race alien besides Chinese who 
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were deemed worthy of a separate discussion is the Hindu race,”403 
which, while demonstrating an awareness of a growing population (and 
hence the need for inclusion in state reporting), nonetheless continued to 
conflate religion with ethnicity. Such a statement, however, did not explain 
why Māori were not likewise “deemed worthy of a separate 
discussion” (remaining excluded from the national census), nor did it 
attempt to disclose an actor responsible for doing the ‘deeming.’ As 
responsibility rests with the state, there was no discussion or explanation 
of Māori exclusion at this time other than to state that they were 
enumerated separately.404 
Phase One censuses were therefore marked by significant irregularities in 
categorising Asian settlers. In the absence of any formal ethnic 
classification, enumerators and operatives, supported by ideologically 
driven government bureaucracies, resorted to jumbling such 
nonclassifiables in religious affiliation and birthplace tables, 
accomplishing erasure through tabulation as ‘Europeans.’ Such cursory 
dismissal belies the treatment early Indian settlers experienced on arrival 
and is reflected in the harsh treatment many experienced aboard the 
European vessels that brought them here.405 Such blatant physical 
demonstration of European superiority at sea was mirrored ashore in 
European assertions of control in arenas where the power discourse could 
be easily maintained (census enumeration and reporting), where white 
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403 See the 1916 Census, page 148.
404 Brown (1984) and others (Kukutai 2003, 2011a, 2012) however, have later explained Māori 
exclusion. 
405 Many of the newspaper clippings available on the PapersPast website, when searching the term 
‘lascar,’ return horrific tales of their mistreatment, even murder, at the hands of their European 
superiors. For example, the reporting of the incident aboard the Kestrel, on its way to Port Philip, 
Melbourne, which details the whipping and murder of a lascar (Wellington Independent 1846), or the 
incident aboard the Shah Jehan, which reports the charge of murder of five lascars by Commander 
Adams. In his defense, Adams states: “I have no objection to the court enquiry into my conduct 
towards my lascar crew, and confidently assert that I have always behaved to them in a spirit of 
humanity and kindness, and was not guilty of any act of cruelty towards them” (Daily Southern 
Cross 1861). 
collar offenses were less frequently noted by a majority sharing similar 
values. 
Second phase tabulation focused on exacting reports of race and blood 
quantum, perpetuating majority notions of racial superiority while 
suppressing an assertion of minority identity, and severely restricting non-
European immigration. Minorities during this phase were barely tolerated 
as second class citizens. Third Phase incidents of racism and 
discrimination appear to be rooted in pervasive racial ideologies, readily 
evident through miscegenation reporting during the second period. Third 
phase enumeration, however, marks a significant departure from earlier 
ideological and racial priorities, and relied predominantly on self-reported 
ethnicity and ticking inclusion in multiple ethnicities. Overall, New 
Zealand appears to have overcome ambiguity in ethnicity reporting in the 
third phase, which remains problematic in the US, still grappling over 
questions of ethnicity, offering overlapping questions where one would 
suffice (Bennett 2000, Morning 2008).
Figure 6.4: US Census questions on ethnicity, 2010 Census.
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US questions continue to conflate race, colour, ancestry, nationality and 
citizenship with ethnicity. Confusion over these terms prevails since this 
practice continues in its decennial census. US ethnicity discourse remains 
based on colour (i.e. white/black) and nationality.
The third phase of the New Zealand census, however, still represents 
shallow forms of diversity management even though multiple, self-
identified ethnicities are allowed. This is due to public census reporting 
that remains generally limited to Level 2 categories and a single Level 3 
designator (‘Fijian-Indian’), which inconsistently appears in Level 2 
reporting alongside ‘Indian.’406 This is in contrast to current indigenous 
reporting, which allows for iwi self-identification and reports it publicly.407 
A deep diversity approach would see similar prompts for non-Māori 
minorities, which are generally limited to Level 1 (i.e. ‘Asian’) and Level 2 
(i.e. ‘Indian,’ ‘Chinese’) distinctions for ethnicity reporting. While a write-
in space is available on the form,408 these only clue respondents to specify 
other Level 1 or Level 2 ethnicities and not subgroup affiliations (like 
Gujarati or Maharastrian). Currently, insignificant numbers of Indians 
write in subgroup affiliations, the practice and extent of which are 
detailed in Chapter Seven. Furthermore, census reporting favours some 
groups over others. While European populations are afforded 70 distinct 
Level 2 subgroups in the publicly available statistical releases from the 
2013 Census, the separate iwi table for Māori (Table 15) lists 139 distinct 
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406 In ethnicity reporting for the Indian situation, Level 1 refers to ‘Asian,’ Level 2 to ‘Indian,’ and 
Level 3 to further descriptors like ‘Fijian-Indian,’ ‘Bengali,’ and ‘Punjabi,’ which are inconsistently 
reported in the publication of available census statistics during Phase Three, i.e. while the Level 3 
‘Fijian-Indian’ category appears regularly, other Level 3 Indian subgroups do not. 
407 For more information on Māori treatment in the New Zealand census see Kukutai ( 2012). 
408 See Question 11 of the 2013 Census form, currently available at <www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-
census/info-about-2013-census-data/2013-census-definitions-forms/forms.aspx>. 
iwi affiliations tabulated individually.409 In contrast, Asian categories are 
allocated 41 distinct Level 2 groups based predominantly on nationality or 
cultural group (e.g. ‘Indian,’ ‘Thai’). Of these, the Level 2 category ‘Indian’ 
is now supplemented with an additional six categories publicly available 
for the first time in the 2013 Census410 that were not previously publicly 
available in preceding censuses. These, however, do not adequately 
address additional Level 3 groups which can easily be identified,411 and 
are just as important, if not more so, than the six groups now available 
(e.g. ‘Malayali,’ ‘Maharashtrian’ which are subsumed under the Level 2 
category ‘Indian’). Including only a small portion of Indian subgroups is 
likened to the arbitrary removal of over half the European Level 2 
categories from publicly reported statistics, or only reporting, for instance, 
North Island iwi affiliations for Māori, while ignoring or lumping all 
South Island iwi into a ‘not further defined’ classification. While Level 3-4 
identification/reporting is not imperative, it nonetheless is indicative of 
the present inequalities between groups that characterise current 
enumeration methodologies and census reporting during Phase Three.
There is also blurring between the new Level 3 categories (i.e. ‘Punjabi’ 
and ‘Sikh,’ the first referring to regional, ethnic and linguistic affiliations, 
while ‘Sikh’ refers to a religious affiliation), yet both refer to people from 
the same geographic and ancestral region in India known as the Punjab. 
Further, they do not reflect actual group membership. For instance, the 
number identifying themselves on the ethnicity question as ‘Fijian-Indian’ 
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409 The 2013 data tables are publicly available at <www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/data-tables/
total-by-topic.aspx>, last accessed 3 November 2014. See particularly Table 7 for Ethnic Group and 
Table 15 on iwi identification. 
410 The 2013 publicly released Level 3 categories (released for the very first time in census history as 
“Ethnic group profiles” on 19 August 2014) are, in addition to ‘Indian nfd’ (Level 2), ‘Bengali,’ 
‘Fijian Indian,’ ‘Indian Tamil,’ ‘Punjabi,’ ‘Sikh,’ and ‘Anglo Indian.’ These are available at 
<www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/profile-and-summary-reports/ethnic-profiles.aspx>, last accessed 
3 November 2014.
411 See my survey results in Chapter Eight.
does not equate with the number ticking both ‘Indian’ for ethnicity and 
‘Fiji’ as one’s birthplace, nor does self-identification with ‘Indian Tamil,’ 
for example, represent all Tamilian Indians in New Zealand. The only 
probable explanation for the inclusion of these additional six ‘ethnicities’ 
would be that they represent the largest numerical instances of Indian 
subgroup identification on the census. Their inclusion demonstrates that 
group boundaries are indeed difficult to define, and portrays state ethnic 
enumeration procedures that continue to conflate ethnicity, and religious, 
linguistic and ancestral affiliations. 
Census reporting of ethnicity is indeed problematic. What criteria ought to 
be implemented in order to achieve greater equity in ethnic recognition? 
Which groups should be represented and how? In presenting some 
subgroup statistics is the state alienating others? Is recognising all 
subgroups possible or even meaningful? If actual and accurate 
representation is a goal, then, in order to counter the ‘example effect,’412 
perhaps the addition of a simple prompt, along the lines of “Please state 
any subgroup identification” could be added to Question 11.413 Question 
11 already has a prompt for Level 2 affiliation (“other such as Dutch, 
Japanese, Tokelauan. Please state:”). Would adding a similar prompt for 
Level 3 subgroup identification resolve these issues? This may represent 
the simplest was to address equity issues in reporting and might allow for 
the greater representation of subgroup identities, however changing the 
ethnicity question on the census would involve extensive consultation and 
is no easy task. While it wouldn’t answer all of the relevant questions, it 
would address equity and accuracy. The larger issue to address, however, 
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412 The ‘example effect’ occurs when fixed lists of potential responses, provided as examples, 
influence a respondent’s write-in response or the boxes they may tick (see Waters 2000:1736). 
413 See Figure 7.1 in Chapter 7.
is whether or not minorities desire further subgroup identification, a topic 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
As a central focus of this chapter, an examination of themes and phases is 
relevant as there is a growing body of literature that considers the 
significance and impact of particular government pursuits, like census 
enumeration, on notions of identity, identity formation and minority 
group belonging.414 Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion on 
the meaning and implications that deep diversity holds for the census and 
the possibilities of a future not defined by ethnic classifications. 
6.6 Conclusion
Much of the above discussion is necessarily descriptive and provides the 
raw data and source citations necessary to help alter the previous historic 
narrative. Failure to do so would leave the record incomplete and 
perpetuate an Asian migration discourse that assumes their arrival and 
settlement is a relatively recent phenomenon. This discourse is shared by 
both majority and minority communities, and unpacking evidence of 
earlier tauiwi settlement helps reshape anecdotal narratives into factual 
evidence. The reasons for providing such detail are three-fold. First, it 
helps shift the migration discourse by embedding Asian ‘others’ in 
Aotearoa at the time of earliest European colonisation. Second, awareness 
of earlier settlement should help non-Māori minorities better identify with 
an emerging shared national identity. As previously shown, the 
recognition of common histories strengthens minority identities and 
provides a basis for improved cohesion. Shared national identities might 
allow majority and minority alike to construct new alliances that could 
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414 See Jordan (19850, Hirschman et al. (2000), Skerry (2000), Kertzer & Arel (2002b), Nobles (2002), 
Weller (2004), Morning (2008), Hochschild & Powell (2008), Kukutai & Didham (2009), and Kukutai 
(2011a). 
undermine the dominant-subordinate paradigm. Majorities might 
therefore be more open to Asian inclusion in a common national identity 
when equipped with knowledge of a shared past. Such an appreciation 
might help reduce minority discrimination by majorities controlling the 
discourse, although no such evidence currently exists. Third, the detail 
provided is necessary to render the obscure evident and reverse the 
historic invisibility of early tauiwi settlement. Providing one instance 
might merely correct historic error; providing multiple examples helps 
establish a trend of European complicity in the erasure and invisibility of 
early tauiwi history. 
The data reported here also helps connect the central thesis themes of 
invisibility and identity. Establishing erasure and invisibility of early 
minority settlement in Phase One, and providing detailed examples of the 
preoccupation with maintaining racial superiority in Phase Two, has 
heralded, on the heels of lessening immigration restrictions in 1987, and 
the introduction of multiethnic self-reporting in Phase Three, the 
emergence of minority identities that had long been suppressed. This has 
enabled socioeconomic and political minority aspirations to manifest and 
become established in the parliamentary arena, and has made progress 
possible in other sectors (e.g. economic, educational, health), although 
parity on all fronts, and for all populations, remains elusive. Heightened 
recognition empowers political actors in multiple ways. The further 
strengthening of minority identity, along with concomitant increases in 
European awareness, may help curtail incidences of discrimination, 
which, along with inequality, remain entrenched at all societal levels—
characteristic of shallow approaches. 
Such discrepancies reveal that a possible fourth census phase, 
distinguished by deepening diversity governance, may be on the horizon. 
297
This might allow for equal and more inclusive diversity governance 
strategies in which the desire for more refined and subtler ways of self-
identification become increasingly less important, for reasons that, in the 
third census period, are exceedingly essential; that the desire for minority 
aspiration and affirmation is no longer necessary to define census 
categories by ever-smaller divisions. That, or census enumeration as 
currently practised will give way to major reform, as New Zealand 
ponders the future of its national census and the increasingly burdensome 
economic costs it entails, considering other options.415 While current 
ethnicity categories form the basis for the distribution of shrinking state 
resources, political representation, and the accommodation of group 
rights, is it possible to conceive of a future in which fourth phase 
enumeration no longer necessitates such descriptive and lengthy 
categorisation? Achieving such a condition may be unlikely in the short-
term, and largely unnecessary by present standards. In moving toward 
greater minority recognition, as aspirations begin to be realised, Treaty 
obligations settled, proportional political representation achieved, and the 
allocation of resources for affirmative action no longer required (as only 
some, of many, examples of achieving appropriate minority recognition), 
can we envision a future in which cumbersome ethnicity questions are no 
longer required? 
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415 See Bycroft (2011, 2013). 
CHAPTER SEVEN: 
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF 
THE 2006 AND 2013 CENSUS DATA
7.1 Introduction
Through the use of historical census data on the New Zealand Indian 
population, the previous chapter discussed three distinct periods in the 
state treatment of minorities: 1) minority invisibility, characterised by 
exclusionary policies, European domination and racial supremacy, 2), 
biological determinism, controlled largely by the discourse of blood 
quantum and the maintenance of European domination, and 3) inclusion, 
in which minority assertion and aspiration receive majority recognition. 
These phases have woven through them the twin threads of identity and 
discrimination—central themes throughout. This chapter sets the stage for 
presenting select survey results in Chapter Eight. It summarises select 
statistical results from the 2006 and 2013 New Zealand Censuses,416 and 
examines the theme of identity that emerges from census results on 
ethnicity, birthplace, linguistic and religious affiliation, educational 
attainment and income. The investigation undertaken in Chapters Seven-
Eight exposes the disparity between the current use of ethnicity as a 
classificatory tool in the census and the myriad ways in which minorities 
choose to identify. 
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416 Due to the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake, the 2011 Census, originally planned for 
March 2011, was postponed until March 2013. I had originally planned to use statistics from the 
2011 Census, but in the wake of its cancellation, I had to resort to using the 2006 data, the most 
recent year for which figures were currently available during the writing of this thesis. The 2006 
data was made available through a customised data request and subsequent grant from the Council 
of New Zealand University Librarians (CONZUL) and Statistics New Zealand (JOB-3357 and 
JOB-4081). This data formed the basis for the first draft of this chapter. Ethnicity data from the 2013 
Census was only publicly released on 15 April 2014, with additional data on 19 August 2014, and 
due to time constraints for completion, a second customised data request based on the 2013 data 
was not possible. As a result, I have updated some of the statistics to reflect the publicly released 
2013 Census data, where possible. 
A deep diversity framework intrinsically questions the underlying 
assumption that ethnic categories, as portrayed by census classifications, 
are each homogenous entities, e.g. that all ‘Indians’ (or ‘Filipinos’ or 
‘Māori’) share similar characteristics with other members of their group; 
that there is little differentiation between them. In fact, the diversity that 
exists within Level 1 and 2 ethnic categories can be described at various 
levels. The state generally supports such differentiation in its public 
releases of census ethnicity statistics of both European and Māori 
populations, but such heterogeneity is not divulged for other Level 1 
ethnic categories. This perhaps best represents an existing bicultural 
framework, but shows considerable bias against growing tauiwi 
populations, who may wish to obtain greater access to census detail than 
currently provided.417 This reaffirms a shallow interpretation of diversity 
management. In describing the Indian population in New Zealand, it is 
therefore important to discuss demographic performance in a wide variety 
of sectors418 in order to demonstrate that considerable differentiation exists 
within other Level 1-2 ethnic populations. 
Using more detailed results that disaggregate higher-level ethnic 
categories into stated Indian subethnicities that are not publicly available, 
this chapter begins with a summary of the Indian population based on the 
2013 Census, and proceeds with an in-depth analysis based on the 2006 
data and, where available, more recent figures from the 2013 Census. It 
examines a number of key variables by cross-tabulating these by stated 
ethnicities and subethnicities, country of birth, and other regional, 
linguistic, or religious affiliations. These difference are key to 
understanding the demographic makeup of the population and in 
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417 At present, there is no published research suggesting that those with ‘Indian’ ethnicity in New 
Zealand desire to make claims for specific subgroup identification. However, Murphy (2007) has 
specifically reported that are are potential legislative and political claims that can be made on 
behalf of all Indians in New Zealand.
418 e.g. language, religious affiliation, educational attainment and income. 
exposing whatever previously invisible heterogeneity exists. Differences of 
birth country help distinguish, for example, India-born Indians from Indo-
Fijians, Indo-South Africans and New Zealand-born Indians as having 
distinct sociocultural histories and identities that differentiate them from 
others in the ‘Indian nfd’ classification. Such submergence only reaffirms 
shallow ideological approaches which homogenise diversity, allowing 
particular regional, religious, and linguistic identities to remain invisible, 
perpetuating status quo. Deeper diversity strategies addressing 
ideological and operative societal values may allow particular 
sociocultural needs to be accommodated.419 Such an analysis details the 
methods in which the Census continues to misrepresent identity amongst 
minority populations. 
7.2 Summary and analysis of 2006 and 2013 Census data
This section analyses data on the New Zealand-resident Indian population 
from the 2006 and 2013 Censuses. The release of ethnicity statistics for 
tauiwi are limited, as only Level 1 (e.g. Asian) and Level 2 (e.g. Indian) 
are publicly available,420 while specialised Level 3 or 4 requests are only 
obtainable at cost to the researcher, institution or organisation requesting 
the data.421 Statistics on both European and Māori populations are 
exceptionally well detailed and publicly released, while statistics on other 
ethnic minorities are much less detailed. 
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419 For instance, India-born Indians may have higher rates of diabetes than the New Zealand-born 
population, or Indian Muslims or Hindus may be politically under-represented when compared 
with the general New Zealand population. 
420 Generally, only Level 1 categories are available in Statistics New Zealand’s data tool ‘NZ Stat,’ 
available on their website, while some Level 2 categorisations are available as downloadable 
spreadsheets.
421 All 2006 Census figures presented here represent the Usually Resident Population Count on 
census night and do not include those visiting New Zealand temporarily. Note that Statistics New 
Zealand uses a Base 3 system to protect confidentiality where actual numbers are small, so as not to 
be able to identify individuals. In such cases, low numbers are rounded to the nearest multiple of 3. 
This may result in numbers that do not always total or equal 100%. In all instances, those returning 
as nei (not elsewhere included) have been removed from the calculations, except where otherwise 
noted. 
Population summary
In the 2013 Census, 156,567 individuals identified within the Indian ethnic 
group, accounting for 3.7 percent of the total population, or 3.9 percent of 
those stating an ethnicity. The ‘Indian’ category has more than doubled 
from 1.7 percent of the total population in 2001, to 3.7 percent in 2013. 
Table 7.1: Indian ethnicity, 2001-2013 Censuses.
Ethnicity:
2001 2006 2013
Percent 
change 
2001 - 2013n % n % n %
Indian 62,193 1.7 104,583 2.6 156,567 3.7 151.7
All other stated ethnicities 3,524,382 94.3 3,755,580 93.2 3,854,832 90.9 9.4
Not elsewhere included 150,705 4.0 167,784 4.2 230,646 5.4 53.0
Total Population: 3,737,280 100.0 4,027,947 100.0 4,242,048 100.0 13.5
The existing census question on ethnicity asks respondents to select which 
ethnic group they belong two, allowing for multiple responses, and 
provides blank spaces in which to write an ethnic affiliation not already 
provided. This allows Level 1 and 2 responses to be tabulated. Level 1 
responses consist of aggregating ethnicities into larger categories of 
‘European,’ ‘Māori,’ ‘Pasifika,’ ‘Asian,’ and ‘MELAA.’422 Although 
subgroups are not required, any respondent can write one in, but for 
ethnic Indians there is only a single option, as no further prompts exist, as 
they do for Māori on Question 15 regrading ancestry and iwi affiliation.423 
Only a small percentage of Indian census respondents opt to write in such 
further identifiers as ‘Gujarati,’ ‘Sikh,’ or ‘Fijian-Indian.’424
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422 ‘MELAA,’ as a Level 1 aggregated ethnicity classification in the New Zealand Census, stands for 
Middle Eastern, Latin American, and African.
423 Question 15, however, only applies to indigenous New Zealanders.
424 Although most Fijian Indians prefer the term ‘Indo-Fijian,’ I follow the practice established by 
Statistics New Zealand, employing the term ‘Fijian Indian’ for consistency with the original data. 
Figure 7.1: Questions 11 and 15 on Ethnicity, 2013 Census.425 
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During the 2001-2013 intercensal period, minority communities 
underwent rapid increases in their respective populations. Of the four 
main minority categories, Māori increased the least (13.7%), while Pasifika 
populations grew 27.7%, and Asian and MELAA populations grew 98.1% 
and 95.0% respectively.426 In contrast, the total New Zealand population 
increased 13.5% during this 12 year period. Much of the growth in the 
New Zealand population is being fueled by increases in non-Māori 
minority populations (e.g. Asian migration), and other factors, such as 
natural increase in European, and Māori populations, and natural increase 
and migration in Pasifika. 
In comparing the 2001-2013 intercensal growth rates of the ‘Indian nfd’ 
and ‘Fijian Indian’ groups427 with Level One ethnicities, those stating 
‘Indian’ ethnicity grew at a faster rate (138%) than the larger Asian 
population (98%), while those stating ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity more than 
quadrupled (451%) during this period. This can partially be due to the 
sharp rise in the Fijian Indian population in the post-coup years. The 
overseas-born populations for both the ‘Indian nfd’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ 
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425 Determining which groups are recognised on Question 11, would largely be determined by 
numerical representation, as mentioned earlier, and by historical presence. 
426 See Table 7.2. 
427 See Table 7.3.
groups grew at faster rates than their New Zealand-born counterparts, not 
unexpected in migrant communities. 
Table 7.2: Percentage change in ethnic populations in New Zealand, 2001-2013.428 
Intercensal Percent Change
2001-2006 2006-2013 2001-2013
Total New Zealand Population 7.8 5.3 13.5
Level 1 Ethnicities
European -9.1* 13.8* 3.4*
Māori 7.4 5.9 13.7
Pasifika 14.7 11.3 27.7
Asian 48.9 33.0 98.1
MELAA 44.3 35.1 95.0
Other ethnicities* 53,492* -84.3* 8,327*
Total stated: 7.6 3.9 11.8
Table 7.3: Percentage change in Indian ethnic communities, 2001-2013. 
Intercensal Percent Change
2001-2006 2006-2013 2001-2013
Indian nfd total 61.8 47.3 138.4
Indian nfd - NZ-born 30.6 48.8 94.3
Indian nfd - OS-born 74.6 46.8 156.4
Fijian Indian total 183.2 94.6 451.1
Fijian Indian - NZ-born 107.8 155.7 431.3
Fijian Indian - OS-born 199.1 85.7 455.3
Table 7.4 introduces Level 3 subgroups and percentages reported in the 
2006 Census. As no further prompts exist, ethnic Indians overwhelmingly 
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428 *The huge percentage increase in those with ‘Other ethnicities’ and fluctuations in European 
populations are due to the official recognition of those stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity in 2006, 
consisting predominantly of ‘European‘ populations (Kukutai & Didham 2012). This is offset by the 
resultant drop in ‘European’ populations in the same period. The significant drop in ‘Other 
ethnicities’ in the 2006-2013 intercensal period is likewise due to the significant decrease in those 
stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity in the 2013 Census.
(93.2%) identified as ‘Indian’429 by simply ticking the box.430 Those that 
specified subgroup affinity, a write-in response under ‘other,’ represented 
only 6.9% of all Indians, doing so along regional (e.g. ‘Gujarati,’ ‘Punjabi’), 
ethnic (e.g. ‘Anglo Indian’) or religious (e.g. ‘Sikh’) lines, with the majority 
stating ‘Fijian Indian’ (5.4%) in contrast to those born in India or in other 
diasporic countries (94.6%). This demonstrates the overwhelming 
dominance of the ‘Indian nfd’ category, hence the importance of the 
Table 7.4: Indian ethnicities (Level 3), by birthplace, 2006 Census.431
Stated Ethnicity:
NZ Born Overseas Born Not Stated Total
n percent n percent n percent n percent
Indian nfd* 22,857 95.9 73,737 92.3 846 95.9 97,443 93.2
Bengali 21 0.1 99 0.1 3 0.3 126 0.1
Fijian Indian 717 3.0 4,878 6.1 24 2.7 5,616 5.4
Gujarati 9 0.0 12 0.0 0 0.0 21 0.0
Indian Tamil 30 0.1 162 0.2 3 0.3 198 0.2
Punjabi 72 0.3 192 0.2 6 0.7 270 0.3
Sikh 45 0.2 114 0.1 0 0.0 162 0.2
Anglo Indian 54 0.2 192 0.2 3 0.3 249 0.2
Indian nec* 39 0.2 501 0.6 3 0.3 537 0.5
TOTAL: 23,832 100.1 79,869 100.0 882 100.7 104,583 100.0
Percent across: 22.8 76.4 0.8 100.0
presented analysis that examines subgroup differentiation when 
crosstabulated with other variables (e.g. birthplace, language, religion). 
Unlike other stated ethnicities in New Zealand, Indians represent 
extensive regional, linguistic, religious and ancestral differentiation and 
migrants arrive from a wide variety of diasporic countries—not just from 
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429 In comparison, 2013 Census figures show that 91.7% identified with the ‘Indian nfd’ category, 
although further breakdowns by birth country or stated subethnicity were not available before 
submission of this thesis. 
430 By contrast, Māori are specifically asked for their iwi (Level 3) affiliation in Question 15.
431 *nfd = not further defined, *nec = not elsewhere classifiable.
India. As such, membership in such groups as ‘New Zealand-born Indian,’ 
‘Fiji-born Indian,’ ‘South Africa-born Indian,’ or Indian Muslim and Indian 
Christian become important in identity formation. 
Of those stating an ‘Indian’ ethnicity (all Indian ethnicities combined), 
22.8% were born in New Zealand, while 76.4% were born overseas. Of the 
Indian subgroups recorded, ‘Fijian Indian’ was the most popular (5,616). 
This indicates a strong national affiliation and identification with Fiji, 
distinguishing them from India-born or other birth countries of the 
diaspora. The percentage identifying as ‘Indian’ was remarkably similar 
for both overseas- and domestic-born Indians, possibly due to the absence 
of subgroup prompts on the census form. The birthplace comparison 
within the ‘Fijian Indian’ group is significant, as it shows that Fijian 
Indians are more strongly represented among overseas-born (vs. New 
Zealand-born) ‘Indians.’ The two historic Indian settler populations 
(Gujaratis, Punjabis), both self-identified in numbers too small to warrant 
attention when compared with the ‘Fijian Indian’ population, which 
prefers to distinguish itself from Indians of other diasporic countries. This 
is possibly due to the length of their generational tenure in New Zealand, 
demonstrating that subgroup identification may be less important for 
established migrants than more recently arrived populations that may 
wish to distinguish themselves from those of other regions. More recent 
migrants (e.g. ‘Indian Tamil,’432 ‘Bengali’) also chose self-identification in 
smaller numbers.433 Of all reported subgroups, ‘Fijian-Indians’ are most 
likely to distinguish themselves from the general Indian population. 
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432 Here I follow the census usage of the category ‘Indian Tamil,’ as opposed to the more commonly 
used ‘Tamilian.’ ‘Indian Tamil’ is also used in the census to differentiate it from ‘Sri Lankan Tamil,’ 
referring to South Asian Tamil speakers of Sri Lankan origin, a separate ethnic category tracked by 
Statistics NZ. 
433 It is important to note, however, that should subgroup prompts be offered on future censuses, 
more may choose to report regional, national, linguistic or religious affinity than currently 
represented statistics reveal.
Table 7.5: Stated Indian ethnicities by country of birth, 2006 Census.
Indian 
identity:
Country of Birth
Total Stated
India Fiji New Zealand All others
n % n % n % n % n %
Indian nfd
Bengali
Fijian Indian
Gujarati
Indian Tamil
Punjabi
Sikh
Anglo Indian
Indian nec
Total stated:
40,959 99.2 24,885 83.7 22,860 95.9 7,882 89.6 96,594 93.2
0 0.0 0 0.0 21 0.1 102 1.2 123 0.1
6 0.0 4,824 16.2 714 3.0 33 0.4 5,589 5.4
6 0.0 6 0.0 9 0.0 0 0.0 21 0.0
12 0.0 0 0.0 33 0.1 153 1.7 195 0.2
138 0.3 6 0.0 72 0.3 48 0.5 264 0.3
66 0.2 12 0.0 42 0.2 39 0.4 162 0.2
117 0.3 0 0.0 51 0.2 81 0.9 246 0.2
15 0.0 3 0.0 39 0.2 471 5.4 534 0.5
41,304 100.0 29,736 100.0 23,832 100.0 8,792 100.0 103,695 100.0
It should be noted however that subgroup identification with ‘Fijian 
Indian’ only signifies that respondents identified their Level 2 affiliation 
and does not necessarily signify Fijian birth, and should not be considered 
a proxy for those born in Fiji or their descendants. As such, only a small 
percentage (16.2%) of Fiji-born Indians identified as ‘Fijian Indian,’ with 
the majority (83.7%) ticking ‘Indian.’ Of all those born in India, 99.2% 
stated an ‘Indian’ ethnicity, demonstrating that strong national affiliations 
are important for migrant communities, or that the absence of a subgroup 
prompt was a strong factor in identification as ‘Indian nfd.’ The ‘example 
effect’ referred to earlier434 appears to explain, at least partially, why 
participation in subgroup identification is poorly demonstrated amongst 
the Indian population.435 Regardless, stating a ‘Fijian Indian’ identity is the 
highest of any of the main birth countries. In comparison, those stating 
307
434 See Waters (2000:1736). 
435 There may be additional factors, and research into why so many India-born Indians identify as 
‘Indian nfd,’ or why so few Fiji-born Indians fail to identify as such, is indeed warranted, but 
presently beyond the scope of this inquiry. 
other Level 2 Indian subgroups barely registered above 0.5 percent of the 
total Indian population. 
Table 7.6 shows that of those identifying as ‘Fijian Indian,’ 86.3% were 
born in Fiji, 12.8% in New Zealand, with 0.9% born elsewhere, 
demonstrating that Fijian Indian self-identification is important, even 
when born outside of Fiji. 
Table 7.6: Country of birth by stated Indian ethnicity, 2006 Census.
Birth Country:
Indian nfd Fijian Indian All other sub-
ethnicities
Total Indian 
Ethnicity Stated
n % n % n % n %
India
Fiji
New Zealand
All other countries
Total Indian stated:
40,959 42.4 6 0.1 339 22.4 41,304 39.8
24,885 25.8 4,824 86.3 27 1.8 29,736 28.7
22,860 23.7 714 12.8 258 17.1 23,832 23.0
7,882 8.2 42 0.8 868 57.4 8,792 8.5
96,594 100.0 5,589 100.0 1,512 100.0 103,695 100.0
Due to the small numbers reporting subgroup affinities, the ‘Indian nfd’ 
and ‘Fijian Indian’ categories, along with birthplace differentiation, form 
the basis for further analysis of the census data. Comparisons are drawn 
between those born in New Zealand and those born overseas, creating 
four distinct identity groups. These are used throughout to determine if 
any significant differences exist between the Indian and Fijian Indian 
ethnicities, or between the New Zealand-born and overseas-born Indian 
populations.
All Indians combined identified 111 distinct countries of birth. The top 
four birth countries together represent 93.2% of the Indian population. The 
top ten countries, are tabulated in Table 7.7. The top three birth countries 
of India, Fiji and South Africa together account for 92.3% of all Indian 
migrants. Southeast Asia, other South Asian countries, Europe, North 
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America, the Gulf, and East and South Africa are also represented. The top 
twenty birth countries together account for 98.2% of the entire Indian 
population in New Zealand, while the remaining 91 birth countries only 
account for a total of 1.8% of the population.
Table 7.7: Top ten birth countries, total Indian population, 2006 Census. 
Country of birth:
Total Indian population Percentage 
of Indian 
migrantsnumber percent
India 41,304 39.49 51.71
Fiji 29,736 28.43 37.23
New Zealand 23,832 22.79              -
South Africa 2,640 2.52 3.31
Malaysia 1,356 1.30 1.70
England 660 0.63 0.83
Australia 369 0.35 0.46
Singapore 366 0.35 0.46
Pakistan 351 0.34 0.44
Sri Lanka 288 0.28 0.36
All other countries 3,678 3.52 4.61
TOTAL: 104,583 100.0 101.1
As expected, the largest groups of migrant Indians come from South Asia 
and Oceania (predominantly from Fiji), with smaller populations arriving 
from Africa and Southeast Asia. Those stating an ‘Indian’ ethnicity are 
more widely distributed, with the majority (44.6%) born in Asia (including 
India), 25.3% in the Pacific (including Fiji), and 23.6% in New Zealand. 
Those stating a ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity are overwhelmingly (86.0%) from 
Fiji, while only 12.8% were born in New Zealand, demonstrating that a 
Fijian ancestry is sufficiently important as an identifier, even when born in 
countries outside Fiji. This is not demonstrated to the same extent in any 
of the other identified subgroups. Of all Indians born in the Pacific 
(excluding New Zealand and Australia), which includes predominantly 
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Fijian Indians, 83.8% identified as ‘Indian’ while 6.2% identified as ‘Fijian 
Indian.’ While the majority of Fijian Indians identified as ‘Indian,’ only a 
small proportion self-identified as ‘Fijian Indian.’ This might be 
statistically significant if ‘Indian’ respondents were instructed to further 
identify with a subgroup. 
There is variation and differentiation with age distribution in both New 
Zealand-born and overseas-born Indians, as well as between those stating 
either an ‘Indian’ or ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity. The key point is that migrant 
groups demonstrate a selective age structure, concentrated in the working 
ages. When compared to all Indians in each age range, the percentages of 
Table 7.8: Age distribution by Indian ethnicity and birthplace, 2006 Census.
Age range:
New Zealand-born 
Indian
Overseas-born 
Indian
New Zealand-born 
Fijian Indian
Overseas-born Fijian 
Indian TOTAL INDIAN:
n percent n percent n percent n percent n percent
0-14 yrs. 14,625 63.3 9,672 12.9 525 72.9 516 10.6 25,557 24.4
15-24 yrs 3,624 15.7 11,865 15.8 135 18.8 1,071 21.9 16,791 16.1
25-34 yrs. 1,806 7.8 17,418 23.2 39 5.4 993 20.3 20,397 19.5
35-44 yrs. 1,449 6.3 16,047 21.4 12 1.7 939 19.2 18,582 17.8
45-54 yrs. 1,098 4.7 10,782 14.4 6 0.8 774 15.8 12,774 12.2
55-64 yrs 345 1.5 5,550 7.4 3 0.4 393 8.0 6,354 6.1
65+ yrs. 174 0.8 3,690 4.9 0 0.0 198 4.1 4,128 3.9
TOTAL: 23,121 100.0 75,024 100.0 720 100.0 4,884 100.0 104,583 100.0
those aged under 15 years of both groups are significantly higher for the 
domestic-born than those born overseas. Young age structures are 
characteristic of recent migrant populations. Although Indians have been 
in New Zealand for multiple generations, they have only appeared in 
larger numbers relatively recently. In the 15-24 year age range, the 
emphasis shifts to ethnicity, where those stating ‘Fijian Indian’ are more 
represented than those stating ‘Indian,’ regardless of birthplace; i.e. 
percentages of ‘Fijian Indians’ are higher for this age range than those 
stating an ‘Indian’ ethnicity. Both New Zealand-born -‘Indians’ and -‘Fijian 
Indians’ are less likely to be of working age than are overseas-born 
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-‘Indians’ and -‘Fijian Indians,’ i.e. those born overseas are significantly 
more likely to be of working age than their New Zealand-born 
counterparts, which is expected for migrant populations.
Table 7.9: Years since arrival, overseas-born populations, 2013 Census.436 
Years since 
arrival:
Indian nfd Fijian Indian Total Indian Percent difference b/w 
Indian nfd & Fijian 
Indian populationsn % n % n %
< 1 Year 6,606 6.4 189 2.2 6,795 6.1 65.9
1 Year 6,480 6.3 237 2.7 6,717 6.0 56.3
2 Years 6,480 6.3 216 2.5 6,696 6.0 60.2
3 Years 6,810 6.6 501 5.8 7,311 6.5 12.2
4 Years 8,040 7.8 777 9.0 8,817 7.9 -15.3
5-9 Years 26,550 25.7 2,751 31.7 29,301 26.1 -23.7
10-19 Years 29,442 28.5 2,637 30.4 32,079 28.6 -6.9
20+ Years 13,017 12.6 1,362 15.7 14,379 12.8 -24.9
Total Stated: 103,476 100.0 8,670 100.0 112,146 100.0 -0.0
Migrants stating ‘Indian’ or ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity are compared in Table 
7.9. For the total Indian migrant population, a third (32.5%) had arrived in 
New Zealand within the four years prior to the 2013 Census, with the 
remainder (67.5%) arriving five years or more prior to the 2013 Census. 
While those identified as ‘Fijian Indian’ arrived in slightly larger 
percentages (46.1% have been in New Zealand at least 10 years) than those 
stating ‘Indian’ during the post-Fiji coup years437 (41.1%), those stating an 
‘Indian’ ethnicity have been arriving in larger percentages (25.6%) 
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436 The ‘Indian nfd’ category in the publicly released 2013 results, excludes Level 3 Indian categories 
(e.g. Bengali, Punjabi) which were instead included in the ‘Other Asian’ category. This 
demonstrates considerable inconsistency with earlier censuses. Positive values for percentage 
differences in the final column indicate that those stating an ‘Indian nfd’ ethnicity are growing at 
faster percentages than those stating a ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity, while negative values indicate that 
those stating a ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity are growing at faster percentages. 
437 The Fiji coups occurred in 1987 and 2000 and led to widespread Indian emigration, many of 
whom settled in New Zealand.
compared to ‘Fijian Indians’ (13.2%) in the last three years prior to the 2013 
Census. 
Cultural variables: language acquisition and transmission
The 2006 Census also provides significant details of the various languages 
and religions of the Indian population, all exceptionally important in 
identity formation. Both language and religious affiliation will be explored 
in detail, with comparisons made between both the New Zealand-born 
and overseas-born populations, as well as between both ‘Indian nfd’ and 
‘Fijian Indian’ populations. Table 7.11 shows the total number and percent 
of all four identity groups able to speak at least one South Asian language. 
Table 7.10: Indians speaking at least one South Asian language, 2006 Census.438
Ethnicity:
New Zealand-born Overseas-born Birthplace Total Stated
n percent n percent n row %
Indian
Fijian Indian
Ethnicity Total:
23,115 22.3 74,988 72.3 98,103 23.6
717 0.7 4,878 4.7 5,595 12.8
23,832 23.0 79,866 77.0 103,698 100.0
This table demonstrates that respondents born overseas are significantly 
more likely (77.0%) to speak at least one South Asian language when 
compared with those born in New Zealand (23.0%). When those born in 
New Zealand are viewed by ethnicity, those identifying as ‘Indian’ are 
significantly more likely (22.3%) than ‘Fijian Indians’ (0.7%) to speak at 
least one South Asian language. When those born overseas are viewed by 
ethnicity, those identifying as ‘Indian’ are again significantly more likely 
(72.3%) than ‘Fijian Indians’ (4.7%) to speak at least one South Asian 
language. Row percentages show that, regardless of birthplace, ‘Indians’ 
are nearly twice as likely (23.6%) as ‘Fijian Indians’ (12.8) to speak at least 
one South Asian language. This demonstrates considerable variation 
between the different identity groups. 
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438 ‘Indian’ includes all Indian ethnicities except ‘Fijian Indian.’ 
Table 7.11: Top spoken languages & birthplace, all Indian ethnicities, 2006 Census.439
South Asian 
language spoken:
New Zealand-born Overseas-born Total Indian Stated
n percent n percent n percent
Hindi 3,615 35.4 38,688 49.8 42,303 49.4
Urdu 165 1.6 2,124 2.7 2,292 2.7
Bengali 48 0.5 1,002 1.3 1,050 1.2
Punjabi 1,629 15.9 8,445 10.9 10,074 11.8
Gujarati 3,798 37.2 11,643 15.0 15,444 18.0
Marathi 54 0.5 2,484 3.2 2,535 3.0
Other Indo-Aryan* 636 6.2 4,467 5.7 3,723 4.3
Malayalam 51 0.5 2,052 2.6 2,103 2.5
Tamil 111 1.1 3,273 4.2 3,381 3.9
Telugu 105 1.0 2,676 3.4 2,781 3.2
Other Dravidian* 6 0.1 885 1.1 27 0.0
Total: 10,218 100.0 77,739 100.0 85,713 100.0
(*Includes both nfd and nei responses.)
Table 7.11 displays only the stated South Asian languages (which includes 
members of both the Indo-Aryan and Dravidian language families) that 
are spoken by those stating any Indian ethnicity. This excludes English 
and any other non-native Indo-Aryan or Dravidian languages spoken in 
South Asia.440 First, the New Zealand-born population will be compared 
with the overseas-born population to determine the extent of 
differentiation. As expected, percentages of native language speakers are 
generally higher for overseas-born populations, however, there is a 
curious anomaly which shows that Punjabi and Gujarati speakers, which 
comprise the two native languages of the earliest Indian settlers in New 
Zealand, are markedly higher in the New Zealand- born population when 
compared to the overseas-born population; the more established Indian 
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439 A complete table appears in Appendix F.
440 Census respondents can state more than a single language spoken. 
communities (i.e. those in both the Gujarati- and Punjabi-speaking 
communities) appear to be passing their native language on to their 
children more than the more recently arrived migrant populations from 
other regions of India. Hindi, the most widely spoken of the Indian 
languages, is still spoken by more overseas-than domestic-born Indians in 
New Zealand.441 However, Hindi is not being passed on in the same 
percentages to New Zealand-born generations as are both Gujarati and 
Punjabi. Whereas Hindi shows a downward trend amongst New Zealand-
born, both Gujarati and Punjabi languages are showing significant 
increases. This lends credence that the Indian population still strongly 
identifies with its smaller subgroups, languages and regional affiliations 
(e.g. Gujarati, Punjabi) over a pan-Indian identification, thereby 
supporting a deep diversity framework for analysis. However, it is 
significant that India’s most important Indo-European language, Hindi, is 
not being passed on in the same percentages as are the Gujarati and 
Punjabi languages. This has important ramifications for Indian New 
Zealanders and shows that much work still needs to be done in language 
transference to younger, domestically-born, generations. It also shows that 
Gujaratis and Punjabis are much more likely to pass on their regional 
languages than they are to teach successive generations Hindi. This may 
provide evidence that regional or linguistic affiliations are more significant 
identity markers than are the Indian or Fijian Indian identity groups, 
demonstrating the shallowness of the Level 2 classification of ‘Indian’ 
provided in the census, and supporting a deep diversity framework. 
Table 7.12 breaks down the most widely spoken of the Indian languages 
by birthplace, as breaking down the figures into the four identity groups 
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441 Figures from the 2013 Census show that Hindi is now the fourth most spoken language in New 
Zealand, after English, Māori and Sāmoan, accounting for 67,983 speakers, or 1.7% of the total 
population stating a spoken language. 
does not reveal any useful information. This is because the majority of Fiji-
born Indians did not specifically state a Fijian Indian identity, as 
Table 7.12: South Asian languages by birthplace, Indian ethnicity, 2006 Census.442 
Languages spoken:
New Zealand-born Overseas-born Total Indian
n percent n percent n percent
Hindi* 3,648 8.5 39,087 91.0 42,942 99.5
Gujarati 3,798 24.4 11,643 74.8 15,570 99.2
Punjabi 1,629 16.0 8,445 83.1 10,158 99.2
Other Indo-Aryan 870 8.2 9,687 91.4 10,599 99.6
Dravidian languages 273 3.0 8,886 96.6 9,201 99.5
All other languages 22,479 23.6 72,318 75.8 95,430 99.3
(*includes Fijian Hindi.)
mentioned earlier, and many of the ‘overseas-born Indians’ were born in 
Fiji. A comparison between the New Zealand-born and overseas-born 
groups reveals more useful results. Of the total Indian population stating 
Hindi as a spoken language, 91.0% were overseas-born while only 8.5% 
were born in New Zealand. This shows that less than one-in-ten New 
Zealand-born Indians speak Hindi compared with more than nine-in-ten 
overseas-born. Those stating Gujarati as a spoken language have a far 
better rate of language continuance than do other South Asian language 
speakers, with 74.8% overseas-born and 24.4% of those speaking Gujarati 
being New Zealand-born.  Of Punjabi speakers, 83.1% were born overseas, 
while 16.0% were born in New Zealand. Those speaking Dravidian 
languages (e.g. Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam) have the lowest rate of 
language continuance when compared with speakers of other South Asian 
languages, i.e. 96.6% of all Dravidian language speakers where born 
overseas while only 3.0% were born in New Zealand. This shows that 
Gujarati and Punjabi speakers are passing on their language skills to their 
domestically-born generations in significantly greater numbers than are 
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442 Percentages listed are row totals rather than column totals. Languages spoken includes all of the 
people who stated each language spoken, whether as their only language, or as one of several 
languages. Where a person reported more than one language spoken, they have been counted in 
each applicable group. Therefore the total number of responses in the table will be greater than the 
total number of people. 
their other Indo-Aryan and Dravidian speaking counterparts. These 
results would show that much more could be done for preserving non-
Gujarati and non-Punjabi speaking Indians than is currently underway in 
Indian communities in New Zealand. 
Indigenous South Asian languages are also spoken by small numbers of 
other ethnicities and not just those stating an Indian ethnicity. Table 7.13 
looks at selected Indian languages by Level 1 ethnicities and demonstrates 
the uptake of South Asian languages amongst non-Asian ethnicities. This 
could be the result of intermarriage and/or those that stated more than a 
single ethnicity. It is evident that South Asian language speaking is not 
restricted to Asian ethnic groups. This may indicate intermarriage where 
spouses, or children of mixed marriages, learn to speak the languages of 
their parents/spouses, and respondents stating more than a single 
ethnicity. Of note are the high numbers of non-Asian speakers of South 
Asian languages. This is even more evident when those stating a ‘New 
Zealander’ ethnicity are removed from the ‘Other ethnicity’ category, as it 
is comprised of predominantly ‘New Zealanders’ who are mostly 
Europeans (Kukutai & Didham 2009, 2012). The final column on the right 
represents the percentage of the total South Asian language speakers that 
speak each language.443 This right-most column shows that Hindi is 
spoken by 43.7% of all respondents stating a spoken South Asian 
language, while Gujarati and Punjabi are spoken by 15.6% and 10.5% of 
the total population of South Asian language speakers respectively. Tamil 
is spoken by 5.5% of the South Asian language speaking population, 
followed by Urdu at 4.1%.
There are some interesting points to consider in Table 7.13. When those 
stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity are considered and added to the 
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443 i.e. the percentages in this column are column percentages and not row percentages. 
European total, nearly 2% of all Hindi speakers stated a European 
ethnicity. Furthermore, 2.1% of all Hindi speakers stated a Pasifika 
ethnicity; these are most likely Fijian Indians with both Fijian and Indian 
ancestry. Also of note, most likely due to intermarriage and/or 
respondents stating more than a single ethnicity, are the 2.1% of Gujarati 
speakers that are members of an ‘Other’ ethnic affiliation, most likely 
those stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity. 
Table 7.13: South Asian language spoken by ethnicity, 2006 Census.444 
South Asian 
languages 
spoken:
European Maori Pacific Asian MELAA Other ethnicity** Total Speakers Stated
n % n % n % n % n % n % n row% col.%
Indo-Aryan:
Hindi* 501 1.1 90 0.2 924 2.1 43,227 97.5 69 0.2 453 1.0 44,325 102.1 43.7
Gujarati 108 0.7 18 0.1 27 0.2 15,591 98.7 51 0.3 333 2.1 15,801 102.1 15.6
Punjabi 84 0.8 39 0.4 48 0.5 10,566 99.1 3 0.0 87 0.8 10,665 101.5 10.5
Urdu 174 4.1 21 0.5 108 2.6 3,879 92.3 66 1.6 99 2.4 4,203 103.4 4.1
Marathi 6 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 2,544 99.5 0 0.0 15 0.6 2,556 100.4 2.5
Bengali 69 3.1 12 0.5 0 0.0 2,160 95.9 3 0.1 39 1.7 2,253 101.3 2.2
Sinhala 27 0.7 3 0.1 3 0.1 3,864 99.1 3 0.1 78 2.0 3,900 102.0 3.8
I-A nfd 123 3.2 69 1.8 267 6.8 3,639 93.2 9 0.2 48 1.2 3,903 106.5 3.8
Other I-A 165 6.8 18 0.7 90 3.7 2,148 88.9 15 0.6 60 2.5 2,415 103.4 2.4
Dravidian: 0.0
Tamil 39 0.7 3 0.1 3 0.1 5,535 98.7 6 0.1 114 2.0 5,607 101.7 5.5
Telugu 12 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 2,799 99.4 0 0.0 18 0.6 2,817 100.4 2.8
Malayalam 6 0.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 2,124 99.7 0 0.0 9 0.4 2,130 100.4 2.1
Othr Drav. 6 0.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 903 98.4 0 0.0 3 0.3 918 99.3 0.9
Total: 1,320 1.3 273 0.3 1,470 1.4 98,979 97.5 225 0.2 1,356 1.3 101,493 102.1
(*includes Fijian Hindi. **includes both ‘New Zealander’ and ‘Other ethnicity’ categories.) 
The Urdu language, spoken by predominantly Muslim Indian and Muslim 
Fijian Indian speakers, represents the most widely spoken South Asian 
language that is spoken by ethnicities other than Asian. Of all Urdu 
speakers nationally, 4.1% are European, 2.4% stating an ‘Other’ ethnicity 
(including ethnic ‘New Zealanders’), 2.6% stated a Pasifika ethnicity (most 
probably Muslim Fijians with both Fijian and Indian ancestry), and 1.6% 
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444 Cell percentages represent row percentages rather than column percentages and represent the 
total number from each ethnic category that speak each individual South Asian language. Row 
percentages can total more than 100% as language speakers for each particular language can 
identity as belonging to more than one ethnicity. Column totals represent the number of 
respondents in each ethnic category that speak a South Asian language, while the percentages in 
the bottom ‘Total’ row are row percentages. 
stating a MELAA ethnicity. Marathi speakers show the narrowest 
distribution of all the Indo-Aryan languages, with 99.5% of Marathi 
speakers stating an Asian ethnicity. Amongst Bengali speakers, 3.1% stated 
a European ethnicity and 1.7% stated an ‘Other’ ethnicity, which also 
includes those stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity. As a whole, speakers of 
Dravidian, or South Indian, languages are slightly less distributed than 
their Indo-Aryan counterparts, with a more limited distribution amongst 
other ethnicities. A small exception to this is the percentage of those 
stating an ‘Other’ ethnicity (which includes ethnic ‘New Zealanders’) 
which constitute about 2% of the entire Tamil-speaking population. Of all 
the spoken Indo-Aryan and Dravidian languages, Malayalam speakers 
represent the least widely distributed language, in which 97.7% of all 
Malayalam speakers stated an Asian ethnicity. 
Depicting language diversification amongst the ‘Indian’ population using 
a deep diversity framework helps demonstrate sub-populations within 
this Level 2 category. While regional variations in homeland affiliation, 
usually measured by which Indian state one’s ancestors come from,445 are 
less prominent culturally, linguistic variations between populations are 
much more pronounced. The North Indian Indo-Aryan language family446 
is much more closely related to English and its kin European languages 
than it is to the Dravidian, or South Indian, language family,447 which 
comprises a distinct language family, separating it from the Indo-
European language group. So Hindi, an Indo-Aryan language, is more 
closely related to English and German then it is to Tamil and Malayalam, 
both Dravidian languages. Such linguistic differentiation distinguishes the 
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445 e.g. Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala or Tamil Nadu.
446 The Indo-Aryan language family consists of, for example, Hindi, Urdu, Marathi, Gujarati, 
Punjabi, and Bengali, and is considered a member of the larger Indo-European language family. 
447 The Dravidian language family consists of, for example, Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam and 
Kannada, and is considered to be one of the main language families globally, and is unrelated to the 
Indo-Aryan language family (Caldwell 1856, Krishnamurti 2003). 
‘Indian’ population into speakers of unrelated language families, unlike 
other ethnic communities in New Zealand (e.g. Chinese, Korean, Filipino), 
in which the languages spoken by its members show variation only within 
their particular language families.448 As such, the ethnic term ‘Indian,’ 
itself a construct, lumps together particular groups sharing regional, 
religious and cultural, but not linguistic, affinities. These distinctions 
become readily apparent when applying a deep diversity framework to 
ethnic analysis. Such interpretations demonstrate uptake and continuance 
of particular South Asian languages in New Zealand, and also highlight 
those at risk of decline or disappearance. As language is often a carrier of 
cultural significance, declining use over successive generations highlights 
particular policy needs. Such requirements are currently being addressed 
amongst Māori language populations (Fleras 1989, Reedy 2000) and have 
generally aided Māori cultural resurgence (King 2003:324, Spolsky 2003). 
This has aided the significant increases in Māori subgroup (iwi) affiliation 
revealed in the 2013 Census (Smallman 2014). 
Cultural variables: bi- and multilingualism
In terms of the numbers of languages spoken, Table 7.14 shows the 
numbers and percentages of those born domestically and those born 
overseas.449 As expected, this table shows that New Zealand-born Indians 
are more likely to speak only a single language (presumably English) 
rather than multiple languages, while those born overseas are more likely 
to speak multiple languages rather than only a single language. 
Multilingualism accounts for 67.9% of the entire overseas-born Indian 
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448 For example, ethnic Chinese in New Zealand speak predominantly Northern Chinese (which 
includes Mandarin), Yue (which includes Cantonese), or Min (spoken predominantly in the south-
eastern Fujian province). All Chinese languages spoken in New Zealand are members of the Sinitic 
branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family (Thurgood & LaPolla 2003). 
449 Number of languages spoken refers to all languages, and not just Indian languages.
population, whereas only 46.8% of domestically-born Indians are 
multilingual. 
Table 7.14: Number of languages spoken by birthplace, Indian ethnicity, 2006 Census.
Number of 
languages 
spoken:
New Zealand-born Overseas-born Total Indian
n percent n percent n percent
One 10,869 53.2 25,200 32.1 36,420 36.5
Two 8,541 41.8 35,040 44.6 43,830 44.0
Three or more 1,017 5.0 18,264 23.3 19,404 19.5
Total: 20,427 100.0 78,504 100.0 99,654 100.0
By comparison, Table 7.15-7.16 show the number of languages spoken by 
each of the main ethnic groups. As expected, European populations 
account for the majority of monolingual speakers in New Zealand (68.6%), 
and for the majority of bilingual speakers as well (28.8%). Asian 
populations, however, are in the majority for multilingual speakers, 
accounting for 40.8% of the multilingual population stating an ethnicity. 
By comparison, 36.5% of all Indians are monolingual, while 44.0% are 
bilingual and 19.5% are multilingual. The majority of Europeans are 
monolingual (91.5%), with only 6.9% bilingual and 1.6 multilingual, and 
Māori have higher bilingual percentages (22.7%) when compared with 
Europeans. Both European and Māori populations show similarities in 
multilingualism with rates of 1.6% and 1.7% respectively. Asians by 
comparison have lower rates of monolingualism (37.3%) and much higher 
rates of bilingualism (48.5%) and multilingualism (14.2%) when compared 
with either European or Māori language groups. Higher bi- or 
multilingual percentages are expected in migrant populations. The New 
Zealander ethnicity shows striking similarities to Europeans, which adds 
further support to Kukutai & Didham’s (2012) assertion that the New 
Zealander ethnicity is composed largely of Europeans. This table 
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demonstrates however that the majority of language diversity in New 
Zealand is due primarily to minority diversification.
Table 7.15: Percentages of spoken languages by ethnicity, 2006 Census.450 
Number 
of spoken 
languages
European Māori Pacific Asian MELAA NZer Total
c % r % c % r % c % r % c % r % c % r % c % r % c % r %
One 91.5 68.6 75.5 12.0 51.4 3.8 37.3 3.7 35.3 0.3 93.3 11.5 82.3 100.0
Two 6.9 28.8 22.7 20.0 44.5 18.0 48.5 26.8 50.7 2.7 5.4 3.7 14.9 100.0
Three + 1.6 34.2 1.7 8.0 4.0 8.6 14.2 40.8 14.0 3.9 1.3 4.6 2.9 100.0
Total: 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 7.16: Ethnicity by number of spoken languages stated, 2006 Census.451 
Ethnicity:
None Monolingual Bilingual Multilingual Total Stated
n % n % n % n % n %
Total NZ population: 74,820 2.0 3,064,305 80.5 558,720 14.7 108,354 2.8 3,806,199 100.0
Main Ethnic Groups:
European 48,384 1.9 2,317,851 89.8 175,908 6.8 40,062 1.6 2,582,205 100.0
Māori 15,465 2.8 407,094 73.4 122,469 22.1 9,330 1.7 554,358 100.0
Pacific 9,306 3.6 127,554 49.6 110,379 42.9 10,035 3.9 257,274 100.0
Asian 9,333 2.7 125,979 36.3 163,956 47.2 47,826 13.8 347,094 100.0
MELAA 1,341 4.0 11,445 33.9 16,455 48.7 4,545 13.5 33,786 100.0
New Zealander 8,121 1.9 389,949 91.5 22,617 5.3 5,364 1.3 426,051 100.0
Other ethnicity 30 2.0 912 61.8 345 23.4 189 12.8 1,476 100.0
Four Identity Groups:
Indian, total pop. 3,240 3.1 36,420 35.4 43,830 42.6 19,404 18.9 102,894 100.0
Indian, NZ born 2,814 12.4 10,533 46.5 8,319 36.7 966 4.3 22,638 100.0
Indian, OS born 294 0.4 24,216 32.7 31,956 43.2 17,473 23.6 73,965 100.0
Fiji Indian, NZ born 99 14.0 336 47.7 222 31.5 51 7.2 705 100.4
Fiji Indian, OS born 9 0.2 984 20.3 3,084 63.7 771 15.9 4,839 100.2
Table 7.16 shows that 80.5% of the total New Zealand population is 
monolingual, while 14.7% are bilingual and 2.9% are multilingual. For 
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450 This table includes all of the people who stated each ethnic group, whether as their only ethnic 
group or as one of several ethnic groups.  Where a person reported more than one ethnic group, 
they have been counted in each applicable group, hence column totals will not equal 100%.
451 All percentages are row percentages.
monolingual populations, both Europeans (89.8%) and those stating a 
‘New Zealander’ ethnicity (91.5%) hold the majority452 while Asian 
(36.3%) and MELAA (33.9%) populations are in the minority. For bilingual 
speakers, the situation is reversed. Asian (47.2%) and MELAA (48.7%) 
populations hold the majority of bilingual speakers, while European 
(6.8%) and ‘New Zealander’ (5.3%) populations are in the minority. A 
similar situation exists for multilingual populations, where Asian (13.8%) 
and MELAA (13.5%) populations are again in the majority, with European 
(1.6%) and ‘New Zealander’ populations (1.3%) in the minority. 
Similar comparisons can be made for the four identity groups. Both New 
Zealand-born Indians (46.5%) and those stating a Fijian Indian identity 
(47.7%) have higher rates of monolingualism than their overseas-born 
compatriots. The opposite is true for bilingual Indian and Fijian Indian 
populations, where both overseas-born Indians and overseas-born Fijian 
Indians have much higher bilingualism rates than their domestically-born 
counterparts. Also, overseas-born Fijian Indians have much higher rates 
(63.7%) of bilingualism than the overseas-born Indian population (43.2%), 
and when compared to the total for the entire Indian population (42.6%). 
As expected, multilingual rates are highest for the overseas-born 
populations when compared with their domestically-born counterparts. 
For multilingual speakers however, there are some difference between the 
identity groups. While both Indian and Fijian Indian populations born 
domestically have low multilingual rates (4.3% and 7.2% respectively), 
overseas-born Indians are more likely to be multilingual than are 
overseas-born Fijian Indians. When comparing the total Indian population 
to the total population of New Zealand, there are considerable differences 
between the two. While the total New Zealand population is 80.5% 
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452 That both ‘European’ and ‘New Zealander’ categories have very similar monolingual rates is a 
further indicator that those stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity on the census are primarily 
‘Europeans.’ 
monolingual, only 35.4% of the Indian population is, and while only 17.5% 
of the total New Zealand population is either bi- or multilingual, 61.5% of 
the Indian population is bi- and multilingual. 
Cultural variables: Religious affiliation
Religion is an integral and significant aspect of Indian identity (Kaviraj 
1997, Sen 2006),453 with Indian populations distinguishing themselves 
predominantly along regional, linguistic and religious lines. 
Table 7.17: Religions of those stating an Indian ethnicity, 2006 Census.454 
Religious affiliation:
Indian Fijian Indian Total Indian Stated
n % n % n %
No Religion 4,776 4.9 249 4.5 5,022 4.9
Buddhism 348 0.4 9 0.2 357 0.3
Christianity 16,476 17.0 795 14.3 17,268 16.9
Hinduism 54,402 56.3 2,805 50.6 57,192 56.0
Islam 9,735 10.1 1,572 28.3 11,310 11.1
Jain 105 0.1 0 0.0 105 0.1
Judaism 81 0.1 0 0.0 81 0.1
Māori Christian 249 0.3 9 0.2 255 0.2
Sikh 9,324 9.6 30 0.5 9,330 9.1
Zoroastrian 885 0.9 0 0.0 885 0.9
Other nfd 294 0.3 78 1.4 330 0.3
Total stated: 96,675 100.0 5,547 100.0 102,135 100.0
Table 7.17 portrays the religious affiliations of the Indian population. 
Hindus comprise the majority (56.0%) of the total Indian population, 
followed by Christians (16.9%), Muslims (11.1%) and Sikhs (9.1%). Secular 
Indians made up 4.9% of the total Indian population. For the most part, 
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453 Sen (2005) also points out that atheism has an ancient lineage in Indian philosophy. 
454 Those stating both an Indian ethnicity and a religion. ‘Not elsewhere included’ were removed. 
the religious affiliations of those identifying as ‘Indian’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ 
were similar for most religious groups, however, a much larger percentage 
of the ‘Fijian Indian’ population (28.3%) identified as Muslim when 
compared with ‘Indians’ (10.1%). Also, those identifying as ‘Sikh’ were 
represented in much higher proportions (9.6%) amongst ‘Indians’ when 
compared with ‘Fijian Indians’ (0.5%). Indians identifying ‘Māori 
Christian’ affiliations are of note here, signifying an important element of 
Indo-Māori integration. Although these represent only a tiny fraction of 
Indian religiosity, it does indicate Indian marriage into Māori whānau, in 
which Indians have taken on the religious identities of the larger family. 
This interethnic blending may go back several generations and represent 
descendants of early Indian settler intermarriage. 
Table 7.18 portrays religious affiliation for select Level 1 ethnicities to 
determine if any additional significant differentiation exists. As evident, 
European populations are predominantly Christian (56.3%) and secular 
(37.7%), while Asian populations have a more religiously diverse spread. 
Māori populations, while majority Christian, show similar rates of 
secularisation, and, as expected, significantly higher rates for adherence to 
Māori religious traditions when compared with the other Level 1 
ethnicities. While 31.2% of the Asian population are secular, 28.7% are 
Christian, 17.6% are Hindu, and 11.4% Buddhist. Of interest in Table 7.20 
are the rather low percentages of non-religious Indians (4.9%) when 
compared with the total stating Asian ethnicity (31.2%) and with the total 
stated population (34.7%). This affirms that stating an affiliation, or not 
stating one, is important in considering the various factors that may 
comprise a formulation of Indian identity. As an ethnic group, the Indian 
population shows a significantly lower rate of secularism when compared 
with other ethnicities, as well as a high degree of religious diversification, 
which portrays those of Indian ethnicity as being the most religiously 
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diverse when compared with other Level 2 ethnicities. Compared with 
other Level 1 ethnicities, the total Indian population shows extensive 
religious diversification. Christian Indians account for only 16.5% of the 
total Indian population. At the lowest end of the scale, Christians account 
for 56.3% of the European population, and, at the higher end, 80.2% of 
Pasifika populations report a Christian affiliation. Further group 
differentiation into ‘Indian nfd’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity also reveals 
significant differences within the Indian population. Using a deep 
diversity framework for analysis (e.g. stressing the importance of religious 
differentiation in identity formation) allows us to ascertain additional 
underlying differences between both ‘Indian nfd’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ 
groups. 
Table 7.18. Religious affiliation and ethnicity, total stated population, 2006 Census.455
Religious 
affiliation:
European Maori Asian All Other Total Stated
n % n % n % n % n %
No Religion 955,257 37.7 193,683 36.5 106,569 31.2 194,058 27.8 1,290,786 34.7
Buddhism 10,755 0.4 1,836 0.3 38,994 11.4 3,099 0.4 51,870 1.4
Christianity 1,426,305 56.3 245,052 46.2 97,809 28.7 426,549 61.2 2,015,172 54.2
Hinduism 3,300 0.1 816 0.2 59,922 17.6 2,103 0.3 64,017 1.7
Islam 3,861 0.2 1,074 0.2 19,863 5.8 13,032 1.9 35,523 1.0
Judaism 5,088 0.2 375 0.1 210 0.1 1,830 0.3 6,723 0.2
Māori Christian 13,950 0.6 58,779 11.1 696 0.2 4,944 0.7 65,040 1.7
Spiritual/New Age 14,373 0.6 2,946 0.6 300 0.1 4,875 0.7 19,503 0.5
Other nfd 6,801 0.3 4,431 0.8 11,862 3.5 3,693 0.5 24,153 0.6
Object to answer 152,925 6.0 45,519 8.6 11,631 3.4 62,004 8.9 239,574 6.4
Total stated: 2,534,427 102.3 530,622 104.5 341,211 101.9 697,218 102.7 3,720,501 102.5
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455 The ‘All others’ category includes MELAA, ‘New Zealander,’ and those stating an ethnicity that 
is not elsewhere classifiable in the other main ethnic groupings. This category, like those of 
European ethnicity, is comprised mostly of Christian and secular populations. 
Table 7.19: Comparisons of ethnicity by religiosity, 2006 Census.456 
Ethnicity:
Secular Religious Object Total Stated:
n % n % n % n %
Total NZ pop.: 1,290,786 34.7 2,282,001 61.3 239,574 6.4 3,720,501 102.5
Level 1 Ethnicities:
European 955,257 37.7 1,484,433 58.6 152,925 6.0 2,534,427 102.3
Māori 193,683 36.5 315,309 59.4 45,519 8.6 530,622 104.5
Pacific 34,833 14.0 207,822 83.3 12,603 5.1 249,435 102.3
Asian 106,569 31.2 229,656 67.3 11,631 3.4 341,211 101.9
MELAA 3,651 11.0 29,112 87.6 1,182 3.6 33,246 102.1
New Zealander 155,265 37.6 222,156 53.8 48,069 11.6 413,109 103.0
Other ethnicity 309 21.6 1035 72.5 150 10.5 1,428 104.6
Asian ethnicities:
Indian 4,989 4.9 96,366 95.2 2,052 2.0 101,196 102.2
Chinese 83,352 59.6 52,182 37.3 7,056 5.0 139,881 101.9
Korean 6,003 20.5 23,244 79.3 432 1.5 29,325 101.2
Filipino 564 3.4 15,882 95.9 264 1.6 16,563 100.9
Japanese 6,963 63.7 3,720 34.0 543 5.0 10,935 102.7
Sri Lankan 318 3.9 7,908 96.9 75 0.9 8,157 101.8
Cambodian 852 13.1 5,556 85.7 285 4.4 6,483 103.2
Thai 501 8.7 5,202 90.8 189 3.3 5,727 102.9
Other Asian 3,183 13.2 20,682 85.6 816 3.4 24,171 102.1
Total Asian: 105,921 31.3 228,009 67.3 11,529 3.4 338,919 101.9
In terms of religiosity, further comparisons between the Indian population 
and other Level 1 ethnicities are made in Table 7.19. Compared with the 
other Asian ethnicities, Indians rank as the third least secular Asian 
country (4.9%), compared with the least secular country, the Philippines 
(3.4%). The Japanese (63.7%) and Chinese (59.6%) are the two most secular 
Asian ethnicities. As a whole, the New Zealand population is 61.3% 
religious, while amongst the main ethnic groups, MELAA ethnicities 
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456 Percentages represent row totals. These may not equal 100% as respondents are allowed to tick 
more than one affiliation (e.g. secular and Buddhist). 
combined are the most religious (87.6%), followed by Pasifika (83.3%). 
Compared with the other Asian ethnicities, Indians, along with Sri 
Lankans and Filipinos, are the most religiously affiliated ethnicities with 
Sri Lankan’s 97.0% religious, followed by Filipinos (95.9%) and Indians 
(95.2%). As expected, the least religiously affiliated ethnicities are the 
Japanese (34.0%) and Chinese (37.5%). Of those ethnicities that ‘object’ to 
answer, the ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity shows a marked difference from 
the European population (11.6%), as compared with only 6.0% of 
Europeans. This is perhaps the only indicator of comparison in which a 
‘New Zealander’ ethnicity shows a marked deviation of nearly double 
that of European populations (cf. Kukutai & Didham 2009, 2012). 
Table 7.20 shows how the four identity groups differ from the total Indian 
population with regard to religiosity, and comparisons can be made with 
the other main ethnic groups as well as with other Asian ethnicities. 
Compared to all Indians, there are significant differences between ‘Indian’ 
and ‘Fijian Indian’ identity groups born domestically and born overseas. 
Those identifying as New Zealand-born ‘Indians’ are more than three times 
as likely to be secular (15.0%) when compared with the total Indian 
population (4.9%), and New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ are more than 
four times as likely to be secular (20.2%) when compared with the ‘Indian’ 
total. Conversely, overseas-born ‘Indians’ (1.9%) are two and a half times 
less likely to be secular, and overseas-born ‘Fijian Indians’ just over twice 
as likely (2.3%) to be secular, when compared with the total ‘Indian’ 
population. When compared with each other, those specifically stating a 
New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indian’ identity are slightly more likely to be 
secular (20.2%) than those identifying as New Zealand-born 
‘Indians’ (15.0%). As expected, there are significant differences between 
the New Zealand-born and overseas-born populations of both ‘Indian’ 
and ‘Fijian Indian’ identity groups, with the New Zealand-born ‘Indian’ 
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group significantly more likely to be secular (15.0%) than the overseas-
born ‘Indian’ group (1.9%), while the domestically-born ‘Fijian Indian’ 
group is significantly more likely to be secular (20.2%) than the overseas-
born ‘Fijian Indian’ group (2.3%). The key point here is that the overseas-
born groups are far more likely to report religious affiliations. This has 
significant repercussions on Indian identity demonstrating that both New 
Zealand-born groups incorporate secular characteristics of the total New 
Zealand population. This demonstrates that the New Zealand-born 
groups exhibit a higher degree of integration into majority society than do 
their migrant counterparts. 
Table 7.20: Four Indian identity groups by stated religiosity, 2006 Census. 
Ethnicity:
Secular Religious Total Stated:
n percent n percent n percent
Total Indian population 4,989 4.9 96,366 95.1 101,355 100.0
Indian identity:
Indian, NZ-born 3,336 15.0 18,852 85.0 22,188 100.0
Indian, overseas-born 1,401 1.9 72,282 98.1 73,683 100.0
Fijian Indian identity:
Fiji Indian, NZ-born 138 20.2 546 79.8 684 100.0
Fiji Indian, overseas-born 111 2.3 4,683 97.7 4,794 100.0
Both overseas-born groups are more likely to be religious than their 
domestic counterparts. For instance, overseas-born ‘Indians’ are 13.5% 
more likely to be religious than those born domestically, and those 
specifically stating an overseas-born ‘Fijian Indian’ identity are 18.3% 
more likely to be religious than their domestic-born counterparts. Between 
the ‘Indian’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ groups, nearly identical patterns exist for 
both secular and religious, and the two are nearly identical with ‘Indians’ 
4.9% secular and 95.1% religious, while ‘Fijian Indians’ 4.6% secular and 
95.4% religious. For the four identity groups, birthplace is the significantly 
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more important factor determining religiosity, with overseas-born 
populations of both groups significantly more likely be to religious when 
compared with their domestic-born counterparts, who are significantly 
more likely to be secular. This would confirm the trend that both ‘Indian’ 
and ‘Fijian Indian’ tend to follow the pattern of secularisation amongst 
majority New Zealanders, which might be interpreted as evidence of 
integration, suggesting a growing national identity, or a stronger affinity 
of belonging to New Zealand. Since birthplace is a determining factor in 
the differences between religiosity and secularism, a result of this finding 
would point to the possibility that other ethnic minorities might 
experience similar shifts, or that length of stay in New Zealand for 
migrants may also be a factor contributing to rising patterns of 
secularisation amongst minority groups. 
In terms of religious affiliation, Table 1 (Appendix G) shows that there are 
no major differences between overseas-born and domestically-born 
populations, although Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Sikhism and 
Zoroastrianism are all slightly better represented amongst the overseas-
born population than within domestically-born communities, with 
Hinduism being represented at nearly 15% higher levels amongst the 
overseas-born populations when compared with the New Zealand-born 
populations. This Table also shows that Zoroastrian Parsis are coming 
from predominantly overseas and have begun to establish themselves as a 
viable population in New Zealand. When row percentages are considered, 
Table 2 (Appendix G), all religions show significantly higher percentages 
amongst overseas-born populations, except those specifying Māori 
Christian and Māori Religion affiliations, and those specifying adherence 
to Spiritual and New Age movements, which are significantly higher 
amongst the New Zealand-born populations. This confirms the movement 
towards secularity amongst the New Zealand-born Indian population and 
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displays a characteristic shift towards secularity demonstrated in the total 
New Zealand population.
Table 7.21 compares the four main identity groups according to their 
stated religious affiliation, and exhibits some interesting differences 
between groups. Hinduism is the most stated religion for domestic-born 
(45.6%) and overseas-born (59.6%) ‘Indians,’ as well as for overseas-born 
‘Fijian Indians’ (54.6%), with these populations showing sizable Hindu 
majorities. However, religious affiliation is much more broadly 
distributed amongst the New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indian’ population. 
The religious distribution amongst New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ 
shows roughly one-quarter of this population affiliating with each of the 
Christian (24.1%), Hindu (25.4%), Muslim (27.2%) and secular (20.2%) 
populations, with the remainder, 3.1%, affiliating with other religious 
traditions. This might suggest higher rates of religious conversion to 
another religious or secular belief amongst New Zealand-born ‘Fijian 
Indians.’ 
Table 7.21: Stated religious affiliation and Indian identity groups, 2006 Census. 
Religious 
affiliation:
NZ-born 
Indian
Overseas-born 
Indian
NZ-born 
Fijian Indian
Overseas-born 
Fijian Indian Total Stated
n percent n percent n percent n percent n percent
No Religion
Christianity
Hinduism
Islam
Other religions
Total:
3,336 15.0 1,401 1.9 138 20.2 111 2.3 5,022 4.9
3,927 17.7 12,402 16.8 165 24.1 627 13.1 17,268 16.9
10,122 45.6 43,899 59.6 174 25.4 2,616 54.6 57,192 56.0
2,238 10.1 7,422 10.1 186 27.2 1,386 28.9 11,310 11.1
2,565 11.6 8,559 11.6 21 3.1 54 1.1 11,334 11.1
22,188 100.0 73,683 100.0 684 100.0 4,794 100.0 102,126 100.0
In comparing the four identity groups, domestically-born ‘Fijian Indians’ 
have the highest percentage of Muslims. In comparison, Hinduism, in 
the other three identity groups, is the majority religion, comprising 
nearly half of all domestically-born ‘Indians,’ or more than half of both 
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overseas-born ‘Indians’ and overseas-born ‘Fijian Indians.’ As earlier, 
secularism runs highest in both domestically-born ‘Indian’ (15.0%) and 
domestically-born ‘Fijian Indian’ populations (20.2%). Adherence to 
Christianity is fairly even throughout, although New Zealand-born 
‘Fijian Indian’ populations have the highest percentage (24.1%) of 
Christian adherents when compared with the other three identity 
groups. Both domestically-born and overseas-born ‘Fijian Indians’ have 
the highest percentages of Muslim adherents, 27.2% and 28.9% 
respectively, when compared with their New Zealand-born and 
overseas-born ‘Indian’ counterparts, at 10.1% each. Islam has a higher 
representation rate amongst ‘Fijian Indian’ populations (27.2% for those 
born in New Zealand and 28.9% for those born overseas) that is nearly 
three times that of their ‘Indian’ counterparts (10.1% for those born in 
New Zealand and 10.1% for those born overseas). As expected, other 
religious traditions, e.g. Sikhism, Jainism and Zoroastrianism, are more 
represented in both New Zealand-born and overseas-born ‘Indian’ 
populations, when compared with their ‘Fijian Indian’ counterparts. 
The data presented here demonstrates that the ‘Indian’ ethnic group is 
New Zealand’s most religiously diverse community, adding significant 
populations of minority religions (e.g. Hindus, Sikhs, Zoroastrian Parsis) 
that are not as well-represented as in other Level 1 ethnicities. 
Disaggregation has also shown extensive differentiation within the Level 
2 ‘Indian’ category, and as a result, there is now an extensive network of 
Indian religious organisations and associations that have distinguished 
themselves from the earlier ethnic and cultural groups that formed 
during the earlier years of Indian settlement in New Zealand.457 Such 
diversification and affiliation has been an important element of Indian 
community life in New Zealand, and has helped attract new migrants 
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457 See Appendix K; cf. McGee (1962) and Tiwari (1980). 
and keep them here, contributing to New Zealand’s growing economy 
and its rising trade interest in Asia. 
Education and Income:
A deep diversity framework that questions underlying assumptions of 
ethnic classification needs to view all aspects of diversification both within 
the Indian community itself, and in comparison with other ethnic groups. 
Such an analysis helps to determine how Level 1-2 ethnicities might differ 
when more closely examined. Scrutinising categories of educational 
attainment and income is another way of achieving this aim. 
Table 7.22: Highest qualification by identity groups, ages 15 and above, 2006 Census. 
Highest qualification:
NZ-born 
Indian
OS-born 
Indian
NZ-born 
Fijian Indian
OS-born 
Fijian Indian
Total Indian 
Stated
n % n % n % n % n %
No Qualification 1,289 16.2 6,594 13.9 48 27.1 498 14.8 8,463 14.3
Level 1-4 Certificates 4,524 56.7 14,316 30.1 114 64.4 1,584 47.2 20,676 34.8
Level 5-6 Diplomas 534 6.7 5,223 11.0 6 3.4 489 14.6 6,279 10.6
Bachelor Degree or higher 1,629 20.4 21,375 45.0 9 5.1 786 23.4 23,952 40.3
Total Stated: 7976 100.0 47,508 100.0 177 100.0 3357 100.0 59,370 100.0
Of those with no qualification, New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ are 
significantly more represented (27.1%) than the other identity groups, 
which may put them at a disadvantage. For those with primary 
qualifications (Level 1-4 certificates), the domestic-born ‘Fijian Indian’ 
population has the highest rates (64.4%). For those with secondary 
qualifications (Level 5-6 diplomas), the highest rates of completion are 
shown amongst the overseas-born ‘Fijian Indian’ population (14.6%). The 
lowest rates for completion of secondary qualifications fall to New 
Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ with only 3.4% completion of secondary 
qualifications. As numbers are especially low, it is difficult to assess the 
degree of differentiation of this population with any accuracy, however, it 
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is evident that New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ have higher rates of 
those with no qualification and of those having a primary qualification 
when compared with the other identity groups. 
For those attaining a Bachelors degree or higher, New Zealand-born ‘Fijian 
Indians’ have the lowest achievement level with only 5.1% of those aged 
15 and above attaining a Bachelors or higher degree. In comparison, 
overseas-born ‘Fijian Indians’ are significantly more likely (23.4%) to have 
earned a Bachelors or higher degree.458 In comparison, New Zealand-born 
Indians are significantly more likely to have earned a Bachelors or higher 
degree (20.4%) than their ‘Fijian Indian’ counterparts (5.1%). The only 
identity group to show an achievement rate for completion of a Bachelors 
or higher degree that is higher than the rate for the entire Indian 
population, is the overseas-born ‘Indian’ group, which shows that 45.0% 
have a Bachelors or higher degree. This is nearly double the percentage of 
overseas-born ‘Fijian Indians’ (23.4%). Overall, ‘Fijian Indians’ tend to 
have higher rates for lower qualifications, while ‘Indians’ tend to have 
higher rates of higher qualifications, which is more clearly evident when 
combining the overseas- and New Zealand-born populations of each 
group. This may be due to a more competitive educational system in India 
resulting from a much larger population, or more probably due to the fact 
that many ‘Fijian Indians’ migrated under different circumstances (i.e. in 
the post-coup years) than those ‘Indians’ who came as voluntary migrants, 
which would need to qualify under a more stringent points-based 
immigration system. These differences, however, may also be affected by 
age structure and not just by migrant selectivity. In any case, the above 
analysis demonstrates that applying a deep diversity framework can be 
instructive in highlighting specific differences between subgroup 
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458 Numbers of domestic-born Fijian Indians with higher degrees are presently, however, generally 
too small for solid conclusions to be made. 
populations that might normally remain hidden. It can also help identify if 
any particular communities may be at risk. 
Educational attainment is directly related to income, as those with higher 
degrees will generally earn higher salaries (Maani 2000, US Census Bureau 
2002, Baum et al. 2010). Figure 7.2 views income data and compares the 
total Indian population to those specifying an Asian ethnicity and to the 
total New Zealand population that stated an ethnicity. 
Figure 7.2: Percentage and Income Range for stated ethnicities, ages 15+, 2006 Census. 
Generally, the Indian population compares favourably with both those 
stating Asian ethnicity and with the total population of New Zealand. 
Percentages of Indians earning smaller annual amounts (<$10,000), 
however, are higher than both Asians and the total New Zealand 
population. This may be indicative of a relatively young migrant 
population or higher rates of younger populations that typically earn less. 
At higher income brackets, Indians earn slightly less than both the Asian 
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and total New Zealand populations. At low income levels ($1-$30,000), the 
Indian population is slightly less represented (49.0%) when compared 
with all those stating an Asian ethnicity (54.9%) and with the total New 
Zealand population stating an ethnicity (52.6%). At middle income levels 
($30,001-$70,000) the Indian population is nearly identical (34.5%) to that 
of the total population of New Zealand (33.5%), with all those stating an 
Asian ethnicity at 24.4%. In the upper most income-brackets ($70,001+), 
the Indian population is slightly less represented (5.4%) compared with 
the total New Zealand population that stated an ethnicity (8.2%), while 
those stating an Asian ethnicity are represented at 4.2%. This might show 
that top income earning jobs are usually reserved for those with New 
Zealand experience,459 adding to the Indian population’s perceived 
experience of discrimination, discussed in Chapter 8. 
Table 7.23: Income range and median income by identity groups, age 15+, 2006 Census. 
Income bracket:
NZ-born 
Indian
OS-born 
Indian
NZ-born 
Fijian 
Indian
OS-born 
Fijian 
Indian
Total Indian 
stated
n % n % n % n % n %
Low (loss/none - $30,000) 4,761 61.1 35,889 59.9 117 78.0 2,466 60.7 43,233 60.1
Middle ($30,001 - $70,000) 2,367 30.4 20,919 34.9 33 22.0 1,464 36.0 24,783 34.5
High ($70,001 and above) 666 8.5 3,075 5.1 0 0.0 132 3.2 3,873 5.4
Total: 7,794 100.0 59,883 100.0 150 100.0 4,062 100.0 71,895 100.0
Viewing the data according to the four identity groups confirms the 
finding that those stating a New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indian’ identity earn 
less than the other three groups at both low and middle income levels. At 
high income levels, more New Zealand-born ‘Indians’ are represented 
than the other identity groups, and those stating a New Zealand-born 
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459 This is often a euphemism for employers who do not wish to employ migrants, or only wish to 
hire Pākehā or Māori employees. 
‘Fijian Indian’ identity are not represented in the higher income ranges of 
those earning more than $70,000 annually.460 
Median Income for the four identity groups is compared below. While 
Median Income for the total Indian population is $27,126, both overseas-
born ‘Indian’ and overseas-born ‘Fijian Indian’ identity groups compared 
favourably well, earning only slightly higher than that of the total Indian 
population ($27,324 and $26,776 respectively). Of the four identity groups, 
New Zealand-born ‘Indians’ earned less than the median income of the 
total stated Indian population aged 15 and above ($25,784), while those 
stating a ‘Fijian Indian’ identity earned less than half ($10,833) when 
compared to the total Indian population. Compared with the total New 
Zealand population, both overseas-born identity groups, and the New 
Zealand-born ‘Indian’ identity group, had median incomes that compared 
well with the total stated population, while the New Zealand-born ‘Fijian 
Indian’ identity group had significantly lower income. 
Figure 7.3: Median income by identity groups, ages 15+, 2006 Census.461 
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460 The data may be affected by age structures as these are not age-standardised.
461 In computing Median Income, the Loss and Zero income categories were removed. 
Such an analysis of identity groups suggests that the low median income 
for New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ group may largely be attributed to 
the lower levels of educational attainment demonstrated earlier. 
In order to determine whether birthplace or ethnicity is more of a factor, 
the above data is further disaggregated in Table 7.24. By birthplace, no 
significant differences are apparent when compared with the total Indian 
population, although those ‘Indians’ and ‘Fijian Indians’ born in New 
Zealand appear to make slightly higher salaries. When breaking down the 
data according to stated ethnicity, no significant differences are apparent 
when compared with the total Indian population, although ‘Fijian Indians’ 
are slightly under-represented in the higher income levels compared with 
the total Indian population.
Table 7.24: Income bracket by birthplace and identity group, age 15+, 2006 Census. 
Income bracket:
Birthplace Identity group
Total Indian
NZ-born OS-born Indian Fijian Indian
n % n % n % n % n %
Low (loss/none - $30,000) 4,878 61.4 38,355 60.0 40,650 60.1 2,583 61.3 43,233 60.1
Middle ($30,001 - $70,000) 2,400 30.2 22,383 35.0 23,286 34.4 1,497 35.5 24,783 34.5
High ($70,001 and above) 666 8.4 3,207 5.0 3,741 5.5 132 3.1 3,873 5.4
Total: 7,944 100.0 63,945 100.0 67,677 100.0 4,212 100.0 71,895 100.0
The application of a deep diversity framework for an analysis of the 
education and income data has proved useful in highlighting significant 
differences between subgroups, with the New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indian’ 
population exhibiting both lower educational attainment levels and lower 
income earning potential than the other subgroups, the Asian population 
in general, and the total New Zealand population. 
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7.3 Conclusion
This chapter summarises 2006 and 2013 Census data on the Indian 
population, examining differences between four specific identity groups 
defined by birthplace (domestic- or overseas-born), and by stated 
ethnicity (‘Indian’ or ‘Fijian Indian’). Other stated identities (see Table 7.4) 
were not included due to low reported numbers. Such an examination 
reveals the complex nature of Indian identity that emerges from the 
census data, and portrays the population, not so much as one 
homogenous group, but one showing marked differences within the four 
select identity groups, as seen through such variables as birth country, 
spoken language, religious affiliation, education and income. Significant 
differences emerge between the four select identity groups, especially in 
terms of language acquisition and transmission, which demonstrates that 
both the Punjabi and Gujarati languages are being passed on at 
significantly greater rates than Hindi, the most widely spoken South 
Asian language and currently the fourth most spoken language in New 
Zealand. Religious affiliation trends also show a marked increase in 
secularity for the domestically-born, portraying them as nearly eight 
times more likely to be secular when compared with their overseas-born 
counterparts. This trend could have significant implications for religious 
identity, while indicating growing acculturation amongst settled Indians 
and increased integration in a national identity. In terms of educational 
attainment, ‘Fijian Indians’ demonstrate a higher rate of lower educational 
qualifications while those stating an ‘Indian’ identity portray elevated 
rates of higher educational qualifications. As a result, New Zealand-born 
‘Fijian Indians’ appear to be somewhat disadvantaged when compared 
with the other identity groups. Presented income data confirms this 
statistic. These findings have emerged based on the application of a deep 
diversity framework for the analysis of census data. 
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While subgroup differentiation is apparent within the census data even 
when only Level 2 ethnicities (i.e. Indian) are requested on the census 
form, the absence of such prompts for ethnic subgroup affiliation (e.g. 
‘Gujarati,’ ‘Punjabi’) creates low numbers that make comparisons difficult. 
As such, the only ethnically identified subgroup appearing in sufficient 
numbers for analysis was the ‘Fijian Indian’ category, and comparisons 
between it and ‘Indian nfd,’ as well as division between overseas and 
New Zealand-born Indians were carried out. If Level 3 subgroup prompts 
appeared in the census, larger numbers would be stating regional (e.g. 
Maharashtrian, Tamilian), linguistic (e.g. Malayalam, Konkani), ethnic 
(e.g. Anglo Indian) and religious (e.g. Sikh) identities462 than are currently 
represented in the available ethnicity data, and further differentiation in 
the Indian population would be readily apparent.
Overall, given the differences between the four identity groups presented 
in this chapter, it should be evident that census homogenisation of Indian 
ethnicity masks the heterogeneity evident within the ‘Indian nfd’ 
population. As with Level 1 and 2 ethnic categories, further distinctions 
within the population can not only help identify particularly 
disadvantaged segments, but can also help other subgroups achieve better 
political representation and greater access to resources. Such identification 
may also aid minority inclusion in a national identity and improve 
incidences of perceived discrimination, highlighted in Chapter Eight. 
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462 While such distinctions are not all necessarily ‘ethnic,’ the fact that small portions of the 
population are identifying themselves as such on the census ethnicity question is noteworthy. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
SELECT SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Identity is always plural and in process. (Brah 1996:197). 
The ethnic and cultural origin questions [on censuses] result in 
complexities and ambiguities, although results fit in with the 
argument that ethnicity involves choices and complexities rarely 
captured by simple or ‘objective’ questions (Goldscheider 2002:82). 
The landscapes of group identity around the world are no longer 
familiar anthropological objects, insofar as groups are no longer 
tightly territorialized, spatially bounded, historically 
unselfconscious, or culturally homogenous (Appadurai 1991, pp. 
191–192). 
8.1 Introduction
While the recent census results presented in Chapter 7 allowed for an 
analysis based on stated ethnicity (‘Indian’ or ‘Fijian Indian’), these do not 
adequately portray the substantial diversities within the population and 
controvert underlying identities that are equally, if not more, significant. 
Census categories are limited and a more extensive examination and 
analysis of ethnicity and identity is possible by utilising a deep diversity 
approach. Census statistics present a misleading notion of a singular 
Indian ethnic identity (i.e. ‘Indian nfd’) when there are deeper, more 
nuanced, differences. This chapter presents select results from a web-
based survey of people of Indian ethnicity resident in New Zealand 
between 2008-2013. The survey reveals the complexity of Indian identity 
otherwise obscured by the census, and demonstrates that ethnicity is too 
broad a concept to be reduced to a single term. Since census formulations 
of questions on race or ethnicity often force respondents to select a single 
group when their own identities are more complex (Goldscheider 
2002:79), and fixed lists of potential responses, provided as examples, can 
often influence write-in responses,463 the survey data presented here 
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463 The “example effect” referred to earlier (c.f. Waters 2000:1736).
allows for a richer and deeper analysis. While 79 distinct questions were 
asked of survey respondents, this chapter presents findings and analysis 
that are relevant only to the themes of self-reported identity and 
discrimination.464 
Section 8.2 presents data that supports a wider interpretation of identity 
than that provided by existing state categories, which generally assume 
that members of any particular ethnic group all share a single ethnic 
identity with similar, if not the same, characteristics and values (cf. 
Wimmer 2009, 2013; Sen 2006). It presents key identity variables crucial to 
an understanding of Indian identity (e.g. ancestral region, language, 
religion) to demonstrate their wide variety. The presentation of such data 
is contextualised within a wider theoretical frame that posits the inclusion 
of such various attributes as religion, language, culture, a sense of a 
shared history, and a connection with the powerful symbols associated 
with an ethnic group, as being essential building blocks of ethnic identity 
formation (Cohen 2004). These elements serve to reinforce and perpetuate 
a subjective feeling of belonging, thus providing an important theoretical 
frame which supports deep diversity. A sense of ethnic belonging imparts 
sentiments of dignity, self-respect and pride in its unique character, 
continuity with the past, connections to homeland, and survival beyond 
the self, allowing minority members to better adjust to, and integrate with, 
majority society (de Vos 1995, Cohen 2004, Guibernau 2013). 
One result of migration and integration is that most minorities now 
profess multiple group affiliations and more complex ethnic identities 
(Castles & Miller 2009). The data presented here establishes the 
heterogeneity of Indian identity in New Zealand as not being limited to 
the use of the term ‘Indian’—that regional, linguistic and religious 
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464 Unreported results from the survey will make their way into future articles.
affiliations, among others, are equally as important as ethnicity in self-
identification. While normative, ideological and operative values of 
shallow approaches to multicultural policies have produced statistics 
based on census formulations of ethnicity,465 a deep diversity framework 
allows for a fuller explication of ethnicity and identity than is achievable 
through a state instrument such as a census. Such an approach posits that 
survey respondents, when asked about their identity in the absence of any 
‘example effect,’ will use innumerable terms to describe themselves. As 
‘Indian’ and ‘Fijian-Indian’ responses, the two most popular Indian 
ethnicity categories on the Census, were utilised in Chapter 7 to further 
analysis, crosstabulation with the select variables of migrant status466 and 
identity467 and will be used here.468
Section 8.3 examines an emergent issue from the survey—the perceived 
incidence and experience of discrimination—which has profound impacts 
on both individual and group identity,469 and has sociopolitical 
implications for advancing minority aspirations and recognition. That 
discrimination continues is an ongoing issue demonstrating the inability 
of shallow policy approaches to mitigate and alleviate its pernicious 
effects. Presenting direct evidence of the extent and pervasiveness of its 
existence through the presentation of survey respondent experience 
should obviate the need for deeper policy initiatives. Normative values of 
shallow policy approaches assume that minorities need better integration, 
and stress the need for improved majority toleration of minorities—in other 
words, the state tends to focus more on becoming better at existing policies 
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465 Census formulations in New Zealand long predate shallow multiculturalism. 
466 i.e. born domestically or overseas. 
467 Described below.
468 In some instances, age was useful as a variable to support migrant status during the discussion 
of language usage and cultural transmission, and gender crosstabulations were instructive during 
the discussion of discrimination.
469 See Mossakowski (2003), Sellers & Shelton (2003), Sellers et al. (2006), Yip et al. (2008). 
designed to mitigate racism, rather than implementing new strategies 
with different target groups and deeper approaches. Ideological values 
that champion minority integration into existing national identities usually 
exclude minority individual and group conceptions of personality and 
selfhood, and the failure to recognise the significance of appropriate 
minority accommodation may therefore negate stated policy objectives. 
Operative values that advance minority dependance on majorities only 
serve to strengthen paternalistic reactive attitudes towards racism rather 
than addressing more proactive active engagement responses that deeper 
policy approaches require. A deep diversity framework focuses on the 
mitigation of discrimination at its source through including and working 
with dominant majorities rather than merely requiring minorities to better 
integrate. 
Background
Existing literature on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand does not fully 
address nor quantify the demographic changes to the population since 
more recent migrant arrivals. While the understanding of recent change 
has been largely anecdotal, the findings presented in this chapter 
differentiate Indian identity from that presented in recent censuses. As an 
example, much previous work published prior to 2005 focused largely on 
Punjabi and Gujarati migrants as the main Indian migrant communities 
(Grimes 1957; McGee 1960, 1962, 1993; Taher 1965, 1970; Tiwari 1980; 
McLeod 1980, 1984, 1986; Zodgekar 1980; Leckie 1981, 1995b, 1998; 
McLeod & Bhullar 1992),470 with most migrating directly from India. A 
second body of literature followed the more recent influx of Fijian-Indians 
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470 Additional research by Atkinson (1969), Williams (1976, 1977), Kirwan (1978), Roy (1978), Budhia 
(1979), Kasanji (1980, 1982), Palakshapa (1980), McDonald (1982), McGill (1982), Singh (1984), Patel 
(1987), Meanger (1989), Corne (1996) and Murphy (2007) is also worth noting.
in the aftermath of the 1987 and 2000 coups in Fiji.471 Some recent work 
still examines Gujarati and Punjabi populations (Chhiba 2007, Harrington-
Watt 2011, Leckie & Patel 2011, Bola 2014). Other recent research, while 
acknowledging the diversification of the Indian population, does not 
adequately quantify the rise of additional Indian communities from other 
geographic, linguistic and cultural regions, as well as new religious 
groups, that comprise a quickly-diversifying population (Leckie 2006, 
2010, 2011; Friesen & Kearns 2008; Friesen 2008a; Singh & Singh 2011; 
Swarbrick 2012). Leckie’s Indian Settlers (2007), however, does an 
exceptional job of bringing together the history of Indian migration and 
settlement in New Zealand into a single volume and discusses the 
changing demographic brought about by recent immigration, but where 
its focus is primarily qualitative, this chapter is quantitative. 
Until the 1980s over 90% of Indians in New Zealand traced their roots 
back to Gujarat (Zodgekar 2010:70) with the remainder hailing mostly 
from the Punjab. This profile changed dramatically since 1987 
immigration reform. Zodgekar (2010) discusses this recent Indian 
demographic and describes the religious and linguistic affiliation of those 
identifying as members of the ‘Indian nfd’ ethnic group based on 2006 
census data, yet no research has attempted to quantify the diversity of 
Indian identities472 in New Zealand based on data collected directly. This 
research, built on previous recent work discussing growing diversity in 
the population (Bandyopadhyay 2006, 2010; Leckie, 2007, 2010, 2011; 
Zodgekar 2010) attempts to trace the possible contours of contemporary 
Indian identity in New Zealand; that Punjabi and Gujarati communities, 
while exceptionally well-established, are no longer the sole 
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471 See Bedford (1989), Kashyap (1989), Shameem (1993, 1994, 1995, 1998), Grant (1997), Narayan & 
Smyth (2003), Lal (2006b).
472 Individual Indian identity can often be construed as an ad hoc mixture of birthplace, spoken 
language(s), caste, and regional, religious and ancestral affiliation. 
representatives of the Indian community, and that more recently arrived 
migrant populations from other Indian cultural, geographic and linguistic 
regions, as well as from other countries of the diaspora, are growing 
rapidly and have quickly established themselves as distinct communities 
within the Indian ethnic population. 
This increase in Indian diversity has helped fuel the recent growth of 
Indian sociocultural, linguistic, sporting and religious organisations and 
has helped make the Indian population more varied and visible than it 
was a decade ago.473 New religious communities are overseeing the 
construction of new houses of worship to cater to this rapidly diversifying 
population,474 with new alliances being formed between the expanding 
number of Indian cultural, educational and linguistic organisations that 
cater to the growing demands of new migrants and their desire for 
recognition. Compared to a decade ago, Indian migrant communities now 
come from a greater variety of birth countries, speak a wider variety of 
languages, and have an exceptionally wide array of religious proclivities, 
cultural and linguistic needs. 
When properly queried, respondents should give more varied and 
complex responses regarding identity and ethnicity than those currently 
recorded through existing census questions of birthplace, ethnicity, 
language and religion. Other identifiers and subgroups exist. Through 
demonstrating variability between populations (e.g. that migrant status or 
gender can impact self-identification or one’s experience of 
discrimination) I hope to show that a deep diversity approach is not only 
useful to help fine-tune the delivery of policy, but also essential is 
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473 See Appendix K for a list of current Indian organisations and associations in New Zealand. 
474 For instance, the Sri Balaji Temple Trust in Hamilton has recently purchased property and is 
currently proceeding with additional fund-raising for temple renovation. 
determining the importance of subgroup variability as opposed to single 
identifiers like ‘Indian.’
8.2 Complex identities
This section focuses on the quantitative results from the survey that help 
define the makeup of a more complex Indian identity than those reported 
in the Census. Earlier chapters have already discussed the importance of 
state recognition of minority identities, and the wide gap that exists 
between state interpretations of minority identity and how minorities self-
identify. This is crucial to a deep diversity framework, as, established in 
earlier chapters, incorporating minority identity into a shared national 
identity can be instrumental in aiding social cohesion between minority 
and majority populations (Miller 1995, Kearns & Forrest 2000:1001, 
Putnam 2007, Novy et al. 2012:1879, Reeskens & Wright 2012), aid the 
settlement, adaptation and integration of new migrants, lead minorities to 
more certain forms of belonging (e.g. permanent residency, citizenship), 
and enhance the overall wellbeing of minority communities in host 
societies (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2006, Grant 2007, Ager & Strang 2008, 
Dhingra 2008, Fischer & Boer 2011, Doerschler & Jackson 2012, Ward & 
Stuart 2012). A greater sense of minority belonging can also foster 
increased participation in all levels of society (de Wit & Koopmans 2005, 
Parekh 2006). Data presented here supports the diversity of expressed 
identities within the survey population. Exposing the disparities between 
the two interpretations of identity may be a first step in moving from 
shallow forms of diversity management to more inclusive, deeper, forms 
of diversity governance. 
These results better represent the diversity within the Indian population 
than those afforded by census statistics. Key demographic variables of the 
survey population are presented below.
347
Table 8.1: Socio-demographic profile of survey respondents (n=1124). 
Frequency Frequency
Variable: n % Variable: n %
Age ranges: Migrant status:
15-19 years 43 3.8 New Zealand-born 122 11.6
20-29 years 244 21.8 Overseas-born 934 88.4
30-39 years 263 23.5 Total: 1056 100.0
40-49 years 261 23.3
50-59 years 204 18.2 Gender:
60-69 years 78 7.0 male 674 60.3
70 and above 25 2.2 female 443 39.7
Total: 1118 100.0 Total: 1117 100.0
Ancestral homeland in South Asia475
Respondents were asked to select their parent’s homeland (state or region) 
within South Asia.476 This is an important identity marker for Indian 
ethnicity, as each region or state contains its own particular languages and 
customs, distinct from other regions within South Asia. It removes any 
association with birth country (as reported in census figures) and asks 
respondents to state their parent’s original regional affiliation (often a 
proxy for ethnicity), where known. Much in the way that Māori first 
choose to identify by waka or iwi affiliation (in lieu of ‘Māori’), those of 
Indian ethnicity often first identify with particular geographic regions (e.g. 
West Bengal), languages (e.g. Malayalam), or country of birth (e.g. Fijian-
Indian) rather than identifying themselves as ‘Indian.’ Many born outside 
of India, whose families have lived for generations overseas, may be 
uncertain of their ancestral homeland, as these ties were often lost over 
successive generations, hence the don’t know/not sure category is an 
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475 South Asia is used here rather than India as many in the Indian diaspora emigrated before 
partition in 1947 split the subcontinent into India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
476 Respondents were allowed to give more than one answer if their parents came from different 
regions.
important identity marker to include as it provides insight into one’s 
connectedness to India. Many who have lost touch with their ancestral 
regions in South Asia might be able to identify a particular geopolitical or 
linguistic region (e.g. somewhere in Bihar), but may be unaware of the 
specific village, town or city from which their ancestors migrated. The 
majority of those in the global Indian diaspora that are descendants of 
indentured servitude or girmitiya,477 were born in, for example, Fiji, South 
Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Guiana and the West Indies, and have mostly 
lost touch with relatives who may still dwell in South Asia (Lal 2006a). 
Survey results presented in Figure 8.1 demonstrate that the current 
composition of the Indian population is no longer made up of 
predominantly Gujarati, Punjabi and Fijian Indian communities, and 
differs significantly from the ‘Indian nfd’ results in the 2006 and 2013 
Censuses. Census data on Indian ethnicity renders invisible distinguishing 
features of the Indian demographic that contribute to the highly 
heterogeneous population revealed using a deep diversity approach. 
While the statistics presented are not based on a representative survey of 
the entire Indian population in New Zealand, they are, nonetheless, 
indicative of the hidden diversity within the ‘Indian’ census population, 
with distinct groups possessing their own regional language, culture, 
customs and cuisines, not unlike Europe. In this sense, to say one is 
‘Indian’ is the South Asian equivalent of using Level 1 census ethnicity 
categories like ‘European’ or ‘Polynesian,’ when regional variations are 
more important identifiers. To further this analogy of nested hierarchies of 
identity, stating that one is ‘Bengali’ or ‘Maharashtrian’ rather than 
‘Indian’ is akin to stating that, for example, one is ‘German’ or ‘French’ 
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477 See Lal (1983).
Figure 8.1: Ancestral region in South Asia (n=1044).478 
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478 Survey respondents could tick more than a single ancestral region. 
rather than ‘European,’ or stating one’s specific iwi affiliation rather than 
‘Māori.’479 Larger common denominators may be useful for state purposes 
or to further majority understanding, but does little to support ethnic self-
identification. 
There is now extensive diversification within the Indian population,480 and 
other (non-Gujarati non-Punjabi) Indian regional groups are quickly 
increasing in population,481 forming new sociocultural, religious, regional 
and linguistic groups and associations, as well as new alliances. The 
addition of new ethnic and religious organisations has helped increase 
overall Indian visibility and recognition. This can be seen with the rapid 
growth of distinct cultural associations (e.g. Kerala, Probasee Bengali), 
linguistic groups (e.g. Marathi, Tamil), or religious organisations (e.g. 
Kerala Christian, Fijian-Indian Hindu) groupings.482 The 3.3% of those 
survey respondents that do not know their ancestry are mostly made up of 
those Indians born in Fiji and South Africa who have largely lost touch 
with their ancestral homeland. Surprisingly, such a loss appears to have 
both strengthened one’s religious identity, where the loss of homeland is 
replaced by one’s increased faith and devotion,483 which in turn fuels the 
Sanskritisation484 of the predominantly low-caste indentured servants that 
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479 It is useful to note here that the Māori word iwi, usually interpreted as ‘tribe,’ has additional 
meanings connoting ‘strength’ and ‘bones,’ in that the important individual parts (bones) comprise 
and support a larger whole (Moorfield 2011). 
480 See Figure 8.1, where only 31.5% of survey respondents reported either Gujarat or Punjab as an 
ancestral homeland. 
481 McGee (1962, 1993), McLeod (1980, 1986), Tiwari (1980), Zodgekar (1980), Leckie (1981, 1998, 
2007) and Murphy (2007), have all established Gujarati and Punjabi populations as foundational 
Indian communities in New Zealand. 
482 See Appendix K for a list of currently known Indian cultural, linguistic and religious 
organisations currently in New Zealand. 
483 This phenomenon is observed in Fijian-Indian Hindu populations in New Zealand, which are 
anecdotally seen as more religious than their India-born counterparts. While evidence supporting 
this exists in my survey results, a discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
484 Sanskritisation is an anthropological term used to describe the process of raising one’s caste 
affiliation to one of higher status, usually through increasing one’s use of religious ritual and 
ascription (see Srinivas 1952, Charsley 1998). 
migrated from India in the second wave of the Indian diaspora.485 This 
process has been especially well represented amongst girmitiyas and their 
descendants, and is currently evident in Fijian-Indian and South African-
Indian populations in New Zealand. Sanskritisation also constitutes a 
possible reason why original girmitiyas may have changed their 
surnames486 or conveniently forgotten or failed to pass on their original 
names and caste affiliations to subsequent generations. Such intra-group 
discrimination is not unknown amongst Indian populations in New 
Zealand.487 It also provides additional evidence of internal diversification 
within the population. If group and subgroup boundaries are both defined 
by processes of group inclusion and exclusion, than surely intra-group 
discrimination is ample evidence of diversification within the ‘Indian nfd’ 
population in New Zealand.
Migrant status
While Chapter Seven focused on the ethnic categories of ’Indian’ and 
’Fijian Indian’ in the census (being the only two categories with sufficient 
numbers for analysis, this chapter utilises migrant status (i.e. born 
overseas or born in New Zealand) in order to analyse additional identity 
differentiation.488 In some places, both age range and gender proved 
useful for crosstabulations. As much of the subsequent analysis uses 
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485 See Section 5.2. 
486 Indian surnames are often markers for one’s caste and religious affiliations. 
487 See the earlier discussion of the Jacinta Lal story regarding discrimination between groups of 
Indians in New Zealand. 
488 In the earlier data analysis stage of this thesis, an analysis based on the strength of respondent 
agreement or disagreement with identifying more as either Indian or Kiwi (Questions 10 & 11 on 
the survey) was discussed and trialled. Four possible identification models presented themselves 
based on the data: 1) New Zealand-born that strongly identified as Kiwi, 2) New Zealand-born that 
strongly identified as Indian, 3) Overseas-born that strongly identified as Kiwi, and 4) Overseas-
born that strongly identified as Indian. While an analysis based on these four identity groups 
would have proved illuminating, there was insufficient data (in terms of actual numbers in cells) in 
two of the four categories, needed for a robust analysis. Crosstabulations for chi-square analysis 
generally require minimum cell counts of five or greater. 
migrant status, Table 8.1 provides the percentages of overseas-born and 
New Zealand-born from the survey used throughout this chapter.
Identity terms
Respondents were instructed to “Enter some words or terms that you 
might use to describe yourself.” This was the only wholly open-ended 
question in the survey, as opposed to providing a preset list of terms for 
respondents to tick, in order to counter the ‘example effect.’ While 468 
respondents (42.2%) skipped this question, 642 respondents (57.8%) wrote 
in one or more descriptive terms to self-identify.489 A total of 144 distinct 
terms were recorded,490 presented in Table 8.2. 
The overwhelming majority of responses (60.8%) chose to self-identify 
using a term denoting nationality or ethnicity with either a single or 
hyphenated term of identification, while many used terms representing 
qualities or attributes that they perceived they had, or identified as coming 
from a particular regional or geopolitical location, or with a particular 
religion. This demonstrates the importance of regional affiliation and 
belonging to one’s identity, which has significant implications for the 
notion of a shared national identity. This contrasts with the shallow forms 
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489 While the literature suggests that open-ended questions have higher responses rates in email or 
web-based surveys when compared to traditional paper questionnaires (Bachmann et al. 1996, Shin 
et al. 2012), no comparable literature discussing response rates for open- versus closed-ended 
questions on web-based surveys was found. However, the ‘burden’ of open-ended responses, that 
respondents would need to be ‘highly motivated’ to be expected to respond to more challenging 
open-ended questions, and the rate of survey ‘abandonment’ being the highest during the asking of 
open-ended questions on web-based surveys, was discussed in the literature (Crawford et al. 2001). 
As a possible explanation for the response rate received for a single open-ended question in an 
otherwise completely close-ended questionnaire format, I suggest that most respondents on web-
based surveys are more interested in ticking boxes quickly, and have a tendency to skip over 
questions that require more thought and time to consider, rather than pausing to answer an open-
ended question. Even so, a 58% response rate for this open-ended question would not be 
considered ‘low’ and shows high respondent motivation and interest in answering the question. 
490 Rather than present a list of terms, I have grouped them into similar themes by the type of term 
used. For instance, many respondents listed geographic terms denoting ancestral region (e.g. 
Punjabi, Bengali), while many used religious terms (e.g. Sikh, Christian) to self-identify, and others 
used particular adjectives to describe specific qualities about themselves (e.g. easy-going, broad-
minded).
of identification requested on the census. Although the Census and survey 
questions are framed differently, the survey results at least demonstrate 
the types of responses that may be received in the absence of any ‘example 
effect.’ 
Table 8.2: Identity terms used, grouped by category.491 
Identity terms used: n
% of 
responses 
(n=1194)
% of 
cases 
(n=645)
Nationality or ethnicity (e.g. Kiwi, Indian, Indo-Fijian) 726 60.8 112.6
Quality/attribute (e.g. broad-minded, cosmopolitan) 117 9.8 18.1
Geographic or political region in India (e.g. Punjabi, Malayalee) 64 5.4 9.9
Religious term (e.g. Hindu, Christian, Sikh) 57 4.8 8.8
Cultural term (e.g. bi- or multicultural, has strong cultural ties) 50 4.2 7.8
Occupational term (e.g. accountant, employee, nurse, teacher) 37 3.1 5.7
Gender/familial term (e.g. female, male, mother, son, husband) 29 2.4 4.5
Citizenship/residency status term (e.g. dual citizen, 3rd gen.) 25 2.1 3.9
Educational term (e.g. educated, student, well-read, PhD) 10 0.8 1.6
Caste designation (e.g. Brahmin, Iyar, Kshatriya) 13 1.1 2.0
Language term (Telugu speaker, Haryanvi, multi-lingual) 6 0.5 0.9
Income or economic class (e.g. middle class, money saver) 3 0.3 0.5
Age-related term (e.g. young, old, 25 years old, retired) 2 0.2 0.3
Other term 55 4.6 8.5
Total responses: 1,194 100.0 185.1
To highlight the differences between the example effect in the census and 
the self-identified terms used in the survey, I have expanded the 
‘Nationality or ethnicity’ terms used above into their nationality or 
geographic regions, presented below. These survey statistics demonstrate 
how those that chose to identify using a nationality or regional identity 
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491 The total percentage of cases (i.e. survey respondents) exceeds 100% as respondents could 
denote multiple terms. Of those that responded (n=645) 45.7% gave a single term, 33.3% gave two 
distinct terms, 13.9% gave 3 distinct terms, and 7.1% gave 4 or more terms. The most number of 
terms given by a single respondent (Respondent #62) was 12. 
would define themselves. It is interesting to note that nearly 40% of those 
identifying a nationality or ethnicity chose to use the term ‘Indian’ (or 
Table 8.3: Identity terms for nationality or ethnicity.492 
Identity terms using nationality or ethnicity, 
singly or hyphenated: n
% of 
responses 
(n=726)
Indian (or similar term) (e.g. Desi, Hindustani, South Asian) 289 39.8
New Zealander, Kiwi, New Zealand-born (or similar term) 194 26.7
Kiwi-Indian, Indo-Kiwi, New Zealand-Indian (or similar) 124 17.1
Fiji-Indian, Indo-Fijian (or similar term) 71 9.8
Other Asia (e.g. Singaporean, Malaysian, Southeast Asian) 13 1.8
African, South African (or similar term) 11 1.5
North American (e.g. American, Canadian) 8 1.1
European 3 0.4
Māori 2 0.3
Pacific Islander (or similar term) 2 0.3
Other 9 1.2
Total: 726 100.0
similar term) in the absence of an ‘example effect,’ compared with the 
93.2%493 that did so on the Census, where ethnic examples are provided. 
Also, while 5.4% of Census respondents wrote in ‘Fijian Indian,’ 9.8% of 
survey responses did so. More importantly, 26.7% of all survey responses 
chose to self-identify as ‘Kiwi’ or ‘New Zealander’ while an additional 
17.1% self-identified with both countries using a hyphenated term like 
‘Kiwi-Indian’ or ‘Indo-Kiwi.’ Together, those responses demonstrating 
‘Kiwi/New Zealander’ (and similar) and hyphenated ‘Kiwi-Indian’ (or 
similar) affiliations accounted for a combined 43.8% of all responses, 
demonstrating strong affiliation between Indian identity and a sense of 
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492 Where respondents wrote separate terms for ‘Indian’ or ‘Kiwi,’ (e.g. where these terms were 
separated by a comma), the terms were categorised as separate terms. Where identity terms were 
hyphenated (e.g. ‘Indo-Kiwi,’ ‘Kiwi-Indian’) these were placed in the hyphenated category above. 
493 See Table 7.4, 2006 Census. 
‘belonging’ in New Zealand. This provides empirical evidence that a 
greater number (44%) of survey responses identify with being both ‘Kiwi’ 
and ‘Indian’ than those identifying solely as ‘Indian’ (40%), demonstrating 
strong support for the notion of a shared national identity discussed in 
previous chapters. Much of the shallow policy discourse work that focuses 
on minority integration (i.e. that minorities must be better integrated or 
assimilated into majorities as the hosting population) appears to have 
already been accomplished. What remains then is for majorities to do their 
fair share of the accommodating. 
As for regional affiliations, 10% of respondents identified with terms 
signaling a strong regional identification within India, using geopolitical 
boundaries in addition to the Gujaratis and Punjabis identified by the 
Census. In fact, those with Dravidian494 identities (40.7%) self-identified in 
greater numbers than those Gujaratis and Punjabis (26.6%) from North 
India, perhaps reflecting a southern predilection for distinguishing 
themselves, both regionally and linguistically, from North Indians. 
Table 8.4: Identity terms used for regional geopolitical affiliations within India. 
Identity terms for 
regional affiliations: n
% of responses 
(n=64)
% of cases 
(n=642)
Tamilian 14 21.9 2.2
South Indian 12 18.8 1.9
Punjabi 11 17.2 1.7
Gujarati 6 9.4 0.9
Maharashtrian 5 7.8 0.8
Malayali 6 9.4 0.9
Bengali 4 6.3 0.6
North Indian 2 3.1 0.3
Anglo-Indian 2 3.1 0.3
Goan 2 3.1 0.3
Total: 64 100.0 10.0
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494 Represented in this table by ‘Tamilian’ and ‘South Indian’ responses.
This confirms a strong Dravidian regional identification that South Indian 
communities are having on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand, and 
demonstrates strong identity assertion and differentiation from North 
Indian populations formerly dominated by Gujaratis and Punjabis. These 
types of responses signify an exceptionally determined identification with 
ancestral homeland, regardless of country of birth, which is not evident in 
Census statistics.
In terms of religious affiliation, 8.9% of all self-identifying respondents 
used a religious term, 45.6% of whom identified as ‘Hindu,’ 15.8% as 
‘religious,’ and smaller numbers as members of other religions or as 
‘secular.’ Regarding other types of self-identification,495 2.0% of 
respondents used a caste identifier to proclaim their caste (e.g. Brahmin) 
or jāti496 affiliation, while 5.7% identified themselves by their profession, 
Table 8.5: Identity terms used for religious affiliations. 
Identity terms for 
religious affiliations: n
% of 
responses 
(n=57)
% of cases 
(n=642)
Hindu 26 45.6 4.0
religious or spiritual 9 15.8 1.4
Parsi/Zoroastrian 6 10.5 0.9
Christian 5 8.8 0.8
Sikh 4 7.0 0.6
Muslim 3 5.3 0.5
secular 3 5.3 0.5
Jewish 1 1.8 0.2
Total: 57 100.0 8.9
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495 See Table 8.2.
496 While caste is identified with varna (;$7<), one’s jāti (*dv_matradv_matra8) is often a more relevant identifier. Jātis 
usually refer to or associate with a traditional job function or tribe and is used to denote any one of 
thousands of caste (varna) subgroups, such as clans, communities and sub-communities within 
India (see Mandelbaum 1970, Chapter 2, or Tyler 1973, Chapter 8, for classic discussions of varna 
and jāti). 
job or occupation.497 The largest category of responses however, after those 
using Indian or New Zealander/Kiwi designations, were those that used 
particular qualities, adjectives or nouns to identify themselves. 18.1% of 
respondents used words like ‘broad-minded,’ ‘confident,’ ‘humble,’ 
‘migrant,’ ‘resilient,’ ‘respectful’ or ‘vegetarian.‘ Respondents also left 
telling comments in addition to stating identity terms.498 Many of these 
reinforce the depth to which respondents still feel very much connected to 
their ancestral homeland, regardless of where they were born or when 
they migrated. Those selected are poignant examples of how strongly 
respondents felt about expressing particular identities. 
These comments testify to the increasing complexities of one’s Indian 
identity, a feature of deep diversity. There are some interesting cases. 
Respondent 361 used the single identity term, Kiwi even though he is a 
35-39 year old Indian male born in Kenya who migrated directly to New 
Zealand in 2003, and disagreed with Question 10 identifying himself as an 
Indian. Respondent 654 commented on the general disgust felt amongst 
ethnic minorities after the Paul Henry incidents mentioned in Chapter 1. 
These comments generally show that respondents, although strongly 
identifying with being Indian, also strongly identify with their adopted 
homeland, many of whom consider themselves full Kiwis and are proud 
to be living in New Zealand. Such comments are consistent with 
theoretical considerations on the importance that ethnic boundary making, 
identity and belonging have on both individual and group formations and 
constructions of self-worth (Barth 1969, Guibernau 2013, Wimmer 2013). 
Creating a strong vision of oneself as being both Indian and Kiwi, 
therefore, represents an important integration marker—that one’s 
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497 See Table 8.2. Some of these responses include ‘accountant,’ ‘Ayurvedic practitioner,’ ‘musician,’ 
‘nurse,’ ‘political activist,’ ‘scientist,’ ‘software engineer,’ ‘teacher,’ or ‘volunteer.’
498 See Table 8.6. 
Table 8.6: Select respondent comments, Question 11 on identity.499 
No. Comment: 
204 “NZ citizen of Indian origin. You can take me out of India but can’t take India out of 
me.”
244 “I love & am privileged to live in NZ & love my Indian identity. Proud to be Indian.”
278 “Indian by birth. Kiwi by choice.”
308 “All Blacks Indian.”
369 “Indian in my attitude and values around family, work ethic and value of education, 
but Kiwi in most aspects of my lifestyle.”
370 “Jewish-New Zealander-Indian” (Respondent NZ-born, 15 yrs., father Indo-Fijian 
Hindu, mum pākehā Jew; considers himself Jewish.)
396 “I identify with all my cultures. I use mainly Kiwi, Asian, Indian and Malaysian to 
identify myself where race is concerned.” (Respondent a 20-24 year old female, mother 
of Sri Lankan, Indian, & Portuguese heritage, born & raised in Malaysia. Father of 
Native American, Irish and Scottish heritage.) 
413 “Indo-Fijian turning Indo-Kiwi.”
416 “I’ve adapted to my new culture. NZ is my country. I’m a NZ citizen of Indian origin.”
440 “Indian born New Zealander with strong feelings towards both NZ and India.”
472 “Of Indian origin. Have resettled, remarried to a lady from NZ. Subsequently, feel that 
I've moved on and now identify myself as a New Zealander. This is home.”
482 “Born in India but lived in NZ for over 49 years and class myself as a Kiwi.”
586 “Ko Ganges te awa, Ko Taxi te waka, Ko Kolkata te iwi, Ko Slumdog Millionaire te 
Kiriata, Ko butter chicken te Kai, Ko dairy te mahi, Ko rohit ahau, No reira, tena 
koutou, tena koutou, tena koutou katoa.”
595 “Physically Indian, mentally kiwi.”
611 “Now that NZ’s home, I’ve strong bonding here. At the same time my bonds with 
India are quite strong too which helps me bring to the fore the best of both worlds.”
701 “By race, I am an Indian first. By ethnicity, I am a Tamil; born in Malaysia; came to NZ 
as a tertiary student and settled. By nationality, I am a New Zealander.”
779 “Gujarati & Ngati Tuwharetoa.”
847 “A good blend of Indian and Kiwi—picking up the good parts of both cultures.”
912 “I’ve adopted the Kiwi lifestyle and am living life in the New Zealand way, but I 
personally don’t think I’m a kiwi. I’m an Indian living overseas with a different 
lifestyle compared to the lifestyle I was living in India.”
915 “When it’s rugby, I’m kiwi, when it’s cricket I’m Indian!”
985 “Have lived in NZ since age 3 weeks. I think like Kiwi & talk like a Kiwi. Parents have 
Indian roots which have been passed on to me. I speak and understand the language. I 
love NZ, it’s the best place in the world.” 
1010 “NRI (non-resident Indian) who loves New Zealand and loves to be in New Zealand.”
1013 “Fijistani.”
1014 “Mixed heritage, born in India, now living in New Zealand and loving it.”
1035 “FBI Kiwi” (Foreign-born Indian Kiwi).
1058 “The in-between space between two cultures.”
359
499 Numbers in the Table refer to the corresponding respondent number in the survey. 
struggles for acceptance within the wider society for instance, have been 
mitigated, echoing Bourdieu: 
The social world is both the product and the stake of inseparably cognitive and 
political struggles over knowledge and recognition, in which each pushes not 
only the imposition of an advantageous representation of himself or herself,…
but also the power to impose as legitimate the principles of construction of social 
reality most favorable to his or her social being—individual and collective, 
with…struggles over the boundaries of groups (Bourdieu 2000:187). 
This has strong implications for nationality, citizenship, belonging, and 
participation in a shared national identity, essential for an operative 
framework of deep diversity to become established and take effect. 
Respondent 779 confidently declares a distinctively Indo-Kiwi identity with 
the simple proclamation of her/his “Gujarati and Ngāti Tuwharetoa” 
identity. Such assertions are thus essential not just for the self-recognition 
and expression of one’s individual identity, they are crucial for altering 
majority perceptions of collective minority ethnic identity. 
Also of note is the popular use of the Hindi term desi500 for self-
identification. This is a relatively recent term, popularised in the west 
mostly amongst younger Indians in the diaspora who prefer not to 
identify themselves with any particular South Asian region, instead 
wishing to emphasise their South Asia-ness through shared values and 
common bonds (like food, culture and music) rather than through 
regional, national or ancestral affiliations with which they may not relate. 
Desi, literally ‘of the country,’ does away with regional, linguistic and 
religious identification and is a broad spectrum, rather hip, term referring 
to anyone with South Asian ethnicity or ancestral affiliation to the 
subcontinent. Accordingly, it defies political boundaries and inclusively 
refers to anyone from India, Nepal, Pakistan or Bangladesh. It is especially 
in use by children of Indian migrants, or their descendants, who live and 
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500 Desi (pronounced ‘deshi’) is derived from the Sanskrit/Hindi word desh (=dv_matra3), meaning ‘country.’ 
were raised in western countries like the UK, US or Australia, who lack 
strong regional or national South Asian affiliations, or who wish to defy 
class and caste boundaries. The use of the term has been recently 
popularised in India and countries of the diaspora by South Asian youth 
through web sites, social media and television shows. A US-based 
company was recently granted a top level internet domain name (.desi)501 
in August 2014 to further popularise its use. The growth and adoption of 
the term desi, however, appears to signify a shift away from the complex 
identities of recent migrant populations and a movement towards more 
uniform categorisation—a re-homogenising of identity in younger 
generations or the descendants of migrant populations. It may also be seen 
as indicative of a greater desire, especially amongst the domestically-born, 
towards finding commonalities and a shared sense of identity and 
belonging with other South Asian youth that goes beyond the regional, 
linguistic and religious identifiers of previous migrant generations. This 
example should serve to highlight the rather complex and changing 
nature of identity in minority populations.502 
Language use and frequency
Identity is indeed complicated, and it is often difficult, if not impossible, to 
reduce one’s understanding to a single variable like ethnicity, birthplace, 
nationality, ancestry, or religion. Language, however, is often one of the 
most potent conveyors of identity, and most global nationalist movements 
view language as a key component in establishing ethnic boundaries (Arel 
2002:92). In the Indian context, spoken language, like regional affiliation or 
ancestral home in India, can be considered a proxy for ethnicity, as mother 
tongue is often one of the dominant identity markers. 
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501 See <www.nic.desi>, last accessed 7 January 2015. 
502 An examination of emergent desi identities may best be left, however, for future research.
Survey respondents were asked a variety of questions relating to language 
usage. These are summarised below and cross tabulated by migrant status. 
Table 8.7. Language indicators by migrant status.503
Language indicator:
NZ-born OS-born
n % n %
Speaks a South Asian language (n=954)*** 86 9.5 822 90.5
Speaks 1 or more South Asian Languages (n=954)*** 85 9.4 816 90.6
Speaks a South Asian language at home (n=955)*** 82 9.5 778 90.5
Speaks a South Asian language at home always or often (n=866)*** 45 6.3 668 93.7
Agrees that speaking a South Asian language at home is 
somewhat, very, or extremely important (n=914)
91 11.2 724 88.8
Notes: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.  [χ2(1) = 99.446, p = 0.000, p < .001]
Survey respondents were asked to select any and all South Asian 
languages spoken from a list of 28 languages presented, ranging from 
Assamese to Urdu. If a particular spoken South Asian language was not 
listed, respondents could choose ‘Other’ and write it in. In total, 94.4% of 
all survey respondents (n=954) spoke a South Asian language indigenous 
to their ancestral homeland. Since 88.4% of respondents are migrants504 
this statistic is to be expected. Analysis of the Census results in Chapter 7 
however, have shown that language transmission to children of migrants, 
and language ability of those born in New Zealand is strikingly lacking. 
Survey results confirm this, with those born overseas (90.5%) significantly 
more likely than those born in New Zealand (9.5%) to speak a South Asian 
language. 
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503 n in the first column represents the question’s total number of respondents, including 
both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses, while n in the other columns represents those responding 
‘yes’ only. P-values represent levels of significance, with p < 0.001 indicating very high 
significance. 
504 See Table 8.1.
An analysis by age range also reveals that this is indeed the case, with 
those aged 30 years or above significantly more likely (76.5%) to speak a 
South Asian language than those aged under 30 (23.5%). 
Table 8.8: Age range by ability to speak a South Asian language. 
Age range:
Do you speak a South Asian language?
no yes
n % n %
15-29 years 16 30.2 212 23.5
30-49 years 31 58.5 429 47.6
50+ years 6 11.3 261 28.9
Total: 53 100.0 902 100.0
[χ2(2) = 7.734, p = 0.021, p < 0.05].
The table in Appendix I presents the frequency and percentages for those 
that speak South Asian languages, excluding English. The most spoken 
South Asian language in New Zealand is Hindi, spoken by 79.9% of 
survey respondents, followed by Gujarati, spoken by 27.1%. Punjabi 
(20.1%) and Tamil (20.1%) are spoken by equal numbers of survey 
respondents, followed by Marathi (16.5%) and Urdu (11.8%). Most Indians 
in New Zealand will speak some Hindi, although many South Indians do 
not, as it is considered a language of the north. However, it is understood 
by most although not always spoken at home. At home, most Indians will 
speak either their regional language or English. Until recently, it has been 
commonly held that Gujarati, Punjabi and Hindi speakers have made up 
the majority of Indians residing in New Zealand (McGee 1962; Patel 1987; 
Shameem 1994, 1998; Corne 1996; Roberts 1997, Leckie 2005). This research 
shows that while still prevalent, Gujarati, Punjabi and Hindi are being 
challenged for their supremacy by the increasing numbers of other 
speakers from different regions in India. Where Gujarat and Punjab used 
to dominate as the regions that Indians came from (Tiwari 1980, McLeod 
1986, Leckie 2007), this is no longer the case. Indians from other regions 
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such as Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra are now arriving in greater 
numbers, and as a result, their regional languages are being spoken with 
greater frequency and by increasing numbers. Current demographic 
trends should see this linguistic diversity continue to increase. 
Indian language speakers are generally multilingual and survey 
respondents detailed the number of South Asian languages spoken. 
Figure 8.2: Number of South Asian languages spoken per respondent (n=955).505 
While 5.5% of survey respondents do not speak a South Asian language, 
29.8% speak one South Asian language, 31.7% speak two South Asian 
languages, 18.6% speak three South Asian languages, and 14.3% speak 
four or more South Asian languages in addition to English. 
In terms of other spoken languages, 28.8% of all survey respondents spoke 
an additional non-English non-South Asian language, while 71.2% did not 
(n=954). Of those able to speak another foreign language (n=275) these 
were French (24.7%), Fijian (20.7%), Malay (12.0%), Arabic (11.3%), 
German (10.5%), Spanish (6.9%), Māori (6.2%), Afrikaans (6.2%), Japanese 
(5.8%), Indonesian/Javanese (5.1%), with the remainder speaking a variety 
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505 Includes both migrants and non-migrants, excludes English. 
of foreign tongues ranging from Chinese to Zulu. This is generally 
indicative of the wide variety of birth countries from which Indian 
migrants emigrate. It is interesting to note that while no survey 
respondents were born in France, 20.7% of those speaking a foreign 
language choose to learn French. The high incidence of Arabic would be 
amongst those survey respondents that indicated Muslim religious 
affiliation, or those that were either born, grew up, or resided in one of the 
Gulf states prior to migrating to New Zealand. The incidence of survey 
respondents that can speak Māori is noteworthy, and this perhaps denotes 
intermarriage, a strong desire to learn the language of the country in 
which one resides, a strong sense of belonging, or the emergence of a 
shared Indo-Māori identity.506 
Some respondents did qualify the level at which they could speak the 
foreign language indicated, as evidenced by Respondent 949, who 
commented that they had “learnt Japanese in school, but could not hold a 
conversation.” Another, Respondent 992, commented “I took Māori at 
college for one year, but father made me end it to take economics!!” There 
were a few over-achievers in the population. For instance, Respondent 484 
stated that he spoke German, Mandarin and Farsi, as well as Bengali, 
Gujarati, Hindi, Konkani, Marathi, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Tulu and Urdu. 
Respondent 568 commented that in addition to the seven languages she 
can speak and the five that she can read and write, she claims to speak six 
other foreign languages. While almost hard to fathom, South Asians are 
known for their abilities at multilingualism. There were respondents at the 
other end of this ability spectrum as well. For instance, Respondent 1006 
commented that she spoke “Fiji-Hindi, but I am not sure if that is Fijian or 
not.”
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506 See Pio 2012.
In terms of the frequency of language usage in everyday life, an indication 
of the intensity of one’s connection to homeland, a few questions were 
asked of survey respondents about the frequency of use and level of 
importance ascribed to speaking one’s mother tongue, two of which are 
presented below.
Figure 8.3: How often do you use a South Asian language at home? (n=867).
The majority of survey respondents (82.3%) regularly (either often or 
always) speak their particular native language at home, while only 17.5% 
of respondents use their native language only rarely or never. This shows 
that a large majority of respondents choose to speak their native language 
at home. The frequency of South Asian language use at home is 
crosstabulated by migrant status in Table 8.7 with very highly significant 
correlations (χ2(1) = 59.105, p = 0.000, p < .001) that show the frequency of 
language usage steadily increasing amongst migrants, while no such trend 
is seen amongst the New Zealand-born. 
Respondents indicating they could speak a South Asian language, were 
asked “How important do you think it is for your immediate family 
members to speak an Indian language at home?” The majority of survey 
respondents (67.1%) felt that it was either very important or extremely 
important to speak one’s native language at home while only 32.9% felt 
that it was either not important or somewhat important. Crosstabulating
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Figure 8.4: Level of importance for family to speak at home (n=915).
these results according to migrant status shows that amongst migrants, a 
significant majority (69.7%) felt that it was either very important or 
extremely important to speak a South Asian language at home, while only 
30.3% said that it was either not important or only somewhat important.507 
This trend is reversed amongst the New Zealand-born population, 
showing a highly significant correlation between migrant status and the 
perceived importance of speaking a South Asian language in the home. 
Table 8.9: Migrant status by importance of S. Asian language use (n=921). 
Migrant 
Status:
Importance of South Asian language usage at home
not 
important
somewhat 
important
very 
important
extremely 
important total
n row% n row% n row% n row% n row
%
OS-born* 85 10.4 162 19.9 332 40.8 235 28.9 814 100.0
NZ-born** 14 13.1 42 39.3 31 29.0 20 18.7 107 100.0
Notes: *[χ2(1) = 59.105, p = 0.000, p < .001]. **[χ2(3) = 23.488, p = 0.000, p < .001].
Religious affiliation and practice
Survey respondents were asked the following question: “I currently 
consider myself to be...” and were given a list of choices in which to tick a 
suitable response. Respondents could also tick ‘Other’ and fill in the 
comment box to denote affiliation with another religion, denomination or 
sect, or write in comments. Respondents could tick as many religions as 
appropriate. One’s religious identity is extremely important to one’s 
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507 Table 8.7 shows this as 88.8% of migrants agree that speaking a South Asian language at home is 
either ‘somewhat,’ ‘very,’ or ‘extremely important,’ while only 11.2% of New Zealand-born agree. 
conception of self. As such, the data gives a sense of the religious diversity 
of the respondents as well as an indication of the religious diversity of the 
overall Indian population. 
Hindus comprised 62.7% of all survey respondents, Christians 12.6%, 
Sikhs 6.7% and Muslims 3.7%. Three Jewish Indian migrants currently 
living in Christchurch also participated in the survey. Some select 
comments pertaining to identity and religious practice are included in 
Table 8.10. From the statistics and comments it is interesting to note that 
some Hindus believe that their religion encompasses other religions. Also 
evident, are trends towards general spirituality or secularity, rather than 
towards any one particular faith. 
Figure 8.5: Respondent religion (n=972).508
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508 For survey results, the responses ‘No religion or belief,’ ‘Atheist’ and ‘Agnostic’ were combined 
to create the category ‘None,’ and ‘Multireligious,’ ‘Spiritual’ and ‘Other’ were combined into the 
category ‘Other.’ ‘Refused’ is the category ‘Prefer not to answer.’ Many respondents used the 
comments section to write in a particular denomination or sect, but these were recoded to the main 
religious category (e.g. ‘Arya Samaj,’ ‘Hare Krishna’ or ‘Lingayat’ were recoded as ‘Hindu’ and 
‘Methodist’ as ‘Christian’).
Table 8.10: Respondent comments on religion affiliation. 
No. Comment:
369 “I am spiritual and believe in the fundamental principles of Hinduism, but I don’t 
follow any organised religion.”
395 Hindu: “Not a staunch follower. Don’t care too much about religion.”
448 Other: “My spiritual beliefs are ever evolving but not fixed to a particular religion.”
454 Other: “Into spiritualism—believe all religions have one higher spiritual being.”
668 “Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism are offshoots of Hinduism. Hinduism consists of 
all these beliefs. Why you should separate them?”
801 Sikh: “I don’t follow all the practices strictly as for my appearance etc., but I believe 
in the teachings.”
814 “Spiritual, but do not follow any religion.”
817 Other: “I believe all religion is equal.”
825 “I’m a Hindu by origin, but strongly believe in all religions as spiritualistic.”
897 Muslim: “Shia, follower of 12 Imams, the progeny of prophet Mohammad (peace be 
upon him), and awaiting Imam Mehdi the Savior.”
949 “Grew up with celebrating some Hindu festivals, now enjoy the culture, and believe 
something bigger, but don’t know what.”
992 “Internal and neutral spiritual beliefs, don’t practice anything.”
993 Hindu: “studying the bible.”
1000 Humanist/Rationalist: “I want to be a spiritual person.”
1051 Sikh: “We also go to Hindu mandirs to visit. We are not baptised Sikhs.”
1054 Hindu: “Buddhist, Jain and Sikh faiths are branches of Hinduism. God is one—
different paths to reach God, no different religions. I respect all religions/faiths.”
1089 “Like my mother, I will participate in Hindu events but I don’t actively follow the 
Hindu religion, I don’t pray regularly.”
Survey respondents were also asked about their own religious practice, of 
which more than four-fifths, 82.7%, practice their religion, while 17.3% do 
not. These are cross tabulated by migrant status below. 
Table 8.11: Migrant status by religious practice (n=849).509
Migrant Status:
Do you practice your religion?
No Yes Totals
n % n % n %
OS-born* 68 9.0 687 91.0 755 100.0
NZ-born 33 35.1 61 64.9 94 100.0
Notes: *[χ2(1) = 54.329, p = 0.000, p < .001].
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509 Those with ‘not applicable,’ ‘prefer not to answer,’ or ‘don’t know’ responses (n=120) were 
removed. 
Overseas-born populations are significantly more likely (91.0%) to practice 
their religion when compared with the domestically born (64.9%), while 
the New Zealand-born are more than three times as likely (35.1%) to not 
practice their religion when compared to migrants (9.0%). Migrants are 
also ten times as likely to practice their religion (91.0%) than not (9.0%), 
while non-migrants are nearly twice as likely to practice (64.9%) than not 
practice (35.1%). This demonstrates a very highly significant relationship 
between religious practice and migrant status where migrants are much 
more likely to be religious than their domestic counterparts. This 
quantifies a trend demonstrating the increasing secularity of migrant 
minorities as they become more acculturated and integrated in successive 
generations. This trend towards secularity has been largely anecdotal and 
hasn’t previously been demonstrated amongst ethnic migrant populations 
in New Zealand. 
Some select comments about one’s religious practice are presented in 
Table 8.12. Respondent 779 identifies herself as a 45-49 year old female 
born in New Zealand, and living in the Waikato with a Christian Māori 
mother and an Indian Hindu father, who was brought up Christian. Her 
mother has Scottish and English heritage while the father recently 
migrated from Gujarat. For a number of respondents, the move towards 
secularisation is clearly evident; as are the pressures to conform to the 
influences of mainstream society. Other respondents have experienced the 
increasing numbers of migrants in their midst that swell numbers in their 
particular congregations. This may lead some groups to splinter and form 
newer, more specialised groups, as is evident in the establishment of a 
second Sikh gurdwara and Muslim mosque in Hamilton, or the rise of 
Indo-Fijian Hindu groups that form from larger, pan-Indian religious 
associations, where previously only a single religious group existed. 
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Table 8.12: Respondent comments on religious practice. 
No. Comments:
755 “Although not religious, I follow traditional customs as a mark of respect & 
belonging.”
779 “Only Christian & Maori. Don’t know any Indian practices. Would love to learn 
them.”
801 “There are a lot of rules and regulation in Sikh religion, don’t cut your hair, 
wear a turban, don’t cut your beard or mustache. I respect it but I can’t follow 
these rules. I do believe in God and I love my culture. I love Punjabi music and 
the traditional dances, weddings and everything. But the main thing which a 
Sikh should be doing on daily basis, all the rules which I don’t really follow so I 
ticked atheist but I do believe in god.”
802 Sikh: “I don’t follow all practices strictly as in appearance, but I believe in the 
teachings.”
840 “I believe in God but don’t believe in religious institutions.”
879 It depends for me, just thanking God once in a while when I felt that I got some 
good news, I do. I don’t believe in different religions though, I do think that 
there is some super power that is directing activities on earth. I thank that super 
power for offering our life as human beings and ask him to grant me some 
when I need to move ahead in life.”
939 “I participate when required.”
947 “I read and keep up with scientific research.”
956 “I sing in a church choir”
965 “Not to the extent I should, but I do.”
1010 “Without being dogmatic, I feel respectful towards all religions.”
1051 “I guess I’m mainstream moderate Sikh. I go to temple when I can. It gets hard 
to balance w/ other obligations like work, home life. I like meeting people who 
have arrived in NZ in different migration waves. I miss meeting people who are 
not just Punjabi or Sikh.”
1070 “Although not overtly religious, we do small pujas for major Hindu festivals 
with the intention of sharing cultural values with our kids, so they can 
appreciate their roots.”
1076 “My religion is embedded in my nature through my good deeds and I don’t 
practise all the traditional customs in Hinduism. Just have some select things 
we as a family follow.”
1091 “I am not a very religious person. I have developed my own philosophy having 
an interest in all religions and philosophies.”
1106 “Now I don’t believe in any kind of religious rituals, though I consider myself 
as Hindu.”
Likewise, with Malayalam-speaking communities, where a single Kerala 
association had previously formed to cater to the group’s cultural and 
linguistic needs, splinter groups have emerged along religious lines to 
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create separate Christian and Hindu Malayali associations. Also evident is 
the tendency, especially amongst Hindus, to worship at one’s household 
shrine. Many see this as more important than attendance at the local 
mandir, or as a substitute place of worship in the absence of a local temple 
and pujāri.510 
Religious change and acculturation
As respondent religion was discussed above as an integral part of identity, 
this section focuses on religious change and acculturation. The religious 
affiliation of both parents and survey respondents was queried. In 
combining the results from these two questions, it is possible to quantify 
interfaith marriage in the parent’s generation, and to view the extent of 
religious conversion and change, and possible movements towards 
secularity (i.e. has a respondent’s religion remained the same as the 
parent’s or has it changed? In what ways has it changed?). These have not 
before been viewed for Indian populations in New Zealand within the 
context of integration. Results show that 6.6% of all respondents are the 
offspring of an interfaith marriage, while 93.4% grew up in single faith 
homes (i.e. the religion of both parents are the same, n=973). In order to 
view the extent of religious conversion and change, responses were coded 
into the following categories: a) respondent religion remained the same as 
that of the parents (where both parent’s religions were identical); b) where 
parent’s religions were different (parents’ interfaith marriage) and the 
survey respondent chose to follow one of the parent’s religions over the 
other; c) where the respondent became multireligious, incorporating both 
the parent’s religions, as well as other religions, into their own spirituality; 
d) where the survey respondent questions the religion(s) of the parents; e) 
where the respondent lost one (i.e. took on only one of the parent’s 
religions) or both of the parent’s religions (i.e. became secular); f) where 
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510 A mandir (%?dv_matra=$) is a Hindu temple; a pujāri (5dv_matra*dv_matra$dv_matra) is a Hindu priest. 
the survey respondent converted to another religion altogether from that 
of the parents; or g) where the respondent became religious where the 
parents were not religious at all. 
Table 8.13: Respondent religious outcome, based on parent’s religion (n=949). 
Respondent religious outcome number percent of 
responses
Stayed the same as parents 729 75.8
Chose one of the parent’s religions 21 2.2
Became multireligious or spiritual 52 5.4
Questions parent’s religion 55 5.7
Lost one or both of parent’s religion(s) 88 9.1
Converted to another religion different from parents 15 1.6
Became religious, where parents were not religious 2 0.2
Total: 962 100.0
From this table it is possible to state that over three-quarters of survey 
respondents (75.8%) kept and followed the same religion of their parents 
while one-quarter of respondents (24.2%) did not. Of those that did not, 
14.8% became secular (i.e. either lost their parent’s religion or in some way 
questioned the relevancy or appropriateness of their parents’ faiths) in a 
way that they no longer practiced or kept up their religious beliefs. This is 
an important finding for delegates that attended the first Hindu 
Conference in New Zealand511 who were concerned about the incidence of 
religious conversion amongst their sons and daughters who appeared to 
be converting in large numbers from Hinduism to Christianity prior to 
their weddings. The survey however demonstrates that it is not the 
incidence of conversion to Christianity that should be of concern, but 
rather the movement towards secularity that is occurring in much greater 
numbers primarily amongst the young or amongst those that appear to be 
more integrated or acculturated to New Zealand society. 
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511 This was held in May 2007 in Auckland, and was sponsored by the NZ Hindu Council.
Kiwi & Indian identification
Two questions ask respondents to rate the strength of their agreement 
with statements about their identity. The first asked “To what extent do 
you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘In many ways I think of myself 
as being a Kiwi,’” while the second asked “To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the statement: ‘In many ways I think of myself as being an 
Indian.’” 
Table 8.14: Extent of respondent agreement with Kiwi and Indian identity. 
Level of agreement:
Kiwi identity Indian identity
n % n %
strongly disagree 85 8.5 49 4.8
disagree 172 17.1 40 3.9
neither agree nor disagree 253 25.2 100 9.9
agree 327 32.6 425 42.0
strongly agree 166 16.6 399 39.4
Total: 1,003 100.0 1,013 100.0
Nearly half of all survey respondents (49.2%) either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly 
agreed’ that they think of themselves as being Kiwi. One quarter of survey 
respondents (25.2%) were neutral, neither ‘agreeing’ nor ‘disagreeing.’ The 
remaining quarter (25.6%) either ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed.’ This 
shows that nearly half of all survey respondents answering the question 
agree that they think of themselves as being Kiwi, demonstrating the 
extent to which the surveyed population perceives themselves as being 
fairly well integrated into majority society. For agreement with the 
statement on Indian identity, the overwhelming majority of survey 
respondents (81.4%) either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the 
statement. Nearly 10% were neutral, while only 8.7% either ‘disagreed’ or 
‘strongly disagreed.’ This demonstrates that the large majority of 
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respondents agreed with Indian self-identification. This also indicates 
strong retention of Indian cultural and religious values. 
Survey respondents, while feeling comfortable with Kiwi identification, 
felt much more comfortable identifying themselves with their Indian 
heritage. At the opposite end of the scale, there were comparable numbers 
of those that ‘strongly disagreed’ with either statement, less than 10% 
each, with a 3.7% spread between the two responses, while there was 
much larger disparity between those that ‘disagreed,’ with a 13.2% spread 
between the two responses. 17.1% of survey respondents that answered 
the question ‘disagreed’ to identifying with being Kiwi, while only 3.9% 
‘disagreed’ with being an Indian, e.g. respondents are much more likely to 
agree to having an Indian identity, than to having a Kiwi identity. Also of 
note is the neutral group, those that ‘neither agree nor disagree’ with 
either statement. In this group, 25.2% of respondents were neutral on the 
Kiwi identity question, while only 9.9% were neutral on the Indian 
identity question. There appears to be a wide disparity (15.3%) between 
neutral Kiwis and neutral Indians, showing that there are still greater 
numbers of those unsure about their Kiwi identity than there are those 
that are certain of their Indian identity. These results are cross tabulated by 
migrant status in Table 8.15.
The crosstabulation between migrant status and agreement with Kiwi 
identity shows a very highly significant relationship, while the 
crosstabulation between migrant status and agreement with Indian 
identity shows no correlation between the two. This is reflected in the fact 
that migrant respondents disagree with identifying as ‘Kiwi’ in much 
higher proportions (28.1%) than those born in New Zealand (4.3%), while 
the percentage difference between migrants (8.5%) and those born in New 
Zealand (10.3%) who disagree with possessing an Indian identity is much 
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Table 8.15: Migrant status by agreement with Kiwi and Indian identity. 
Migrant 
Status:
Kiwi Identity (n=991)*
Disagree Neutral Agree Total
n % n % n % n %
OS-born 246 28.1 240 27.4 390 44.5 876 100.0
NZ-born 5 4.3 12 10.4 98 85.2 115 100.0
Migrant 
Status:
Indian Identity (n=1001)**
Disagree Neutral Agree Total
n % n % n % n %
OS-born 75 8.5 82 9.3 728 82.3 885 100.0
NZ-born 12 10.3 17 14.7 87 75.0 116 100.0
Notes: *p < 0.001 (very highly significant) [χ2(2) = 68.302, p = 0.000, p < 0.001]. ** p > 0.05 (not significant), 
[χ2(2) = 4.089, p = 0.129, p > .05].
smaller, as the majority of Indian respondents agree with identifying as an 
Indian, regardless of migrant status. What is important here is the high 
level of respondent agreement with ‘Kiwi’ identification (49.2%),512 which 
demonstrates the importance of a deep diversity approach. The 
significance of the migrant status-Kiwi identity relationship is such that 
while those respondents born in New Zealand are nearly twice as likely to 
agree with identifying as ‘Kiwi’ (85.2%) the majority of overseas-born 
respondents (44.5%) still strongly identify with being ‘Kiwi,’ even though 
born overseas.513 As earlier mentioned, this has significant implications for 
minority belonging to a shared national (‘Kiwi’) identity. A deep diversity 
approach therefore indicates that additional policy initiatives could focus 
on the possibilities of strengthening a minority sense of belonging as a 
means to improve minority integration. 
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512 See Table 8.14. 
513 This points to the possibility that additional research could be undertaken examining whether or 
not the level of agreement with a ‘Kiwi’ identity increases as the length of migrant settlement 
increases. 
8.3 Discrimination, personal safety and barriers in labour market
As discussed in the Chapter introduction, this section examines the 
perceived incidence and experience of discrimination, which has 
profound impacts on both individual and group identity.514 It examines 
the rate of perceived discrimination amongst the surveyed population. 
The results are crosstabulated by migrant status and gender to determine 
if any significant relationships exist. For some of the discrimination 
variables below,515 analysis is furthered by crosstabulation of respondent’s 
strong or weak identification with being a ‘Kiwi’ or an ‘Indian’ (Questions 
9 and 10 on the survey)
Difficulty finding employment
The question “Have you ever had difficulty finding a job in New 
Zealand?” was asked.516 The majority of survey respondents, 54.2% did 
not have difficulty finding employment in New Zealand, while 45.8% had 
difficulty finding suitable employment. Crosstabulated results by gender 
reveal that males (61.8%) are more likely than females (38.2%) to have 
difficulty finding employment in New Zealand. This quantifies anecdotal 
evidence that suggests that males are generally overqualified for New 
Zealand positions (e.g. bank managers that end up as taxi drivers). It also 
suggests that females are having less difficulty finding employment than 
males and that this is perhaps due to the choices of professions that many 
Indian females make (e.g. social workers, educators, nurses, doctors), all 
positions on New Zealand skills shortages list. This suggests that females 
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514 See Mossakowski (2003), Sellers & Shelton (2003), Sellers et al. (2006), Yip et al. (2008). 
515 These consist of Questions 75, 76, 78 and 79 of the survey.
516 (n=942). ’Don’t know,’ ‘not applicable,’ ‘prefer not to answer’ responses (n=90), were removed, 
leaving (n=852).
may be more employable due to the professional choices they make, and 
that male professions may not be as well represented on the skills 
shortages list, although this is by no means conclusive. The chi-square 
statistic shows that the correlation between gender and difficulty finding 
employment is not significant. 
Table 8.16: Gender and Migrant Status by difficulty in finding employment. 
Gender
No Yes Total
n col % row% n col % row % n col % row %
Female 199 43.1 57.2 149 38.2 42.8 348 40.8 100.0
Male 263 56.9 52.2 241 61.8 47.8 504 59.2 100.0
Total: 462 100.0 390 100.0 852 100.0
Note: [χ2(1) = 2.075, p = 0.150, p > 0.05].
Migrant status:
No Yes Total
n col % row% n col % row % n col % row %
Overseas-born 389 84.2 52.1 358 92.0 47.9 747 87.8 100.0
New Zealand-born 73 15.8 70.2 31 8.0 29.8 104 12.2 100.0
Total: 462 100.0 389 100.0 851 100.0
Note: [χ2(1) = 12.075, p = 0.001, p < 0.001].
When cross tabulating by migrant status, it is evident that those 
respondents born in New Zealand are more than twice as likely (70.2%) to 
not have difficulty finding employment than those that do have difficulty 
(29.8%). Of migrant respondents, a slight majority (52.1%) reported having 
no difficulty finding employment while a slight minority (47.9%) reported 
having some difficulty. However, of those reporting difficulty in finding 
employment in New Zealand, respondents were more than ten times as 
likely to be migrants (92%) when compared with those born in New 
Zealand (8.0%). This shows a highly significant relationship between 
migrant status and the perceived difficulty of Indian minorities in finding 
suitable employment.
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A total of 76 respondents left comments, many of which are pertinent, as 
they are indicative of the difficulties and frustrations many have had while 
trying to obtain suitable employment.
Table 8.17: Respondent comments on finding suitable employment. 
No. Comments:
8
49
68
92
107
111
133
139
162
230
237
272
275
344
383
393
396
405
443
479
498
561
607
644
“Searched for over 6 months, then found a job. I’ve been in it since and am very happy!”
“I haven’t really had difficulty, but I know I am an exception, especially for people who moved 
here around 2000.”
“It was quite difficult to get the first job, but relatively easy after that.”
“It was difficult for my wife.”
“Finding a job was difficult as I had no New Zealand experience.”
“In 1996 it was tough to find employment, as not many Indians were here and most of us were 
over-qualified for the jobs that we applied for.”
“When I first moved here, I found it difficult to get a job in the area of my expertise.”
“When I migrated it was hard finding a job to match my qualifications and experience.”
“Experienced discrimination as to being overqualified or over-experienced.”
“Not getting a relevant job, employers have a parochial mind in asking for NZ experience. How 
can we gain experience if no one hires us? Our knowledge & skills aren’t properly utilised.”
“Not able to find job in 1990 in my field, so I left to go back to Bahrain.”
“It’s very hard to get job here being migrant.”
“I had no difficulty. I was recruited while still working in India.”
“Applying for last 8 mo. but all applications rejected despite 24 yrs management experience.”
“YES! To the point of total frustration, feelings of unworthiness, leading on to a state of 
depression - something I have never experienced before.”
“Could not find a job in my field.”
“I find it very difficult...and I’m not sure whether it is because no one wants you to answer the 
phones when you have an Indian name - perhaps the customer might think you’re actually 
answering from a Call Center in India!”
“In the beginning, yes. Everyone was looking for someone with NZ experience.”
“For the first time only, after that I jumped between jobs without any problems.”
“Took time, about six months, to get into my own field of expertise.”
“Although I was highly qualified, I worked in a related field in an assistant’s position for 
sometime to come to grips with the system before deciding on my next step.”
“Was always considered inferior despite having extensive experience, training & skills”
“I’m too qualified I guess for NZ companies!!”
“It took 90 odd applications before I landed a position.”
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701
712
801
807
862
883
1085
1100
“Even though I am NZ qualified and have accumulated work experiences and now I am made 
redundant due to National Government’s cost-cutting policy and restructure. I am now 
unemployed for almost 1 year and have applied for 370 jobs and have attended a total of 20 
interviews. Everyone acknowledges I have proven skills and experience and an MBA from a NZ 
university, I was not successful in securing a job yet. The feedback I get is that I don’t “fit in with 
their team and personality.” I feel that I can fit in and work hard as I am focused in my job and 
this can be perceived as too serious-looking. I am not an extrovert and pub going person or rugby 
fan. I feel that Kiwis need to be exposed to working with other cultures and races and be more 
accommodating. It is them not feeling comfortable working with other races and cultures. It’s like 
Paul Henry’s comment - why employ a person who doesn’t look like or sound like a New 
Zealander. I do look different - colourwise, sound and think different. I am comfortable working 
in a mainstream culture and my wife is a pakeha and I understand Kiwi culture and mindset. 
Likewise my pakeha wife understands Indian culture and loves cooking Indian meals and 
Bollywood movies. Pakehas need broadening their cultural exposure and training in 
multiculturalism. The main reason I am considering going to Australia is because I feel I am 
discriminated in securing employment in NZ due to my race and my accent and now my age 
(55years). Many of my friends are in the same boat and most of them shifted to Australia to seek 
jobs there. We need help and affirmative action from the government, like for the Pacific people 
and Maoris. The current government is killing our ethnic voice.”
“I always felt I was offered positions below what my resume deserves.”
“I wanted to find a job in computing but because of just level 5 qualification I did not really 
qualify, but it’s difficult to find jobs, even like casual one with KFC, Burger King or something.”
“Very difficult, took me 7 years for office job relevant to my study.”
“Rejected since I did not have New Zealand job experience.”
“I am here from last five months and do not have a job.”
“There is racial attitude for people competing for top jobs.”
“It’s a herculean task to land a job in New Zealand, especially for aspiring students.”
From these comments, a number of interesting themes emerge. Many 
respondents felt that it was extremely difficult to find suitable 
employment, while some felt that they were clearly over-qualified (e.g. 
Respondent 712). Some had difficulty at first when searching for their first 
job, or reported that the settling in process was difficult, but once they felt 
settled in, things improved. Many also took jobs below their qualifications 
or found jobs in similar or related fields. Some also felt the need for 
further education or reskilling. Others felt that they could not find a job 
due to the recession. Some also relied on family connections to help them 
find employment. A number of people experienced ethnic, age or gender 
discrimination while looking for suitable work, and some mentioned that 
once they had changed their name to one that New Zealanders could 
pronounce, their employment chances improved considerably. Some 
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reported experiencing depression or that the search for employment 
negatively affected their mental state. There were still others that 
mentioned that they had had no problems and that the search for suitable 
employment was as expected. Respondents 701’s comments are 
instructive as an example of particular policy needs to be addressed; i.e. 
that a shift away from government agencies working with potential 
employers, toward working with host communities, is an area that 
requires attention.
Personal safety
The next questions relate to one’s perceived experience of safety, racism 
and discrimination in New Zealand. This question asks “With regards to 
your own personal safety and security in New Zealand, in general, how 
safe do you actually feel living here?” In sum, 46% of survey respondents 
answering the question felt ‘somewhat safe,’ while 41% of the population 
felt ‘totally safe.’ Only14% of the population felt either ‘unsafe’ or ‘totally 
unsafe.’ 
Table 8.18: Personal safety in New Zealand.517 
Level of personal safety: n %
I feel totally unsafe living here & am often concerned about my personal security 6 0.7
I feel somewhat unsafe living here & am sometimes concerned about my personal security 115 12.8
I feel somewhat safe living here & am not usually concerned about my personal security 413 45.9
I feel totally safe living here & am rarely concerned about my personal security 365 40.6
Total: 899 100.0
Crosstabulating by gender reveals that males are more likely (61.3%) than 
females (38.7%) to feel either ‘safe’ or ‘totally safe’ in New Zealand. Other 
comparisons are inconclusive, although there does appear to be a 
significant relationship between gender and perceived personal safety.
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517 ‘Don’t know,’ ’NA,’ and ‘prefer not to answer’ responses (n=13) were removed from the sample.
Table 8.19: Gender and Migrant Status by Perceived personal safety. 
Gender
Unsafe or totally unsafe Safe or totally safe Total
n col % row % n col % row % n col % row %
Female 60 49.6 16.7 299 38.7 83.3 359 40.2 100.0
Male 61 50.4 11.4 473 61.3 88.6 534 59.8 100.0
Total: 121 100.0 772 100.0 893 100.0
Note: [χ2(1) = 5.128, p = 0.024, p < 0.05].
Migrant status:
Unsafe or 
totally unsafe Safe or totally safe Total
n col % row% n col % row % n col % row %
Overseas-born 112 92.6 14.2 675 87.4 85.8 787 88.1 100.0
New Zealand-born 9 7.4 8.5 97 12.6 91.5 106 11.9 100.0
Total: 121 100.0 772 100.0 893 100.0
Note: [χ2(1) = 2.628, p = 0.105, p > 0.05].
When crosstabulating by migrant status, migrants were 12.5 times more 
likely (92.6%) to feel either unsafe or totally unsafe than non-migrants 
(7.4%), demonstrating the unease the majority of migrants feel as 
minorities in their adopted homeland. Other crosstabulations are 
inconclusive and contradictory, as the chi-square statistic reveals that the 
variables are independent. A couple of respondent comments however, do 
highlight some of the difficulties Indian minorities experience, regardless 
of gender or migrant status.
Respondent 912 in Table 8.20 underscores the emotions experienced by 
ethnic minorities, while Respondent 1031 highlights the ignorance some 
New Zealanders have about religious minorities:
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Table 8.20: Respondent comments on personal safety. 
No. Comments:
912 “I used to feel safe, but I don’t feel safe anymore and I’m usually concerned 
about my safety and security. I have been assaulted by drunken youths on a 
weekend evening for no apparent reason. They laughed after assaulting me 
and ran away. By the time the police arrived, they were gone. It has left a 
deep impact on my mind and I avoid going to areas where there are drunk 
people. This was the worst thing that has ever happened to me in my life 
and the only reason I thought of leaving NZ for good. It’s not that I can’t hit 
someone, the only reason I think most Indians are peaceful and non-violent 
is because we know that if we get involved in an incident and get charges 
laid against us, it will affect our visa/residency and job prospects etc.
1031 “With turban on my head while walking some times teens traveling in car 
pass unpleasant remarks. Probably mistaken identity, they may think I am 
Muslim,which of course is again undesirable.”
Target of perceived discrimination
This question asks “Have you ever felt that you were the target of or 
involved in an incident of cultural, ethnic or racial discrimination in New 
Zealand?” While 51.6% of all survey respondents518 answering the 
question stated that they had not been a target of cultural, ethnic or racial 
discrimination in New Zealand, 48.4% had stated that they had been a 
target. Results are crosstabulated by gender, migrant status, and 
identification with being either a ‘Kiwi’ or ‘Indian’ below. 
Table 8.21: Gender by ‘Ever been a target of discrimination?’ (n=834). 
Gender
No Yes Total
n col % row% n col % row % n col % row %
Female 170 39.4 50.1 169 41.9 49.9 339 40.6 100.0
Male 261 60.6 52.7 234 58.1 47.3 495 59.4 100.0
Total: 431 100.0 403 100.0 834 100.0
Note: [χ2(1) = 0.536, p = 0.464, p > 0.05].
For gender, there does not appear to be any significant relationship and 
results are inconclusive. However, of those perceiving that they have been 
a target of discrimination 41.9% were women while a greater number 
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518 (n=835). ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Prefer not to answer’ responses (n=81) were removed from the 
sample.
(58.1%) were men. Nearly equal percentages of both genders had similar 
percentages of perceived discrimination. For migrant status however, of 
those that have experienced being the target of a discrimination event, 
86.9% were migrants compared with the 13.1% born in New Zealand. This 
suggests that other factors may contribute to the high incidence of migrant 
discrimination amongst respondents. For instance, difference in accents 
between migrant and non-migrant respondents may be a factor that 
potential employers consider when undertaking hiring decisions. Nearly 
equal percentages of migrants (47.6%) and non-migrants (54.1%) have 
experienced being the target of a discrimination event, suggesting an 
inconclusive result in which the two variables appear to be independent; 
there is no significant relationship between migrant status and the 
perceived incidence of being the target of discrimination. This suggests 
that other factors may be in play. 
Table 8.22: Migrant Status by ‘Ever been a target of discrimination?’ (n=835).
Migrant status:
No Yes Total
n col % row% n col % row% n col % row%
Overseas-born 386 89.6 52.4 351 86.9 47.6 737 88.3 100.0
New Zealand-born 45 10.4 45.9 53 13.1 54.1 98 11.7 100.0
Total: 431 100.0 404 100.0 835 100.0
Note: [χ2(1) = 1.444, p = 0.230, p > 0.05].
Crosstabulations based on strong or weak identification with being ‘Kiwi’ 
reveal that no significant relationship exists between ‘Kiwi’ identification 
and having ever been the target of discrimination. Indians who strongly 
identify with being ‘Kiwi’ are therefore just as likely as those with a weak 
affiliation to report that they have experienced some form of 
discrimination. This is consistent with the argument that simply feeling a 
part of the ‘host’ society does not offer a buffer against workaday 
discrimination for racialised minorities. Crosstabulations based on strong 
or weak identification with being ‘Indian’ also reveal that no significant 
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relationship exists between ‘Indian’ identification and having ever been 
the target of discrimination.
Table 8.23: Strength of identification by ‘Ever been a target of discrimination?’ 
Strength of Kiwi Identification (n=781)
Identity
No Yes Total
n col % row% n col % r % n c % row %
Weak Kiwi 192 46.8 49.9 193 52.0 50.1 385 49.3 100.0
Strong Kiwi 218 53.2 55.1 178 48.0 44.9 396 50.7 100.0
Total: 410 100.0 371 100.0 781 100.0
[χ2(1) = 2.101, p = 0.147, p > 0.05].
Strength of Indian Identification (n=787)
Identity
No Yes Total
n col % row% n col % row % n col % row %
Weak Indian 68 16.3 49.6 69 18.6 50.4 137 17.4 100.0
Strong Indian 348 83.7 53.5 302 81.4 46.5 650 82.6 100.0
Total: 416 100.0 371 100.0 787 100.0
[χ2(1) = 0.692, p = 0.406, p > 0.05].
Frequency of experiencing discrimination
This question asks “How often have these incidents occurred, if at all?” Of 
the 848 responses,519 40.4% had ‘never’ experienced an incidence of 
cultural, ethnic or racial discrimination in New Zealand, while 32.7% had 
experienced these ‘rarely,’ 22.8% ‘sometimes,’ and 4.1% ‘regularly.’ Of 
those who either ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ experience discrimination, males are in 
the majority (62.4%) compared to females (37.6%), although both males 
(50.4%) and females (49.6%) nearly equally experience incidents of 
discrimination either ‘sometimes’ or ‘regularly.’ Although both males and 
females are more likely to either ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ experience an incidence 
of racism or discrimination, of those that do, females (32.7%) are more 
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519 ‘Don’t know’ and ‘I prefer not to answer’ responses (n=69) were removed from the sample.
likely than males (23%) to experience discrimination either ‘sometimes’ or 
‘regularly.’ Hence the results show that a significant relationship exists (p < 
0.01) between gender and one’s experience of discrimination. 
Table 8.24: Gender and Migrant Status by ‘Frequency of experiencing discrimination.’ 
Gender
Never or rarely Sometimes or regularly Total
n col % row% n col % row % n col % row %
Female 233 37.6 67.3 113 49.6 32.7 346 40.9 100.0
Male 386 62.4 77.0 115 50.4 23.0 501 59.1 100.0
Total: 619 100.0 228 100.0 847 100.0
[χ2(1) = 9.798, p = 0.002, p < 0.01].
Migrant status:
Never or rarely Sometimes or 
regularly
Total
n col % row% n col % row% n col % row%
Overseas-born 537 86.6 71.9 210 92.1 28.1 747 88.1 100.0
New Zealand-born 83 13.4 82.2 18 7.9 17.8 101 11.9 100.0
Total: 620 100.0 228 100.0 848 100.0
[χ2(1) = 4.793, p = 0.029, p < 0.05].
For migrant status, of those that either ‘sometimes’ or ‘regularly’ 
experience a discrimination event, migrants are much more likely (92.1%) 
than those born in New Zealand (7.9%) to experience discrimination. 
Although both migrants and those born in New Zealand both have a 
higher incidence of ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ experiencing a discrimination event 
when compared with ‘sometimes’ or ‘regularly’ experiencing one, the 
New Zealand-born have a higher incidence of experiencing it ‘never’ or 
‘rarely’ (82.2%) than do migrants (71.2%), and migrants have a higher 
incidence of experiencing discrimination ‘sometimes’ or 
‘regularly’ (28.1%) when compared with those born in New Zealand 
(17.8%). This shows a significant relationship (p < 0.05) between migrant 
status and the frequency of one’s experience of discrimination with 
migrants more prone to experiencing a higher frequency of discrimination 
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events than non-migrants. These statistics quantify that much policy work 
needs to be undertaken in host communities in order to lessen minority 
experience of incidences of discrimination. 
Crosstabulations based on strong or weak identification with being ‘Kiwi’ 
reveals that no significant relationship exists between ‘Kiwi’ identification 
and  the frequency of experiencing discrimination. Crosstabulations based 
on strong or weak identification with being ‘Indian’ also reveals that no 
significant relationship exists between ‘Indian’ identification and the 
frequency of experiencing discrimination.
Table 8.25: Strength of identification by ‘Frequency of experiencing discrimination’ 
Strength of Kiwi Identification (n=793)
Identity
Never or rarely Sometimes or 
regularly
Total
n col % row% n col % row % n col % row %
Weak Kiwi 279 47.8 71.2 113 54.1 28.8 392 49.4 100.0
Strong Kiwi 305 52.2 76.1 96 45.9 23.9 401 50.6 100.0
Total: 584 100.0 209 100.0 793 100.0
[χ2(1) = 2.438, p = 0.118, p > 0.05].
Strength of Indian Identification (n=799)
Identity
No Yes Total
n col % row% n col % row % n col % row %
Weak Indian 109 18.5 77.3 32 15.2 22.7 141 17.6 100.0
Strong Indian 480 81.5 72.9 178 84.8 27.1 658 82.4 100.0
Total: 589 100.0 210 100.0 799 100.0
[χ2(1) = 1.138, p = 0.286, p > 0.05].
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Where discrimination occurs
This question asks “If these incidents have happened to you, where have 
they occurred?”520 Those selecting ‘I have not experienced any such event,’ 
accounted for 29% of all responses (n=1254), with the remaining 71% of 
respondents locating at least one discrimination event. 
Table 8.26: Locations where discrimination occurs.521 
Location where discrimination occurred: n % of responses (n=890)
% of cases 
(n=463)
At home 14 1.6 3.0
In my neighbourhood 104 11.7 22.5
At school 124 13.9 26.8
While looking for work 154 17.3 33.3
In the workplace 220 24.7 47.5
While out and about in the community 241 27.1 52.1
Other location 33 3.7 7.1
Total: 890 100.0 192.2
It is interesting to note that many believe anecdotally that discrimination 
occurs most frequently in the workplace, yet this does not appear to be the 
case amongst survey respondents, who stated that most discrimination 
events (27.1%) occurred while they were out and about in the community 
minding their own business or while running errands. A similar number 
of respondents (24.7%) had reported workplace discrimination, while 
17.3% had reported discrimination while seeking employment. Smaller 
numbers (13.9%) had reported discrimination at school, while 11.7% had 
reported discrimination while out and about in their own 
neighbourhoods. When combining the sums for the responses ‘in my 
neighbourhood’ with ‘out an about in the community,’ we get a 
substantial percentage (38.8%) of all respondents stating that they 
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520 Respondents were invited to tick all the locations that may apply.
521 ‘Not applicable’ responses (n=362) were removed from the sample. ‘Out and about in the 
community’ refers to running errands or going from place to place tending to one’s business.
experienced a discrimination event while out and about, while 42% had 
experienced discrimination in either their workplace or while looking for 
employment. This strongly suggests that government funding and public 
policy directed at improving workplace relations and encouraging 
multicultural diversity amongst employers may need to be redirected 
towards the general host community of New Zealand, for it appears that a 
sizable amount of discrimination events occur outside of the workplace. 
As most discrimination occurs within a community context, this strongly 
suggests that employers are not the only ones that need to be the focus of 
new policy initiates, which need to be directed towards educating majority 
populations. This is a significant finding that has emerged from this 
research and demonstrates that working with host communities may be 
more important than working with minority communities in terms of 
better integration outcomes. 
A number of indicative comments were also received, some of which 
specifically locate these events.522 Numerous respondents identified 
multiple discrimination events. Most of these occurred while out and 
about in the community, with fewer events occurring in the workplace or 
while looking for employment. A number of events occurred within the 
Indian community itself, suggesting that discrimination also exists within 
the Indian community, e.g. between Indians of differing birth countries 
(e.g. India-Indians and Fijian-Indians), between Indians from different 
geographical regions within India (e.g. Gujaratis and Punjabis), or 
between different caste or economic groupings.523 This further supports 
‘Indian’ diversification as an insufficient means for ethnic identification, as 
intragroup discrimination continues and the discriminator and 
discriminatee are differentiated. 
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522 See Table 8.27. 
523 This was initially mentioned in referring to the Jacinta Lal story in Chapter 1.
Table 8.27: Select comments on the locations of discrimination events. 
No. Comments:
45 “Real Estate agents.”
69 “Once at a restaurant in Taupo, and once in one of the parks in Auckland.”
116 “While walking on footpath some teenagers in a car mouthed abuses and spat at 
me.”167 “While in business meetings.”
244 “Within the Indian community.”
262 “Dealing with police once. It was awful to see that they chose to visit a break-in in a 
European household and not come to mine just few days after that when I took the 
trouble to go to the police station as well.” 
341 “At Court.”
659 “By ethnic Indian groups (a committee), by my own community people because I 
am an Indian women and it is culturally inappropriate to be seen to influence 
change.”
670 “At my local pub.”
717 “While walking through the streets of Christchurch.”
737 “Once while in a coffee shop, and another time from an Air NZ flight attendant.”
859 “Mostly at pubs and targeted by drunk people.”
874 “One unforgettable time, when about 10 Maori kids shouted ‘go back to your 
country’ and forced us to come out from a children’s park. Those kids were about 
6-13 year old.”
879 “Once by a Pacific Islander sitting in his car on the side of road in Remuera. I was 
looking at what was written on his car, painted with a garden mower, or something 
like that. I was listening to music and the guy fingered me and said f... word.”
921 “While riding bike to office at pedestrian crossing I was abused by drivers many 
times.”
944 “I worked for a telephone survey company and got a lot of rude comments because 
of my name, but when I changed it, the rude comments stopped.”
953 “Judgements stopped when I used my married name. I wanted to keep my (Indian) 
maiden name but knew I was better off with a European name when applying for 
jobs. My mother (NZ born pakeha) suffered terribly at times when people knew her 
Indian surname. My brothers and I attended private Anglican prep and secondary 
schools in 1970s and 80s. Having an Indian surname was treated with suspicion. 
Once other mothers had met our pakeha mum, we would be welcome in other’s 
homes.
992 “Once while doing a public talk on refugees. The Chairperson asked if I was a 
former refugee but didn’t ask my pakeha colleague. Another time I took a wallet I 
found to the police. The cop said ‘Where did you say you found it, outside your 
dairy?’ I said ‘I beg your pardon. I don’t own a dairy.’ He was stereotyping and was 
serious.”
996 “Once in a supermarket, and another time while on a train.”
1004 “At the beach or parks while walking my dog.”
Two respondents (Respondents 944 & 953) specifically mentioned name 
discrimination and the pressure to alter one’s first or last names to have 
more ‘western-sounding’ or ‘easier-to-pronounce’ names that are 
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perceived to be more ‘customer friendly.’ This is a recurring issue 
experienced by many and common to ethnic minorities. 
Is there discrimination in New Zealand?
Of the respondents answering ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ 90.7% believe that racism and 
discrimination currently exist within New Zealand society, while only 
9.3% believe that it does not exist.524 The high number of ethnic minorities 
that believe that discrimination exists, also indicates that much integration 
and awareness work still remains amongst majority communities to 
educate them about ethnic and religious minorities. These statistics are 
crosstabulated below to determine if any significant relationships exist. 
Table 8.28: Gender and Migrant Status by ‘Does discrimination exist in NZ?’ (n=775). 
Gender
No Yes Total
n % n % n %
Female 21 6.4 307 93.6 328 100.0
Male 51 11.4 396 88.6 447 100.0
Note: [χ2(1) = 5.628, p = 0.018, p < .05].
Migrant status:
No Yes Total
n col % r % n col % r % n col % r %
Overseas-born 70 97.2 10.4 604 85.9 89.6 674 87.0 100.0
New Zealand-born 2 2.8 2.0 99 14.1 98.0 101 13.0 100.0
Total: 72 100.0 703 100.0 775 100.0
Note: [χ2(1) = 7.364, p = 0.007, p < .01].
Women are slightly more likely to agree (93.6%) that discrimination exists 
than men (88.6%), although the difference appears negligible. Even so, the 
statistic demonstrates that there is a significant relationship between 
gender and agreement that discrimination exists. For migrant status, of 
those agreeing that discrimination exists in New Zealand, 85.9% were 
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524 ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Prefer not to answer’ responses (n=139) were removed from the sample. The 
original number of respondents was (n=914).
migrants compared with only 14.1% of those born in New Zealand. 
Amongst the overseas-born only 10.4% thought that discrimination did 
not exist while 89.6% believed that it does. Interestingly, amongst Indians 
born in New Zealand, 98% believe that discrimination exists while only 
2% believe that it does not, so non-migrant Indians have a slightly higher 
percentage (98%) of those who believe discrimination exists when 
compared with migrants (89.6%). Either way, there is a significant 
relationship between migrant status and the belief that discrimination 
exists in New Zealand society.
Table 8.29: Strength of identification by ‘Belief that discrimination exists in NZ.’ 
Strength of Kiwi Identification (n=733)
Identity
No Yes Total
n col % row% n col % row % n col % row %
Weak Kiwi 29 42.0 7.9 336 50.6 92.1 365 49.8 100.0
Strong Kiwi 40 58.0 10.9 328 49.4 89.1 368 50.2 100.0
Total: 69 100.0 664 100.0 733 100.0
[χ2(1) = 1.838, p = 0.175, p > 0.05].
Strength of Indian Identification (n=738)
Identity
No Yes Total
n col % row% n col % row % n col % row %
Weak Indian 16 22.9 12.2 115 17.2 87.8 131 17.8 100.0
Strong Indian 54 77.1 8.9 553 82.8 91.1 607 82.2 100.0
Total: 70 100.0 668 100.0 738 100.0
[χ2(1) = 1.381, p = 0.240, p > 0.05].
Crosstabulations based on strong or weak identification with being ‘Kiwi’ 
reveals that no significant relationship exists between ‘Kiwi’ identification 
and  if a respondent believes that discrimination exists in New Zealand. 
Crosstabulations based on strong or weak identification with being 
‘Indian’ also reveals that no significant relationship exists between ‘Indian’ 
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identification and if a respondent believes that discrimination exists in 
New Zealand.
Discrimination against Indians in New Zealand
For the last question of the survey, respondents were asked “To what 
extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘There is 
discrimination in New Zealand against members of the Indian 
community.’ Responses were ticked along an ordinal scale ranging from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree.’ The majority of survey respondents 
(53.3%) either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with the statement that there is 
discrimination against Indians. This is followed by 29.1% of respondents, 
who were neutral towards the statement, neither agreeing nor disagreeing, 
while only 17.6% of respondents either ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ 
with the statement.
Table 8.30: Extent of agreement that discrimination against Indians exists in NZ.525 
There is discrimination against Indians in NZ number percent
Strongly disagree 44 5.3
Disagree 101 12.3
Neither disagree nor agree 240 29.1
Agree 336 40.8
Strongly agree 103 12.5
Total: 824 100.0
Crosstabulation by gender reveals that for both males and females, there is 
an increasing trend of the extent of agreement with the statement, that the 
lowest percentages are to be found amongst those that ‘strongly disagree’ 
or ‘disagree’ with the statement, and the highest percentages are found 
amongst those that either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with the statement, 
although females show a higher percentage of agreement (58.6%) than do 
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525 ‘Don’t know’ or ‘I prefer to not answer’ responses (n=94) were removed from the sample.
males (49.6%). Amongst those that ‘disagree,’ males are in the majority 
(69.2%), compared with only 30.8% for females, demonstrating the higher 
extent to which females voice their displeasure with discrimination. The 
statistic shows that there is indeed a relationship between gender and the 
extent of agreement with the statement. 
Table 8.31: Gender & Migrant Status by ‘Agreement Indian discrimination exists.’ 
Gender
Strongly Disagree 
& Disagree
Neutral Agree & 
Strongly Agree
Total
n c% r% n c% r% n c% r% n c% r%
Female 44 30.8 13.2 94 39.3 28.2 195 44.8 58.6 333 40.8 100.0
Male 99 69.2 20.5 145 60.7 30.0 240 55.2 49.6 484 59.2 100.0
Total: 143 100.0 239 100.0 435 100 817 100.0
Note: [χ2(2) = 9.094, p = 0.011, p < .05]
Migrant 
status
Strongly Disagree 
& Disagree Neutral
Agree & 
Strongly Agree Total
n c% r% n c% r% n c% r% n c% r%
migrant 133 92.4 18.5 209 87.4 29.0 378 86.9 52.5 720 88.0 100.0
NZ-born 11 7.6 11.2 30 12.6 30.6 57 13.1 58.2 98 12.0 100.0
Total: 144 100.0 239 100.0 435 100 818 100.0
For migrant status, as with gender, for both migrants and non-migrants, 
there is an increasing trend of the extent of agreement with the statement, 
that the lowest percentages are to be found amongst those that ‘strongly 
disagree’ or ‘disagree’ with the statement, and the highest percentages are 
found amongst those that either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with the 
statement, although the New Zealand-born show a slightly higher 
percentage of agreement (58.2%) than do migrants (52.5%). As expected, of 
those that ‘strongly disagree’ or ‘disagree’ with the statement that 
discrimination exists against Indians in New Zealand, the overwhelming 
majority (92.4%) are migrants, compared with only 7.6% of non-migrants. 
Migrants are also much more likely (87.4%) to remain ‘neutral’ than are 
those born in New Zealand (12.6%). 
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Crosstabulations based on strong or weak identification with being ‘Kiwi’ 
reveals that no significant relationship exists between ‘Kiwi’ identification 
and  if a respondent agrees with the statement that discrimination against 
Indians exists in New Zealand. Crosstabulations based on strong or weak 
identification with being ‘Indian’ also reveals that no significant 
relationship exists between ‘Indian’ identification and if a respondent 
agrees with the statement that discrimination against Indians exists in 
New Zealand. 
Table 8.32: Strength of identification by ‘Belief that discrimination exists in NZ.’526 
Strength of Kiwi Identification (n=546)
Identity
Strongly disagree and 
disagree
Agree and 
strongly agree
Total
n col % row% n col % row % n col % row %
Weak Kiwi 56 40.9 21.4 206 50.4 78.6 262 48.0 100.0
Strong Kiwi 81 59.1 28.5 203 49.6 71.5 284 52.0 100.0
Total: 137 100.0 409 100.0 546 100.0
Note: [χ2(1) = 3.704, p = 0.054, p > 0.05].
Strength of Indian Identification (n=551)
Identity
Strongly disagree 
and disagree
Agree and 
strongly agree
Total
n col % row% n col % row % n col % row %
Weak Indian 27 19.6 26.7 74 17.9 73.3 101 18.3 100.0
Strong Indian 111 80.4 24.7 339 82.1 75.3 450 81.7 100.0
Total: 138 100.0 413 100.0 551 100.0
Note: [χ2(1) = 0.188, p = 0.665, p > 0.05].
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526 Neutral responses (n=229) were removed from the equation.
8.4 Summary
Identity and discrimination have emerged as the two most important 
issues from the survey results. Identity results demonstrate the extent to 
which the survey results differ from the census results in terms of self-
identification, while discrimination results quantify that much works still 
remains to be done amongst majorities in order to mitigate the incidence 
of discrimination in society and for increased integration of minorities into 
majority society. Together, these results portray a need for policy to be 
better directed towards both mitigating discrimination of minorities by 
majorities and in raising minority awareness amongst majority 
populations. This may aid the emergence of a shared national identity, a 
cornerstone of a deep diversity framework. Presented identity results have 
already shown that minorities have already begun such integration work 
while majorities have not. Discrimination results have also demonstrated 
the extent and frequency of the perceived incidence of discrimination 
amongst the survey population, showing that much work remains to be 
done amongst majorities in order to diminish the incidence of 
discrimination and racism within New Zealand society. A critical reading 
of deep diversity however, would suggest that, for minorities, a sense of 
belonging in a shared national identity with majorities is insufficient, as 
majorities do not necessarily share the same sensibilities, hence the 
continued presence of racism. As the mechanisms of discrimination 
operate independently of migrant actors, policy will need to take a more 
proactive stance at mitigating it effects. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION
A DEEP DIVERSITY FRAMEWORK FOR NEW ZEALAND
The main hope of harmony in our troubled world lies in the plurality of our 
identities…Our shared humanity gets savagely challenged when our 
differences are narrowed into one devised system of uniquely powerful 
categorization (Sen 2006:16). 
9.1 Introduction 
Since the founding of the modern state, minorities have had a tremendous 
impact on the social fabric of New Zealand. Historically, British 
colonisation of Aotearoa led to the minoritisation of indigenous Māori, 
and furthered their dominance in the sociocultural, political and economic 
spheres. Strong Māori resurgence since the 1970s led the call for 
biculturalism and an assertion of interest in participating in affairs which 
affected them directly. A bicultural response was needed, and performed 
its role as an appropriate and timely reaction to experienced inequality. As 
a policy directive, biculturalism generally served New Zealand well and 
led to many significant changes in social policy that have had, and 
continue to have, a positive effect, although much progress remains. 
Recent immigration, most notably from Asia, has had a broad 
demographic impact, and migrants and minorities have played a 
substantial role in realising positive economic outcomes, improving 
international relations, and increasing New Zealand’s multicultural 
footprint. Multiculturalism, as unofficial policy objective, consequently 
emerged to complement biculturalism as a policy directive. Such an 
initiative allowed policymakers to shift focus from a restrictive 
immigration policy favouring migrants from traditional European source 
countries to a points-based system prioritising skill shortages not limited 
to specific sending countries. Multicultural policy objectives, designed to 
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enhance bicultural initiatives, targeted migrants and non-Māori minorities 
in settlement support, and improved economic and social integration. 
This thesis expresses the premise that existing state forms of multicultural 
management are not working as well as they could; there is room for 
improvement and much racism and discrimination remains.527 It examines 
the possibility of approaching increasing forms of plurality with a novel 
framework for advancing diversity governance in multicultural societies. 
When it comes to appropriate policy, multicultural models of the past 
generation appear poorly placed to progress minority treatment and aid 
social cohesion. Based on shallow approaches that may have previously 
functioned well, such policies no longer seem appropriate responses to 
contemporary forms of diversity, minority participation, continued 
discrimination, and calls for greater minority accommodation. Clearer 
policy guidelines are essential for states preparing for the 
‘superdiversity’528 forecast to come. 
Multiculturalism, when used to refer to a general state of affairs—as in 
“New Zealand is a multicultural nation”—is an acceptable and rarely 
contested statement affirming present plurality, and should be amenable 
to all along the political spectrum. It draws attention to the number and 
variance of ethnicities, cultures, languages, and religions that interact in 
society today. Multiculturalism, however, becomes problematic and 
contentious when it involves state direction in, and negotiation of, policy 
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527 As I write this, another racist incident has appeared in the press. A New Zealand policewoman 
has been found guilty of racially abusing an ethnic Indian taxi driver from Malaysia during a late-
night fare dispute in Queenstown, telling him to “f... off to India, you come here and get all the 
Kiwi jobs. Eat your f...... curry and f... off to India. This is a Kiwi job.” (Edens 2014). Given the New 
Zealand police’s proactive stance on race relations and religious diversity (New Zealand Police 
2004, 2012), this would appear to be a sizable setback and public relations problem for this 
government institution. 
528 Vertovec first introduced the concept of ‘superdiversity’ as a summary term in 2007, defining it 
as “a term denoting a transformation of population patterns, especially arising from shifts in global 
mobility.” For more on ‘superdiversity,’ see Vertovec (2007, 2010, 2015), Spoonley & Butcher (2009) 
and Spoonley (2014). 
circumscribing minority affairs. Whereas biculturalism formed a two-
party partnership designed to address Māori grievances under the Treaty 
of Waitangi and saw resources directed at Māori social uplift and better 
bicultural relations, multiculturalism appears to have had limited success 
at garnering support or participation. Existing forms of multicultural 
policy represent shallow forms of diversity management. New forms of 
governance are required in order to accommodate rapidly changing 
demographics, increased immigration, and expanding minority 
participation in society. Shallow management policies invoke the 
particular normative, ideological and operative values529 that appear 
increasingly peripheral given burgeoning superdiversity and 
contemporary forms of pluralism, not to mention the accompanying rise 
of minority participation in the sociocultural, economic and political 
affairs of state. Deeper governance strategies need to be contemporary, 
appropriate, and equally responsive to all societal groups. 
Deep diversity, a novel conceptual framework for diversity policy in 
liberal western democracies, is only one such response to increasing 
pluralism. It outlines the need for newer forms of diversity governance 
that establish more appropriate and better suited values which can be 
applied to policy frameworks designed to improve social cohesion. It does 
not purport to solve policy problems nor presume to harbour definitive 
solutions. It does however hope to direct policymakers to ask more 
appropriate questions about the nature, depth and direction of increasing 
diversity, and to think about alternative responses to the new challenges of 
cohesion in superdiverse societies. Achieving majority participation in 
policy directives is a hallmark of deep diversity, as shallow policies mostly 
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529 As discussed in Chapter Two, normative assumptions generally affirm or establish what might 
be commonly held beliefs about existing shallow and proposed deeper interpretations of diversity. 
Ideological values represent aspirational beliefs, principles and ideals that are currently accepted. 
Operative values result from actualising normative assumptions and by putting policies into play. 
direct ‘targeted’ initiatives at minorities in the perceived need for better 
integration. Such policies can only hope to achieve limited results as only 
a portion of society (e.g. minorities, migrants, refugees) are ‘doing the 
work’ of integration, through settlement support services, language 
initiatives, educational training and economic integration programmes 
that currently make up the bulk of diversity policy initiatives. Campaigns 
focusing on better preparing majorities for minority integration and 
migrant accommodation could actually help in reducing the regular 
incidences of racism and discrimination and help undermine the 
perpetuation of insidious forms of structural and institutional 
discrimination, which are more deeply embedded and therefore more 
problematic to extricate and expunge. 
In taking a critical look at historical accounts and census treatments, I have 
shown that self-reported identity constructs from the case study are far 
more complex than those utilised by the state for the management of its 
diversity. In exploring earliest Indian presence in Aotearoa between 
1769-1850, I uncovered and introduced new information that places 
Indians in Aotearoa at the very founding of the modern nation. This 
differs distinctly from mainstream Pākehā views of the immigration 
discourse that specifically peg the earliest Asian arrivals to the discovery 
of gold in Otago, with settlement generally occurring during the 1850s and 
1860s in exceptionally small numbers. European political dominance 
established a series of anti-Asian immigration legislation which remained 
fairly intact until progressive immigration reform was enacted in 1987. 
This was followed by the huge increase in Asian immigration seen today. 
Such a discourse has historically played largely upon European fears of an 
Asian tidal wave outpacing European growth, characterised by the 
traditional preoccupation with maintaining and perpetuating a white New 
Zealand. European discourse today focuses on a bicultural policy that 
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incorporates multiculturalism, and Asian immigration is largely still 
perceived as a recent phenomenon, something to be limited or controlled. 
If the ‘Asian’ discourse is to be believed, then little has changed in the 
state’s view, or majority perception of, Asians/Indians since the founding 
of the modern nation-state. 
Asian understanding of the diversity discourse generally demonstrates 
similar historical attitudes, with the majority of migrants also believing 
that Asian settlement and immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Except for a small domestic minority with multigenerational citizenship, 
very few migrants are aware of an earlier Asian and African530 history in 
Aotearoa. Scholars of Asian minority history show Indian presence here as 
early as 1809, and Chinese arrivals from the 1840s, both in exceptionally 
small numbers,531 but here nonetheless. As I have demonstrated, first 
Asian presence in Aotearoa dates back to 1769, along with the very first 
arrivals of European vessels to Aotearoa, and places Indian sailors as crew 
aboard European expeditions of exploration and exploitation. From these 
accounts, it is possible that hundreds of Indian lascars came to Aotearoa 
aboard ships during the early years of European settlement. A detailed 
view of the Muster Rolls of each of the European vessels that visited up to 
about 1850, along with thorough archival readings and database searches 
of past newspapers and court cases, tasks beyond the purview of this 
thesis, would be in order to demonstrate the extent of early Asian 
participation and to help complete an inclusive history of New Zealand’s 
founding discourse. The realisation of Asian presence in Aotearoa along 
with the very first Europeans has the potential to alter Asian 
understanding of their place in New Zealand, and creates an opportunity 
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530 I have earlier mentioned that African and Pasifika peoples were also known to be aboard the 
earliest European ships, although their treatment here is beyond the scope of this research. 
531 See Leckie (2006, 2007, 2010), Ip (2003b), Ng (1993:123, 2003), Drury (2014).
for new histories to be written and for new shared national identities to be 
forged. 
I have also explored the idea that a refashioned Indo-Kiwi identity could 
be established through the knowledge and understanding that Indians 
were present long prior to dates originally assumed; that Indians are not 
just recent arrivals stealing Kiwi jobs (as the September 2014 outburst of 
the Pākehā policewoman in Queenstown illustrates), but that they played a 
vital role in the very foundations of New Zealand history alongside 
indigenous Māori and their European colonisers.532 That Indians have a 
claim, however small, to Aotearoan history and early Māori-European 
encounter has significant implications for both how majorities perceive 
minorities and how minorities perceive themselves in relation to majority 
society. Tauiwi need no longer consider themselves recent arrivals or 
outsiders needing to be integrated, but rather as having just as much a 
right as Europeans to live and fully engage in a plural, deeply diverse, 
New Zealand society. Although the promise of biculturalism remains 
largely unfulfilled, Māori, as tangata whenua imbued with kaitiakitanga533 of 
a multicultural Aotearoa New Zealand, have a unique role and 
responsibility in actively engaging both Pākehā and non-Pākehā tauiwi in 
multicultural discourse, and in pursuing improved relations of all kinds, 
under terms established by the Treaty of Waitangi. 
At present, there is a surprising lack of scholarship on Māori-tauiwi 
relations534 that should become increasingly important for a steadily 
pluralising Aotearoa. Today’s diversity discourse therefore appears solidly 
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532 In an earlier anecdote, I related the tale of an Indian who settled amongst Māori and aided them 
in dealing with European incursion. 
533 Kaitiakitanga refers to Māori guardianship and stewardship (Moorfield 2011). 
534 See Ip (2003a, 2009), Ballantyne (2006), Lee (2007), Kukutai (2008), Bedford et al. (2009), Chang 
(2009), Didham (2009), Murphy (2009) and Nakhid & Devere (2015) for material on Māori-Asian 
relations. 
grounded in either bicultural (a singularly Māori-European affair), or 
multicultural modes of reference generally focused on the rather 
ambiguous term ‘race relations,’ itself referring to associations amongst 
and between all of New Zealand’s various ethnicities, the majority-
minority discourse, and sorely underreported indigene-immigrant 
relations. Walker (1990), Ip (2003a), Kukutai (2008), and Chang (2009) 
write of growing Māori suspicion regarding ever-increasing Asian 
immigration, strongly suggesting that Māori-tauiwi relations are equally in 
need of attention. Ip (2003a:227) rightly states that formal bicultural 
policies have failed to define the place of non-Maori minorities in a 
modern multicultural New Zealand, demonstrating that new forms of 
diversity governance are necessary in a rapidly pluralising New Zealand 
that already consists of a population in which more than a quarter were 
born overseas. It is clear that the race relations dialogue needs to 
increasingly embrace notions of an inclusive shared national identity if it 
is to make significant progress in its ‘race relations.’535 
Joris de Bres (2005:291), New Zealand’s former Race Relations 
Commissioner, recently introduced the need for such an inclusive national 
identity as an increasingly important race relations issue. Such an identity, 
he posits, is not easily defined, and “would be a perilous undertaking—
opening one up to all sorts of charges of social engineering and political 
correctness.” I would counter that such an inclusive national identity does 
not require a guiding hand or potentially intrusive government agency 
directing its formation, but rather that it already exists in nascent stages 
and can be unearthed through identification with various forms of 
belonging and inclusion already experienced by majority and minority 
alike. At issue is getting all parties actively engaged. Such forms of 
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535 Ghosh & Leckie’s (2015) just-released edited volume, and Spoonley’s (2015) included article, 
begin to address this need.
belonging can easily be found in a shared view of participation in the 
founding of the modern state. Māori trepidation of rising Asian 
immigration notwithstanding, de Bres (2005:291) also identified the 
“changing interpretation of our history” as an element having the 
potential of contributing to an inclusive sense of belonging, but such an 
ideal hadn’t been previously articulated. I have discussed in Chapter Two 
such activities as communal service in war, and such experiences as a 
shared sense of colonial history (which could help in better articulating 
improved Māori-tauiwi relations), or enthusiasm for national sporting 
events, singing the national anthem, civic engagement, participation in 
national elections, realising citizenship, or in local, regional and national 
communal activities that tie participants to shared common goals; all are 
psychologically vital for experiences of inclusion and belonging. A shared 
national identity can thus be the instrument through which migrants and 
minorities can better participate and integrate into majority society. And 
majorities, being aware of such shared experiences, can hopefully be more 
welcoming of minorities into majority society. What remains is for 
majorities to be better at or work harder on the sharing part, and for 
Māori, as tangata whenua, to take a leading race relations role in a now 
deeply diverse Aotearoa. Māori are well placed to take on such a challenge 
and lead such an initiative. 
In focusing on early Indian settlement in New Zealand, I also examined 
the history of their appearance in the New Zealand Census, beginning in 
1851, as it marked the movement from presence to settlement, as sojourners 
stayed and initial instances of Indian appearance in the census record 
began. In so doing, this thesis uncovered earlier appearance in the census 
than was previously known and exposed majority ambivalence and 
discrimination in historical state treatment of minorities. Such an 
examination of census history revealed the extent of the obfuscation of 
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early Indian settlement and provided insight into the state reportage of 
early non-Māori minorities. A review of census records presented evidence 
that directly addressed the research objective of establishing that past state 
treatment of minorities tended to render non-Māori minorities invisible. 
An examination of early minority treatment in the census focused on their 
early invisibility from the census record, and demonstrated majority 
inconsistencies in the early reportage of minority populations, which 
continues today with the publicly released and freely downloadable 
census figures for ethnicity from 2013,536 in which ‘Indian’ and ‘Fijian 
Indian’ groups are clearly reported in the data spreadsheets while other 
Level 3 Indian groups537 are subsumed under the Level 2 category of 
‘other Asian,’ making it difficult to determine actual numbers. 
The summaries of select statistical results from both the 2006 and 2013 
Censuses critiqued state reportage of ethnic identity that emerged from 
existing categories of ethnicity, birthplace, linguistic and religious 
affiliation, educational attainment and income. Recent censuses have only 
publicly reported on those who identify their ethnicities as either Indian, 
usually referred to in the census as ‘Indian nfd’; and ‘Fijian Indian,’ which 
includes only 5.4% of those reporting Indian ethnicity, and is therefore not 
a proxy for Indians born in Fiji (which represented 28.7% of the entire 
‘Indian’ population538). Other reported Indian subethnicities are grossly 
underreported due to the lack of sufficient prompts on the census forms. 
Such an examination exposed the disparity between the census’ current 
use of ethnicity as a classificatory tool and the myriad ways in which 
minorities choose to identify. The two disparate measures of identity, one 
objectively imposed by the state, the other constructed on emic self-
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536 Released in August 2014. 
537 e.g. ‘Bengali,’ ‘Indian Tamil,’ ‘Punjabi,’ ‘Sikh’ and ‘Anglo Indian.’
538 See Table 7.6, based on 2006 Census results. 
identification, demonstrated that, while progress has been achieved, 
majority recognition of minority identities is still largely unfulfilled. This 
can potentially hinder minority integration and exclude groups from 
participation in a shared national identity.
Select findings and analysis of a survey of the Indian diaspora in New 
Zealand demonstrated the depth of self-reported identity not evident in 
either the 2006 or 2013 Censuses. It also portrayed the continued 
experience and location of discrimination, as evidenced through 
responses on employment, self-reported racism and perceptions of 
personal safety. The stated ethnicities in the official census statistics do not 
adequately portray the substantial diversities within the Indian 
population and controvert underlying emergent identities that are 
equally, if not more, significant. The census statistics therefore present a 
false notion of a single minority ethnic identity when a more extensive 
examination and analysis of ethnicity and identity is possible by utilising 
a deep diversity approach. 
9.2 The policy implications of deep diversity
In The future of multi-ethnic Britain, Parekh (2000b) makes several 
recommendations to government policymakers to improve social cohesion 
in the UK. He cites three especially important guiding principles which 
must be consistently applied and remain central in all government policy, 
decision making, and legislation. These three central concepts are 
cohesion, equality and difference. Other fundamental guidelines included 
in the Report of the Commission include: addressing racisms, tackling 
disadvantage, empowering and enfranchising, and a pluralistic culture of 
human rights (Parekh 2000b). To these I would add some fundamental 
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guidelines to be considered when formulating or implementing public 
policies within a deep diversity framework, as below. 
All groups within human society have an intrinsic and equal value, and an 
equal right to exist, no matter the extent of difference that may divide. The 
fundamental and inherent value of equality for diverse groups exemplifies 
a basic right to the freedom of existence. This includes a fundamental 
concern and respect for individuals, groups, subgroups, tribes, 
associations, populations and all manner of human individual and 
collective society. No one group should therefore privilege its own beliefs 
above those of any other. Deep diversity effectively negates the notion of 
ethnocentrism, the belief in the inherent superiority of one’s own group or 
culture over others, or as a tendency to view other groups or cultures from 
the perspective of one’s own. Instead, deep diversity presumes that the 
beliefs, traditions, customs and languages of all human cultures are 
inherently of equal value. No particular group or political entity therefore 
has a right to lessen diversity except in circumstances that are critical to 
the common good and the functioning of society. This point may be 
necessarily vague, but it allows for the various interpretations necessary 
for changing circumstances in a widely diverse array of cultures and social 
structures that need be taken into account in the formulation and 
implementation of diversity policy. 
In the instance of non-Māori minorities, this can best be achieved through 
the avoidance of enacting any policy or legislation that gives preferential 
treatment to any one particular group above any of the others. However, 
Kymlicka’s (1995) notion of group differentiated rights would need to be 
the operative value for what he terms ‘national minorities,’ which in a 
New Zealand context refers to certain differentiated rights for Māori, as 
tangata whenua. In such instances, ethnically oriented policies may be 
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permissible as long as they uphold principles that justify differential 
treatment on the basis of fairness, special needs, or beliefs, and in so far as 
they do not interfere with the normal functioning of society. Following 
Parekh (2000b), where an urgent resolution is required for any particular 
policy initiative that is deemed by the majority to be morally or ethically 
unacceptable, the operative public values of the wider society should 
prevail. This provides us with specific guidelines for policy application 
given the particularities of the New Zealand context, while 
simultaneously upholding the foundational principles of biculturalism, 
their importance to Māori, and their incorporation in deeper forms of 
diversity governance. As earlier mentioned, biculturalism and 
multiculturalism are not mutually exclusive entities. 
Policies targeting migrant and minority populations also need to include 
specific companion policies especially designed for the host community. 
Shallow policies are usually designed and implemented for a sole 
purpose, such as immigration and legislation that determines the 
porousness of state borders, a separate set of policies designed for the 
smooth settlement and acculturation of migrant communities, or health 
and education policies designed specifically for minority uplift. 
Companion policies that specifically target the majority are wholly absent. 
These need to be designed in such a way as to educate majorities on the 
social and economic value of hosting minorities, and should likewise 
include preparing majorities for minority arrival, as in the way that 
minorities are expected to learn and adapt to majority values, adhering to 
the particular sociocultural, legal, economic, religious and linguistic norms 
of majority society. Majorities are also sorely in need of basic education 
about minority values and beliefs, and educational programmes designed 
to further understanding of minorities is either nonexistent or in 
exceptionally short supply. Such education should allow majorities to 
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differentiate, for example, Sikh from Muslim, and to achieve a level of 
understanding of and respect for difference that has the potential to 
mitigate discrimination and racism. 
Particular non-governmental organisations such as the various Interfaith 
Councils scattered throughout New Zealand’s larger cities are currently 
engaged in raising awareness of cultural and religious diversity primarily 
amongst majority populations in need of awareness enhancement. They 
actively engage both minorities and majorities in common endeavours. 
Such voluntary associations differ markedly from the numerous 
Multicultural Councils that already exist in the main centres, but which 
occupy a different sphere of influence and need; these are largely designed 
as outlets to further ethnic minority accommodation or representation and 
do not engage as well with majority society—they speak largely to 
minorities and have little majority appeal. It is therefore of interest that 
Multicultural Councils are well-supported throughout New Zealand and 
have a national governing infrastructure, while Interfaith Councils remain 
largely unfunded and maintain no national infrastructure. Similarly, 
agencies that work specifically with minorities, such as settlement support 
services and refugee or migrant resources, are funded, though poorly, and 
tend to focus predominantly on social uplift and improved integration. 
While necessary, their purpose appears to equally assuage majority guilt 
(Hage 1998) as it does to provide minority aid, albeit while perpetuating 
paternalistic majority roles as ‘aid givers’ and ‘information bestowers.’ 
They do however, motivate majorities to engage with minorities and are of 
great value, but that value largely sustains shallow multiculturalism rather 
than engage in deeper diversity strategies. Policies that reflect a deeper 
approach could better equalise resources in this regard, to include those 
agencies, associations and organisations that are having a larger impact on 
majority society in addition to those that work with minorities. Social 
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cohesion is thus a two-way street, requiring the inclusion and active 
engagement of both minorities and majorities; it is not an arena reserved 
exclusively for minority actors and majority aid givers. Creating public 
spaces for engagement and promoting a shared national identity 
necessitates equal majority participation and effort at social cohesion and 
should be a major objective of diversity policy initiatives. 
New Zealand, however, cannot be accused of inaction on majority 
engagement. A recent example of government resourcing targeting 
majorities deserves mention. Quite often, immigration, settlement and 
integration policies are, in most places, working well for migrant 
communities, but once settled, individual members of such communities 
are often unable to find suitable employment. In this instance, companion 
policies might target host community employers about the economic and 
social benefits of hiring migrant and minority populations, or improving 
policies of professional accreditation. As an example, the Office of Ethnic 
Affairs539 implemented its EPIC NZ initiative in May 2012, which engages 
potential employers and educates them about the benefits of hiring 
minorities, migrants and refugees. Such strategies represent new modes of 
thinking about minority integration and social cohesion, point toward 
more equitable policies to come and new models of diversity governance. 
Yet much remains unknown of their efficacy. New Zealand has yet to fully 
address issues of professional accreditation in particular fields where 
labour shortages are pressing and well qualified members of migrant 
minority communities remain unemployed because they do not possess 
the domestic qualifications or experience necessary for employment. Much 
work in this sector remains. 
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539 The Office of Ethnic Affairs changed its name to the Office of Ethnic Communities in early 2015.
Further, diverse societies are stable and robust when its constituent 
minority and majority communities are justly recognised and receive 
equitable shares of economic and political power. This means that policy 
and legislation must allow for appropriate representation of minority and 
majority communities at all levels. In some circumstances, this might 
entail greater representation of minority communities and lesser 
representation of majority communities. The operative policy here would 
be that representation should be equal or nearly equal to the percentages 
within society at large, as best determined by official census or other 
established means to enumerate its populations and establish the various 
types of diversity it contains. This exemplifies the continued importance of 
regular national enumeration and why appropriate categorisation is a 
fundamental necessity of deep diversity. This would include such distinct 
demographic entities as ethnicity, gender, religion, and other important 
measures of particularity determined by the specific composition and 
circumstance of the state.
Also, most governments and institutions generally have profound 
structural or organisational limitations that are inherited and deeply 
entrenched. The removal of institutional and structural discrimination 
must therefore remain a priority at all levels of government and from 
within institutions, organisations and associations. Institutional and 
structural discrimination within society is often a primary reason for 
minority disadvantage, lower levels of health or educational attainment, 
and higher crime and incarceration rates. Public and private institutions 
and organisations need to address these inequities and implement policies 
designed to mitigate such entrenched hinderances.540 
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540 See Human Rights Commission (2012b) for its discussion paper on addressing structural and 
institutional discrimination in New Zealand society. 
Public policy must also be viewed within the wider context of other 
relevant state policies; that no single policy should be designed or 
implemented without reference to related diversity policy initiatives. 
Policy domains are generally holistic and must be viewed in relation to 
others purposed to address diversity or accommodate difference. As an 
example, immigration policies and laws should not be implemented in 
isolation, but instead need to be viewed within the context of the entire 
migration complex, and in conjunction with, rather than as an afterthought 
for the migrant receipt of professional accreditation earlier mentioned. 
Such policies must reference and be synchronised with other outcomes 
designed for social uplift. Viewing such policy settings as a holistic 
system, rather than as independent entities, is what drives and motivates 
integration. When we situate multiculturalism within its larger context, 
“we see that it is not a rejection of integration, but a renegotiation of the 
terms of integration” (Kymlicka 1998:24). 
In formulating, implementing and monitoring policy, deep diversity must 
be exceptionally proactive in its responsibilities towards minorities, 
ensuring that they are not marginalised in any additional ways. Such 
obligation requires that state policy supersede merely the immigration 
legislation that determines entry and residence, but also provides for 
succor during settlement, assistance in obtaining employment, promoting 
minority identity, and engagement of both minority and majority 
communities towards full minority participation in civil society, including 
clear pathways to citizenship. Policy is more than just immigration 
legislation and settlement support; it must focus equally on the civil 
institutions and organisations that support minorities, as on the minorities 
and majorities themselves. Tackling the historically rooted and deeply 
entrenched forms of structural and institutional discrimination are 
paramount. Additional policy initiatives are needed to ensure that state 
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organisations and institutions engage with the communities that comprise 
the majority, not ones directed just at minority populations. This is where 
current forms of multiculturalism most often fail and deep diversity 
begins. 
9.3 Significance of the research
This thesis has presented new evidence of state minority treatment 
through an examination of the Indian diaspora in New Zealand as a case 
study. It has highlighted the historical treatment of non-Māori minorities 
through a reexamination of both Aotearoan history and early census 
records related to the case study. Such an examination underscores the 
historic invisibility and erasure of non-Māori minorities based on a 
perceived bicultural past that excludes tauiwi minorities. Establishing non-
Māori minority presence at the founding of the modern state is therefore 
crucial in advancing the notion of a shared multicultural past that has the 
potential to influence majority and minority understanding of a national 
identity inclusive of Māori, European and other tauiwi populations. 
Revealing new evidence of minority presence and participation in early 
Aotearoan encounter history also has significant implications for the 
treatment and inclusion of minorities in the contemporary execution of 
public policy designed to increase social cohesion and reduce ethnic 
tension and discrimination. 
The research has also demonstrated that state-imposed identity and ethnic 
categorisation measures, as currently employed on the census for example, 
may be incompatible with larger policy objectives designed for minority 
social inclusion—there is an acute disconnect between what the state 
hopes to achieve and the implementation of its diversity management 
policies that fails to acknowledge the importance of how minorities may 
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choose to self-identify. Minority groups that remain poorly identified may 
have less incentive in social participation than do groups that are are more 
appropriately identified. Māori subgroup identification on the census 
allows for individual and group participation in the public arena and 
recognition for the purposes of political accommodation and resource 
allocation. Failure to apply such standards to other minority groups may 
magnify inequality, increase marginalisation, and lessen social 
participation, resulting in an inability to achieve stated policy objectives. 
More equitable application of policy implementation in the diversity arena 
may help realise state ambition in improving social cohesion. As such, the 
research identifies new avenues and highlights areas in which policy is 
currently deficient. It demonstrates that many policy advances are still 
required in order to equalise majority and minority participation and to 
achieve a more appropriate balance between the extent of minority 
increase and the depth of current diversity policy. 
The application of the case study has also made a significant contribution 
to the understanding of minority treatment in the New Zealand context, 
and has highlighted some of the obstacles faced by minorities in 
overcoming discrimination and achieving recognition and accommodation 
within plural or pluralising societies. It is hoped that the treatment of the 
Indian situation in both historic and contemporary contexts may have 
ramifications for other ethnic minorities in New Zealand. This may also 
have implications for diversity governance within other state contexts, 
and may help New Zealand advance its own diversity policies and 
aspirations for providing ‘a fair go for all.’ 
The Indian population today is arguably New Zealand’s most diverse 
ethnic community, and hence serves well as a case study, a lens through 
which a deep diversity framework can be applied. It arguably contains the 
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greatest ethnic, religious and linguistic heterogeneity of all New Zealand’s 
ethnic groups, and comprises the largest number of birth countries of all 
New Zealand’s minorities. An examination of Indian presence and 
settlement has revealed a previously invisible element of Aotearoan 
history that not only adds a significant chapter to minority contributions 
to the founding of the modern state, but also exposes the extent of state 
complicity and responsibility in the erasure of non-Māori minority 
participation from history. Such an addition enhances existing historical 
discourse from being purely bicultural to establishing multicultural 
presence and participation in the very founding of the modern state. This 
may allow more inclusive histories to be written. An in-depth examination 
of historical Indian appearance in the census has exposed state control of a 
racial discourse that firmly established European hegemony and minority 
invisibility, especially in the earliest censuses between 1851-1916. A history 
of state obfuscation of minority participation, through an examination of 
the most current Indian census data, has exposed continued majority 
dominance and control of the race relations discourse and its prevailing 
focus on predominantly bicultural relations at the expense of more 
multicultural modes of collaboration. This demonstrates that New 
Zealand, while striving to be a proactive force and a global leader in state 
management of pluralism, still has much to realise. 
Demonstrating both the Indian demographic as presented in the census 
and through the analysis of a survey of the Indian population today 
exposed the lacunae between what the state reports about Indian ethnicity 
and what individual members of the Indian population reveal about 
themselves. Self-identification thus emerges as a possible element in the 
construction of identity and enhances a sense of belonging to the nation-
state. Revealing the extent of the difference between the two presentations 
of identity has potentially shown a way forward by providing the same 
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means of self-identification for members of all ethnicities as are afforded 
today to Māori. Certainly, the current obfuscation of Level 3 Indian 
subgroups in the 2013 Census spreadsheets must be addressed. 
Demonstrating such equality helps advance diversity management to 
diversity governance. 
9.4 Reflections on the study
The identities we end up constructing through the choices we might make 
of association or group membership all provide what de Bres (2005:292) 
refers to as “a means of defending and contesting existing power 
relationships,” i.e. such interactions allow us to continually reassess and 
reinterpret our participation and integration in society. These choices also 
both perpetuate and challenge exclusion. When the state prompts Māori to 
identify iwi, as it does on Census Question 15, it promotes societal 
inclusion of Māori subgroups and advances bicultural discourse, thereby 
allowing for greater participation and interest amongst Māori, leading to a 
greater sense of inclusion, among other reasons. This suggests the still 
decidedly bicultural lean of existing state diversity policy, perpetuating 
limited or shallow forms of diversity management which further exclude 
non-Māori minorities and do little to advance diversity governance and 
the notion of a shared national identity. 
Barth (1969), Wimmer (2013) and Guibernau (2013) also share the belief 
that identity is constructed through both belonging and exclusion. 
Belonging, through the choices of association and membership, allows us 
to experience both a shared sense of national identity and group-subgroup 
affiliation. This can increase minority participation in society, enhancing 
social cohesion. The choices imposed by the state through exclusion, tend 
to alienate or marginalise through separation and division, which 
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increases inequality. When the state fails to prompt other ethnic minorities 
for subgroup affiliations, it unintentionally highlights exclusion rather 
than promoting inclusion. While recognising the unique status of Māori as 
tangata whenua within New Zealand society, such unequal application of 
what should be standardised ethnicity prompts for all populations may 
tend to marginalise non-Māori minorities through the evident differences 
in how subgroup affiliation is treated and enacted by government 
institutions. When the state could be sending a message of inclusion, it 
inadvertently applies asymmetrical standards that perpetuate shallow 
management forms. This is why self-identification can be such an 
indispensable tool in improving social cohesion and why its greater 
importance must be cultivated rather than disregarded. An application of 
deeper diversity measures would therefore call upon states to equally 
apply prompts for all subgroups, sending a message of inclusion rather 
than division. Subgroup affiliation for non-Māori minorities would 
therefore appear to challenge the state imposition of the single ethnicity 
‘Indian’ for example, when further subgroup self-identification is a crucial 
consideration for promoting inclusion. While census treatment may 
merely be a single example of this principle, it can, nonetheless, 
perpetuate inequality and inhibit the advancement of shallow 
management to deeper forms of diversity governance. 
This thesis discussed the importance of self-identification and what 
Amartya Sen (2006:60) argues is the “mistake of attempting to see human 
beings in terms of only one affiliation.” However, Sen reminds us that a 
singularly exclusive identity, one based on prioritising a strong affiliation 
with a single religious or ‘civilizational identity’ at the expense of one’s 
other ‘lesser’ identities, can often lead to extreme violence or terrorism. We 
should therefore come to embrace the very diversity of our own myriad 
individual heterogeneous identities, all of which can exist simultaneously 
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(e.g. identities of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, employment, 
caste, class) and are negotiated and change based on one’s particular 
context and circumstance. The stuff that drives religious extremism and 
violence is the very identification with a supreme overarching principle, 
the notion that nothing else matters except the annihilation of all those 
that do not share the same belief or singular identity. It would therefore 
stand to reason that the very opposite of ethnic ‘lumping’ (borrowing the 
term from biological taxonomy), the embracing of all of our various 
collective identities, might help bring about the very civic solidarity, active 
engagement, and social cohesion of which this thesis speaks. 
Homogenising identities, Huntington (1996) warns, runs the risk of 
heightening ethnic tension by reducing identity to its largest common 
denominator. While his notion of an impending ‘clash of civilisations’ has 
been discredited, there are dangers and difficulties associated with 
reductionist classifications of people according to the largest groups to 
which they may allegedly ‘belong.’ Similarly, early Marxist analysis 
tended to categorise individuals as either workers or nonworkers, thereby 
alienating any other identities they might have possessed—as if one’s 
occupation was the sole realm of individual identification and all other 
measures were rendered inert. Through such reductionism “we implicitly 
give credibility to the allegedly unique importance of that one 
categorization over all the other ways in which people of the world can be 
classified” (Sen 2006:41). The potential of such limited categorisation to 
undermine social cohesion is just one such outcome of shallow and limited 
forms of diversity management. 
The tendency for ethnic lumping should hold as equally true for 
classifications like ‘Asian’ or ‘European.’ Individuals do not have 
unidimensional identities unless they are taught or learn to prioritise a 
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singular identity as being most important, to the exclusion of any other 
identities they may possess. Such classifications often ignore or deny the 
existence of the many subgroup affiliations minorities may choose. If 
states wish to prevent the formation or fomentation of fundamentalism, 
they need to promote identity diversification over homogenising 
classification. Such homogenisation creates majorities that harbour limited 
understandings of diversification (e.g. the inability to distinguish Sikh 
from Muslim) and only serves to reinforce majority anxiety about ethnic 
diversity rather than promoting heightened awareness. It also prevents 
minorities from full participation in society due to poor recognition.
Complicating matters, Putnam (2001) describes American desocialisation 
based upon a persistent and long-term drop in community activities—that 
as social beings we are less involved in community memberships, 
associations and organisations than we were a generation ago, and most of 
our assorted ‘lesser’ identities have been dismissed for participation in the 
few that we have prioritised. Such change in our ability to be engaged 
makes society inherently less cohesive and more vulnerable to unraveling. 
To counter such effects, I have highlighted the importance of ‘active 
engagement’ as fundamental to deep diversity, creating a form of civic 
solidarity that would see individuals embrace their multitudinous 
identities, whatever they may be, and actively pursue interest in 
involvement in activities of a civic nature. The importance of subgroup 
affiliation must be acknowledged for increasing social cohesion. Singular 
affiliation at the expense of indulging multiple identities may have the 
opposite effect.
Limited state categorisations in the census reduce identity to uniformity, 
defining individuals as European, Māori, Asian, for example, as if 
ethnicity alone defines identity. Human beings cannot be understood or 
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preeminently classified in terms of the ethnic groups to which they belong
—they have underlying layers of identities in addition to the singular 
ethnic categories with which they may choose to affiliate. To be 
categorised as ‘Indian’ for example, assumes, to perhaps all other non-
Indians, that one is equally similar in other ways to all other ‘Indians,’ 
when there are underlying regional, linguistic, cultural, behavioural, 
ancestral and religious differences that perhaps better define ethnicity. 
9.5 Future research
Amongst its many objectives, this research set out to identify weaknesses 
in existing forms of diversity management; it did not purport to solve its 
associated problems. As such, it set out a framework through which 
diversity governance can be advanced in an era of superdiversity. Deep 
diversity should therefore help policymakers design and prioritise new 
policy objectives, guide implementation and strengthen evaluation 
procedures. Follow-up research could thus focus on operationalising and 
prioritising some of the concepts introduced here. 
In its treatment of the Indian diaspora in New Zealand, the presentation of 
the demographic results from the survey I conducted, focused only on 
those aspects that directly addressed the research objectives, that is, they 
were focused on the small portion of survey results that spoke to the twin 
themes of self-reported identity and discrimination, as examples. 
Analysing the wide variety of themes from the collected data that were 
beyond the purview of the present research would allow for an 
exploration of the relationship between other variables and deep diversity. 
Additional data was collected on such themes as migration pathways, 
reasons for migration, intent to stay, settlement, sponsorship, remittances, 
citizenship, employment and income, relevance of educational attainment 
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to employment, the receipt of government benefits, religion, religious 
practice and participation, religious conversion, language use and 
application, the extent of cultural transmission to children, integration into 
majority society, Māori relations, and political participation. The 
implications and relationships, if any, of each of the variables within the 
above listed themes could be further explored. 
The analysis of the Indian demographic presented here focused mainly on 
the ethnicity question in the census, and the extent to which census 
respondents chose to affiliate as either ‘Indian nfd’ or as ‘Fijian Indian.’ A 
similar analysis of Indian identity could occur along the lines of country of 
birth, ancestral home and regional affiliation, religion, language, or the 
strength of one’s association with either a Kiwi or an Indian identity, 
instead of just the ethnic classifications or migrant status reported here. In 
terms of Indian participation in Aotearoan history, this research has only 
identified presence and activity as occurring along with the very first 
European arrivals. Further research documenting the nature and extent of 
its earliest participation would be in order. Archival research of additional 
Muster Rolls and ship logs and diaries of each of the early European 
vessels that visited Aotearoa would indeed be in order, and a thorough 
reading of newspapers past might reveal relevant anecdotes to construct a 
more realistic history of other early minority presence during European 
settlement. 
Applying a deep diversity framework has also helped augment the 
importance that a shared national identity has to minority integration. 
Exploring the extent of this relationship, as well as its implications, should 
be of primary importance for future research. How important is this 
relationship for social cohesion? In addition to minority participation in a 
common history, what additional factors can be identified that could 
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potentially contribute to a shared national identity? How might majority 
perception influence the adoption of a shared national identity and 
influence social cohesion? Indeed, what role might a shared national 
identity play in mitigating discrimination and racism, if any? What other 
ways can be identified for majority participation in active engagement? 
Themes of appropriate minority political representation were introduced 
and a potential model for quantifying that engagement discussed. 
Although limited in scope in terms of its presentation in this thesis, it may 
be possible to apply it to other minorities in New Zealand to determine if 
the percentage of existing political representation is commensurate with 
the minority’s percentage of the total population of New Zealand. These 
comparisons could be applied to minority representation in other 
countries and compared. As a starting point, this model also suggests that 
quantifying a deep diversity framework may indeed be possible in areas 
other than appropriate political representation. This would warrant 
further analysis. 
Many questions, however, remain. Are the results of an analysis of the 
Indian demographic, and the implications they may have on public policy, 
relevant to other ethnic groups in New Zealand? How extensive is existing 
diversity? What measures represent best practice at quantifying diversity? 
Should policies that have aided Māori cultural resurgence be put in place 
for tauiwi? Should non-Māori minorities have similar rights to declare 
subgroup affiliation on the national census as do Māori? These questions, 
and others, suggest multiple avenues for further research. 
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9.6 Summary conclusion: a deep diversity framework for New Zealand?
Overall, this thesis has presented an alternative historical account, that 
both remedies the invisibility of non-Māori minority contributions and 
destabilises the sequence and issues of priority that have been evident in 
the bicultural discourse, demonstrating that such minorities have been a 
fundamental part of nation building since the inception of Māori-
European encounter. While this unsettles the existing settlement narrative 
and the primary considerations of biculturalism, deep diversity, as an 
alternative approach to diversity management, offers a multicultural 
governance framework that builds upon the accomplishments and 
successes of the bicultural discourse,541 however limited, and 
acknowledges the multicultural nature of contemporary Aotearoa New 
Zealand. 
Yet much progress remains. Spoonley (2015:51) states that “the more 
problematic issues relate to the recognition of minority ethnic rights 
alongside the rights of tangata whenua.” Yet deep diversity does not 
presume a multicultural appropriation of the bicultural endeavour, or that 
the bicultural discourse diminish in any perceptible way. Rather, it builds 
upon the foundational outcomes of biculturalism while enabling both to 
evolve and mature in combination or close association. The recognition of 
both contemporaneous discourses positions Māori as indigenous 
kaitiaki,542 well-placed to affirm and lead Aotearoa New Zealand’s existing 
diversity to a more deeply heterogenous future. Biculturalism and 
multiculturalism are therefore not seen as “problematic” contending isms 
jostling for prominence in the diversity discourse, but rather as positive 
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541 e.g. recognition of indigenous rights, heightened collaboration in national institutions, greater 
Māori social and political participation, Treaty redress and settlement. 
542 guardians, stewards (Moorfield 2011).
complementary and interdependent ideologies that ground a modern 
Aotearoan New Zealand ethic. It’s a part of our shared national identity. 
The alternative history, census scrutiny, and survey data presented in the 
substantive chapters of this thesis are linked through an analysis informed 
by a deep diversity framework, which serves as the thread that weaves the 
disparate historic, demographic and statistical approaches evident in Part 
II together. In such an analysis, the elemental motifs of identity and 
invisibility have served as the unifying stream cohering an historic past to 
continued contemporary practices that perpetuate state hegemony and 
assertion of majority values over minority aspirations. The invisibility of 
non-Māori minority groups from the historic settlement narrative, the 
homogenising of ethnicity in the contemporary diversity discourse, and 
continued state disregard of the significance of self-identification 
(especially evident in the domain of census enumeration), perpetuate both 
majority dominance of social and political discourse and the subaltern 
status of minorities and their subgroups. Historic and contemporary state 
handling of identity and invisibility concerns only serves to reinforce and 
perpetuate discrimination at individual, group, institutional, and 
structural levels, highlighting the need for change in diversity policy from 
existing top-down patriarchal management to more inclusive and 
equitable governance strategies. 
The perpetuation and experience of racism and discrimination in society 
raises interesting issues about the nature of tolerance and minority rights. 
How far should majority tolerance extend? More importantly, is tolerance 
alone enough? A lesson of deep diversity is that majorities must work 
harder at social cohesion; that mere tolerance of difference will never be 
enough to achieve it. Toleration implies an insignificant acknowledgement 
of the existence and difference of ‘others,’ and ignores any practical 
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engagement. It should be abundantly clear that moving beyond tolerance is 
crucial for social cohesion and for establishing a deep diversity 
framework. Spoonley (2015:51) rightly laments that “a new 
multiculturalism [is] now apparent,” but has “yet to be reflected in 
policy.” Are such achievements even possible for New Zealand to realise? 
Further, how far should minorities press for recognition and 
accommodation? What are majority’s limits in the face of what may be 
deemed to be unnecessary minority demands? What responses are 
therefore appropriate in a society moving beyond tolerance? 
A further challenge for deep diversity is how states might contend with 
and react to threats to its domestic and global security. If society believes 
that minorities threaten national security, then, according to Kymlicka 
(2010b:86) “the space for multiculturalism disappears.” If however, states 
emphasise the importance of social cohesion and a shared national 
identity, implement their diversity policies equally with majority and 
minority alike, and are responsive to minority calls for appropriate 
accommodation and political representation where reasonable, will that be 
enough to reduce racism and mitigate structural and institutional 
discrimination? A shared national identity, at least, may be just the 
beginning for a deepening diversity to take hold in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
and can be an instrument through which social cohesion may best be 
achieved. 
The challenge is how to keep building in our small nation the tolerance and 
mutual respect for each other which allows diverse peoples to live alongside 
each other in peace. Trying to enforce a monoculture which doesn’t allow for 
diversity of culture, heritage,  and belief would be a disaster for New Zealand. 
Trying to force everyone into a mythical mainstream would blow up in our face. 
In our nation building, the unifying concept must be love for our country—
whoever we are and whatever our backgrounds. Proud Kiwis can be of any 
religion, faith,  or belief; of any ethnic or cultural background; of any gender or 
orientation. The New Zealand way must be to build unity in diversity,  to avoid 
marginalisation, to practise inclusion in the national interest, and to encourage 
all those who want to be part of the building of New Zealand (Clark 2005). 
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Given its bicultural history and the current extensive ethnic diversity, New 
Zealand can become an exemplar of social cohesion if it boldly embraces 
policies and practices informed by deep diversity. 
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APPENDIX A: 
Summary of census statistics reporting ethnicity, 1851-1926
(Summarised from both the official census reports and separate Māori estimates)
NOTES:
a. ‘European,’ in the following census years, referred to:
1921: ‘Europeans’ (1,209,239) and ‘European-Māori’ living with European (4,236)
1926: ‘Europeans’ (1,332,095), ’European-Māori quarter-castes’ (6,053), and ‘European, not specified, but 
apparently European (19)
b. While Māori were excluded from the national census until 1951, I am including the totals (which were usually 
represented by estimates taken at the time). In the following years, these referred to:
1926: ‘Māori’ (45,429), ’Māori-European’ (11,609), and ‘Māori-European three-quarter castes’ (6,632)
c. ‘Other Asian’ referred to the following in the listed census years, below:
1916: ‘Afghans’ (2), ‘Asiatic Jews’ (5), ‘Asiatic Turks’ (1), ‘Japanese’ (59), ‘Javanese’ (1), ‘Sinhalese’ (12), 
‘Thai’ (1)
1921: ‘Armenians’ (2), ‘Asiatic Turks’ (1), ’Asiatic Jews’ (68), ‘Japanese’ (38), ‘Sinhalese’ (18), ‘Javanese’ (4), 
‘Malays’ (14), ‘Siamese’ Thai (1)
1926: ‘Armenians’ (2), ‘Asiatic Jews’ (5), ‘Japanese’ (50), ‘Japanese-Māori’ (9), Indian-Māori (9), 
‘Sinhalese’ (5), ‘Filipino’ (16), ‘Javanese’ (1), ‘Malays’ (3)
d. ‘Pacific’ referred to the following in the listed census years, below:
Year
Europeana Māori
b 
(estimates)
Asian
Pacificd Othere Total
Chinese Indian Otherc
n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n %
1851 26,707 92.5 - - - - - - - - - - 2,158 7.5 28,865 100.0
1858 59,398 50.6 56,049 47.8 - - - - - - - - 1,896 1.6 117,343 100.0
1861 99,021 59.8 56,336 34.0 - - - - - - - - 10,294 6.2 165,651 100.0
1864 172,158 100.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - 172,158 100.0
1867 218,668 85.0 38,540 15.0 - - - - - - - - - - 257,208 100.0
1871 256,393 86.8 37,502 12.7 - - - - - - - - 1,455 0.5 295,350 100.0
1874 294,698 85.4 45,470 13.2 4,816 1.4 - - - - - - - - 344,984 100.0
1878 409,979 89.5 43,595 9.5 4,433 1.0 - - - - - - - - 458,007 100.0
1881 484,923 90.8 44,097 8.3 5,004 0.9 6 0.0 - - - - - - 534,030 100.0
1886 573,940 92.5 41,969 6.8 4,542 0.7 - - - - - - - - 620,451 100.0
1891 622,214 93.1 41,953 6.3 4,444 0.7 - - - - - - 40 0.0 668,651 100.0
1896 699,603 94.1 39,834 5.4 3,711 0.5 46 0.0 - - - - 20 0.0 743,214 100.0
1901 769,838 94.4 43,112 5.3 2,857 0.4 24 0.0 - - - - 31 0.0 815,862 100.0
1906 886,002 93.4 47,701 5.0 2,570 0.3 6 0.0 - - 12,340 1.3 30 0.0 948,649 100.0
1911 1,005,823 93.9 49,829 4.7 2,630 0.2 15 0.0 - - 12,598 1.2 15 0.0 1,070,910 100.0
1916 1,096,244 94.3 49,771 4.3 2,147 0.2 181 0.0 81 0.0 12,995 1.1 854 0.1 1,162,273 100.0
1921 1,213,475 91.8 52,751 4.0 3,266 0.2 671 0.1 146 0.0 49,933 3.8 974 0.1 1,321,216 100.0
1926 1,338,167 91.5 63,670 4.4 3,374 0.2 978 0.1 100 0.0 55,825 3.8 1,150 0.1 1,463,264 100.0
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1906: ‘Cook and other annexed islands’
1911: ‘Cook and other annexed islands’
1916: ‘Cook and other annexed islands (12,797),’ ‘Polynesian, other and undefined’ (151), ‘Fijians’ (29), and 
‘Melanesians’ (18)
1921: ‘Population of Cook and other annexed Pacific Islands’ (13,209), ‘Population of the Mandated 
Territory of Western Samoa’ (36,343), ‘Polynesian, other and undefined’ (360), ‘Melanesians’ (21)
1926: ‘Population of Cook and other annexed Pacific Islands’ (13,863), ‘Population of the Mandated 
Territory of Western Samoa’ (40,229), ‘Population of Tokelau Islands Dependency’ (1,033), 
‘Polynesian-Māori (39), ‘Polynesian, not further-defined’ (549), ‘Fijian’ (109), ‘Melanisians (3)
e. ’Other’ included populations not otherwise included in the previous columns of the above table, and consisted of 
the following in the listed census years, below:
1851: ‘Military and their families’
1858: ‘Military and their families’
1861: ‘Military and their families’ (7,294) and ‘Gold miners at Otago’ (3,000)
1871: ‘Military and their families’
1891: ‘Moriori at Chatham Islands’
1896: ‘Moriori at Chatham Islands’ 
1906: ‘Moriori at Chatham Islands’ 
1911: ‘Moriori at Chatham Islands’ 
1916:‘Moriori at Chatham Islands’ (5), ‘Europeans in Samoa’ (271), Australian Aboriginals (5), and ‘Native 
Americans’ (1), ‘Abyssinians’ (4), ‘African Negroes’ (95), ‘Arabs’ (10), ‘Egyptians’ (2), ‘Persians’ (2), 
‘Syrians’ (459)
1921: ‘Australian Aboriginals (4), ‘American Indians’ (4), ‘West Indians’ from the West Indies (41), 
‘Arabs’ (3), ‘Egyptians’ (3), ‘Syrians’ (707), ‘Abyssinians’ (8), ‘Negroes’ (96), ‘Other half-castes, 
unspecified (59), ‘non-Europeans, not further defined’ (49)
1926: ‘Australian Aboriginals (10), ‘American Indians’ (7), ‘West Indians’ from the West Indies (61), 
‘Abyssinians’ (10), ‘Arabs’ (14), ‘Egyptians’ (1), ‘Syrians’ (951), ‘Negroes’ (93), ‘Other half-castes, 
unspecified (3),
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APPENDIX B: 
Summary of census statistics reporting religious affiliation, 1851-1926
NOTES:
a. ‘Other Religions’ included, in the following years: 
1886: ‘Spiritualist’ (252), and ‘Other Religions’ (179)
1891: ‘Spiritualist’ (339), and ‘Other Religions’ (154)
1896: ‘Zoroastrian’ (2), ’Spiritualist’ (376), and ‘Other Religions’ (187)
1901: ‘Zoroastrian’ (3), ‘Spiritualist’ (499), and ‘Other Religions’ (204)
1906: ‘Zoroastrian (1), ’Spiritualist’ (1,054), and ‘Other Religions’ (355)
1911: ‘Sikh’ (1), ’Zoroastrian (2), ‘Spiritualist’ (1,197), Sikh (1) and ‘Other Religions’ (657)
1916: ‘Sikh’ (18), ‘Other Religions’ (12,471)
1921: ‘Sikh’ (38), ’Bahá’í’ (2), ‘Chinese Religions’ (2,100), ‘Other Religions’ (20,072)
1926:‘Sikh’ (97), ‘Zoroastrian (4), ‘Jain’ (1), ’Bahá’í’ (25), ‘Chinese Religions’ (1,194), ’Other Religions’ (14,232)
b. ’Other’ included, in the following years: 
1851: ‘Non-Sectarians’ 
1858: ‘No Denomination’
1861: ‘No Denomination’
1867: ‘Pagans, Chinese, and Heathens’ (1,111)
1871: ‘Object to answering’
Year
Christian Jewish Hindu Islam Buddhist Other Religionsa Other
b Total Stated
n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n %
1851 25,110 97.8 65 0.3 - - - - - - - - 496 1.9 25,671 100.0
1858 57,130 95.5 188 0.3 - - - - - - 968 1.6 1,560 2.6 59,846 100.0
1861 89,701 90.6 326 0.3 14 0.0 4 0.0 3 0.0 - - 8,993 9.1 99,041 100.0
1864 166,411 98.2 955 0.6 - - - - - - 2,174 1.3 - - 169,540 100.0
1867 211,363 97.4 1,247 0.6 - - - - - - 3,195 1.5 1,111 0.5 216,916 100.0
1871 239,542 93.7 1,262 0.5 - - - - - - 6,097 2.4 8,630 3.4 255,531 100.0
1874 284,235 95.2 1,215 0.4 9 0.0 17 0.0 - - 135 0.0 12,957 4.3 298,568 100.0
1878 393,747 95.4 1,424 0.3 - - 39 0.0 - - 103 0.0 17,356 4.2 412,669 100.0
1881 463,281 94.8 1,536 0.3 - - 7 0.0 - - 237 0.0 23,543 4.8 488,604 100.0
1886 542,243 94.2 1,559 0.3 - - - - - - 431 0.1 31,380 5.5 575,613 100.0
1891 594,334 95.0 1,463 0.2 - - - - - - 493 0.1 29,080 4.7 625,370 100.0
1896 670,358 95.5 1,549 0.2 3 0.0 43 0.0 3,391 0.5 563 0.1 26,377 3.8 702,284 100.0
1901 739,401 95.8 1,611 0.2 2 0.0 41 0.0 2,432 0.3 706 0.1 27,644 3.6 771,837 100.0
1906 846,566 95.5 1,867 0.2 12 0.0 17 0.0 1,452 0.2 1,410 0.2 35,373 4.0 886,697 100.0
1911 949,954 94.4 2,128 0.2 2 0.0 12 0.0 1,501 0.1 1,858 0.2 50,611 5.0 1,006,066 100.0
1916 1,063,296 95.8 2,341 0.2 97 0.0 47 0.0 1,433 0.1 12,489 1.1 29,888 2.7 1,109,591 100.0
1921 1,162,851 97.6 2,380 0.2 402 0.0 65 0.0 43 0.0 22,212 1.9 3,919 0.3 1,191,872 100.0
1926 1,261,594 93.7 2,591 0.2 359 0.0 80 0.0 169 0.0 15,553 1.2 65,647 4.9 1,345,993 100.0
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1874: ‘Pagans’ (4,764), ‘No Denomination’ (1,281), ‘No Religion’ (152), ‘Object’ (6,760)
1878: ‘Pagans’ (4,379), ‘No Denomination’ (2,211), ‘No Religion’ (202), ‘Object’ (10,564)
1881: ‘Pagans’ (4,936), ‘No Denomination’ (4,357), ‘No Religion’ (272), ‘Object’ (13,978)
1886: ‘Pagans’ (4,472), ‘No Denomination’ (6,046), ‘No Religion’ (973), ‘Object’ (19,889)
1891: ‘Pagans’ (3,928), ‘No Denomination’ (8,252), ‘No Religion’ (1,558), ‘Object’ (15,342)
1896: ‘No Denomination’ (8,535), ‘No Religion’ (1,875), ‘Object’ (15,967) 
1901: ‘No Denomination’ (4,799), ‘No Religion’ (4,550), ‘Object’ (18,295)
1906: ‘No Denomination’ (9,339), ‘No Religion’ (1,709), ‘Object’ (24,325)
1911: ‘No Denomination’ (9,177), ‘No Religion’ (5,529), ‘Object’ (35,905)
1916: ‘No Religion’ (4,311), ‘Object’ (25,577)
1921: ‘No Religion’ (3,919)
1926: ‘No Religion’ (2,838), ’Don’t Know’ (224), ‘Object’ (62,585)
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APPENDIX C:
Detailed occupations of Indians recorded in 1916 (Census of 1916, p. 147). 
NOTE: *=includes 1 female half-caste; ** =  includes 1 male half-caste;  ***=includes 2 male half-
castes; ****=includes 2 male half castes and 5 female half-castes.
Occupation:
Gender Totals
Males Females No. Percent
Ministering to religion, charity, health, education, &c. 1 - 1 0.55
Engaged in supplying board and lodging 12 - 12 6.63
Engaged in domestic service and attendance* 8 5 13 7.18
Dealing in property and finance 1 - 1 0.55
Dealing in art and mechanic production 4 - 4 2.21
Dealing in textile fabrics, dress & fibrous materials 1 - 1 0.55
Dealing in food, drinks, narcotics, and stimulants 38 - 38 20.99
Dealing in animals, animal and vegetable substances 3 - 3 1.66
Dealing in metals and other minerals 1 - 1 0.55
General and undefined merchants and dealers 5 - 5 2.76
Engaged in traffic on seas and rivers** 2 - 2 1.1
Working in art and mechanic production 2 1 3 1.66
Working in textile fabrics, dress and fibrous materials 5 - 5 2.76
Working in food, drinks, narcotics, and stimulants 6 - 6 3.31
Working in metals and other minerals 9 - 9 4.97
Engaged in construction of buildings, roads, railways &c 1 - 1 0.55
Engaged in disposal of the dead or of refuse 4 - 4 2.21
Engaged in undefined industrial pursuits 3 - 3 1.66
Engaged in agricultural pursuits** 24 - 24 13.26
Engaged in pastoral pursuits*** 26 - 26 14.36
Engaged in mining and quarrying 2 - 2 1.1
Dependent on natural guardians**** 6 8 14 7.73
Supported by voluntary or State contributions 2 - 2 1.1
Criminal class (under legal detention) 1 - 1 0.55
Total: 167 14 181 100
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APPENDIX D:
Industries of the ethnic Indian population, Census of 1926. 
(Source: 1926 Census, Vol. VI ‘Race Aliens,’ p. 28-29.)
(Table continued on next page)
INDUSTRY:
Gender Total
Males Females No. Percent
Agricultural and pastoral: 158 16.01
    Sheep farming 7 - 7 0.71
    Dairy farming 40 - 40 4.05
    Mixed farming and farming undefined 83 - 83 8.41
    Market gardening 6 - 6 0.61
    Bush-felling and scrub cutting 20 - 20 2.03
    Other 2 - 2 0.2
Forestry: 22 2.23
    Bush sawmilling 19 - 19 1.93
    Other 3 - 3 0.3
Mining and quarrying: 3 0.3
    Gold mining - - - -
    Road metal, gravel, and sand pits - - - -
    Other 3 - 3 0.3
Manufactures and industrial: 71 7.19
    Brickworks, &c. 6 - 6 0.61
    Foundries and general engineering 1 - 1 0.1
    Flax milling 41 - 41 4.15
    Tailoring 4 2 6 0.61
    Dressmaking - 2 2 0.2
    Boot repairs 3 - 3 0.3
    Confectionary (sugar) 2 1 3 0.3
    Job and general printing 2 - 2 0.2
    Photography 2 - 2 0.2
    Other 5 - 5 0.51
Building and construction: 30 3.04
    Roads, construction and maintenance 2 - 2 0.2
    Railways and tramways 2 - 2 0.2
    Land drainage 22 - 22 2.23
    Other 4 - 4 0.41
Transport and communication: 49 4.96
    Railway service 2 - 2 0.2
    Carrying and cartage services 2 - 2 0.2
    Shipping service 36 - 36 3.65
    Loading and discharging vessels 5 - 5 0.51
    Telegraph 2 - 2 0.2
    Other 2 - 2 0.2
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APPENDIX D (continued)
Industries of the ethnic Indian population, Census of 1926. 
Commerce and Finance: 225 22.8
    Groceries and provisions 4 - 4 0.41
    Vegetables and fruit 136 - 136 13.78
    Tobacco, &c., including hairdressers & tobacconists 9 - 9 0.91
    Cycles, motor-vehicles, and accessories 1 - 1 0.1
    Textiles, clothing, drapery, &c. 3 1 4 0.41
    Scrap metal, waste materials, old bottles 19 - 19 1.93
    Fancy goods and toys 2 - 2 0.2
    Hawking and street selling 24 1 25 2.53
    General stores and mixed businesses 16 - 16 1.62
    Other 9 - 9 0.91
Public administration and professional: 19 1.93
    General government, administrative, n.e.i.* 1 1 2 0.2
    Local government administrative, n.e.i.* 3 - 3 0.3
    Legal profession 1 - 1 0.1
    Religion, persons connected w/ places of worship - 1 1 0.1
    Hospital staff, incl. mental staff & attendants - 2 2 0.2
    Kindergarten, primary, and secondary schools 2 2 4 0.41
    Other 3 3 6 0.61
Recreation: 3 0.3
    Theatrical and other entertainers 1 - 1 0.1
    Other 2 - 2 0.2
Personal and domestic service: 106 10.74
    Private domestic service 4 24 28 2.84
    Licensed hotels and accommodation houses 38 2 40 4.05
    Private hotels and boarding houses 32 - 32 3.24
    Restaurants, soda-fountains, &c. 1 2 3 0.3
    Laundries, job-dyeing, and dry cleaning 1 - 1 0.1
    Other 2 - 2 0.2
Other industry, or not specified: 301 30.5
    Industry not specified 68 1 69 6.99
    Retired 3 - 3 0.3
    Dependent on natural guardians 87 129 216 21.88
    Hospital inmates, orphanages, institutions 7 3 10 1.01
    Inmates of gaols, industrial schools, &c. 3 - 3 0.3
TOTAL: 810 177 987 100
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APPENDIX E:
Reported occupations of the ethnic Indian population, 1926 Census. 
(Source: 1926 Census, Vol. VI ‘Race Aliens,’ p. 30-32. Includes subcategories omitted from Table 6.12.) 
(Notes: *n.e.i. = not elsewhere identifiable, n.o.d. = not otherwise described.)
(Table continued on next page)
OCCUPATIONS:
Indians Total
Males Females No. Percent
Agricultural and pastoral occupations: 132 13.54
    Mixed farming and farming undefined 15 - 15 1.54
    Dairy-farmer 5 - 5 0.51
    Market gardening 6 - 6 0.62
    Relative assisting on farm, n.o.d.* 1 - 1 0.1
    Farm labourer 93 - 93 9.54
    Ploughman 2 - 2 0.21
    Teamster 2 - 2 0.21
    Gardener (undefined) 2 - 2 0.21
    Sharemilker 1 - 1 0.1
    Other 5 - 5 0.51
Forest occupations: 58 5.95
    Employer 2 - 2 0.21
    Bushman 1 - 1 0.1
    Log-hauler 2 - 2 0.21
    Scrub-cutter, bushfeller (not mill) 24 - 24 2.46
    Firewood-cutter 2 - 2 0.21
    Post-splitter 10 - 10 1.03
    Kauri-gum digger, bleeder 1 - 1 0.1
    Flax cutter 16 - 16 1.64
Miners and quarrymen: 2 0.21
    Collier, coal-miner, n.o.d.* 2 - 2 0.21
Non-precious metal workers, electrical fittings, &c. 5 0.51
    Coppersmith 1 - 1 0.1
    Electric lineman, telegraph lineman 1 - 1 0.1
    Fitter (not range-fitter) 1 - 1 0.1
    Plumber 1 - 1 0.1
    Others 1 - 1 0.1
Workers in fibrous materials other than clothing 17 1.74
    Flaxmill hand, n.e.i.* 17 - 17 1.74
Workers in clothing and dress 11 1.13
    Employer 1 - 1 0.1
    Tailor 3 1 4 0.41
    Dressmaker - 1 1 0.1
    Machinist (clothing) - 2 2 0.21
    Bootmaker (not factory) 3 - 3 0.31
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APPENDIX E:  (continued)
Reported occupations of the ethnic Indian population, 1926 Census. 
Workers in food, drink, and tobacco 3 0.31
    Employer 1 - 1 0.1
    Brewer (ale, stout) 1 - 1 0.1
    Others 1 - 1 0.1
Workers in wood 11 1.13
    Carpenter 2 - 2 0.21
    Machinist 1 - 1 0.1
    Sawmill hand, n.e.i.* 4 - 4 0.41
    Printing machinist 1 - 1 0.1
    Photographers 2 - 2 0.21
    Other 1 - 1 0.1
Workers in building and construction, n.e.i.: 35 3.59
    Employer 2 - 2 0.21
    Contractor 5 - 5 0.51
    Navvy 2 - 2 0.21
    Drainer, ditcher 25 - 25 2.56
    Other 1 - 1 0.1
Workers in transport and communication: 44 4.51
    Steward (marine) 4 - 4 0.41
    Donkeyman (marine) 2 - 2 0.21
    Fireman, stoker (marine) 14 - 14 1.44
    Coal trimmer 9 - 9 0.92
    Seaman, boatswain 4 - 4 0.41
    Waterside worker 4 - 4 0.41
    Engine-driver (locomotive) 1 - 1 0.1
    Driver, motor-lorry, motor-bus, &c. 3 - 3 0.31
    Carrier, carter 1 - 1 0.1
    Messenger (other than telegraph) 1 - 1 0.1
    Telegraph messenger 1 - 1 0.1
Commercial occupations: 213 21.85
    Employer, n.e.i.* 1 - 1 0.1
    Manager 1 - 1 0.1
    Soft goods merchant 2 - 2 0.21
    Coal and firewood dealer 2 - 2 0.21
    Storekeeper, shopkeeper, retailer 15 - 15 1.54
    Hairdresser, barber 2 - 2 0.21
    Hairdresser and tobacconist (combined) 7 - 7 0.72
    Hawker, pedlar 82 1 83 8.51
    Grocer, provision-merchant 3 - 3 0.31
    Greengrocer, fruiterer 55 - 55 5.64
    Agent, n.o.d.* 1 - 1 0.1
    Buyer (not livestock) 1 - 1 0.1
    Salesman, canvasser (not insurance) 2 - 2 0.21
    Shop assistant, shopman 34 1 35 3.59
    Commercial traveller 3 - 3 0.31
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APPENDIX E:  (continued)
Reported occupations of the ethnic Indian population, 1926 Census. 
(Notes: *n.e.i. = not elsewhere identifiable, n.o.d. = not otherwise described.)  
Public administration: 5 0.51
    School-teacher (State school) - 2 2 0.21
    Nurse (hospital) - 1 1 0.1
    Probationer (hospital) - 1 1 0.1
    Firebrigadesman 1 - 1 0.1
Clerical and professional occupations 12 1.23
    Medical practitioner, doctor, surgeon 1 - 1 0.1
    Law clerk, conveyancing clerk 1 - 1 0.1
    Sister of Mercy, compassion, &c., nun - 1 1 0.1
    Civil servant, n.o.d.* 1 - 1 0.1
    Insurance clerk 1 - 1 0.1
    Clerk, n.e.i. - 1 1 0.1
    Typist, stenographer - 1 1 0.1
    Student, n.o.d.* 2 1 3 0.31
    Others 1 1 2 0.21
Occupations connected with sport & recreation: 2 0.21
    Ticket-taker, gate or door keeper 1 - 1 0.1
    Others 1 - 1 0.1
Personal and domestic occupations: 113 11.59
    Manager (not hotel) 1 - 1 0.1
    Cook, chef 27 - 27 2.77
    Kitchenman, sculleryman 22 - 22 2.26
    Pantryman 6 - 6 0.62
    Houseman, housemaid 1 2 3 0.31
    Domestic servant 3 24 27 2.77
    Laundry employee, n.o.d.* 2 - 2 0.21
    Hotel porter 19 - 19 1.95
    Waiter - 3 3 0.31
    Others 3 - 3 0.31
Other ill-defined occupations: 94 9.64
    Labourer, n.o.d.* 67 - 67 6.87
    Factory hand, n.o.d.* - 1 1 0.1
    Bottle gatherer 9 - 9 0.92
    Not specified (age 16 years or over) 16 1 17 1.74
Persons not actively emplyd in gainful occupation: 230 23.59
    Retired farmer or farm manager 1 - 1 0.1
    Convict, gaol prisoner 3 - 3 0.31
    Mental hospital patient 4 2 6 0.62
    Invalid, hospital patient (not mental) 1 - 1 0.1
    Inmate of benevolent institution 1 1 2 0.21
    Not specified (children under 16 years) 87 79 166 17.03
    Domestic duties - 49 49 5.03
    Retired, n.o.d.* 2 - 2 0.21
TOTAL: 810 177 975 100
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APPENDIX F:
Spoken languages and birthplace, all Indian ethnicities, 2006 Census. 
(*Includes both nfd and nei responses.)
South Asian 
language spoken:
New Zealand-born Overseas-born Total Indian Stated
n percent n percent n percent
Hindi 3,615 35.4 38,688 49.8 42,303 48.1
Urdu 165 1.6 2,124 2.7 2,292 2.6
Fiji Hindi 33 0.3 399 0.5 435 0.5
Bengali 48 0.5 1,002 1.3 1,050 1.2
Oriya 0 0.0 51 0.1 51 0.1
Nepalese 0 0.0 48 0.1 48 0.1
Punjabi 1,629 15.9 8,445 10.9 10,074 11.5
Sindhi 3 0.0 156 0.2 159 0.2
Kashmiri 6 0.1 54 0.1 57 0.1
Sinhala 3 0.0 51 0.1 51 0.1
Gujarati 3,798 37.2 11,643 15.0 15,444 17.6
Konkani 3 0.0 576 0.7 576 0.7
Marathi 54 0.5 2,484 3.2 2,535 2.9
Other Indo-Aryan* 588 5.8 3,132 4.0 3,723 4.2
Kannada 6 0.1 858 1.1 864 1.0
Malayalam 51 0.5 2,052 2.6 2,103 2.4
Tamil 111 1.1 3,273 4.2 3,381 3.8
Telugu 105 1.0 2,676 3.4 2,781 3.2
Other Dravidian* 0 0.0 27 0.0 27 0.0
Total: 10,218 100.0 77,739 100.0 87,954 100.0
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APPENDIX G:
Religious affiliation and birthplace, all Indian ethnicities, 2006 Census. 
Table 1: Religious affiliation and birthplace, column percentages.
Table 2: Religious affiliation and birthplace, row percentages. 
Religious affiliation:
New Zealand-born Overseas-born Total Indian Stated
n percent n percent n percent
Buddhism 117 0.6 228 0.3 348 0.4
Christianity 4,092 21.1 13,029 16.9 17,121 17.8
Hinduism 10,296 53.1 46,515 60.4 56,808 58.9
Islam 2,424 12.5 8,808 11.4 11,235 11.7
Jainism 6 0.0 99 0.1 105 0.1
Judaism 30 0.2 48 0.1 78 0.1
Māori Christian 186 1.0 60 0.1 255 0.3
Māori Religion 18 0.1 3 0.0 18 0.0
Sikh 2,028 10.5 7,200 9.4 9,231 9.6
Zoroastrianism 66 0.3 819 1.1 882 0.9
Other Religions nfd 135 0.7 153 0.2 306 0.3
Total: 19,398 100.0 76,962 100.0 96,387 100.0
Religious affiliation:
New Zealand-born Overseas-born Total Indian Stated
n percent n percent n percent
Buddhism 117 33.6 228 65.5 348 99.1
Christianity 4,092 23.9 13,029 76.1 17,121 100.0
Hinduism 10,296 18.1 46,515 81.9 56,808 100.0
Islam 2,424 21.6 8,808 78.4 11,235 100.0
Jainism 6 5.7 99 94.3 105 100.0
Judaism 30 38.5 48 61.5 78 100.0
Māori Christian 186 72.9 60 23.5 255 96.5
Māori Religion 18 100.0 3 16.7 18 116.7
Sikh 2,028 22.0 7,200 78.0 9,231 100.0
Zoroastrianism 66 7.5 819 92.9 882 100.3
Other Religions nfd 135 44.1 153 50.0 306 94.1
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APPENDIX H:
Survey Questionnaire. 
"
"517
APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)
"
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APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)
"
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APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)
"
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APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)
"
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APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)
"
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APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)
"
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APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)
"
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APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)
"
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APPENDIX I: 
Spoken South Asian languages of survey respondents (Q36).*
* ‘Fiji-Hindi’ and ‘Hindi’ are combined above, since Fiji-Hindi is a dialect and not a distinct language. 
Since respondents speak more than one South Asian language the percentage shown is based on the 
total number of cases (respondents) that answered the question rather than the total number of 
languages spoken for all respondents.
Language Frequency
Percent of 
responses (n=2082)
Percent of cases 
(n=902)
Assamese 5 0.2 0.6
Bengali 78 3.7 8.6
Bhojpuri 24 1.2 2.7
Garhwali 2 0.1 0.2
Gujarati 244 11.7 27.1
Haryanvi 4 0.2 0.4
Hindi 721 34.6 79.9
Kannada 68 3.3 7.5
Kashmiri 8 0.4 0.9
Konkani 32 1.5 3.5
Kumaoni 3 0.1 0.3
Kutchi 8 0.4 0.9
Maithili 3 0.1 0.3
Malayalam 84 4.0 9.3
Marathi 149 7.2 16.5
Nepali 5 0.2 0.6
Oriya 9 0.4 1.0
Punjabi 181 8.7 20.1
Rajasthani 20 1.0 2.2
Sanskrit 25 1.2 2.8
Sindhi 11 0.5 1.2
Sinhala 6 0.3 0.7
Tamil 181 8.7 20.1
Telugu 86 4.1 9.5
Tulu 10 0.5 1.1
Urdu 106 5.1 11.8
other 9 0.4 1.0
Total: 2,082 100.0 230.8
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APPENDIX J: 
List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand
(Note: A current list of sources on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand is maintained on my 
web site at <indiandiaspora.wikispaces.com>.) 
Adam, Leila
1999. “A Muslim community in New Zealand.” Al-Nahda, 19(1), pp. 38-41.
Ali, Nargis
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(Note: A current list of organisations related to the Indian diaspora in New Zealand is 
maintained on my web site at <indiandiaspora.wikispaces.com>.) 
INDIAN ORGANISATIONS & ASSOCIATIONS:
Indian Cultural Organisations and Associations:
Auckland Indian Association: PO Box 8110, Symonds St, Auckland; <www.auckindianassoc.org.nz>
Auckland Malayalee Samajham, PO Box 1093, New Market, Auckland; 
<aucklandmalayalisamajam.org>
Auckland Marathi Association, PO Box 64 369, Botany Town Centre, East Tamaki, Auckland
Bay of Plenty (Rotorua) Indian Association, PO Box 294, Rotorua
Bengali New Zealand Council, Christchurch
Bharat Samaj – Society for Indian Cultural Activities, 51 Catherine Crescent, Paparangi, Wellington
Bharatiya Samaj Charitable Trust, 17 Valley View Rd., Glenfield, North Shore City, Auckland 0629: 
<www.bsct.org.nz>, <bhartiya@xtra.co.nz>
Bihar Jharkhand Sabha of Australia and New Zealand: <info@bjsm.org>, <www.bjsm.org>
Canterbury Tamil Society, PO Box 80097, Christchurch: <www.canterburytamilsociety.org>, 
<canterbury.tamil@gmail.com>
Central Districts Indian Association, PO Box 4037, Palmerston North
Christchurch Fiji (Indian) Association
Christchurch Indian Association, PO Box 22-423, Christchurch
Christchurch Indians: <nzindians.moonfruit.com>
Christchurch Kerala Association, 32 Strowan Rd, Christchurch
Country Section (NZ) Indian Association, PO Box 10391, Te Rapa, Hamilton: <cocop@ihug.co.nz>
Fiji Association in Auckland, PO Box 19333, Avondale, Auckland: <www.fijiassociation.co.nz>
Fiji Indian Association, 32 Kauri St., Miramar, Wellington; Hall on Halford Place (north end of Jackson 
St., Petone): <www.fia.org.nz>
Goan Overseas Association of New Zealand: <www.goanz.co.nz>
Global Organization for People of Indian Origin (Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington & Christchurch): 
<www.gopionz.org>
Global Telugu Association, Mt Albert, Auckland: <globaltelugu@gmail.com> or 
<medhainternational@yahoo.co.nz>
Hamilton Kerala Samajam, PO Box 4316, Hamilton East, Hamilton: 
<hamiltonkeralasamajam@yahoo.co.nz>, <info@keralasamajam.co.nz>.
Hamilton Malayalee Association, PO Box 7136, Hamilton: <www.nzmalayalee.org>, 
<info@nzmalayalee.org>
Hutt Indian Community, Lower Hutt, Wellington
India Sanmarga Ikya Waikato Sangam, 3 Northview Lane, Hamilton
Indian Cultural Society, PO Box 1358, Hamilton: <icswaikato@hotmail.com>
Indian Cultural Society, Dunedin
Indian Multicultural Club of Victoria University of Wellington, on Facebook at: “IMC Indian Multi-
Cultural Club of VUW”
India NZ Dunedin
Indian Social and Cultural Club, Level 1 / 829 Colombo St., Christchurch 8053: <isccnz@gmail.com>; 
Facebook: <www.facebook.com/IndianSocialAndCulturalClubChristchurchnz>
International Movement for Tamil Culture, PO Box 40306, Glenfield, Auckland
Kerala Association of Palmerston North
Koshish Waikato Charitable Trust, Hamilton: email: <kwctrust@gmail.com>, web: 
<ketehamilton.peoplesnetworknz.info/koshish>.
Manawatu Bengali Society
Manukau Indian Association, 57 Hillside Road, Papatoetoe, Auckland 2025; web: 
<manukauindians.org.nz>, on Facebook at <Manukau Indian Association>
Massey University Indian Association: <www.facebook.com>, email: <masseyindia@gmail.com>
Massey University Tamil Society
Migrant Heritage Charitable Trust, PO Box 251579, Manukau, Auckland 2140: <www.might-i.org>
Muth Tamil Sangam, PO Box 96105, Balmoral, Auckland; <www.muthtamilsangam.co.nz>
New Plymouth Indian Community, New Plymouth  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New Zealand Charotar Patidar Samaj (NZCPS), Auckland: <www.charotar.co.nz>
New Zealand Indian Central Association: PO Box 1941, Wellington 6140. web: 
<www.nzindians.org.nz>; email: <secretary@nzindians.org.nz>
New Zealand India Society, 31 Mulberry Street, Wellington
New Zealand Kannada Koota, Auckland: <www.kannadakoota.co.nz>, email: 
<secretary@kannadakoota.co.nz>
New Zealand Punjabi Cultural Association, 158 Kolmar Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland
New Zealand Punjabi Foundation, Auckland: <nzpf2012@gmail.com>
New Zealand Punjabi Youth, 79A Park Avenue, Papatoetoe, Auckland
New Zealand Sikh Society, Hamilton: <info@nzsikhsociety.org>
New Zealand Sikh Women’s Association, 214 Great South Rd, Otahuhu, Auckland: 
<nzswa@yahoo.com>
New Zealand Tamil Senior Citizens Association, Auckland
New Zealand Tamil Society, PO Box 6428, Wellesley St, Auckland: <www.nztamil.org.nz>
New Zealand Telugu Association, 2/181 Mt Albert Rd, Mt Albert, Auckland: <www.nzta.org>
North Shore Indian Association: <northshoreindian@yahoo.co.nz>
Probasee Bengali Association of New Zealand, PO Box 27388, Mt Roskill, Auckland: 
<www.probasee.co.nz>
Pukekohe Indian Association, PO Box 149, Pukekohe, Auckland
Rotorua Malayalee Association
Shanti Niwas Charitable Trust, PO Box 24 386, Royal Oak, Auckland: <www.shantiniwas.org.nz>
Shanti Niwas Community Centre for Indian Senior Citizens, 63 Allendale Rd, Mt Albert, Auckland
Sikh Centre, PO Box 76730, Manukau City, Auckland
Society of Indians, PO Box 7137, Christchurch
Tamil Society Waikato, PO Box 4189, Hamilton
Taranaki Indian Association, 170 Heta Road, New Plymouth
Then India Sanmarga Ikya (NZ) Sangam, 723 Great South Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland: 
<www.nzsangam.com>
UniIndian Student Association: <http://uniindian.tripod.com/aboutus.html>
United Indianz, an umbrella organisation of Indian cultural & religious groups in the Auckland area: 
<anilchanna@yahoo.com.au>.
University of Canterbury Indian Students Association, Christchurch.
Waikato Fiji Association, 63 Nevada Road, Hamilton: <www.waikatofijiassociation.com>
Waikato Indian Association, PO Box 920, Hamilton
Waikato Indian Community Centre, Phoenix House, 22 Richmond St., Whitiora, Hamilton
Waikato Punjabi Cultural Club, Hamilton: <www.wpcc.co.nz>.
Waikato Senior Indian Citizens Association, PO Box 7175, Hamilton
Waikato Telugu Association, 12 Chesham St, Hamilton: <waikatotelugu@gmail.com>
Waitakere Indian Association, Waitakere: <www.wia.net.nz>
Wellington Indian Association: PO Box 14-480, Kilbirnie, Wellington; <www.wia.org.nz>
Wellington Kerala Community; <www.welKcom.org.nz>
Wellington Malayalee Association: <www.wellingtonmalayalees.org>, 
<contact@wellingtonmalayalees.org.nz>
Wellington Mutamizh Sangam: <admin@mutamizhsangam.org.nz> <www.mutamizhsangam.org.nz> 
<wmsangam@gmail.com>
Wellington Tamil Society, Moera Community Centre, Lower Hutt, Wellington; PO Box 471, Wellington: 
<www.wts.org.nz>.
Indian Religious Organisations and Associations:
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, 20 Dalgety Drive, Wiri, Manukau City, Auckland: 
<www.ahmadiyya.org.nz>
Al-Hijra Islamic Education Trust, PO Box 10662, Wellington: <www.al-hijra.org.nz>
Art of Living Foundation, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar; <www.artofliving.org>.
Arya Pratinidhi Sabha of New Zealand (Arya Samaj); PO Box 76-876, Manukau City, Auckland 2241
Auckland Satsang Ramayan Mandali
Auckland Sikh Society, 158 Kolmar Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland 1701
Avondale Islamic Centre, PO Box 19339, 122 Blockhouse Bay Rd., Avondale, Auckland
Bay of Plenty Sikh Society, PO Box 357, Te Puke
Brahma Kumari Centre New Zealand, Wellington: <www.bkwsu.org>
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Federation of Islamic Associations in New Zealand: <www.fianz.co.nz>
Fiji Indian Satsang Mandal, 21 Balgay St, Christchurch
Hamilton Ramayan Sanstha, PO Box 164, Hamilton
Hindu Council of New Zealand-Auckland, PO Box 26040, Epsom, Auckland: 
<www.hinducouncil.org.nz>
Hindu Council of New Zealand-Hamilton, PO Box 23045, Hamilton: <hcnz.hamilton@gmail.com>
Hindu Elders Foundation, Bukem Place (Off Gadsby Rd), Mangere East, Manukau, Auckland
Hindu Heritage Centre, Bukem Place (Off Gadsby Rd), Mangere East, Manukau, Auckland
Hindu Organisations and Temple Association (HOTA): email <forum@hota.org.nz>, web 
<www.hota.org.nz>
Hindu Swayamsewak Sangh
Hindu Youth New Zealand, Auckland
Indian Christian Life Centre, 92-98 St. George St, Papatoetoe, Auckland: <netministries.org/see/
churches.exe/ch11830>
Institute of Sathya Sai Education New Zealand, PO Box 201081, Airport Oaks, Mangere, Manukau
International Muslim Association of New Zealand: <www.iman.co.nz>
ISKON New Zealand: <www.harekrishna.org.nz>
Islamic Resource Centre, PO Box 27732, Mt Roskill, Auckland
Islamic Women’s Council of New Zealand, Hamilton, <iwcnz@yahoogroups.com>
Invercargill Sikh Society, Invercargill
Kelston Islamic Centre, 145 Cartwright Rd off Sabulite Rd, Kelston, Auckland
Manawatu Muslim Association, PO Box 148281, Awapuni, Palmerston North: 
<manawatumuslims@yahoo.com>
Mt Roskill Islamic Trust, Mt Roskill, Auckland
Muslim Association of Christchurch, Christchurch
Muslim Association of Taranaki, 126A Seaview Rd, Westown, New Plymouth: <www.nakimuslim.org>
New Zealand Guru Ravidas Sabha, PO Box 461, Pukekohe, Auckland 1730
New Zealand Hindu Temple Society, 41 Stanhope Rd, Ellerslie, Auckland
New Zealand Islamic Awareness Week (usually August of each year): <www.islamawareness.co.nz>
New Zealand Muslim Association, PO Box 2822, Ponsonby, Auckland: <www.nzma.net.nz>
New Zealand Muslim League, Hamilton
New Zealand Muslim League, Wellington
New Zealand Sikhs: <www.sikhs.co.nz>
New Zealand Sikh Society-Auckland, PO Box 22579, Otahuhu, Auckland
New Zealand Sikh Society-Christchurch, 55 Westgrove Avenue, Avonhead, Christchurch
New Zealand Sikh Society-Hamilton, PO Box 9464, Hamilton
New Zealand Sikh Society-Hastings, PO Box 162, Hastings 4201
New Zealand Sikh Society-Palmerston North, PO Box 982, Palmerston North
New Zealand Sikh Society-Wellington, PO Box 13598, Johnsonville, Wellington: 
<www.sikhs.wellington.net.nz>
North Shore Islamic Centre, 9B Kaimahi Drive off Target Rd, Glenfield, Auckland
Otago Muslim Association, Dunedin
Papakura Islamic Centre, 12 Tironui Station Rd, Takanini, Auckland
Parsi Community (Parsiana Lodge), 82 Pakuranga Road, Pakuranga, Auckland
Sat Sanatan Vedic Trust, Christchurch
Satsang Ramayan Mandali, Palmerston North, Manawatu
Satsangh Ramayan Mandali Waikato, Hamilton
Sathya Sai Service Organisation, Wellington
Shalom Celebration Centre (Indian Church), PO Box 8991, Symonds St, Auckland
Shirdi Sai Baba Sansthan of New Zealand, PO Box 16142, Sandringham, Auckland: 
<www.shirdisaibaba.org.nz>
Shiv Shakti Ramayan Mandali, Waitakere, Auckland
Shree Sanatan Dharma Hanuman Mandir, 195 Onewa Rd, Birkenhead, Auckland 0626
Shree Sita Rama Kalyana Mahotsava Committee, Mt Roskill, Auckland
Shri Krishna Cultural Centre, No 6. Marshall Ave, Wanganui
Shri Sanatan Dharam Ramayan Mandali, Wellington
Sikh International Gurmat Trust, 40 Water Street, Otahuhu, Auckland
Sikh Naujawan Sabha New Zealand, PO Box 27727, Mt Roskill, Auckland
Sikh Religious Trust of New Zealand, 48 Station Road, Papatoetoe, Auckland
South Auckland Muslim Association, PO Box 22 863, Otahuhu, Auckland  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Sri Om Adishakti, 7-15 Tomo Street, New Lynn, Auckland: <sriominc@gmail.com>, 
<www.sriomadisakthi.org>.
Tauranga Sikh Society, PO Box 3097 Greerton, Tauranga
Vaishnav Parivar New Zealand, Auckland: <www.pushtimargnz.org.nz>
Vishva Shanti Aashnam New Zealand, PO Box 76 612, Manukau, Auckland
Waikato Muslim Assoc., PO Box 665, 921 Heaphy Trc, Hamilton <wma@xtra.co.nz> <wma.co.nz>
Waitakere Indian Association: <www.wia.net.nz>
Waitakere Ramayan Mandali
Wellington Indian Association: <www.wia.org.nz>
Young Muslim Women’s Association: web: <www.ymwa.org.nz> or email: <ymwa.nz@gmail.com>
Zarathustrian Association of New Zealand, PO Box 25128, Pakuranga, Auckland: <www.zanz.org.nz>
Indian Language Classes:
Auckland Gujarati School, Mahatma Gandhi Centre, 145 New North Rd, Eden Terrace, Auckland: 
<www.auckindianassoc.org.nz>
Auckland Muth Tamil Sangam, Tamil classes <www.muthtamilsangam.co.nz/tschool.html>
Bharatiya Samaj Hall, Mt Roskil, Auckland; Hindi classes, Sundays 10:30-1:00pm: <www.bsct.org.nz>
Canterbury Tamil Society, Tamil School, Christchurch: <www.canterburytamilsociety.org>
Hindi Language and Culture Trust of New Zealand, 18 Donegal Park Drive, Manukau, Auckland: 
<info@teachhindi.org.nz>, <www.teachhindi.org.nz>
Hyderabad Urdu Cultural Association New Zealand, Mount Roskill, Auckland: <hucanz@gmail.com>
ISSO Swaminarayan Hindu Temple, 10-12 Wentworth Avenue, Papatoetoe, Auckland 2025: 
<issoauk@xtra.co.nz>
New Zealand Punjabi Cultural Association, 158 Kolmar Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland; Punjabi lessons
Thamizh Aruri Foundation Charitable Trust, 9A Fancourt St., Meadowbrook, Auckland. Promotes Tamil 
language & culture
Urdu Hindi Cultural Association, Auckland, 54A Roberton Rd, Avondale, Auckland
Waitakere Hindi Language and Cultural School: <www.wia.net.nz/wia-hindi-school.htm>
Wellington Hindi School, 38 Priscilla Cres, Kingston, Wellington: <www.hindischool.wellington.net.nz> 
email: <info@hindischool.wellington.net.nz>.
Wellington Indian Association, Gujarati classes: <www.wia.org.nz/education.html>
Wellington Tamil Society, Moera Community Centre, Lower Hutt, Wellington; PO Box 471, Wellington: 
<www.wts.org.nz>.
Indian Music and Dance Groups:
Anujay School of Dance, Auckland
Anuradha Ambalavanar & Bharatanatyam Group of Christchurch
Indiance Dance Group, Auckland
Indian Classical Music and Dance in New Zealand: <icmnz.wikispaces.com>
Indian Classical Music Interest Group, Auckland: <www.icmig.istar.net.nz>
Kadam Dance Academy, Hamilton
Kalaniketan Dance Academy, Hamilton
Mohammed Rafi Academy of Music, Mt Roskill, Auckland
Monisha School of Dance, Auckland
Natraj School of Dance, 1025 High St, Avalon, Wellington
Natyaloka School of Indian Classical Dance, Dunedin: <natyalokanz@gmail.com>
New Zealand Carnatic Music Society, Auckland: <www.nzcms.org>
New Zealand Indian Fine Arts Society, Wellington: <www.nzifs.blogspot.com>
Nrityabhinaya School of Indian Classical Dance, Auckland
Padma School of Classical Dance, Auckland
Raaga Music Group, Hamilton
Rhythm School of Indian Music, Auckland: <www.rhythmschool.co.nz>
Sargam School of Indian Classical Music, Auckland
Sonar Chand Dance Academy, Te Atatu South, Auckland
Suparna Basu Dance Group, 102 Onepu Road, Lyall Bay, Wellington
Wellington Indian Classical Music Academy Trust (WICMAT): <www.musicindia.org.nz>
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Indian Professional Organizations:
Auckland Indian Medical Society
Indian Schools:
Global Indian International School, 10 Bukem Place, 69 Gadsby Rd, Mangere, Auckland
Guru Nanak Sikh School, Nanaksar Gurdwara, Manurewa, Auckland: <www.nanaksar.org>
Institute of Sathya Sai Education New Zealand: <www.issenz.org.nz>
Indian Social Service Organisations:
Bharatiya Samaj Charitable Trust, Mt Roskil, Auckland: <www.bsct.org.nz>
Ekal Vidyalaya Foundation of New Zealand: email <ekalnz@yahoo.co.nz> or <modaksnz@xtra.co.nz>, 
<www.ekal.org>
Hindu Niwas Charitable Trust; <hinduniwas@gmail.com>
Jaagriti Women Support Group: contact Roopa for more information.
Indian Sports Groups & Associations:
Auckland Indian Badminton Club
Auckland Indian Sports Club: <www.aisc.org.nz>
Bay of Plenty Indian Sports Club, PO Box 887, Rotorua
Central Districts Indian Sports Club (CDISC), PO Box 4037, Palmerston North
Christchurch Indian Sports Club, PO Box 22 239, Christchurch
Hamilton Malayalee Badminton Association
New Zealand Indian Sports Association: <nzisa@ingear.co.nz>.
North Harbour Indian Sports Club: <www.nhisc.org.nz>
Pukekohe Indian Sports Club: <www.pisc.co.nz>
Sikh Sports Club Bay of Plenty
SPROUT, Sports Recreation and Outdoor Trust, for people of Indian origin in NZ: <www.sprout.net.nz>
Waikato Indian Sports Club, Hamilton: <waikato.isc@gmail.com>
Waikato Gujarati Soccer Club
Waikato Punjabi Badminton Club
Wellington Indian Sports Club, Gymnasium & Club Rooms, 44 Kemp Street, Kilbirnie, Wellington: 
<www.wisc.org.nz/main.html?src=%2F>
Wellington Tamil Sports Club, PO Box 471, Wellington
HOUSES OF WORSHIP:
Mandirs:
BAPS Swaminarayan Mandir, Rotorua
Bharatiya Mandir, 252-254, Balmoral Rd, Balmoral, Auckland 1003; Ph 09-846-2677: 
<www.bharatiyamandir.org.nz>
ISSO Swaminarayan Hindu Temple, 10-12 Wentworth Avenue, Papatoetoe, Auckland 2025: 
<issoauk@xtra.co.nz>
Kurinji Kumaran Temple/New Zealand Hindu Association, No. 1 Batchelor St, Newlands, Wellington: 
<www.hindutemple.wellington.net.nz/index.html>
New Zealand Thirumurugan Temple, Ellerslie, Auckland: <www.nzmurugan.org.nz>
Pillayar Temple, Sri Ganesh Temple Trust, Papakura, Auckland
Radha Krishna Temple, Hamilton: <abhay001.wordpress.com>
Radha Krishna Temple, 145, New North Rd, Eden Terrace, Auckland 1003; Ph 09-379-4463
Ram Krishna Mandir, 25-27 Onslow Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland 1701; Ph 09-278-6341
Shiva Mandir, Sanatan Shivarchan Trust, 43 Holmes Ave, Manurewa, Auckland
Sri Balaji Temple Trust, 2 Kent St., Frankton, Hamilton: <www.sribalaji.co.nz>
Shree Sanatan Dharma Hanuman Mandir, 195 Onewa Rd, Birkenhead, Auckland 0626
Shri Radha Giridhari Mandir (ISKCON), 1229 Coatsville-Riverhead Hwy 28, Riverhead, Auckland 0892: 
<info@harekrishna.org.nz>
Shri Ram Mandir, 11 Brick St., Henderson, Auckland: <shrirammandir.org.nz> 
<info@shrirammandir.org.nz>  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Shirdi Saibaba Temple of New Zealand, 12-18 Princes St, Onehunga, Auckland: 
<www.shirdisaibaba.org.nz>
Shri Swami Narayan Mandir (BAPS), 21 Barrhead Pl, Avondale, Auckland: <www.swaminarayan.org>
Swami Narayan Group, temple building in Christchurch: <chch_hindutemple@xtra.co.nz>
Sri Ganesh Temple, 4 Dent Place, Papakura, Auckland
Subramaniyam Temple, 41, Stanhope Rd, Ellerslie, Auckland 1005; Ph 09-263-8854
Thiru Subramaniar Temple, New Zealand Hindu Temple Society, Auckland: <www.aalayam.org.nz>
Wellington Mandir, Bharat Bhavan, Kilburnie, Wellington: <www.wia.org.nz/mandir.html>
Masjids & Islamic Centres:
Ahmadiyya Mosque, 20 Dalgety Drive, Wiri, Manukau City, Auckland: <www.ahmadiyya.org.nz>
Al-Madina School, Mangere, Auckland
Al-Noor Charitable Trust, Christchurch
An-Nur Kiwi Academy, Dunedin
Avondale Islamic Centre, Avondale, Auckland
East Auckland Islamic Trust, PO Box 251 019, Pakuranga, Auckland
Frankton Mosque, Hamilton
Glen Innes Islamic Centre, Auckland
Hawera Islamic Centre, Hawera, Taranaki
Jamii Masjid, 921 Heaphy Terrace, Hamilton
Kelston Islamic Centre, Kelston, Auckland
Lower Hutt Islamic Centre, Lower Hutt, Wellington
Masjid Al-Huda, P O Box 6288, Dunedin
Masjid Al-Noor, NZ Muslim Association, 122-126 Blockhouse Bay Road, Avondale, Auckland: 
<www.nzma.net.nz>
Masjid Al-Noor, Muslim Association of Canterbury, P O Box 8272, Riccarton, Christchurch: 
<www.mac.net.nz>
Masjid Al-Taqwa, 58 Grayson Ave., Manukau, Auckland: <www.masjidattaqwa.co.nz>
Masjid-e-Umar, 185-187 Stoddard Rd, Mt Roskill, Auckland: <www.masjideumar.co.nz>
Mt Albert Islamic Centre, Auckland: <www.mtalbertislamiccentre.org>
North Shore Islamic Centre, Glenfield, Auckland
Palmerston North Islamic Centre, PO Box 1482, Palmerston North
Papakura Islamic Centre
Ponsonby Masjid, 17 Vermont Street, Auckland: <www.nzma.net.nz>
Porirua Islamic Centre, PO Box 50 038, Porirua, Wellington
Ranui Masjid, 31-33 Armada Drive, Ranui, Auckland: <www.nzma.net.nz>
South Auckland Mosque, PO Box 22 807, Otahuhu, Auckland
Waikato Muslim Association, PO Box 665, 921 Heaphy Terrace, Hamilton <wma@xtra.co.nz>
Wellington Masjid / New Islamic Centre, PO Box 14503, Kilburnie: <www.iman.co.nz>
West Auckland Mosque, 31-33 Armada Drive, Ranui, Waitakere City
Zayad College for Girls, Mangere, Auckland
Gurdwaras:
Hamilton Gurdwara, 399 Greenhill Rd, Puketaha, Hamilton
Nanaskar That Isher Darbar; 102-104 Great South Rd, Manurewa, Auckland: <www.nanaksar.org>
Nelson Gurdwara, Nelson
Shri Dashmesh Darbar, 158 Kolmar Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland
Shri Guru Singh Sabha, 127 Shirely Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland
Shri Guru Ravidas Gurdwara, Bombay Hills, South Auckland
Sri Guru Nanak Dev Sikh Sangat Gurdwara Sahib Ji, Otahuhu, Auckland
Sri Kalgidhar Sahib Gurdwara, 70 Takanini School Road, Takanini, Auckland
Sri Guru Ravidas Sabha Hastings, PO Box 808, Hastings
Sikh Temple, Palmerston North, Manawatu
Tauranga Gurdwara, 41 Oropi Road, Orapi, Tauranga
Te Puke Gurdwara, Te Puke, Bay of Plenty
Te Rapa Hamilton Gurdwara
Wellington Gurdwara, PO Box 13598, Johnsonville, Wellington
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Churches:
Cavalry Tamil Church, New Lynn, Auckland: <www.calvarytamilchurch.org>
Mercy Gates Indian Christian Fellowship, Pukekoe, Auckland
New Zealand Tamil Christian Fellowship, 30 Kaikoura St, Sunnyvale, Mt Wellington, Auckland
Shalom Malayalee Church, Wellington: <www.shalomwgtn.org.nz>
St. Dionysius Indian Orthodox Church, Hamilton: <stdionysioushamilton@yahoo.co.nz>
Telugu Church of New Zealand, 283 Mt Eden Rd, Mt Eden, Auckland: <www.teluguchurchnz.org >
Media:
Apna FM: <www.apna990.co.nz>
Asia Magazine: <www.amag.co.nz>
The Asian Radio Show, Dr Sapna Samant: <www.holycowmedia.com/theasianradioshow>
Bharat Darshan (Hindi Magazine in NZ): <www.bharatdarshan.co.nz>
FreeFM, Hamilton: <www.freefm.org.nz>
Darpan, The Mirror: <www.teamworkproductions.co.nz>
Humm FM, Auckland’s 1st global Indian & Asian FM station. 106.2FM.
Indian Events: <indianevents.co.nz>
Indian Newslink (newspaper): <www.indiannewslink.co.nz>
Indianz Outlook (newspaper), Auckland: <www.indianzoutlook.co.nz>, <prem@indianzoutlook.co.nz>
Indupages.com, Indian events & classifieds for Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington & Christchurch: 
<www.indupages.com>
Kiwi-Muslim directory: <www.muslimdirectory.co.nz>
Kuk Punjabi Samachar, PO Box 200034, Papatoetoe, Auckland: <kukpunjabi@xtra.co.nz>; 
<www.kuksamachar.com>
Mirchi Radio / Saaz Aur Awaaz, PO Box 22297, Christchurch: <plainsfm.org.nz>
New Zealand Tasveer News (Punjabi newspaper): <http://nztasveernews.co.nz>
The Global Indian Magazine: <www.theglobalindian.co.nz>
The Indian, A New Zealand Indian e-zine: <www.theindian.co.nz>
The Indian Weekender, weekly newsmagazine <www.indianweekender.co.nz>
Radio Spice: <www.radiospice.co.nz>
Radio Tarana: <www.tarana.co.nz>
Radio Masti, Hamilton: <www.radiomasti.co.nz>
Sikh Centre’s Weblog: <http://sikhcentre.wordpress.com>
Voice of Islam TV, PO Box 97920, Wiri, Manukau: <www.voiceofislamtv.com>
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